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Abstract
Research in banking assumes that the production function is either parametric or de-
terministic in nature. This thesis develops a novel method for the parametrization
of efficient frontiers, generalized frontier analysis (GFA), which uses artificial neural
networks and the theory of asymmetric loss functions from forecasting to relax these
assumptions. Results show that GFA can validly parametrize cost- and shareholder
value efficiency (SHVE). This thesis also validates the SHVE concept by demonstrat-
ing that SHVE scores are more informative than managerial ability in explaining bank
value creation.
Moreover, the work examines conflicting theoretical predictions about the relations
between opacity, fragility and bank intermediation. These are disentangled using mea-
sures of bank opacity and liquidity creation from the recent literature. Since available
opacity and liquidity creation proxies may not be mutually exclusive, there is the danger
of obtaining trivial regression coefficients. Therefore this thesis focuses on intermedia-
tion quality, which is operationalized using efficient frontiers. Results show that both
opacity and fragility improve the intermediation quality of banks.
Finally, this thesis investigates whether and how bank intermediation activity and
managerial ability are related. This thesis hypothesizes, and the data supports, the no-
tion that more able bank managers are both better liquidity creators and more avid risk
takers. In addition, the interaction of liquidity creation and managerial ability in crises
has thus far not been addressed. While empirical studies suggest that liquidity creation
may increase during crises, theory predicts that it may be optimal for banks to reduce
intermediation. Analysis shows that more ably managed banks reduce intermediation
and risk during the financial crisis as hypothesized.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the banking and efficiency literatures by shedding
light on heretofore unaddressed questions regarding the intermediation, managerial abil-
ity, shareholder value efficiency and opacity of banks and by developing a new method
for the parametrization of efficient frontiers.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has once again demonstrated the complexity of the bank-
ing industry. Furthermore, the resulting shortage of intermediation activity has also
highlighted the importance of banks for the wider economy. However, many questions
related to the banking sector have either not been resolved satisfactorily or have not
been addressed at all in the literature. Some of these issues, such as the estimation of
bank efficiency, are methodological in nature. Other issues are raised by the intermedi-
ation activity of banks and their transparency to outsiders, while yet other unexplored
questions relate to the impact that managerial ability has in the context of interme-
diation and bank value creation. This thesis contributes to the banking literature by
addressing some of the important extant issues.
While it is not the objective of this thesis to study problems of agency theory, the
abundant banking literature related to agency problems provides a suitable motivation
for part of the work carried out in this thesis. Agency theory suggests that there is
no natural alignment between the interests of the owner and manager of an enterprise.
While the owner is primarily interested in the maximization of value, the manager’s
target function may well contain subjective components such as job security, perquisite
income and prestige (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 2001). Numerous studies in
the banking literature have investigated the extent to which manager and shareholder
interests are aligned. Since the extent of this alignment is latent, a suitable proxy
variable needs to be defined in any empirical investigation. Many studies use efficiency
scores as indicators of agency cost, often with mixed results. For example, Mester (1993)
and Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) use cost efficiency to proxy for the extent
of agency costs and conclude that, in their samples, agency effects are not significant.
On the other hand, DeYoung, Spong and Sullivan (2001), Berger and Bonaccorsi di
Patti (2006) and Chortareas, Girardone and Ventouri (2011), also using efficiency to
capture the extent of the misalignment of owner and manager interests, find support
for hypotheses of the agency cost type.
This brief discussion illustrates that the literature finds contradictory results when
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testing hypotheses about bank behavior using efficiency scores.1 These disparate find-
ings could be due to a number of reasons. First, the literature investigates concerns
about the misalignment of manager and shareholder interests. However, it uses con-
ventional measures of efficiency, such as cost or profit efficiency, to operationalize the
extent of this misalignment. Yet it is clear that a bank can be quite cost efficient, for
instance, while not producing a great deal of value. However, value creation constitutes
one of the primary motives of owners. Hence an alternative measure of efficiency, that
can better quantify the target function of owners and thus better capture the extent
of agency effects, may be needed. Second, the use of conventional efficiency measure-
ment methods, such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis
(SFA), may not do justice to the underlying data generating process. This is because,
as will be discussed in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, both these methods impose critical
assumptions on the problem under investigation. Hence an alternative method of effi-
ciency measurement may be required. Third, the largely agency-theoretic perspective
of the above literature ignores the possibility that managers may be an idiosyncratic
influence on the performance of banks. But in reality, as formalized for example in
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) theory of upper echelons, the ability of managers may
play an important part in explaining the performance of banks in general and therefore
also their efficiency in particular. Hence the influence of managers may need to be
explicitly controlled for.
An important step towards resolving the above issues has been taken in a recent
contribution by Fiordelisi (2007), which develops the measure of shareholder value ef-
ficiency (SHVE). His work shows that the distance of banks from a stochastic “value
creation frontier” can explain a large part of the overall variation in the value creation
of European banks and Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) show that its dynamics respond
to similar value drivers as value creation itself. This measure addresses the first point
made above in that it provides an indicator of bank performance that aligns better
with the target function of owners. However, even though SHVE is an important in-
dicator of bank performance, the idiosyncratic influence of managers on the strategy
and behavior of the bank might reduce its value as an explanatory variable. In addi-
tion, the appropriateness of stochastic frontier analysis as the estimation method used
to parametrize SHVE has as yet not been assessed. This is, however, an important
step towards ensuring the validity of the SHVE concept because, thus far, no rigorous
1Although only findings relating to the “agency cost hypothesis” are explicitly discussed above, a
number of other hypotheses is studied in this literature with similarly conflicting findings. For
contrary results concerning the “quiet life hypothesis” consider for example Chortareas, Girardone
and Ventouri (2011) and Casu and Girardone (2009) as well as Casu and Girardone (2006).
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theory is available to provide intuition as to the functional form underlying the creation
of value in banks. Finally, because efficiency is a latent concept, the literature suggests
that different parametrizations of efficiency should be validated by examining them for
plausibility and comparing them against one another (see for example Bauer, Berger,
Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998). This validation exercise is also as yet pending when
it comes to SHVE since, as will become apparent, the use of the natural alternative
estimation method, DEA, is not feasible.
These three issues are addressed in the first empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter
3). Specifically, Section 3.2 develops a novel efficiency parametrization method, gen-
eralized frontier analysis (GFA), which relaxes the undesirable assumptions underlying
DEA and SFA. Once this method is available, it is used to parametrize shareholder
value efficiency as well as cost efficiency for a large sample of the US banking popula-
tion. The resulting efficiency scores are then investigated on a set of plausibility criteria
in order to examine whether the new method can validly parametrize efficiency scores.
Results show that this is in fact the case. Furthermore, SHVE scores obtained from
SFA and GFA are compared in regression analyses in terms of their explanatory power
with respect to bank value creation. Results show that SFA and GFA are complemen-
tary indicators of bank efficiency. However, GFA strongly outperforms SFA in terms
of the economic and statistical informativeness of the resultant SHVE scores. Further-
more, SHVE is shown to be more important than managerial ability in explaining value
creation. Thus Chapter 3 provides strong evidence that GFA is a promising, flexi-
ble efficiency parametrization method, which does not suffer from the methodological
problems of the more traditional approaches. Moreover, these results further validate
Fiordelisi’s (2007) SHVE concept and suggest that future research, investigating for
example agency problems, would do well to embrace this measure.
A crucial feature of banks is their provision of intermediation services to the wider
economy (see for example Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Nevertheless, primarily due
to an absence of an acceptable operationalization of this aspect of bank behavior, the
quantity and quality of these services has, until recently, not been investigated thor-
oughly. However, recent research has provided efficacious measures of bank liquidity
creation and thus opened the avenue for further inquiry (see for example Berger and
Bouwman, 2009). More specifically, a classification of bank assets and liabilities accord-
ing to their marketability, together with heuristically selected weights, enables one to
compute the liquidity creation of banks. This measure has been shown to reflect bank
behavior during crises (Berger and Bouwman, 2008), to capture value relevant behavior
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(Berger and Bouwman, 2009) and to be responsive to regulatory intervention (Berger
and Bouwman, 2012).
The empirical literature has collated evidence that banks are opaque (see for example
Morgan, 2002 and Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran, 2013). This feature of banks is
believed to emanate from the nature of their assets. These are opaque to outsiders
precisely because of the role of the intermediary as, for example, a delegated monitor
(Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). However, the impact of opacity on bank inter-
mediation has, thus far, not been investigated. Moreover, a strand of the theoretical
literature has suggested that bank risk is intrinsically related to the intermediation ac-
tivity of banks (see for example Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Specifically, this theory
argues that more fragile banks are more effectively disciplined by the threat of a bank
run, which would cause them to lose their valuable license. However, alternative mod-
els that consider soft budget constraints predict that bank intermediation activity is
negatively associated with bank riskiness (consider for example Berglöf and Roland,
1997). In addition to these conflicting predictions about risk and intermediation, these
theories allow for the prediction that opacity will be conducive for bank intermediation
activity. Such a view is disputed by the theory of Coval and Thakor (2005), however.
This leads to three conflicting hypotheses about the interplay between bank fragility,
opacity and intermediation activity. Hence the relation between opacity, fragility and
intermediation activity is an empirical question.
This thesis explicitly addresses this issue. Specifically, it exploits the theoretical
literature on bank intermediation to develop concrete, testable hypotheses about the
relations between bank fragility, opacity and intermediation. In order to test these
hypotheses, measures of opacity, fragility and liquidity creation are required. However,
this leads to an econometric challenge. Common measures of bank opacity that are
available for the population of commercial banks rely on balance sheet information.
The same holds true for the liquidity creation measures of Berger and Bouwman (2009).
Because this latter measure is essentially a linear combination of various balance sheet
categories, naïve regressions involving liquidity creation and opacity may well yield
trivial results.
The empirical work carried out in Chapter 4 overcomes this challenge. This is accom-
plished by investigating a measure of bank intermediation quality, which is defined as
the distance of a given bank from a stochastic liquidity creation frontier, obtained vari-
ously from SFA and GFA, spanned by the entire population of banks. This work exploits
the fact that the GFA method is developed in Chapter 3, which allows for a validation
of the SFA-based results. Such robustness checks are of substantial importance in this
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context because there is no established theory of liquidity efficiency and, hence, the tra-
ditional assumptions underlying the SFA approach may be violated. The results show
strong support for the theory of Diamond and Rajan (2001), which advocates the view
that both fragility and opacity are beneficial for bank intermediation. Hence Chapter
4 of this thesis contributes to the literature on banking and intermediation by showing
that full bank disclosure may bring with it undesirable external effects in the form of
impaired intermediation activity. Findings further highlight that it may be important
to explicitly incorporate opacity into theoretical models of financial intermediation.
Up to this point, Chapter 3 investigates managerial ability in the context of value
creation and shareholder value efficiency. In addition, Chapter 4 analyzes the influence
that bank opacity and fragility have on the intermediation behavior of banks. It is
therefore natural to further investigate whether any impact of managerial ability on
intermediation obtains. This thesis hypothesizes that bank liquidity creation depends
positively on the ability of managers. In addition, more able managers may be more
confident in their own risk management skills and thus prone to taking greater risk.
Neither of these hypotheses has as yet been tested empirically. While the prediction that
more able managers will lead banks that are creating more liquidity is relatively intuitive
in normal times, it is not clear whether managerial ability is conducive or detrimental
to liquidity creation in crisis times. Thus it may be the case that the positive value
implications of increasing liquidity market share during crises, documented by Berger
and Bouwman (2008), will create incentives for managers to expand the intermediation
activity of their banks during crises. Naturally, one would expect more able managers
to better implement such a strategy. On the other hand, Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011)
suggest that it may be individually rational for banks to curtail their intermediation
activity during these periods. They show this in a setting in which the recovery rate on
loans to industrial firms depends positively on the overall intermediation activity of the
banking industry. Hence if some banks give few loans due to, for example, a negative
signal about the state of the economy, it is individually rational for every other bank to
also reduce its loan provisions. This results from the fact that any loans, which a given
bank does end up extending, will suffer from the negative externalities emanating from
the other banks’ reluctance to lend. It is intuitive to suppose that more able managers
will be better able to curtail their banks’ intermediation activity rapidly if it is optimal
to do so. Hence, on this reading, one would expect that managerial ability is negatively
associated with liquidity creation during crises. Finally, it stands to reason that more
able managers should be more effective at de-risking their banks in times of crisis. This
conjecture is also as yet untested.
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Therefore Chapter 5 addresses these open questions. Concretely, the chapter inves-
tigates the impact of managerial ability on liquidity creation and risk-taking both in
normal times and during the recent financial crisis. Results, using Berger and Bouw-
man’s (2009) liquidity creation measures, show that banks with more able managers
create more liquidity during regular periods as hypothesized. Furthermore, in line with
the initial conjecture, the results suggest that more able managers prefer to take more
risk. In addition, a difference-in-differences approach reveals that the shock of the fi-
nancial crisis reduces bank liquidity creation. More importantly, banks that are more
ably managed reduce their liquidity creation more, which is in line with the prediction
of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011). Further examination shows that, to the extent that
they are more able, bank managers also reduce the risk characteristics of their institu-
tions during the crisis. This suggests that managers matter for the resilience of banks
to shocks.
To sum up, this thesis extends the banking and efficiency literatures in a number of
important ways. First, it develops and tests a novel efficiency parametrization method
(generalized frontier analysis, GFA), which relaxes the assumptions of more traditional
approaches. This new method can be exploited to study not only banks but also firms
in other industries. Therefore it has the potential to be a valuable tool for future
research in a variety of contexts. Second, this thesis offers an independent validation
of the shareholder value efficiency concept by demonstrating its importance for the
explanation of value creation in US banks and by showing that SHVE is more important
than managerial ability in explaining bank value creation. Thus the present work offers
a new method (GFA) and strengthens an existing concept (SHVE). Together this creates
an opportunity for future research to resolve disparate findings in the banking literature
regarding, for example, agency cost. Third, this thesis is the first to systematically
investigate the interplay between bank intermediation, opacity and fragility. In so
doing, it contributes to the understanding of the banking sector and allows for the
deduction of meaningful policy implications. Specifically, results show that regulators
would do well to allow for a certain degree of bank opacity so as not to negatively
impact intermediation quality. Fourth, these results also highlight the need for a more
explicit treatment of opacity in the theoretical literature and thus provide a meaningful
direction for future work. Fifth, this thesis demonstrates that managerial ability is an
important feature of banks and that this feature is systematically related to banks’
liquidity creation and risk-taking. Importantly, the present results highlight that the
information content of managerial ability varies between crisis times and normal times.
Thus the present work provides an additional important insight into the functioning of
24
banks and the banking sector. Finally, this insight suggests that policy makers may
wish to consider managerial ability as an indicator variable when deciding not only on
prudential but also on monetary policy.
This overview briefly motivates the issues addressed by the empirical chapters of this
thesis and summarizes its main contributions. The emphasis in the empirical chapters
(Chapters 3-5) is on a concise presentation of the main findings and each of these
chapters is intended to be treated as a largely self-contained unit. Due to the difference
in the questions being addressed, each of the chapters provides its own discussion of
the relevant literature without creating redundancies. Furthermore, each chapter is
accompanied by an appendix (Appendices A-C correspond to Chapters 3-5). These
appendices present material and, where appropriate, also additional discussion that
complements, supports and extends the findings reported in the empirical chapters but
is not immediately required for the unfolding of the main arguments and hypothesis
tests. The underlying theme of all chapters of this thesis is the efficiency of banks
and the thesis contributes to the methodology of efficiency measurement in Chapter 3.
Therefore, in order to put this work into perspective, Chapter 2 provides a discussion
of conventional efficiency measurement methods, attendant data requirements and data
gathering procedures employed in this thesis. Any empirical research is subject to a host
of limitations. While each empirical chapter includes a number of robustness checks,
room for possible extensions remains. These limitations and possible extensions are
discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main results and concludes.
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2. Methods of Efficiency Measurement
This section provides the technical details that underpin the efficiency measurement
methods most commonly encountered in the literature. These methods will be discussed
in Section 2.1. Extensions to these standard methods as well as the remaining challenges
of these approaches are addressed in Section 2.2. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses the data
that is required for efficiency measurement and, in particular, the data that is used in
the empirical chapters of this thesis.
2.1. Standard Efficiency Measurement Approaches
The two main approaches used for the parametrization of efficient frontiers are data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Section 2.1.1 dis-
cusses DEA and Section 2.1.2 provides a basic description of SFA. While DEA has the
advantage of being data-driven, noise substantially confounds efficiency estimates from
this method. SFA, on the other hand, disentangles noise from signal but does so at the
price of restrictive assumptions about the data generating process and the distribution
of error terms.
2.1.1. Data Envelopment Analysis
Data envelopment analysis has the advantage of being non-parametric. This implies
that a production function for the industry under investigation need not be specified a
priori. The method relies on one or several linear programming problems. As there are
very efficient algorithms available for the solution of such problems, the computational
requirements of this method are moderate. However, the major disadvantage of DEA
is that the efficient frontier that it generates is not able to account for statistical noise
such as measurement or variable selection errors. This means that, if such errors exist
in the data, they will drive the results in the sense that the noise will be subsumed
into the efficiency scores. Furthermore, if certain regions of the sample space are only
sparsely populated, DEA exhibits a strong bias towards classifying firms in those regions
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as being fully efficient. This has the potential to impair the validity and reliability of
the resulting efficiency scores.
The DEA method is commonly attributed to Farrell (1957) although the term data
envelopment analysis was coined only later. What follows is a very brief exposition of
DEA, with notation and exposition in this entire section largely following Coelli, Rao,
O’Donnell and Battese (2005), where a much more detailed discussion of this approach
can be found. The discussion begins with technical efficiency, which then allows a simple
extension to economic measures of efficiency such as cost, revenue and profit efficiency.
The basic idea of the method is to use cross-sectional firm-level data on inputs and
outputs to map the I firms in the sample to the space spanned by their bundles of
M inputs and N outputs. The individual firm i is assumed to maximize its efficiency,
defined as the ratio between the total quantities of output (y′iu ) and input (x′iv).
This is achieved by choosing optimal weights (u, v) for given combinations of input
and output quantities, xi, yi. Here xi and yi are M × 1 respectively N × 1 vectors. To
ensure uniqueness, the optimization problem is constrained by normalizing inputs for
all firms to unity, i.e. x′iv = 1. Furthermore, there are I constraints, one for each firm,
which require that efficiency must not exceed unity for any one firm. The resulting
linear program has the following form:
maxu,v (y
′
iu)
s.t. x′iv = 1,
y′ju− x′jv ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, ..., I,
u,v ≥ 0.
(2.1)
Given the fact that I is the number of firms in the sample, the number of constraints
(I + 1) can be high and make computation relatively expensive. Therefore, in general,
one will prefer to solve the dual problem. This is obtained by introducing a set of
I + 1 dual variables λ and θ. Next, one transposes the constraint coefficient matrix
and exchanges the right hand sides and the coefficients in the objective function. The
constraints reverse direction and the problem becomes a minimization problem (if it
was a maximization before).
minθ,λ θ
s.t. θxi −Xλ ≥ 0,
−yi + Yλ ≥ 0,
λ ≥ 0.
(2.2)
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In the objective function θ takes its unit coefficient from the 1st constraint above,
while the I elements of the vector λ have zero coefficients from the I last constraints.
Y and X are N × I, respectively M × I matrices.
The problem aims at minimizing θ, which can be interpreted as the distance of any
given firm from the efficient frontier following a ray emerging outward from the origin.
This amounts to a radial contraction of the input vector which, however, cannot be so
large as to lead to a departure from the feasible set spanned by the other firms in the
sample. Consider a toy example in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1.: DEA Toy Example.
The first column labels firms, Column 2 gives the output quantity, Columns 3 and 4 provide
the input quantities, while the last three columns hold the computed efficiency scores and the
relative input quantities.
Firm Output y Input x1 Input x2 Efficiency Score x1y
x2
y
A 4.000 2.500 8.000 0.800 0.625 2.000
B 2.000 2.000 3.000 0.700 1.000 1.500
C 3.000 4.000 4.000 0.700 1.333 1.333
D 2.000 3.000 2.000 0.824 1.500 1.00
E 3.000 5.000 2.000 1.000 1.667 0.667
F 4.000 2.000 5.000 1.000 0.500 1.250
G 4.000 3.000 6.000 0.778 0.750 1.500
H 4.000 3.000 4.000 1.000 0.750 1.000
I 3.000 3.000 4.000 0.750 1.000 1.333
Given the data on inputs and outputs in Columns 2-4, one can compute the efficiency
scores and relative input quantities in Columns 5-7. To visualize the results, consider
Figure 2.1. Here the resulting frontier is defined by the firms with efficiency scores
of unity (yellow circles) and is plotted in blue. Inefficient firms are plotted as black
squares.
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Figure 2.1.: Plot of Toy Example Efficient Frontier.
Input quantities scaled by the output quantity are plotted on the x- and y-axes. They relate to
a two-input single-output technology. The blue, piecewise smooth curve is the frontier. Firms
that are fully efficient are plotted as yellow circles, inefficient firms are plotted as black squares.
Rays from the origin provide a graphical indication of the firms’ inefficiency. The efficiency
score can be visualized as the distance from the firm to the frontier along the ray divided by
the total length of the ray.
Each firm’s efficiency score will give the scalar by which one would need to multiply
the input vectors for the respective firms in order to reach the frontier. For example,
firm I could produce the same output with only 75% of the inputs it currently utilizes.
The group of efficient firms that define each piece of the frontier constitutes the “peers”
of that firm whose ray from the origin passes through the segment of the frontier defined
by the peers. In Figure 2.1, E and H would form one group of peers (for C, D, and I).
Firm H also forms a peer group with F (for B and G), while F is the only peer for firm
A. Given these results, one can define technical efficiency as the quotient between the
radial distance from the origin to the frontier and the distance from the origin to the
actual point of production. In the present example it is justified to call the resulting
point efficient for firms E, F and H.
In focusing on the reduction of inputs for a given level of outputs, the DEA model
discussed so far has input orientation. The structure of an equivalent output oriented
model is quite similar and therefore not discussed separately. The main difference is
that, in the output oriented case, one obtains a piecewise smooth production possibility
curve, rather than an isoquant. Under a constant returns to scale technology it is
reasonable to expect identical efficiency scores for both models, while this does in general
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not hold in the variable returns to scale case. The set of firms labelled as efficient,
however, remains constant for both in- and output orientation. This thesis follows the
input oriented approach.
An important extension of this productive, or technical, efficiency is the case of
economic efficiencies such as cost, revenue, and profit efficiency. As an example consider
cost efficiency. In this type of model the firm is choosing the optimal input vector x∗i
so as to minimize total cost wi′x∗i given input prices wi, while maintaining feasibility
of the output yi. The constraints imposed on this model are again defined by the
production possibilities set spanned by all other firms’ in and outputs. Specifically, the
problem can be expressed as follows
minx∗i ,λw
′
ix
∗
i
s.t. −yi + Yλ ≥ 0,
x∗i −Xλ ≥ 0,
I1′λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0.
(2.3)
Here, I1 is an I × 1 vector of ones and guarantees variable returns to scale as part of
the convexity constraint. One defines total cost efficiency as the quotient between the
cost incurred when cost-optimal inputs (x∗i ) are chosen and the cost for the actually
observed choice of inputs:
CE =
w′ix
∗
i
w′ixi
. (2.4)
This approach is then easily extended to revenue and profit efficiency by either max-
imizing revenue through choosing optimal combinations of outputs, respectively by
maximizing profit through choosing inputs and outputs simultaneously.
As noted at the outset, the main objection raised against DEA in the literature is
the fact that this method cannot incorporate noise and measurement error naturally.
Also, the scores obtained from such an analysis are strongly dependent on the sample
of firms under observation. This makes DEA quite susceptible to sample selection
problems. Nonetheless, DEA is one of the most commonly used methods in efficiency
measurement due to its long history, easy implementation and low complexity.
2.1.2. Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The second main method currently used for frontier estimation in the literature is
stochastic frontier analysis. See Berger and DeYoung (1997) for a survey and Kumb-
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hakar and Lovell (2003), whom I follow in the below exposition, for a comprehensive
treatment of the subject matter. As opposed to DEA, this method is computationally
somewhat more costly. The main advantage that SFA exhibits over DEA is that it can
accommodate statistical noise, such as for example measurement errors, in its specifica-
tion of the frontier. However, this comes at the cost of having to specify a closed form
for the data generating process and the distribution of the error terms ex ante.
After an adequate production function has been chosen to model the industry under
consideration this can be used to specify the frontier stochastically like:
ln yi = x
′
iβ − ui + vi. (2.5)
This representation assumes some log-linear production function. Here yi represents
the ith firm’s output while xi contains the K log inputs and β holds the unknown
parameters. ui and vi are uncorrelated random variables associated with efficiency
and statistical noise respectively. While vi follows the customary assumptions (zero
mean, homoscedasticity, no serial correlation) ui is assumed to have a nonnegative
mean in order to reflect that on average firms are not fully efficient. The most common
specific assumptions are for vi to be normally distributed, i.e. vi ∼ iidN(0, σ2v), and
for ui to follow a truncated normal distribution, for example ui ∼ iidN+(0, σ2u). These
assumptions are also followed in this thesis. Figure 2.2, adapted from Coelli, Rao,
O’Donnell and Battese (2005) p. 244, illustrates the general features of such a frontier.
Specifically, the frontier will vary about the deterministic component exp (x′iβ), however
it will itself be stochastic due to the presence of vi so that the upper bound for the
output values, also known as frontier output, is given by exp (x′iβ + vi). The variation
is explained by the two stochastic terms ui and vi, the inefficiency effect, and the noise
effect respectively.
Figure 2.2 considers the case of a firm with only one input and one output. The
frontier output is that output which one would expect to observe absent any inefficiency.
The example (−ui < 0, vi > 0) is arbitrary and merely chosen for illustration.
Once the model parameters have been estimated, it is possible to predict the ineffi-
ciency effect (or in other words technical inefficiency) like:
TEi =
yi
exp (x′iβ + vi)
= exp (−ui) (2.6)
For reasons of computational efficiency this thesis implements a custom version of
the steps needed to minimize the negative log-likelihood function in an SFA problem
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Figure 2.2.: Stochastic Frontier, Noise and Inefficiency Adapted from (Coelli, Rao,
O’Donnell and Battese, 2005), p. 244.
Input quantities are plotted on the x-axis, while the y-axis displays output quantities of a single-
input single-output technology. The blue curve represents the deterministic frontier. The black
circles represent firm observations, which can come to lie above or below the deterministic
frontier according to the relation between the noise and inefficiency effects.
in MATLAB R©. The built-in function fmincon is used for the optimization. The cali-
bration of this implementation was tested on the “Rice” data supplied by Coelli, Rao,
O’Donnell and Battese (2005) and found to align exactly (to at least 5 decimals) with
the results given in the tables in that work. To implement a problem like this, one
must obtain the maximum likelihood function and, especially in cases with large sam-
ples, also analytical gradients. Following the derivation in Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt
(1977), this can be achieved as follows:
Starting from the marginal distribution of the composite error  = −u+ v
f() =
2
σ
φ(

σ
)[1− Φ(λ
σ
)], (2.7)
where σ2 = σ2u + σ2v , λ =
σu
σv
and φ and Φ represent the standard normal PDF and
CDF respectively. One can then obtain the log-likelihood function for the normal-half
normal stochastic frontier model. From
L(y|β, λ, σ2) =
I∏
i=1
2
σ
1√
2pi
exp(− 
2
i
σ2
)[1− Φ(iλ
σ
)] (2.8)
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where i = 1, . . . , I indexes observations it follows that
ln(L(y|β, λ, σ2)) = I ln(
√
(2/pi)) + I ln(
1
σ
) +
I∑
i=1
ln(1− Φ(iλ
σ
))− 1
2σ2
I∑
i=1
2i . (2.9)
To maximize (or minimize the negative of) this function it is useful to use the partial
derivatives with respect to the parameters. The required partials are given by:
∂ ln(L)
∂σ2
= − I
2σ2
+
1
2σ4
I∑
i=1
2i +
λ
2σ3
I∑
i=1
i
φ( iλσ )
1− Φ( iλσ )
, (2.10)
∂ ln(L)
∂λ
= − 1
σ
I∑
i=1
i
φ( iλσ )
1− Φ( iλσ )
, (2.11)
∂ ln(L)
∂β
=
1
σ2
I∑
i=1
ixi +
λ
σ
I∑
i=1
xi
φ( iλσ )
1− Φ( iλσ )
, (2.12)
where i = (yi−β′xi) is the prediction error made for the ith firm using the log-linearized
production function represented by the coefficients β with inputs xi.
Once the estimation has been completed, one needs to compute the firm-specific
inefficiencies. This is done by using the traditional decompositions from the literature
proposed either by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) or Battese and Coelli
(1988). Letting µ∗ = − σ2u
σ2
and σ∗ = σ
2
uσ
2
v
σ2
, the Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt
estimator can be expressed as
E[ui|i] = µ∗i + σ∗
[
φ(−µ∗iσ∗ )
1− Φ(−µ∗iσ∗ )
]
(2.13)
and gives the point estimate TEi = exp{−E[ui|i]}. The Battese and Coelli estimator
can be written as
TEi = E[exp{−ui}|i] =
[
1− Φ(σ∗ − µ∗iσ∗ )
1− Φ(µ∗iσ∗ )
]
exp{µ∗i +
1
2
σ∗2}. (2.14)
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) give support to the usage of the latter by arguing that
the former “...includes only the first term in the power series expansion of exp{−u}” (p.
77). Hence this thesis follows the latter approach.
This general approach to efficiency estimation can be applied to economic efficiency,
such as for example cost efficiency, by carrying out some simple sign changes (most
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notably i = ui + vi see for example Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) pp. 75-77 and
pp. 140-141). Furthermore, it can be made more specific by explicitly defining the
deterministic frontier component. The general cost efficiency model then becomes
Ci = c(yi,wi,β) exp (i), (2.15)
where wi are input prices and yi are output quantities. It is frequent in the literature
to find the Translog parametrization of the efficient frontier and this thesis follows this
tradition. The variable stochastic cost function of the Translog form is given by:
lnCi = β0 +
M∑
m=1
αm ln ymi +
N∑
n=1
βn lnwni +
Q∑
q=1
γq ln zqi
+
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
j=1
αmj ln ymi ln yji +
1
2
N∑
n=1
N∑
k=1
βnk lnwni lnwki
+
1
2
Q∑
q=1
Q∑
r=1
γqr ln zqi ln zri +
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
δmn lnwni ln ymi
+
M∑
m=1
Q∑
q=1
ηmq ln ymi ln zqi +
Q∑
q=1
N∑
n=1
κqn lnwni ln zqi + ui + vi. (2.16)
Here ymi represents the quantity of output m produced by firm i, wni represents the
price of the nth input used by firm i and zqi is the quantity of the qth fixed input used
by the ith firm. α, β, γ, δ, η and κ are coefficients to be estimated. In other words, one
specifies the cost function in terms of the output quantities and input prices under the
assumption that input quantities are chosen so as to minimize cost. Linear homogeneity
in prices requires that one impose the following restrictions:
N∑
n=1
βn = 1 (2.17)
N∑
n=1
βnk = 0 ∀k (2.18)
N∑
n=1
δnm = 0 ∀m (2.19)
N∑
n=1
κnq = 0 ∀q. (2.20)
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The usual symmetry conditions are αmj = αjm, βnk = βkn, γqr = γrq.
For the parametrization of revenue and profit frontiers a similar approach can be
taken. In the case of profit functions the result is the so-called alternative profit function
approach of Berger and DeYoung (1997) and is particularly appropriate when services
offered by firms differ in terms of their quality, outputs are not freely disposable, there
exists some degree of market power or there is noise in the measurement of output
prices. It is likely that one or all of these conditions are met in the banking industry.
Hence, in so far as it deals with efficiencies other than cost or revenue efficiency, this
thesis adopts this alternative approach.
The main advantage of the SFA method is its stochastic nature, which allows it
to distinguish between signal and noise. However, this capability comes at the cost of
possibly restrictive assumptions about the functional form of the production technology
and the distribution of the error terms. Hence the literature has suggested extensions
to this method, which will be discussed Section 2.2.
2.2. Alternative Efficiency Measurement Approaches
This section deals with extensions of the standard efficiency measurement methods
as well as with alternative approaches to efficiency measurement. Specifically, Section
2.2.1 discusses some extensions to the standard DEA and SFA methods. This discussion
highlights some of the problematic aspects of these standard approaches and shows that
even the available extensions cannot fully resolve these concerns. Furthermore, Section
2.2.2 provides a summary of the literature, which proposes to utilize artificial neural
networks for the task of efficiency measurement. This discussion shows that, although
promising, the present efforts in this direction create challenges of their own. Taken
together, this discussion motivates the development of the GFA method in Chapter 3.
2.2.1. Extensions of the Standard Approaches
Since DEA suffers most from its deterministic nature, it is not surprising that efforts
have been made to relax this constraint. Consider for example Kao and Liu (2004) and
Kao and Liu (2009). The former study uses interval-based bank-internal projections
for in and outputs to produce forward-looking forecasts. The heuristic approach of the
latter study makes the assumption of beta distributed in and outputs and estimates
the parameters from the data. Then a Monte-Carlo exercise is used to obtain distri-
butions for the efficiency measures calculated by way of DEA. Critically, these studies
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do not address the DEA method itself but rather modify the data used to obtain the
DEA estimates so as to reflect some random influences. In contrast, Simar and Wil-
son (1998), Simar and Wilson (2000) and Kneip, Simar and Wilson (2008) propose
methods for obtaining bootstrap estimates for DEA efficiency scores. In particular,
they resolve problems of inconsistency that follow from the application of a naïve boot-
strap. However, their use of smoothing requires arbitrary choices of parameters such
as bandwidth. Decision choices such as these are ultimately left at the discretion of
the researcher. In addition, notwithstanding the efficiency of available solvers for linear
programming problems, this method is computationally extremely costly due to the
large number of linear programs that need to be evaluated. Finally, Post, Cherchye
and Kuosmanen (2002) and Post (2007) present an approach that attempts to compute
efficiency locally by searching for nearest neighbors to any given firm in neighborhoods
of decreasing size. However, while computationally efficient, this method requires the
appropriate choice of distance measure between firms for which no guidance exists in
the literature. Moreover, their method is restricted to providing an ordinal efficiency
estimate relative to the sample mean, which may or may not be sufficiently informative
depending on the context of the investigation.
Important extensions of the SFA approach include the parametrization of panel data
models provided by Battese and Coelli (1992) and Battese and Coelli (1995). However,
although important, these advances do not suffice to alleviate the main concern about
the SFA method. This concern relates to the functional form assumption. The com-
monly used Translog functional form, for example, is based on a second order Taylor
expansion and thus achieves only a local fit. This shortcoming motivates the alterna-
tive “Fourier Flexible” (henceforth FF) functional form (see for example Gallant, 1981,
Gallant, 1982 and Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003). This approach uses a Translog func-
tion as a starting point and then adds an arbitrary number of orthogonal series terms
(sines and cosines) to this function in order to increase its flexibility. Thus, for example,
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) argue that because the Translog is nested within the FF
as a special case, significantly different results from the two functions will allow one to
test for any bias inherent in the Translog. They use the FF to investigate the existence
of scale and scope economies in their sample of US banks for the years 1986 and 1990.
The authors find that even for their homogeneous sample of medium to large banks
the production function does not follow a Translog form and that the FF and Translog
will lead to different conclusions as to the presence of scale and scope economies. How-
ever, a problem with the FF approach is that the number of trigonometric terms to
be added to the specification is arbitrary. Mitchell and Onvural (1996) do propose a
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rule of thumb, which suggests that the number of terms should be approximately equal
to the number of observations raised to the two-thirds power. However, such rules of
thumb are obviously ad-hoc and subjective. In addition, this heuristic can lead to a
proliferation of parameters in large samples, which may make the FF method suscep-
tible to overfitting and computationally costly. Thus, computational challenges induce
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) to drop the customary regularity conditions (concavity,
monotonicity) that are normally assumed to hold for economic production functions.
Feng and Serletis (2009) attempt to alleviate this issue by using nonlinear constrained
optimization. Computational challenges prevent them from calculating standard er-
rors, however. While they do relax this shortcoming in a later study, the computational
costs remains sufficiently high to force them to split their sample into smaller subsam-
ples and estimate separate frontiers (Feng and Serletis, 2010). This may be warranted
in some industries and time periods but not in others. Thus computational complexity
constitutes an inherent limitation of the FF approach.
Alternatives to the FF method are proposed by, for example, McAllister and Mc-
Manus (1993) and Wheelock and Wilson (2001). McAllister and McManus (1993) argue
that disparate findings about economies of scale in the banking industry are mainly due
to misspecification of the frontier in terms of the functional form and choice of inputs.
Hence, in addition to the FF approach, they also use semi-nonparametric methods such
as Kernel Regression and Linear Splines. They find that the Translog function is mis-
specified for their broad sample of banks and that, out of the proposed alternatives,
the linear spline approach provides the best estimates of scale efficiency. Wheelock
and Wilson (2001) are also concerned about the applicability of the Translog function.
Moreover, they stress the subjectivity involved in determining the number and type
of orthogonal terms to include in a Fourier Flexible estimator. As an alternative they
suggest the use of kernel regression and local polynomial smoothing. The authors argue
that these alternative methods provide a theoretically better grounded model selection
process than is available for the FF approach. Using their alternative techniques, they
show that scale efficiencies obtained on the basis of the Translog functional form are un-
stable. Finally, the approach of Fan, Li and Weersink (1996) is a modification that aims
at making SFA semi-parametric. The approach uses a kernel-regression estimator in the
first stage and a parametric second stage estimation. Unfortunately these alternative
methods also involve arbitrary parameter choices such as the smoothing bandwidth.
This discussion shows that the literature has recognized the need to relax the assump-
tions of the traditional methods. Moreover, this body of research has collated empirical
evidence to suggest that the conventional assumptions are frequently not tenable. As
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alternatives it proposes approaches that address the original limitations. However, these
alternative methods either entail ad-hoc assumptions of their own or cause excessive
computational cost. Therefore the literature has also turned to artificial neural net-
works, a flexible class of general functional approximators, to find alternatives to the
approaches discussed so far.
2.2.2. Existing Work on Efficiency Measurement with Artificial Neural
Networks
This section provides a review of the extant literature concerning the use of artificial
neural networks for firm level efficiency. This line of research has emerged only fairly
recently, which is the reason why the existing body of literature is small compared to
the large number of studies dealing with efficiency.1 Therefore this thesis is able to
provide a very comprehensive review of this literature.
Artificial neural networks (henceforth ANNs) are a flexible class of algorithms, which
have been shown to be able to approximate functions and their quantiles to an arbi-
trary degree of accuracy (see for example Hornik, Stinchcombe and White, 1989, White,
1992). Since, Artificial neural networks have been used successfully in tasks as diverse
as dimensionality reduction (Hinton and Salakhutdinov, 2006), pattern recognition (for
example Graves and Schmidhuber, 2005 and Yang, Yu, Gong and Huang, 2009), lan-
guage modeling (Bengio, Ducharme, Vincent and Jauvin, 2003) and time-series analysis
(Zhang, 2007 and Crone and Kourentzes, 2010). They can perform well on many classi-
fication and pattern recognition tasks by combining multiple layers of connected, simple
computational units. Each of these units carries out a summation of the signal it obtains
from the preceding units to which it is connected. It then applies a, usually nonlinear,
function to the resulting quantity and sends this signal to all subsequent units. The
intensity with which units are connected to preceding and subsequent units can be mod-
ified so as to “train” the entire structure to separate signal from noise. This procedure
is made more precise in Section 3.2.
ANNs have important advantages over both SFA and DEA. Specifically, they are both
non-parametric and stochastic. In other words, they require neither assumptions about
the distribution of errors, the functional form of the production technology nor about
the precision with which the data are observed. However, their main disadvantage is
that they do not readily provide efficiency scores. In their seminal study Athanassopou-
1As an indication of this consider the fact that survey studies which explicitly center around the
application of techniques from Operations Research or Artificial Intelligence in Banking, such as
for example Fethi and Pasiouras (2010), make no mention of this branch of the literature.
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los and Curram (1996) suggest two possible approaches to obtain efficiency scores from
ANNs. First, the efficiency score is simply defined as the ratio of observed output and
the output predicted by the ANN, given the observed inputs. This approach, however,
does not naturally prevent the resulting efficiency scores from exceeding unity, which
is difficult to justify. Therefore their second approach, which they call “standardised
efficiency”, uses as denominator the predicted outputs plus the maximum of the predic-
tion error across all observations. This latter approach can be interpreted as shifting
the unknown efficient frontier outward.2 Figure 2.3 illustrates this approach. Here the
average production function is represented by the dashed line. It is then shifted out-
ward to the full line by the largest observed error. This results in efficiency scores less
than unity and makes ANNs, SFA and DEA comparable. Athanassopoulos and Curram
(1996) test their approach on both simulated and observed data. Specifically, they gen-
erate artificial data following a piecewise two-factor Cobb-Douglas production function
with varying returns to scale. The observations are then contaminated with noise and
measurement errors following a variety of distributions. They also apply their method
to a dataset of bank branches. In general, they find on artificial data that DEA gives
lower deviations from the true known efficiency levels and thus outperforms the ANN
approach. In the application to real world data the ANN classifies a larger number of
firms as efficient based on the un-standardized measure of efficiency since it is fitting
a nonlinear average production function to the data rather than searching for an enve-
lope. This shows the main weaknesses of the approach advanced by Athanassopoulos
and Curram (1996).
The first study to build on these results was that of Costa and Markellos (1997).
They analyze the technical efficiency of the London Underground between 1970 and
1994. Their study uses both DEA and ANNs for efficiency measurement and, in par-
ticular, proposes two different types of ANN architecture to yield different kinds of
efficiency estimates. One architecture with an “average” number of hidden units is in-
tended to model the production technology, while the alternative ANN architecture has
a very large number of units. It is well known that this type of structure will induce
overfitting since increasing the number of units is tantamount to increasing the number
of parameters. The authors argue that using this kind of ANN will generate efficiency
estimates, which are closer to the DEA estimates. Specifically, they argue that an over-
fitted ANN will provide a hull for the data. This argument appears very problematic,
however. Overfitting generally induces the algorithm in question to “learn” not only the
2Note that increasing the denominator of the quotient defining efficiency decreases its numerical
value. Conversely, the frontier is thus shifted outward.
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Figure 2.3.: Schematic Example of Frontier Shift.
Input quantities are plotted on the x-axis, while the y-axis displays output quantities of a single-
input single-output technology. Black dots represent bank output observations. The dashed
line represents the average production function, while the regular line symbolizes the frontier
resulting from the shifting approach of Athanassopoulos and Curram (1996).
true patterns underlying the data generating process but also any noise that is included
in the sample. This has the potential to severely impair performance on unseen data.
Therefore there is no reason to believe that merely overfitting an ANN will yield an
upper bound to the production possibility set.
Some studies construct an artificial production technology and assess the performance
of ANNs on simulated data. This literature includes for example Guermat and Hadri
(1999), Santín, Delgado and Valiño (2004), Santín (2008) and Emrouznejad and Shale
(2009). Guermat and Hadri (1999) use a CES, generalized Leontief, Cobb-Douglas
and Translog specification and they add two sources of error, one representing noise,
the other inefficiency. They compare the accuracy of the predicted efficiency rankings
obtained using the ANN with rankings resulting from an SFA approach. They find
that the rankings produced by the ANN are more robust to noise, that increasing
sample size has a positive influence on performance and that the CES and generalized
Leontief functions are more difficult for the ANN to approximate. Santín, Delgado
and Valiño (2004) compare the efficiency estimation performance of ANNs with the
results obtained from ordinary least squares, corrected ordinary least squares, DEA and
SFA. They evaluate the correlation between the estimated and true efficiency scores for
each of the methods under examination. For their piecewise continuously differentiable
production function, which shows increasing, decreasing and constant returns to scale in
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different segments, they find that the results generated by the ANN dominate the results
obtained from other methods. Santín (2008) follows a similar approach and compares
the results generated by an ANN with those of SFA and DEA. Concretely, he uses small
datasets with 50 observations of simulated data. Noise and random inefficiency are
injected and he implements a thick frontier modeling approach for the ANN. He defines
a thick frontier by using the maximum error for subsets of observations in order to shift
the average production function outward. Comparing the correlation of estimated and
theoretical efficiencies, he finds that the ANN model outperforms all other models, with
SFA providing the worst results. The study by Emrouznejad and Shale (2009) also uses
synthetic data. However, their aim differs from preceding studies in that the authors
attempt to investigate the ability of an ANN to approximate efficiency scores generated
by a DEA model. The authors justify this counterintuitive approach by arguing that
the computational cost incurred in DEA studies is large for very large samples. Given
the efficient linear programming algorithms available for the solution of DEA problems,
this motivation does not seem very compelling. They find a high ability of their ANN
to approximate the frontier generated by DEA with low computational cost.
Some authors study the performance of ANNs on real data. These include the work
of Wang (2003), who proposes an ANN as an alternative to DEA with the principal
motivation of improving upon the deterministic nature of DEA. An interesting feature of
his approach is that the results of a DEA analysis and an ANN are combined linearly to
ultimately provide information about the frontier. The weight attributed to each of the
results in the combination is determined by the distribution of the error terms obtained
from the combination. He finds that, for noisy data, the ANN-DEA hybrid performs
better than DEA alone. A minor expansion of the literature is provided by Delgado
(2005), who argues that to construct a thick frontier not the largest error but an average
of the largest 5% of errors should be used to induce the shift in the ANN frontier. In
line with the literature he finds that ANNs perform well in his sample. Pendharkar
and Rodger (2003), on the other hand, use DEA as a pre-processing technique and
they train the ANN on data, which is clustered into homogeneous groups by efficiency.
Again, they find strong results for the ANN. A similar result is found by Wu, Yang and
Liang (2006) in their application of ANNs to the efficiency estimation of bank branches.
They carry out ANN learning on subsets of the data grouped according to their DEA-
efficiency scores. Azadeh, Ghaderi, Anvari, Saberi and Izadbakhsh (2007) propose
a slightly different approach in that they develop an elaborate data pre-processing
procedure based on Fuzzy-C-means clustering. Here the shift of the ANN-generated
frontier is carried out for each efficiency-cluster in turn. Application to a small sample
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of Iranian power plants illustrates their method. This approach is applied with virtually
no material changes by Azadeh, Saberi and Anvari (2010) and Azadeh, Saberi and
Anvari (2011). The only difference is that Azadeh, Saberi and Anvari (2010) introduce
a sensitivity analysis while Azadeh, Saberi and Anvari (2011) also apply the algorithm
to a small sample of data concerning the global automobile industry.
Michaelides, Vouldis and Tsionas (2010) and Vouldis, Michaelides and Tsionas (2010)
use ANNs in the context of efficiency estimation in a distinctly different way to the pre-
ceding literature. Specifically, they introduce the “neural distance function”. This con-
cept aims to use the ANN computational kernel for the estimation of output distance
functions. This is especially beneficial in cases involving multi-output technologies.
Concretely, the ANN computational kernel is used to approximate the reduced form
equations in a Translog system, giving each output as a function of inputs only. In this
respect the ANN can be said to partially model the production technology underlying
the production of the firm. Ultimately though, the Translog form makes use of the out-
puts generated by the ANN. In their application of the ANN algorithm to the reduced
form equations they find that the informationally most crisp, as well as the most frugal,
specification includes only one unit. Given that a logistic function is used as activa-
tion function in the ANN’s units, each reduced form equation boils down to a logistic
regression, essentially making the ANN strategy unnecessary. Both studies apply their
method to a large sample of US banks between the years 1989 and 2000. They check
their method on artificial data generated by a Translog function for robustness and find
very good results. While this approach does extend traditional SFA by introducing
the ANN concept into the estimation, it is not the ANN that ends up estimating the
efficiency scores.
The seminal work of Athanassopoulos and Curram (1996) is important in that it ini-
tiates the debate on neural networks and efficiency. In addition, although this is not ex-
plicitly stated, the authors recognize and address the need to provide both an estimation
component (in their case the ANN) and a frontier component (in their case the shifting
approach). These types of components are pervasive in all efficiency parametrization
methods. Thus, for example, SFA uses maximum likelihood coupled with the para-
metric functional form as the estimation component and the assumption about the
distribution of the error terms as the frontier component. DEA, on the other hand,
uses linear programming as the estimation component, whereas the inherent convex-
ity assumption provides the frontier component. The contribution of Athanassopoulos
and Curram (1996) is to recognize the possibility of using ANNs for the estimation
component. However, a weakness of their approach is the arbitrariness of the frontier
42
component. Unfortunately, as the preceding discussion shows, the literature on ANNs
in the context of efficiency has inherited this weakness. Hence, while promising, the
ANN approach to efficiency measurement requires further work. This gap is filled by
the generalized frontier analysis method, which is introduced in Chapter 3.
2.3. Data and Variable Selection in Efficiency Measurement
Any efficiency measurement approach must consider the empirical question of selecting
variables that are reflective of the production process of the industry under investiga-
tion. Section 2.3.1 discusses a number of conceptual approaches to selecting inputs and
outputs when measuring the efficiency of banks. Subsequently, Section 2.3.2 discusses
the definition of economic value added for banks, which is an important variable used
especially in Chapter 3. Finally, Section 2.3.3 discusses the data selection and filtering
rules used in obtaining the data on which subsequent analyses are based.
2.3.1. Definition of Bank Inputs, Outputs and Prices
A number of approaches for the classification of bank inputs and outputs have been ad-
vanced in the literature. The value added approach, advocated by Berger and Humphrey
(1992), uses operating cost to classify outputs as important and unimportant in terms
of their value addition. Concretely, it considers the classification of assets and liabilities
as inputs or outputs to be a question of degree and not fixed a priori. Rather, under
this paradigm, the classification of assets and liabilities as financial inputs and outputs
depends on their importance in driving bank expenses. Thus, empirically, one would
regress expenses for physical inputs (labor and capital) on the asset and liability quan-
tities. The magnitude of the coefficients on the asset and liability classes in question
will then provide an indication of the importance of each asset and liability class and
thus yield the value added classification. Less common but similar is the user cost
approach, which stipulates that whether an asset or a liability is an input or an output
should be determined endogenously by considering whether the marginal revenue ex-
ceeds the user cost of capital (Hancock, 1985). It differs from the value added approach
in that it treats operating cost as implicitly determined by the profit maximization of
the bank rather than as explicitly parametrized. While the opportunity cost argument
underlying this approach is sound, empirical difficulties arise. These mainly stem from
noisy estimates of marginal cost and marginal revenue required to partition assets and
liabilities into inputs and outputs, as well as from a high sensitivity of results to the
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underlying assumptions and data such as interest rates (Berger and Humphrey, 1992).
The competing production approach, on the other hand, is deemed more important in
assessing the performance of individual bank branches. This is because it focuses on
the quantity of services provided such as, for example, the number of accounts serviced,
rather than the volume of monetary transactions (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Be-
cause this thesis focusses on banks as intermediaries, this approach is less important in
the present context.
A major shortcoming of these approaches is that off-balance-sheet items and securities
tend to be ignored, primarily because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable revenue data
on these assets. However, the modern banking landscape relies on such instruments
for the provision of trade credit, guarantees and hedging of risks. In addition, with the
exception of the value added approach, all the approaches mentioned above are relatively
rarely encountered in the empirical banking literature which makes comparability of new
results with prior findings difficult. In general, a large number of studies seem to adopt
the intermediation, also known as the asset, approach propounded by Sealey and Lindley
(1977) in order to define in- and outputs.3 This approach, discussed below in greater
detail, focuses on the functional role of banks as intermediaries in the wider economy.
Hence it aligns well with the context of this thesis and is therefore followed in the
remainder of the investigation. Overall, possibly with the exception of the production
approach, the intermediation, value added and user cost approaches tend to overlap
substantially in terms of the input and output classes they consider.4 This suggests
that the choice of classification approach may not be as critical empirically as it appears
to be conceptually.
Within the intermediation approach there is broad consensus that labor, physical
capital and financial capital should constitute the inputs. In addition, some studies
include equity capital as a fixed input (see for example McAllister and McManus, 1993
and Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003). This thesis defines labor, purchased funds and core
deposits as variable inputs, while equity capital and fixed assets are considered fixed.
Equity is fixed in the short run at least and also has a limited scope for variation.
3This notion is confirmed by surveys such as Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Fethi and Pasiouras
(2010).
4As an example see the subsequent discussion of the intermediation approach and compare this with
Hancock (1985), who uses the user cost approach and finds that outputs are demand deposits and
all loans and inputs are labor, physical capital, cash, time deposits and capital, which is held fixed.
Furthermore, Berger and Humphrey (1992) find that the value added approach tends to classify
as outputs all loans (consumer-, real estate-, and commercial) and demand and time and savings
deposits. This latter category is assigned a dual input and output role however. Inputs are mainly
purchased funds, labor and physical capital. Government securities and other nonloan investments
are deemed unimportant outputs.
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Capitalization that is too low will cause intervention from the regulator. Capitalization
that is too high will lead to a firm that is not in fact an intermediary. Thus it appears
justified to treat equity capital as fixed. Fixed assets are also not likely to be freely
disposable in the short run. Acquisitions or divestitures of substantial portions of
the premises and other fixed assets are usually one-off strategic decisions that are not
routinely modified.
In terms of outputs the literature includes various classes of loans as well as securi-
ties (see for example Altunbas and Chakravarty, 2001 and Asaftei, 2008). In addition,
off-balance-sheet items constitute a component of bank output with increasing impor-
tance. Therefore this thesis considers loans, subdivided into commercial, real estate
and consumer loans and securities as variable outputs. Off-balance-sheet items are con-
sidered as fixed outputs. The main reason for this attribution is the fact that many
off-balance-sheet item classes have no direct income other than fee income (such as
letters of credit) while certain off-balance-sheet items, such as derivatives, often serve
purposes other than income generation. Moreover, the available data do not afford ac-
cess to the income generated from this class of assets. Thus a calculation of the output
price is not possible without introducing a substantial degree of subjectivity by arbi-
trarily defining income from off-balance-sheet items. To avoid this subjectivity I prefer
to err on the side of caution and define this asset class as fixed. Overall, the selection
of inputs and outputs follows Berger, Bonime, Goldberg and White (2004) and Berger
and Mester (2003). Table 2.2 summarizes the input and output classes along with the
appropriate price definitions.
The subsequent empirical applications will consider economic efficiencies. These re-
quire the availability of in and output prices for their parametrization. This is often
accomplished in the literature by dividing flows by stocks. Thus the price of labor
can, for example, be determined from the total wage expense divided by the number of
employees (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). However, prices estimated in this way can be
prone to outliers. Therefore this thesis follows Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006).
These authors calculate average faced market prices by first computing the price of
each bank as discussed above. They then investigate individual geographical markets.
Specifically, they consider each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) respectively each
county that is not an MSA. In such a regional market a reasonable approximation to the
market price is the average price of all banks operative there. The weight of each bank
in the market is set as the market share of the respective bank in terms of deposits.5
Furthermore, since each individual bank is assumed to be a price taker in each of its
5 I obtain data on deposits from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012).
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Table 2.2.: Definition of Inputs, Outputs and Prices for Efficiency Estimation.
Inputs Input Prices Outputs Output Prices
Labor (Number of
full-time equivalent
employees)
Total personnel ex-
penses/ labor
Consumer loans Interest income
from consumer
loans/ consumer
loans
Purchased funds Cost of purchased
funds/purchased
funds
Business loans Interest income
from business
loans/ business
loans
Core deposits Cost of core de-
posits/core deposits
Real estate loans Interest income
from real estate
loans/real estate
loans
Equity capital Fixed input Securities (Non-
loan-, non-fixed-
assets)
Total non-loan,
interest in-
come/securities
Fixed assets Fixed input Off-balance-sheet
items
Fixed output
markets, only all the other banks are taken into account when computing a given bank’s
market price. Globally, the price that is relevant for each bank is then defined as the
price it faces in each of its markets weighted by the share of deposits that it maintains
in these markets in terms of its total deposits. More formally, assuming one of n banks
active in market j, bank i, has deposits di,j in that market, which is one of m markets
which the bank services, then that market’s importance for the bank is computed as:
wi,j =
di,j
m∑
j=1
di,j
. (2.21)
Also let each bank’s raw price, computed from the balance sheet data as in Table 2.2,
be pri,j . Then, if the bank is assumed to be a price taker, the price, pi,j , faced by bank
i in market j, can be expressed as:
pi,j =
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
 dk,jn∑
l=1,l 6=i
dl,j
prk,j
 . (2.22)
Consistent with the assumption of price taking behavior, this price depends only on the
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raw prices of the other banks active in the respective market, prk,j . Then the price which
the bank faces globally, taking into account all m markets it services, can be computed
as:
pi =
m∑
j=1
wi,jpi,j . (2.23)
Prices computed in this way are less noisy, conform to economically plausible behav-
ioral assumptions and are less driven by outliers for individual banks.
2.3.2. Computation of Economic Value Added
This thesis is the first to investigate the shareholder value efficiency of US banks. The
shareholder value efficiency concept was introduced by Fiordelisi (2007) and is discussed
in greater detail in Chapter 3. I follow this author in defining the required measure
of value creation. In particular, this thesis proxies value creation by economic value
added (EVA). A measure like EVA is particularly useful for two reasons. First, for
example Rogerson (1997) has shown that a residual income measure of the EVA type
can be used by firm owners to formulate remuneration contracts which induce efficient
investment decisions on the part of managers. Second, EVA depends on relatively frugal
data requirements and can, with only modest assumptions, be applied to datasets such
as the present one, where a majority of banks are not listed on a stock exchange. The
economic value added generated between period t− 1 and t can be defined as follows:
EV At−1,t = EPt−1,t − κCt−1, (2.24)
where EPt−1,t is the economic profit (net operating profit after tax between period t−1
and t), κ is the cost of capital and Ct−1 is the capital invested by the bank during the
preceding period. Table 2.3 gives an overview of my specification for economic profits
and capital invested. In computing EVA, this thesis follows the design of Fiordelisi
(2007) and Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2007) in spirit. However, some adjustments are
necessary because of substantial differences between US-GAAP and IFRS/IAS and data
availability (Call Reports vs Bankscope). When computing the economic profit, also
referred to as net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) in the EVA literature, several
adjustments are made to reflect the economic realities of the bank (for a detailed dis-
cussion see for example Uyemura, Kantor and Pettit, 1996). Specifically, the economic
profit should only take into account cash taxes paid and exclude deferred tax provisions
because these are de facto funding sources due to their often permanent nature. How-
ever, the Call Report does not allow access to the deferred portion of applicable income
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Table 2.3.: Definition of the Components of EVA.
Economic Profit
Net income/loss attributable to bank
+ Other noninterest expense
+ Provision for loan and lease losses
− Net charge-offs on the above
+ Provision for allocated transfer risk reserve
− Net charge-offs on the above
Capital invested
Total bank equity capital (book value)
+ 5-year moving sum of other noninterest expense
− 5-year moving average of other noninterest expense
+ Net loan-loss reserve
+ Transfer risk reserve
taxes. One possibility would be to start with pre-tax income in calculating economic
profits. However, this would overstate the actual income generated. In addition, all
banks are subject to the same federal tax. Hence the cross sectional distortion caused
by the unavailability of the deferred tax position is unlikely to be material since the
only difference between banks will be caused by state taxes, which usually do not ex-
ceed 15% (The Tax Foundation, 2012). Therefore omitting taxes in the computation
is unlikely to bias inference. For this reason and so as to err on the side of caution
in terms of the reported value created by banks, this thesis uses net income/loss after
tax as the starting point for economic profits. Moreover, it is appropriate to adjust the
economic profit by non-recurring events. These could, for example, be R&D expenses or
training expenses. In addition, operating lease expenses are related to financing rather
than the core intermediation business of the bank (Uyemura, Kantor and Pettit, 1996).
Such expenses are captured in the other noninterest expense position and hence added
back to the net income of the bank. The main adjustment applicable to bank income
statements when computing EVA is related to loan and lease loss provisions. The pro-
visions themselves tend to be used to smooth earnings and thus confound the economic
reality of the bank. Instead, Uyemura, Kantor and Pettit (1996) argue that it may be
more appropriate to consider charge-offs, since these may align better with the actual
loan loss situation in a given period. Hence I add provisions for loan and lease losses
back to the net income and subtract the originally excluded charge-offs. The same logic
applies to transfer risk reserves, which is a position that accounts for risks relating to
debt service by foreign borrowers stemming from a lack of convertibility of the local
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currency. General risk provisions are not reported on the Call Report and hence do
not enter into the calculation. When computing bank capital invested, the adjustments
mirror the adjustments made to net income. Specifically, nonrecurring events (disguised
financial expenses) are capitalized (amortized) over a five year period (Fiordelisi, 2007).
Here, the 5-year moving sum (5-year moving average) of “other noninterest expense”
proxies for capitalized (amortized) R&D expense, training expense and operating lease
expense. The assumption behind amortization is straight line depreciation. Deferred
tax debits and credits are not reported on the Call Reports and hence omitted. Finally,
stocks corresponding to other flow positions which are excluded from economic profits,
such as loan loss provisions, are added to capital invested in order to account for their
nature as a funding source and by allocating a corresponding capital charge (Uyemura,
Kantor and Pettit, 1996). With economic profits and capital invested in hand, the only
remaining component of EVA is the cost of capital.
Estimating the cost of capital is a contentious issue in the literature (Fama and
French, 1997). A standard method used for this purpose is the weighted average cost
of capital (WACC) approach (see for example Miles and Ezzell, 1980). This approach
postulates that the firm’s cost of capital is a linear combination of the cost of equity
and the cost of debt. The cost of equity is usually estimated from models of stock
returns such as the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe, 1964), the arbitrage pricing
theory (see for example Ross, 1976) or a multifactor model (see for example Fama and
French, 1993). The cost of debt can be based on the promised interest rate. However,
as Cooper and Davydenko (2007) show, it may need to be adjusted for the riskiness
of debt. In the context of banks, however, Fiordelisi (2007) argues that the WACC
approach may not be appropriate. Thus, for banks, costs relating to liabilities are
primarily productive costs and only partly reflect cost of financing. In contrast, they
would routinely be classified as financial cost in industrial firms. This is because the
main economic function of banks is to act as intermediaries. They intermediate funds
to the wider economy by, for example, transforming large numbers of small deposit
units into large units of loans, as well as by transforming duration and risk. Therefore
their core business involves making and receiving interest payments. In datasets such
as the Call Report, it is not possible to clearly separate the cost of funds into financing
and productive components. In order to avoid arbitrary assumptions in this context,
this thesis follows Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2007) and Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010)
amongst others and defines the cost of capital purely on the basis of equity. This
is a sensible assumption because equity capital is one of the sources of funding that
banks and regulators are likely to target explicitly since it protects the intermediary
49
from financial distress (see for example McAllister and McManus, 1993). Finally, it is
also likely that this simplifying assumption will have only a limited effect on the final
results. This is because the component of interest expenses to be attributed to non-
core activities is likely to be small relative to the majority of interest expenses that are
related to productive assets.
In estimating the cost of capital this thesis follows Ünal and Kane (1988a), Ünal and
Kane (1988b) and Stone (1974) and uses a market model for listed banks. Specifically,
I obtain monthly stock return data on listed banks (primarily holding companies),
data on market returns6 and data on long term interest rate index returns (30yr bond
returns) from CRSP. The betas are estimated using three years of data. These estimated
coefficients allow for the calculation of expected excess returns and thus the cost of
equity capital. Subsequently, I merge these returns with Bank COMPUSTAT data by
way of the CRSP-FRB matching table provided by the New York Branch of the Federal
Reserve (New York Federal Reserve Bank, 2012). This step is necessary in order to
obtain balance sheet data on the listed banks that contribute to the calculation of cost
of equity capital. The next step merges the cost of capital on to the Call Report data,
directly for commercial banks that are either listed or are subsidiaries of listed banks.
For the remaining banks the holding company data are stratified at the 20, 40, 60,
80 and 95th percentiles of the asset size distribution.7 Using the same absolute size
cutoffs on the Call Report data allows one to assign to commercial banks within a given
size stratum the average cost of capital from the corresponding bank holding company
size stratum. Finally, for banks that cannot be matched by this procedure I assign
the average cost of capital computed over all listed banks. This approach essentially
follows Fiordelisi (2007). The main advantage of this approach is that it allows for a
computation of plausible cost of capital values for a broad population of banks with
only minimal assumptions.
2.3.3. Data Selection and Filtering
Finally, this section comments on the data selection and filtering methodology that
is used to generate the data set. Ultimately, the sample should preserve as many
observations as possible, while removing outliers that may drive results due to data entry
errors or idiosyncrasies of single observations. In the context of efficiency orientated
6S&P value weighted returns excluding dividends. The results are robust to the in and exclusion of
dividends, to the use of equal or value weighted indices and to the use of S&P vs. NYSE/AMEX
indices.
7A finer granularity such as deciles at this level does not fundamentally change results.
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studies outliers are in particular bank observations, which exhibit negative values for
inputs, outputs or prices since such values are implausible (see for example Asaftei, 2008
and Wheelock and Wilson, 2001). Furthermore, a certain threshold as to interest rate
related prices can safely be assumed. For example Wheelock and Wilson (2001) delete
from their sample banks that exhibit interest costs exceeding 25% p.a.. In addition,
many studies impose minimum size requirements on their sample (for example Bauer,
Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998, Berger and Bouwman, 2009, Feng and Serletis,
2009, Feng and Serletis, 2010 and Mitchell and Onvural, 1996) or focus on a minimum
period of existence (for example Asaftei, 2008, Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey,
1998, DeYoung, Spong and Sullivan, 2001, Feng and Serletis, 2009 and Feng and Serletis,
2010).
Based on this literature, this thesis eliminates bank-year observations:
1. with missing values in the critical variables,
2. with less than USD 10 m in assets,
3. with negative book value,
4. with implausible values such as negative input- or output- quantities or negative
prices,
5. with equity/asset ratios of less than 1% or greater than 100%,
6. with return on equity > 1 or return on equity < -1,
7. if a bank has no commercial real estate or no commercial industrial loans out-
standing,
8. and if either residential or consumer loans constitute more than half of the loan
portfolio.
The asymmetrical treatment of small banks is due to the fact that very large banks
are likely to be much more representative of the technology prevailing in the banking
markets than are extremely small banks. To the contrary, extremely small banks, for
example due to the heavy influence of the owner or due to extremely localized banking
activities, may employ quite exotic strategies compared to the population of banks.
Negative book value and equity over asset ratios below 1% may indicate either data
entry errors or extreme distress, either of which would contaminate the dataset with
undue noise. Negative prices or input-/output quantities are not plausible and likely
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due to errors in the data. Excessive returns are likely to be indicative of either distress
or atypical observations. Ultimately, this leads to an unbalanced sample with 118,164
bank-year observations between the years 1994-2010. This order of magnitude is above
the median of similar studies but comparable to the literature studying US banks and
in line with the number of banks reported by, for example, Tregenna (2009).
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3. Shareholder Value Efficiency:
Methods and Evidence from the US
Banking Industry
This chapter formalizes the GFA method and applies it to the parametrization of eco-
nomic frontiers in the banking sector. This serves to both validate the new method
on real world data and to investigate some questions of economic interest. I use this
new method to estimate shareholder value efficiency of US banks using a large sample
encompassing 118,164 bank year observations. Results across a number of statistical
and economic criteria show that the GFA method provides valid efficiency scores. GFA
explains a greater proportion of the value creation of US banks and is economically
more significant than stochastic frontier analysis, in particular when the shape of the
production function varies by bank size. Additionally, shareholder value efficiency is
found to be more important in explaining value creation than both conventional effi-
ciency measures and managerial ability. This provides further support for the SHVE
concept.
3.1. Introduction
Economic measures of efficiency, such as cost efficiency, provide information on the ex-
tent to which banks and their managers are able to choose inputs efficiently so as to
minimize the cost of producing a given output bundle relative to the industry technol-
ogy. Analogously, the related concepts of revenue and profit efficiency describe similar
phenomena. The literature has focused on efficiency measures because these allow
comparisons between economic entities using varying input and output bundles. From
the perspective of shareholders, however, these economic quantities may not always
accurately align with their objective functions, since these stakeholders are primarily
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motivated by value creation. It is likely that cost, revenue or even profit efficiency,
albeit necessary, are not sufficient conditions for value to be created efficiently.1
Fiordelisi (2007) has formulated the concept of shareholder value efficiency (SHVE),
which may be efficacious in mitigating these issues. However, the SHVE concept has
previously been operationalized by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which as a method
is not without limitations. Hence this chapter contributes to the discussion in four ways.
First, it develops and tests the GFA method for efficiency measurement. Second, it ap-
plies this method to shareholder value efficiency and compares its performance with
stochastic frontier analysis across a broad set of criteria. The results thus provide an
important check on the plausibility of the shareholder value efficiency concept. Fur-
thermore shareholder value efficiency has so far only been studied in the European
context. Hence the third contribution of this chapter is to provide first evidence on the
shareholder value efficiency of US banks. Fourth, this analysis is the first to establish
a link between value creation and managerial ability for banks. The sample covers vir-
tually the entire population of US commercial banks and contains 118,164 bank-year
observations during the years 1994 through 2010.
Banks face an essential trade-off between risk-taking and value creation. Shareholder
value efficiency has been linked to value creation (Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010). Fur-
thermore, banks that underperform in terms of value creation have been found to be
more risky (Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012). These findings suggest that shareholder
value efficiency might be an important concept that can capture these significant di-
mensions of bank behavior. The shareholder value efficiency metric indicates how well
a bank’s management chooses its input and output mix so as to optimize value creation
relative to the latent transformation function spanned by its industry peers. Sharehold-
ers aim for value maximization within the bounds imposed by technology and compe-
tition. Therefore this measure likely aligns better with their objective functions than
conventional efficiency measures. However, if banks faced homogeneous economic, reg-
ulatory and competitive conditions and if, in addition, managers’ and owners’ interests
were fully aligned, managerial ability should be a better indicator of bank value creation
than SHVE because, in this setting, more able managers would automatically run more
valuable banks. In this case, managerial ability would be a better indicator of bank
value creation than SHVE and the SHVE concept would be redundant. The presence of
1As an example consider the case where excessive cost saving efforts negatively impact the ability
of a bank to screen loans, such that the ensuing losses exceed the initial cost savings. Further
misalignment between conventional efficiency and value creation may be due to other factors such
as agency problems (see Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006, Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon and
Pagano, 2003, Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
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these idealized conditions is always a question of degree and is at the same time difficult
to estimate directly. Therefore it is important to investigate the information content
of SHVE vis-à-vis managerial ability when it comes to explaining value creation in US
banks. This chapter provides this validation exercise.
The received parametrization of SHVE relies on stochastic frontier analysis to gener-
ate a frontier that explains value creation, as proxied by economic value added (EVA),
by way of a Translog production function parametrized in terms of input quantities
and output prices. The use of SFA to parametrize shareholder value efficiency raises
three main concerns, however. First, only one method (SFA) for the parametrization
of the shareholder value efficiency measure is available.2 However, since efficiency is
a latent concept, having an alternative parametrization method would provide deci-
sion makers with a valuable plausibility-check of SHVE scores. The need for such a
check is highlighted by findings in the efficiency literature, which show that alterna-
tive parametrizations of efficiency may provide very different results (see for example
Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998, Weill, 2004 and Huang and Wang, 2002).
Second, SFA postulates that the functional form linking input and output information
to the economic quantity of interest is known and that inefficiency follows a known
distribution. These assumptions may be justified in cases such as cost efficiency, where
the applied researcher has a concrete theory available for guidance. However, no such
theory is available for shareholder value creation. To the contrary, highly nonlinear pat-
terns of value creation may result from, for example, increased tail risk due to adverse
effects of earnings management (see for example Andreou, Cooper, Louca and Philip,
2013 and Balboa, López-Espinosa and Rubia, 2013). These complexities substantially
reduce the likelihood that a priori parametric assumptions regarding the production
function will adequately capture the underlying process.3 Third, SFA requires a rigid
classification of assets and liabilities as either inputs or outputs. However, this will
ignore synergies between different asset classes as well as the dual role of certain assets,
such as derivatives, that can be used by banks as both inputs and outputs. The method
proposed in this chapter overcomes these restrictive assumptions.
2Data envelopment analysis (DEA), the natural alternative, can unfortunately not be used in the
case of shareholder value efficiency. This is because economic frontiers based on DEA would require
the computation of optimal shareholder value creation from the optimal, feasible input and output
mix given prices. Such an approach is straightforward in the case of, for example, cost efficiency,
but it is less obvious which “prices” could link input and output quantities to shareholder value (see
for example, Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell and Battese, 2005).
3Even in the cases for which theoretical underpinnings do exist, the incompatibility of commonly
assumed production functions, such as the Translog, with reality has been noted particularly for
the banking sector (see e.g. Mitchell and Onvural, 1996).
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Ideally, an efficiency parametrization method will have three main properties. First,
it should have the capacity to find an envelope for the data that provides plausible
efficiency scores that are robust to noise. Second, it should not require either prior
knowledge or restrictive assumptions about the data generating process. Third, it
should be able to parametrize various efficiency measures, both economic and technical.
In general, such a method will consist of two components: an estimation component,
whose task is to fit a production function, and a component ensuring that what is
estimated is in fact a frontier and not merely an average production function.
The GFA method satisfies all of the above criteria. This method adopts a nonpara-
metric approach to operationalize the estimation component. Specifically, it uses artifi-
cial neural networks, which have been shown to have the capacity to approximate both
functions and their quantiles arbitrarily well (Hornik, Stinchcombe and White, 1989,
White, 1992) for this purpose. To operationalize the frontier component the method
relies on Granger’s (1969) asymmetric loss functions, which have been applied for ex-
ample in the field of forecasting (Christoffersen and Diebold, 1997). Instead of using
artificial neural networks, any other nonlinear approximator such as kernel regression
could have been used as the estimation component. This would, however, require that a
compatible frontier component can be devised. Thus the GFA method is generalized in
two senses. First, it does not require restrictive assumptions regarding the form of the
transformation function and the distribution underlying the error terms. Second, it can
be used to fit not only shareholder value efficiency but also other measures of economic
and technical efficiency. The appendix to this chapter (Appendix A) demonstrates this
capability by applying GFA to cost efficiency.
The main results are as follows. In the descriptive domain, this chapter examines
the statistical properties of shareholder value efficiency as well as the univariate re-
lations between SHVE and typical bank performance indicators that do not rely on
frontier concepts. The results show that GFA and SFA provide similar efficiency scores,
which illustrates that GFA is a viable efficiency parametrization method. However,
GFA shareholder value efficiency scores tend to provide more information on the per-
formance of US banks than do SFA scores. In the inferential domain, this chapter uses
a multivariate setting to examine the economic and statistical significance of share-
holder value efficiency both vis-à-vis managerial ability and cost and revenue efficiency.
Findings indicate that SHVE is more informative with respect to value creation than
both managerial ability and other efficiency scores. This underscores the importance
of the SHVE concept. Results also show that the SFA and GFA efficiency scores con-
tribute to the explanation of shareholder value creation independently of one another,
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which confirms that they capture similar but not identical information. However, more
importantly, GFA is found to provide SHVE scores that are both economically and
statistically more meaningful in explaining value creation than the comparable SFA-
based scores. Thus, overall, these results vindicate the GFA method and validate the
shareholder value efficiency concept.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The proposed generalized
frontier analysis method is developed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the data
except for managerial ability, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5; Section 3.4
presents the empirical results and Section 3.5 summarizes the robustness checks; Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2. The GFA Algorithm
This section develops the GFA algorithm. As has been noted in the discussion in
Section 2.2.2, prior attempts at parametrizing efficient frontiers by way of ANNs face
the problem that they provide average production functions by design and some ad
hoc procedure must be adopted to obtain efficiency scores from these predictions. To
illustrate the general problem, consider Figure 3.1. The transparent surface describes
the theoretical maximum level of output implied by the production technology, while
the noisy surface describes the actually observed level of output y, both on the third
axis. The x-y-plane denotes the input quantities, xi, used by each bank, i. The task is
to recover the transparent surface from the noisy observed data. More formally, assume
that by training an artificial neural network on the available data on inputs for each
bank i, xi, one has obtained some hypothesis h(xi) about the true value of the output
yi.
Then, in the spirit of Equation 2.6 and following Athanassopoulos and Curram (1996),
a naïve way of defining technical efficiency is:
TEi =
yi
h(xi)
(3.1)
The average production function h(xi) encoded by the ANN will, if it has been learned
well, have a very similar shape as the transparent frontier. However, it will pass through
the center of mass of the noisy data because that is all the ANN has access to in terms
of learning. Therefore, assuming that noise is normally distributed, it will lie above or
below the observed data about half the time. Then, for about half of the observations in
the sample, efficiency will be greater than unity, which makes little sense conceptually.
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Figure 3.1.: Theoretical Output and Observed, Noisy Output.
The x and y coordinates represent the input space, while the z coordinate represents the output
space of a two input single output Cobb-Douglas technology. The transparent, smooth surface
represents the theoretical level of output, while the jagged surface represents the actual observed
output.
Realizing this problem, Athanassopoulos and Curram (1996) propose a simple solution,
which they refer to as standardized frontier. Specifically, for all observations one simply
defines the prediction error of the average production function as  = y−h(X) and lets
standardized efficiency be
TEni =
yi
(h(xi) + max ())
, (3.2)
where the max operation denotes the maximum norm of the vector . Then all effi-
ciency scores will be bounded by unity from above. This approach is reminiscent of the
corrected ordinary least squares estimation of deterministic production frontiers (see
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003, pp.70-71). A third concept for the operationalization of
efficiency with ANNs is proposed by e.g. Santín (2008). This approach is similar in
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spirit to that above, however the definition of the error term is slightly different. Here
the shift to the predicted production function is applied over finite batches of observa-
tions by an iterative procedure. Having sorted the predicted output values h(xi) from
smallest to largest, one considers the errors. If the error is non-negative one increments
the predicted values by the error value. If the error is negative, one considers the next
error value until a positive value is found. Once this is the case, all predicted values
between and including the one corresponding to the first negative observed error are
incremented by this positive value. In effect, the shift in the frontier is carried out
piecewise. It is clear that the approach proposed by Santín (2008) will lead to a very
large number of observations on the frontier. It seems unlikely that this will be an
accurate representation of reality. The second drawback of Athanassopoulos and Cur-
ram’s (1996) and Santín’s (2008) methods of shifting the average production function
outward to obtain a frontier is its arbitrariness. There is no apparent reason why the
maximum prediction error made on a subset or across all observations should impact a
number of other banks in the sample as well.
This arbitrariness of this approach can be eliminated by introducing the GFA method.
The intuition behind this approach can be illustrated as in Figure 3.2. The approach
of Athanassopoulos and Curram (1996) uses information on input quantities x to infer
a “Frontier”, hΘ,β(x), here visualized in blue. This causes no conceptual problems
for observations such as A. This firm is clearly located below the frontier and hence
inefficient. However observation B is more puzzling. Given that it is located above the
frontier it would have to be called “superefficient” and would be assigned an efficiency
score greater than one. But efficiency scores greater than unity make little conceptual
sense. To overcome this problem, the authors resort to arbitrary shift mechanisms as
described above.
GFA resolves this issue in a far less arbitrary way. Specifically, this approach recog-
nizes that observations like A are conceptually sane but that observations like B make
little sense. To accommodate this feature of the modeling situation, GFA splits the
process of fitting a frontier into two components: the frontier and the estimation com-
ponent. It maintains the desirable, flexible, nonparametric characteristics of artificial
neural networks in the estimation component. However, in order to ensure that the
estimation process accommodates observations like B in a natural way, it modifies the
loss function of the artificial neural network. More specifically, “superefficient” firms are
penalized asymmetrically more than regular, inefficient firms. This forces the ANN to
fit a frontier rather than an average production function. This modification allows the
net to efficiently exploit the information about the shape of the error surface as yielded
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by the backpropagation algorithm while at the same time ensuring that the frontier
is closer to more efficient banks and further from less efficient ones. Thus the GFA
algorithm provides a nonparametric, stochastic alternative to SFA and DEA, uniting
the advantages of both these methods.
x
y
hΘ,β(x)
Predicted
Frontier
B
Superefficient?! ×
A
Inefficient X
Figure 3.2.: Estimating Frontiers.
Schematic representation of an average production function hΘ,β(x) given information on a
single input x and corresponding output y for two observations (black circles), A and B.
To illustrate precisely how the GFA method improves on previous approaches, it is
necessary to introduce some theory related to artificial neural networks to facilitate the
exposition. A feed forward ANN is characterized by its architecture, which is defined
by a set of units, or neurons, that are organized in layers and matrices of weights
connecting each unit in each layer layer to each unit in the preceding one. Each neuron
is a computational unit, which takes the sum of the inputs, computes the corresponding
value of a so-called activation function and outputs the result. The first layer, which
takes the raw data as its inputs, is correspondingly called input layer, the last layer
gives the result of the hypothesis for a particular sample of data and is therefore called
output layer. All other layers are called hidden layers. It is customary to attach a
so-called bias unit to each layer. This is a unit which takes no input and which outputs
a constant value of +1, so that it can be thought of as a constant term on each level
of the hypothesis. A particular instance of an ANN is represented in Figure 3.3. Here
the ANN has one hidden layer with four hidden units (medium grey), four input units
(light grey) and one output unit (dark grey). The input signal is propagated from left
to right, while the error signal is propagated from right to left in order to adjust the
connection weights between the units.
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Figure 3.3.:
Schematic Diagram of ANN Architecture, Following Ng, Ngiam, Foo, Mai and Suen
(2011).
Circles represent units, arrows represent weights connecting units. These are the free parameters
of the network. The light grey circles represent the input layer units, the dark grey circle
represents the output layer unit. The remaining circles represent the hidden layer units and
the bias unit (marked “+1”). Information is passed through the network from left to right. x
stands for an input signal, a stands for the activation of the unit, computed by applying an
activation function g to the sum of the incoming signals z. hΘ,β represents the hypothesis of
the network about the true target value, y, corresponding to the input vector x.
More formally, assume the input layer has p, the hidden layer has q and the output
layer has r units and that a bias unit is added to each hidden layer. Given the p
dimensional input vector x, the q × p weight matrix Θ(1) connecting the input layer
and the hidden layer as well as the r × q weight matrix Θ(2) connecting the hidden
layer and the output layer, plus a corresponding bias unit connected by the vector β(1)
(q × 1), the input of the hidden layer can be computed as
z(2) = Θ(1)x + β(1). (3.3)
This will yield a q× 1 dimensional vector z(2), which constitutes the input signal at the
hidden layer. The units of the hidden layer then compute the activation by applying
the activation function g = 1(1+exp(−z)) to the input so that the activation of the hidden
layer is given by:
a(2) = g(z(2)). (3.4)
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Then one obtains the q × 1 input of the output layer as
z(3) = Θ(2)a(2). (3.5)
The network forms a hypothesis, hΘ(1),Θ(2),β(1)(x) about the true, observed value y. The
hypothesis is the output of the ANN given the input data x and the current weights
Θ(1),Θ(2),β(1). Then the activation of the output layer, which corresponds to the
hypothesis, is given by:
a(3) = hΘ(1),Θ(2),β(1)(z
(3)) = g(z(3)). (3.6)
This process of passing a set of inputs to the network and then propagating these
throughout the layers is commonly referred to as forward propagation. The actual
fitting of the network to the data, however, entails the modification of the entries of
the weight matrices, Θ,β. This occurs by the reverse of forward propagation, so that
the algorithm is called backpropagation in the literature. A brief exposition of this
procedure follows. A more extensive derivation and discussion can be found in Haykin
(1999) or in Ng, Ngiam, Foo, Mai and Suen (2011).
At the outset consider the penalty function, also known as cost or loss function, for a
neural network. This function attaches a numerical value to the prediction errors made
by the net such that this value describes the goodness of the prediction relative to the
actually observed values. Assume that the network being considered has L layers, each
of which has sl units, not counting bias units. For ease of notation let Θ,β represent
the free parameters of the ANN for all layers. A common choice in the literature is the
squared error metric as the kernel for the cost function. For one training case this is
given as:
SE(Θ,β,x,y) =
1
2
‖ (hΘ,β(x)− y) ‖2, (3.7)
where x represents the input signal and y represents the target value. Assume that
the parameters are subject to regularization (Gnecco and Sanguineti, 2009). This pro-
cedure, sometimes called weight decay, is similar to ridge regression. Weight decay
is helpful in preventing the excessive growth of individual weights and thus facilitates
generalization. Then the cost, or loss, function with weight decay λ can be defined over
all m training cases as:
C(Θ,β,X,Y, λ) =
1
m
m∑
k=1
SE(Θ,β,xk,yk) +
λ
2
L−1∑
l=1
sl∑
i=1
sl+1∑
j=1
(
Θ
(l)
ji
)2
. (3.8)
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The first term sums the squared errors for all training cases k = 1 up to m. The second
term now sums the squares of the weights for all layers. For each layer consider each
weight from each unit in layer l to each unit in layer l+ 1. Note that the notation Θ(l)ji
signifies the weight in the weight matrix corresponding to layer l which connects unit
i in layer l to unit j in layer l + 1. It is ultimately the aim to iteratively update these
weights such that the value of the loss function associated with the ANN’s prediction
will become minimal. A common way of training the network is by way of gradient
descent with learning rate µ. Then for a layer l one can update the weights as follows:
Θ
(l)
ji = Θ
(l)
ji − µ
∂C(Θ,β,x,y, λ)
∂Θ
(l)
ji
. (3.9)
Similarly, for the bias weights:
β
(l)
j = β
(l)
j − µ
∂C(Θ,β,x,y, λ)
∂β
(l)
j
. (3.10)
The backpropagation algorithm serves the purpose of efficiently computing the partial
derivatives needed for the update of the weights. The computation of the desired partials
is developed next, following Haykin (1999). Define the error that the neural net makes
at the output layer for one observation as:
(x) = hΘ,β(x)− y. (3.11)
To enable the use of gradient descent at reasonable computational cost, it is necessary
to compute the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to each individual
weight. Since the partial of the weight decay term is straightforward, the subsequent
discussion focusses on the SE component of the loss function. Specifically, consider
a general cost function of the form C(hΘ,β(x),y) (subsequently abbreviated as C(.))
that depends on the prediction and the desired target value. Then one can write for the
change in the loss function resulting from a marginal change in the weight connecting
neurons j and i in layers l + 1 and l:
∂C(.)
∂Θ
(l)
ji
=
∂C(.)
∂
(l+1)
j
∂
(l+1)
j
∂a
(l+1)
j
∂a
(l+1)
j
∂z
(l+1)
j
∂z
(l+1)
j
∂Θ
(l)
ji
. (3.12)
This expression follows from applying the chain rule multiple times. First, the change
in the cost function of the network depends on the change of the cost function as one
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varies the error at unit j in the output layer ( ∂C∂j ) and this depends on the variation in
the error as one varies the weight connecting neuron i in the previous layer to neuron
j in the output layer ( ∂j∂Θji ). Then this latter expression is itself the product of the
variation in the error as one varies the activation ( ∂j∂aj ) multiplied by the variation in
the activation as one varies the weight ( ∂aj∂Θji ). Finally, this last expression depends on
how the activation varies as one varies the incoming signal (∂aj∂zj ) and how that signal
varies as one varies the weight ( ∂zj∂Θji ). Decomposing the expressions one by one gives:
∂
(l+1)
j
∂a
(l+1)
j
= 1, (3.13)
∂a
(l+1)
j
∂z
(l+1)
j
= g′(z(l+1)j ), (3.14)
and
∂z
(l+1)
j
∂Θ
(l)
ji
= a
(l)
i . (3.15)
Substituting back into Equation 3.12 gives:
∂C(.)
∂Θ
(l)
ji
=
∂C(.)
∂
(l+1)
j
g′(z(l+1)j )a
(l)
i . (3.16)
Then, with learning rate µ, one can adjust the weights according to the “delta rule”:
∆Θ
(l)
ji = −µδ(l+1)j a(l)i , (3.17)
with
δ
(l+1)
j =
∂C(.)
∂
(l+1)
j
∂
(l+1)
j
∂a
(l+1)
j
∂a
(l+1)
j
∂z
(l+1)
j
= ∇

(l+1)
j
C(.)g′(z(l+1)j ), (3.18)
and ∇ denoting the partial derivative operator of the argument with respect to the
subscript. This notation will be useful when considering the gradient of vector valued
functions such as in Equation 3.21. This works straightforwardly when l + 1 = L.
However, for hidden layers it is not obvious what the desired output value for each
hidden neuron is. Therefore computation of (l+1) requires the “backpropagation of
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errors”. Letting l + 1 = L− 1, for instance, rewrite δj as:
δ
(L−1)
j =
∂C(.)
∂a
(L−1)
j
∂a(L−1)
∂z(L−1)
= ∇
a
(L−1)
j
C(.)g′(z(L−1)j ). (3.19)
Then the value of the cost function C depends on the error at all t = 1, . . . , sL neurons
in layer L as previously defined (see Equation 3.18). The partial with respect to a(L−1)j
can be rewritten as:
∂C(.)
∂a
(L−1)
j
=
∑
t
∇

(L)
t
C(.)
∂
(L)
t
∂a
(L−1)
j
=
∑
t
∇

(L)
t
C(.)
∂
(L)
t
∂z
(L)
t
∂z
(L)
t
∂a
(L−1)
j
. (3.20)
Note that (L) = g(z(L))−y and z(L) = Θ(L−1)a(L−1), which allows one to write (using
matrix calculus notation):
∂C(.)
∂a(L−1)
= Θ(L−1)T (∇(L)C(.) • g′(z(L)))
= Θ(L−1)Tδ(L). (3.21)
Here • is used to denote componentwise multiplication of two matrices, also known as
the Hadamard product. The superscript T signifies transposition. Now using the earlier
definition 3.19 one can write:
δ(L−1) = ∇a(L−1)C(.) • g′(z(L−1))
= Θ(L−1)Tδ(L) • g′(z(L−1)), (3.22)
which defines a recursion that can be applied to any hidden layer. This enables one to
compute the gradients and thus the desired weight changes. Then the partial derivatives
of the cost function with respect to any weight can, in analogy to Equations 3.16 and
3.18, be expressed as:
∂C(.)
∂Θ
(l)
ji
= δ
(l+1)
j a
(l)
i . (3.23)
For β(l)j the analogous expression to 3.15 reduces to unity because that is the constant
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output of the bias unit. Therefore:
∂C(.)
∂β
(l)
j
= δ
(l+1)
j . (3.24)
With these results in hand, one can write down the gradient descent algorithm with
backpropagation, which has been devised so as to efficiently cycle through the data, and
thus update the parameters of the ANN. Assuming the forward pass has been performed
and that the activations at each layer are available, gradient descent, using backpropa-
gation for the computation of the partials, can be carried out for one iteration over the
data as summarized in Algorithm 3.1. After randomly initializing the weights, which
Algorithm 3.1 Gradient Descent with Backpropagation Algorithm
Set ∆Θ(l) := 0 ∧∆β(l) := 0 ∀l
for k = 1 : m do
. Compute ∇Θ(l)C(Θ,β,xk,yk, λ) and ∇β(l)C(Θ,β,xk,yk, λ) by backpropagation:
δ(L) = ∇(L)C(.) • g′(z(L)k )
for l = L− 1 : 1 do . Compute δ(l)
δ(l) = (Θ(l))Tδ(l+1) • (a(l)k • (e− a(l)k )) . Here e is a vector of ones.
∇Θ(l)C(Θ,β,xk,yk, λ) = δ(l+1)(a
(l)
k )
T
∇β(l)C(Θ,β,xk,yk, λ) = δ(l+1)
end for
Set ∆Θ(l) := ∆Θ(l) +∇Θ(l)C(Θ,β,xk,yk, λ) ∀l
Set ∆β(l) := ∆β(l) +∇β(l)C(Θ,β,xk,yk, λ) ∀l
end for
Θ(l) = Θ(l) − µ
[(
1
m∆Θ
(l)
)
+ λΘ(l)
]
∀l . Update the parameters
β(l) = β(l) − µ
(
1
m∆β
(l)
)
∀l
is necessary in order to break symmetrical patterns in the weights because these can
induce a stagnation in the learning process (Nguyen and Widrow, 1990), this algorithm
allows one to update the network weights in a way, which facilitates the learning of
complex nonlinear hypotheses from the data. This idea was first developed by Werbos
(1974) and further elaborated by Rumelhart and McClelland (1986). While many exten-
sions and modifications have been proposed in the literature since, the backpropagation
approach still continues to be used frequently. For a discussion see for example Bengio
and Frasconi (1994), Parekh, Yang and Honavar (2000) or Hinton and Salakhutdinov
(2006). However, if in the present context one were to use this algorithm to update the
weights, Θ,β, until convergence the result would be an average production function.
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This is not a frontier but a function that approximates the available data on inputs and
outputs as well as possible subject to the architecture of the network and the number
of training iterations. Hence, in order to obtain a frontier, it is necessary to modify the
loss function. To do so I introduce the notion of “asymmetric cost functions”.
The use of asymmetric cost functions in forecasting has been known at least since
the work of Granger (1969). This approach involves using an error metric that is
different from the sum of squared errors as the cost function in ANN training. The
formal proof in White (1992) underpins this approach. It builds on his earlier proof of
the general approximation ability of ANNs and shows that ANNs with appropriately
modified loss functions can be used as universal quantile estimators. Applications of
asymmetric cost functions in the case of ANNs are few in number. Crone (2002, 2003)
shows the expansion of the standard backpropagation algorithm used in ANN training
for the computation of the derivatives of the net with respect to individual weights, for
asymmetric cost functions. In fact, the only derivative that is affected by the asymmetry
in the cost function is that of the output layer. Hence the discussion on the preceding
pages can be directly applied to this problem. He provides an empirical application for
the so called LINLIN cost function (see for example Christoffersen and Diebold, 1996,
1997) which consists of two linear branches starting at the origin, each of which has
different slopes in the positive and negative direction:
LINLIN =

a|yˆ − y| if y > yˆ
0 if y = yˆ
b|yˆ − y| if y < yˆ,
(3.25)
where yˆ denotes the prediction and a, b are constants. In later work Crone (2010) shows
the use of the so called QUADQUAD cost function:
QUADQUAD =

a(yˆ − y)2 if y > yˆ
0 if y = yˆ
b(yˆ − y)2 if y < yˆ.
(3.26)
Using such a cost function will induce the ANN to learn a “biased” predictor of the
target data. In the case of efficiency precisely this is the aim, namely to learn the
underlying structure of, for example, industry cost but with special emphasis on those
banks which manage to keep cost low given an input output bundle. This thesis follows
Crone (2002, 2003, 2010) and defines the asymmetric cost function of the neural net as
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follows.
QQ(Θ,β, a, b,x,y) =

a
2 ||(hΘ,β(x)− y)||2 if y > hΘ,β(x)
0 if y = hΘ,β(x)
b
2 ||(hΘ,β(x)− y)||2 if y < hΘ,β(x).
(3.27)
This does not change anything in the derivation of the partials needed for backpropa-
gation except a constant factor. This function can then be substituted into C in lieu of
SE(Θ,β,x,y). In particular, for the output layer one can now, using the asymmetric
cost function, write:
δ(L) =

a(a(L) − y) • g′(z(L)) if y > a(L)
0 if y = a(L)
b(a(L) − y) • g′(z(L)) if y < a(L).
(3.28)
The gradient descent algorithm works identically, only that now the gradients will
be pre-multiplied by a factor of a, respectively b according as the error is positive or
negative. The type of asymmetry will depend on the kind of frontier that is being
parametrized. In the cost efficiency case, for example, it is assumed that banks are
generally producing at higher cost than optimal, while in the technical, profit, revenue
and shareholder value efficiency cases one generally assumes that banks produce less
of the target quantity than they could if they were fully efficient. In the asymmetric
ANN this is equivalent to choosing the asymmetry parameter such that the frontier will
approach the observations from below (cost efficiency) or above (all others). Hence I do
not interpret as an error the prediction of higher cost (lower shareholder value etc.) than
what is actually observed. Rather, this merely implies that the bank has been inefficient
compared to other banks with a similar input-output-mix. However, observing a bank
that has a level of cost below (shareholder value above) the predicted level would mean
that this bank has been super-efficient. Since the frontier should envelop the sample of
banks, I treat this case as a prediction error to be penalized. This is accomplished by
setting b > a (a > b).
Unreported preliminary analyses have been conducted to ensure that the GFA ap-
proach converges and that it does not overfit. Moreover, a grid search across 25 com-
binations of architecture and weight decay and 20 combinations of architecture, weight
decay and asymmetry parameter have shown that the outcomes generated by GFA are
quite robust to the choice of architecture and weight decay as well as to various choices
of the asymmetry parameter. Hence, in the following, the ANN has a weight decay of
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0.5 and ten hidden units. The asymmetry parameter is set to a = 1000 and b = 1 for
shareholder value efficiency and the opposite for cost efficiency.
A practical point that must be addressed when conceptualizing the GFA approach is
the choice of input signals (the vector x) and target values (y). Consider the case of
SFA shareholder value efficiency as a starting point. Here, following Fiordelisi (2007),
the frontier can be specified in terms of the economic outputs and the prices of in-
puts. The assumption is that bank managers aim at maximizing shareholder value by
choosing the optimal input quantities given prices. However, in the context of an ANN
this approach does not recommend itself. First, economically speaking, it is merely a
matter of convenience to postulate that the only variables in managerial shareholder
value maximization are input quantities. One could equally well suppose, and indeed
this appears to be likely in practice, that managers choose both the in- and output mix
under criteria of shareholder value maximization. Hence any efforts to maximize share-
holder value are unlikely to be confined to the input-mix alone. This actual decision
making process should be taken into account when parametrizing the frontier. Second,
technically speaking, an artificial neural network is a structure that aims at recognizing
patterns. Banks with different business models and markets may still charge or pay
very similar “prices” on their products because these prices will correlate strongly with
the overall state of the economy and the behavior of competitors.4 Thus it appears
unlikely that price information is the most meaningful in terms of recognizing patterns
in the data. Rather I argue that banks are distinguished by the structure of their bal-
ance sheet. Therefore an ANN aiming at discovering an efficient frontier from the data
should be parametrized in terms of in- and output quantities.
Having formalized the GFA method, the following section will provide some discussion
on the data used in the analysis before the remainder of this chapter sets out to test
the validity and capabilities of the GFA method.
3.3. Data and Variables
This section discusses the data and empirical strategy of this chapter. The main ef-
ficiency measurement methods have been introduced at length in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2
and in the preceding section.
As expounded in Chapter 2.3, this thesis adopts the intermediation approach pro-
posed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) in order to define inputs and outputs and, in so
doing, places its research in line with many prior studies. Specifically, I follow Berger
4See for example Section 2.3.1 or Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006).
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(2003) in selecting as inputs labor (number of full-time-equivalent employees), purchased
funds, core deposits, physical capital and equity. This thesis treats physical capital and
equity as fixed inputs since these are not freely disposable in the short run. As outputs, I
define consumer loans, business loans, real estate loans, securities and off-balance-sheet
items. The last output category is treated as fixed, as there is no obvious flow definition
that would allow a straightforward calculation of the corresponding price. In comput-
ing prices this thesis follows the localized approach of Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti
(2006), which, using information from the Summary of Deposits database, localizes
banks into markets according to metropolitan statistical areas and non-metropolitan
statistical area counties. Otherwise, all data related to firm-level efficiency stems from
the December Call Reports for 1994-2010, available from the Chicago branch of the
Federal Reserve and is cleaned as described in Section 2.3. All variables are adjusted to
2005 US dollars using the GDP implied deflator. Notably, the timespan being studied
includes at least two periods of considerable turmoil in financial markets, the collapse
of the “dot-com bubble” of 2000-2001 and the financial crisis of 2007-2009. One of the
aims of this chapter is to analyze the validity of efficiency parametrization methods
as well as the degree to which they agree or disagree. In that respect the presence of
periods exhibiting high levels of noise is a welcome test of the methods under study as
regards their ability to deal with such noisy data. This chapter therefore deals with the
periods in question only insofar as it refrains from using panel data methods or pooled
data for the estimation of efficiency. Rather, the approach is to estimate efficiency over
yearly data and thus allow each efficiency parametrization method to adjust the shape
of its prediction to the respective prevailing economic climate. This also ensures com-
patibility of the SFA and GFA results, since there are as yet no panel data extensions
for GFA available.
The empirical analysis sets out to accomplish two main objectives. First, the aim
is to investigate whether the proposed GFA method is able to provide a meaningful
indicator of shareholder value efficiency and whether that indicator is compatible with
efficiency scores derived from SFA. Second, this chapter tries to understand the infor-
mation content of this indicator in terms of explaining shareholder value creation in US
banks. Hence the analysis proceeds in two steps.
Since efficiency is a latent concept, the validity of efficiency scores can only be inves-
tigated indirectly. Therefore I build on Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998)
in order to investigate the first objective. These authors provide a comprehensive
set of consistency criteria that can be used to investigate whether different efficiency
parametrizations provide plausible conclusions about the underlying technology. They
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propose to investigate the similarity between efficiency scores obtained from different
methods along both the statistical and economic dimensions. The aim of the statistical
analysis is to investigate whether the various efficiency scores have similar distributional
properties, whether they provide similar rankings of banks and whether they identify
similar groups of banks as particularly efficient or inefficient. The validation analysis
aims to assess the degree to which efficiency scores align with the observed facts of the
banking industry, and how plausibly they associate with typical nonfrontier measures
of performance. While Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998) include only re-
turn, revenue and cost characteristics among these measures, this chapter expands the
set of nonfrontier performance criteria to encompass the CAMELS rating criteria as
completely as possible. This mnemonic represents Capital adequacy, Asset structure,
Managerial ability, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity. Specifically, I include return on
assets (ROA) and economic value added (EVA)5 to proxy for the earnings dimension.
The analysis also includes the equity over asset ratio to proxy for the capital adequacy
dimension, liquid assets over total assets to capture liquidity, and nonperforming loans
over total loans to capture asset structure. I do not investigate sensitivity explicitly.
So far, the bulk of the analysis is based on rank correlations, following Bauer, Berger,
Ferrier and Humphrey (1998). However, correlations, rank or otherwise, may be unsta-
ble. Therefore, in the second step, the chapter additionally investigates the information
content of the two shareholder value efficiency parametrizations, using regression anal-
ysis. Specifically, it analyzes the information content of the shareholder value efficiency
scores with respect to one another and vis-à-vis other efficiency scores and common con-
trol variables. It also investigates the information content of SHVE vis-à -vis managerial
ability. This analysis enables insight into the value creation process in US banks.
3.4. Empirical Results
This section reports the main empirical results. Specifically, it discusses results on the
statistical and economic analyses of Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998) in
Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. The results of the regression analyses are discussed in Section
3.4.3.
5In deriving this measure of shareholder value creation, I follow Fiordelisi (2007). See Section 2.3.2
for details.
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3.4.1. Statistical Analysis
I turn first to the analysis of statistical properties of the two shareholder value efficiency
scores. These results are reported in Table 3.1.
Panel A: Distributional Properties
SFA GFA
mean 0.6938 0.7634
median 0.7201 0.7870
min 0.0001 -1.4005
max 0.9840 1.0000
std 0.1412 0.0896
skewness -2.0763 -6.9785
Panel B: Correlations
Pearson 0.4749***
Spearman 0.4390***
Kendall 0.3313***
Panel C: Overlaps
Top 25% Bottom 25%
0.4551* 0.5501*
Top 10% Bottom 10%
0.3050* 0.5046*
Top 5% Bottom 5%
0.2703* 0.4884*
Top 1% Bottom 1%
0.2849* 0.3292*
Table 3.1.:
Statistical Analysis of Shareholder
Value Efficiency Parametrization
Methods. This table reports results
relating to the statistical analysis.
Panel A shows distributional properties
computed on a yearly basis and then
averaged across years. Stars indicate
significance levels at 0.01 (***), 0.05
(**) and 0.1 (*) levels. Panel B displays
various correlation coefficients. Panel
C reports the overlap between top and
bottom percentiles of banks as classified
by the two efficiency parametrization
methods. * indicates significant dif-
ference from 25% (10%, 5%, 1%) at
the 10% level (Chi-square test, two-
tailed). SFA indicates stochastic frontier
analysis. GFA indicates generalized
frontier analysis (asymmetry parameter
a = 1000).
The interpretation of these results relies on the benchmark study of Fiordelisi (2007),
which reports values around 60% for the shareholder value efficiency of European banks.
Given that the orientation toward maximizing shareholder value is generally thought to
be more stringently implemented in the US, it is not entirely surprising to obtain values
of around 65% for the same timespan. Overall, results document an average SHVE of
75% from the GFA parametrization (Panel A), while SFA indicates an average SHVE of
around 70%. Although a direct comparison between efficiency scores of European and
American banks is not possible because efficiency is by definition an in-sample quantity,
this does show that, on average, US banks are closer to their efficient frontier than their
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European counterparts are to their frontier. This also resonates with Hughes, Lang,
Mester, Moon and Pagano (2003), who find that listed US banks are approximately
80% market value efficient. The calculation of market value efficiency requires the bank
to be listed, however. Yet the majority of US banks is private, which makes SHVE an
important indicator of value creation efficiency in this context. As expected, the non-
parametric frontier obtained from generalized frontier analysis yields somewhat greater
efficiency scores. It is likely that this is because the GFA method constitutes a relaxation
of the parametric and distributional assumptions imposed by SFA and thus enables a
tighter fit to the data. Only GFA can account naturally for negative shareholder value
efficiency. This will occur in a constellation when a bank is predicted to create positive
value but in fact ends up destroying value. SFA cannot accommodate this feature and
requires data manipulation to achieve nonnegative values of shareholder value prior to
fitting the frontier. This is another conceptual advantage of GFA over SFA. It is also
interesting to note that the GFA method provides lower variation in efficiency scores
and both methods plausibly report negative skewness of efficiency scores. The greater
dispersion and difference between mean and median for the SFA method suggests that
this method may be providing some outlying efficiency scores. While these tests re-
veal that differences between SFA and GFA exist, the literature has documented far
greater differences between parametric and nonparametric methods such as SFA and
DEA (Huang and Wang, 2002, Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998). There-
fore SFA and GFA can be treated as methods providing compatible efficiency scores.
Panel B investigates the (rank) correlations between the efficiency scores. If the effi-
ciency parametrization methods are reasonably compatible, one would expect a positive
similarity between the efficiency-based rankings of banks. In fact, the two methods do
display strong and highly significant positive rank correlations, which indicates that the
two methods provide compatible efficiency parametrizations. This impression is further
strengthened by considering the overlap between the best and worst practitioners in the
US banking industry. The rationale behind considering the overlap between the best
and worst performing banks is that even if two efficiency score distributions do not align
well in their totality, they can still be efficacious, for example in terms of policy im-
plications, if they identify similar banks as being highly (in-)efficient. Therefore Panel
C of Table 3.1 investigates the fraction of banks that any pair of methods simultane-
ously places in the best (worst) percentiles of banks. Concretely, the analysis identifies
those banks that are located in the top or bottom 1st, 5th, 10th and 25th percentile of
the efficiency distribution and compares the proportion of banks that overlap between
any two efficiency parametrization methods. A χ2 test subsequently tests whether the
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overlap is statistically significantly different from one’s expectation of overlap due to
chance. The overlap for quantile Q subsets of two sets A,B with M and N elements is
computed as follows:
O =
C(AQ ∩BQ)
min(M,N)
, (3.29)
where C signifies the cardinality. Findings show that overlaps are statistically signifi-
cantly greater than chance, which further strengthens the conclusion that the GFA and
SFA methods provide compatible results. This shows that GFA is a suitable efficiency
estimation method that produces valid results.
3.4.2. Validation Analysis
Having established that the shareholder value efficiency scores obtained from SFA and
GFA share many statistical properties, the next step is to investigate whether the
resulting efficiency scores also align with the observed facts of the US banking industry.
Hence this section analyzes the association between efficiency scores and nonfrontier
indicators of performance.
Shareholder value efficiency indicates how close a given bank is to choosing an input-
output mix that would enable it to create the maximum technically feasible shareholder
value. Therefore it is natural to expect banks with higher SHVE to be more profitable
(have a higher ROA) and to generate lower (higher) levels of cost (revenue) for a given
level of value created. Higher SHVE should also be positively associated with economic
value added (the measure of value creation used in this study). For further insight,
I split this variable into its two components, economic profits (EP ) and the capital
charge, which is the product of cost of capital and lagged capital invested (see Section
2.3.2 for details). One would further expect that more shareholder value efficient banks
will align positively with greater economic profits and lower capital charge. More ef-
ficient banks have been shown to possess better loan selection and monitoring skills
(Chortareas, Girardone and Ventouri, 2011). Hence one can expect more SHVE banks
to have lower levels of nonperforming loans. Where the capitalization of banks is con-
cerned, there are two possible expectations: either greater efficiency can reduce equity
on the expectation that future profits will offset this initial shortage (see, for example,
the efficiency-risk hypothesis of Altunbas and Chakravarty (2001)); alternatively, more
shareholder value efficient banks will aim to protect their valuable charter by reducing
risk and will therefore hold greater amounts of equity (see, for example, the franchise
value hypothesis of Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)). A similar argument can be
constructed for the fraction of liquid assets over total assets. Hence I do not formulate
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explicit expectations for these two variables. It has been shown that the production
technology of banks may differ by size, for example due to economies of scale or rela-
tionship lending (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005). Hence this section
investigates the results of the validation analysis for the full sample as well as for sub-
samples split by bank size. Specifically, I rerun the parametrization of the shareholder
value efficiency frontier for each subsample and investigate the respective correlations
for each subsample separately. The strong asymmetry in bank size across the US bank-
ing industry (see Feng and Serletis, 2009) suggests that the sample be split, for example,
at the 50th and 90th percentiles. Table 3.2 reports the main findings of this analysis.
The full sample results are reported in Panel A. In particular, findings show that both
methods provide efficiency scores that align well with nonfrontier bank characteristics
for the full sample. Thus the efficiency scores capture the majority of the expected re-
lations. Specifically, more shareholder value efficient banks are more profitable (ROA),
have lower cost ( Total CostTotal Assets) and greater revenue (
Total Revenue
Total Assets ), higher shareholder
value creation ( EV ATotal Assets) and a better quality loan portfolio (
Nonperf. Loans
Total Loans ). These
banks produce both greater economic profits ( EPTotal Assets) and lower capital charges
(Capital ChargeTotal Assets ). The SFA and GFA methods disagree on the association between share-
holder value efficiency and capitalization ( EquityTotal Assets). While SFA associates more
shareholder value efficient banks with less equity and fewer liquid assets (Liquid AssetsTotal Assets ),
the GFA efficiency scores exhibit the opposite relation. Both explanations are plausible
given the findings in the literature. Concretely, it appears that the GFA efficiency scores
are capturing the benefits gained from risk aversion and preservation of a valuable bank
charter, while the SFA scores reflect a more aggressive banking strategy. More impor-
tantly, however, the two methods agree on a majority of the relations. This further
strengthens the conclusion that the GFA and SFA methods are generally compatible,
albeit with distinct information content.
Next, I discuss the results for the split sample analysis (Panels B-D). These are
obtained by estimating a separate frontier for each subsample of banks, based on the
conjecture that size might be driving significant technological differences between banks.
Results show, across subsamples and methods, that higher SHVE banks are more prof-
itable, have lower cost and greater revenue per unit assets, and produce greater economic
profits and EVA. They also generate a lower capital charge, although for medium and
large banks only GFA is significant here. They further appear to hold less risky loan
portfolios; again for large banks only GFA is significant. Furthermore, higher SHVE
banks seem to reduce equity holdings (only GFA is significant for small and medium
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banks). While small banks appear to favor liquid assets, medium banks slightly reduce
this balance sheet position. Again this is indicated only by GFA.
Overall, the validation analysis reveals that both SFA and GFA shareholder value
efficiency scores are associated in plausible ways with other nonfrontier measures of bank
performance. More shareholder value efficient banks appear to accomplish this efficiency
by a strong focus on loan portfolio quality and profitability. Both cost minimization and
revenue maximization are beneficial for value creation in these banks. These findings
are largely independent of bank size. I also find that, probably due to the greater
flexibility of the GFA method, the efficiency scores derived from this parametrization
are more informative than those derived from SFA, judging by the greater frequency of
significant rank correlations.
3.4.3. Regression Analysis
This section investigates the explanatory contribution and economic relevance of share-
holder value efficiency to the analysis of value creation in US banks. To this end I
formulate the following baseline model:
EV Ai,t
Ci,t−1
=α+ βψ − effSFA,i,t + γψ − effGFA,i,t + ξ′zi,t +
16∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t. (3.30)
Here ψ − effm,i,t is shareholder value efficiency estimated by the method m for
m ∈ {SFA,GFA}. dt are time dummies, υ is a firm fixed effect and  is the dis-
turbance. Standard errors are clustered by banks. Further specifications add cost
efficiency (x − effm,i,t) and revenue efficiency (τ − effm,i,t). This analysis also investi-
gates the importance of managerial ability (MA) for bank value creation. In so doing,
I follow the method of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), which is explained at length
in Chapter 5. To purge variation not due to the influence of efficiency I also add control
variables (z), which include ROA, the log of gross total assets (BKSIZE), the ratio of
nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL) and the leverage (LEV RAG) of the bank.6
The dependent variable is economic value added scaled by lagged capital invested, to
reflect the flow nature of value creation. The use of lagged capital invested reduces the
sample to 106,564 bank-year observations.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3.3. The various specifications ex-
6Multicollinearity of regressors is not problematic in this dataset. Thus the greatest correlation of
around 0.6 occurs between the cost and revenue efficiency measures and their lags. These lags are
included in regressions that are reported in the appendix (Section A.2.3.2) without qualitatively
affecting the main results.
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plore the explanatory contribution of SHVE estimated by GFA and SFA. The specific
questions are threefold. First, I ask whether the SHVE scores of one method subsume
the information conveyed by the SHVE scores estimated by the other method (Specifica-
tions 1-6). Second, Specifications 7-10 also examine whether SHVE contains additional
information above and beyond that included in cost and revenue efficiency. Finally,
Specifications 11 and 12 answer the question whether the information of SHVE might
be subsumed by managerial ability. These specifications not only address a question of
economic relevance but they also simultaneously mitigate endogeneity concerns arising
from omitted variable problems. Tests of the fixed effects specifications against the
random effects model using the Hausman (1978) test showed that the random effects
approach is overwhelmingly rejected in the data. I therefore choose the fixed effects
model. The following regressions obtain SHVE estimates by splitting the sample of
banks by size at the 50th and 90th percentiles. A separate frontier is estimated for
each subsample and the resulting efficiency scores are pooled.7 Coefficient estimates
and significances are qualitatively similar if one instead estimates the frontier over the
full sample of banks. I standardize all regressors to Z-Scores in all models. This will
facilitate the interpretation of the economic significance of the efficiency scores. In addi-
tion to these regressions, Table 3.4 also investigates the contribution that the efficiency
scores make to the explanation of value creation.
Specifications 1-6 analyze the information content of the SHVE measures, one vis-
à-vis the other. Consider first Specifications 1 and 3. These compare the economic
significance of SHVE parametrized by SFA and GFA respectively. First, it is impor-
tant to note that the economic importance of GFA is superior to that of SFA. Thus,
the impact of a one standard deviation change in the GFA-SHVE score amounts to a
change in value creation of 3.83 % of lagged capital invested, while the equivalent effect
is only 2.97 % for SFA. Given that the average bank creates value on the order of 5.37
% of capital invested, a 3.83 percentage point increase is substantial. Although less
extreme, the greater economic importance of GFA-SHVE holds when control variables
are added to the regression in Specifications 2 and 4. Furthermore, between Speci-
fications 1 and 3, the GFA specification exhibits a substantially greater adjusted R2
than the SFA specification. The control variables show that more value-creating banks
are more profitable (ROA), more highly leveraged (LEV RAG) and larger (BKSIZE).
Moreover, these banks have a weak preference for higher quality loan portfolios (NPL).
7This is in line with a number of studies that estimate bank technologies that vary according to
different characteristics such as for example McAllister and McManus (1993) and Feng and Serletis
(2009) for size or Mester (1993) for type of ownership structure.
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These results align with the main findings from the validation analysis. Specifications
5 and 6 include SFA and GFA-SHVE jointly, both with and without control variables.
GFA-SHVE is again more economically significant in both cases. Specifically, when
GFA and SFA are jointly included in the regression, the t-statistic for the SFA-SHVE
nearly halves and the coefficient decreases from 0.0297 to 0.0211 vis-à-vis Specification
1. On the other hand, the decrease in the GFA coefficient is only from 0.0383 to 0.0337,
with the t-statistic virtually unchanged. However, including both SHVE measures pro-
vides a significant increase of the adjusted R2 which, along with the fact that both
SHVE parametrizations maintain their significance, confirms the conclusion from the
validation analysis, namely that the two SHVE measures contain similar but distinct
information sets, with GFA being the more informative measure.
Next, I turn to the analysis of Specifications 7-10. These investigate whether SHVE
makes a meaningful contribution to the explanation of value creation above and beyond
the contribution of cost and revenue efficiency. In economic terms, the question is
whether being cost or revenue efficient is a sufficient condition for value creation. All
four specifications show that cost efficiency tends to have a negative impact on value
creation, while revenue efficiency is weakly positive. This is the case regardless of
whether cost and revenue efficiency are parametrized using SFA or GFA.8 A reasonable
explanation for this finding could run as follows. Cost efficiency gains are likely to
require restructuring initiatives that, at least initially, tend to cause frictions and may
destroy value. Consider for example initial organizational difficulties after staff have
been laid off. The organizational adjustments inevitably cause a loss of value at the
outset, while the leaner structure may be beneficial in the long run.9 Unsurprisingly, the
coefficient on revenue efficiency is positive as it likely entails an expansion of economic
activity and may, for example, subsume beneficial scale effects. Again, results show
that the economic significance of the GFA-SHVE scores is greater than that of the
SFA scores. In addition, the inclusion of cost and revenue efficiency into the regression
provides only a marginal increase in adjusted R2, which suggests that SHVE is an
important value driver, while cost and revenue efficiency cannot be viewed as sufficient
for value creation.
A main source of doubt about the validity of regression analyses is the potential
8This documents the ability of GFA to measure efficiency scores other than SHVE, which is further
supported by findings regarding cost efficiency in Appendix A.3. In further (unreported) analyses I
rerun Specifications 9 and 10 using SFA to parametrize cost and revenue efficiency, with qualitatively
unchanged results.
9The specifications including lags of cost efficiency in Appendix A.2.3.2 support this interpretation.
The lags are found to be positively significant for value creation.
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for endogeneity. Specifically, it is conceivable that both shareholder value creation
and shareholder value efficiency are highly correlated with an unobserved third factor,
the influence of which has not been filtered out by the other control variables in the
regression.10 A prime candidate for such an omitted factor would be managerial ability
(MA). Hence I include a proxy of managerial ability in Specifications 11 and 12. The
ability of management to influence the performance of firms has been shown to be
substantial (Beatty and Liao, 2011, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Demerjian, Lev and
McVay (2012) argue that a key function of management is to maximize revenue in an
efficient manner. However, the revenue efficiency of a bank will depend on more than
just the activities of management. Therefore one should purge revenue efficiency scores
of bank-specific effects and use the resulting residual as the indicator of managerial
ability. The authors use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to obtain revenue efficiency
scores and purge these of bank-specific effects by Tobit-regressing them on a set of
controls.11 Therefore I compute this measure of managerial ability and include it in the
regression specifications.
In addition to making inference more robust to the influence of endogeneity, this
approach will allow insight into the importance of bank managers for value creation.
That is, I examine whether SHVE is an important driver of value creation or whether
its impact is fully subsumed by the ability of management. One could argue that it is a
central task of managers to maximize the creation of value on the behalf of owners. In
this case one should expect managerial ability to be positively related to value creation.
However, managerial ability may not be an adequate indicator of value creation. Factors
that make this case more likely include asymmetric effects of local market heterogeneity
on banks and their managers or adverse effects such as empire building, agency problems
or earnings management, which have been sufficiently documented in the literature
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon and Pagano, 2003, Shen and
Chih, 2005). In this case I expect SHVE to retain its significance and sign and to
contribute more to the explanation of value creation than managerial ability.
Specification 11 shows that, as expected, managerial ability is positively and highly
significantly associated with value creation. Its impact, however, is not very econom-
ically significant, judging by the magnitude of the coefficients relative to those of the
10Alternatively, reverse causation might be influencing results if being more shareholder value effi-
cient entails greater value creation and greater value creation can lead to higher shareholder value
efficiency. However, this source of endogeneity is not as troubling in the present context as the
analysis does not claim to establish causation.
11Cantrell (2013) has shown that this measure is an efficacious indicator of managerial ability in
banks. For further details on the construction of the MA variable see Chapter 5.
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Table 3.4.: Contribution of Efficiency Measures to Adjusted R2 in % of Adjusted R2.
This table reports the contribution to adjusted R2 made by each variable in the regressions in
Table 3.3. Specifically, each cell indicates how much the regressor contributes to the explanatory
power of the regression indicated by the column heading. The contribution to adjusted R2 was
computed as Cj =
R2−R2j
R2 , where Cj is the contribution of the j
th variable, R2j is the adjusted R2
computed without that variable and R2 is the total adjusted R2. ψ− eff represents shareholder
value efficiency, while x − eff and τ − eff indicate cost and revenue efficiency. SFA indicates
stochastic frontier analysis. GFA indicates generalized frontier analysis (asymmetry parameter
a = 1000). MA stands for managerial ability and has been computed following Demerjian, Lev
and McVay (2012).
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ψ − effSFA 16.5 3.9 6.3 2.9 16.0 3.6 3.0 6.5
ψ − effGFA 28.1 4.4 19.3 3.4 28.3 4.6 3.5 15.5
x− effSFA 0.1 0.2
τ − effSFA 0.1 0.0
x− effGFA 0.4 0.2
τ − effGFA 0.0 0.1
MA 0.1 0.2
SHVE scores. Moreover, both the SFA- and GFA-based SHVE scores maintain the signs
and significances that were observed in the main analysis. This shows that endogeneity
arising from omitted variables is not driving the main results. More importantly, these
results also show that SHVE scores are important in explaining the creation of value in
US banks in their own right. Furthermore, this points to the existence of some of the
problems mentioned above. I leave disentangling the precise reasons for this finding to
future research as a thoroughgoing investigation of this question is beyond the scope of
this thesis. It has been argued in the literature (Beatty and Liao, 2011) that ROA can
proxy for managerial ability. To alleviate the concern that this effect may be driving
the low economic significance of MA in Specification 11, Specification 12 reruns the re-
gression without ROA. While the coefficient on MA does increase somewhat, it is still
far smaller than that of the SHVE measures, which supports the initial interpretation.
The final step of the regression analysis focuses on the explanatory contribution of
the SHVE measures, vis-à-vis one another and vis-à-vis cost and revenue efficiency as
well as managerial ability. It could be that even though less economically significant,
SFA-SHVE is a statistically more informative variable in explaining value creation.
To explore this question, I re-estimate each of the models above various times. Each
run omits one efficiency score and records the change in adjusted R2 resulting from
adding a particular efficiency score. The percentage change in adjusted R2 is reported
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in Table 3.4. The column headers identify the Specification from Table 3.3 that is being
considered as the benchmark.
Given that these regressions include fixed time and bank effects, the contributions to
adjusted R2 made by the shareholder value efficiency scores are substantial. Thus, in-
cluding SHVE parametrized by GFA into a model that has only fixed effects contributes
28.1% to adjusted R2 (Specification 3). The comparable contribution of SFA is lower
but still a sizeable 16.5%. Control variables dampen the explanatory contribution of
the SHVE scores but cannot eliminate it, as is shown in Specifications 2 and 4. In all
cases, the GFA-SHVE scores are more informative than those obtained from SFA. This
is supported by Specification 5, which includes both SHVE measures. Here GFA-SHVE
contributes 19.3% to the adjusted R2, while the SFA counterpart only delivers 6.3%.
Interestingly, the contribution to the explanation of value creation provided by cost and
revenue efficiency is vanishingly small (Specifications 7-10). Although slightly greater
contributions of the GFA cost efficiency scores suggest that the greater information
content for the GFA efficiency scores might hold not only for SHVE but also for cost
and revenue efficiency scores, I do not overemphasize this result. Finally, Specification
11 shows that managerial ability is almost irrelevant to explaining value creation in the
presence of SHVE. This is in line with findings from the preceding analysis, where MA
is found to be economically only marginally significant. This finding holds even when
ROA is excluded from the regression (Specification 12). As before, GFA is the more
meaningful out of the two SHVE variables in these two Specifications (11, 12).
In sum, I conduct a number of analyses which establish that GFA is a suitable method
for the estimation of efficiency scores. These analyses show that it is both more econom-
ically significant and more informative in this respect than equivalent efficiency scores
obtained from SFA. They further demonstrate that SHVE is an important concept that
cannot be simply subsumed under cost and revenue efficiency or managerial ability.
3.5. Robustness Checks
In order to ensure that this analysis is providing valid and reliable results, I carry out a
number of robustness checks, the majority of which are reported in Appendix A. First,
to check that the SHVE scores themselves are not spurious, I calculate the correlation
of the efficiency scores in period t and all periods t + 1 until T . One would expect
to observe positive correlations that decrease over time, since efficiency is likely to be
a bank characteristic that changes only slowly. Unreported results find precisely this
pattern for both SFA and GFA.
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Second, as regards the validation analysis discussed in Section 3.4.2, I rerun the anal-
ysis for a balanced sample of banks. Results are qualitatively unchanged. I also rerun
the analysis for nonfrontier performance measures shifted one period into the future;
in other words, this robustness check examines the capacity of SHVE scores to predict
nonfrontier performance characteristics of banks. As before, results show that both
SFA and GFA provide meaningful and plausible predictions. A similar, unreported,
check also investigates the relation between SHVE and nonfrontier performance multi-
ple periods into the future and finds that the dynamic patterns displayed by the rank
correlations of nonfrontier performance indicators both with the SFA- and GFA-SHVE
measures are remarkably similar. Another robustness check further considers the cor-
relation of the long-sectional average of SHVE scores with the long-sectional average of
bank nonfrontier characteristics. Again the results show highly significant and plausible
correlations for both SFA and GFA.
Third, the main analysis uses the standard definition of managerial ability proposed
by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). In order to assure the robustness of the key
results, I modify this definition by using SFA instead of DEA to compute the rev-
enue efficiency measure that serves as a basis for the MA proxy (see Section A.2.3.3).
Moreover, I explore a yearly specification for MA instead of a pooled cross-sectional
one (unreported). Additionally, I also change the set of control variables used in the
first-stage regressions to purge the revenue efficiency scores from bank-specific factors
(unreported). The main results continue to hold. Furthermore, I re-estimate the spec-
ifications in Table 3.3, including lags of the efficiency scores and of managerial ability,
because one might argue that efficiency takes time to influence value creation. Again,
results are qualitatively unchanged (see Section A.2.3.2). Moreover, to address pos-
sible endogeneity concerns, I rerun the regression analysis using lagged SHVE only.
Again, results are qualitatively unchanged. Finally, to investigate the ability of GFA
to parametrize efficiency scores other than SHVE, Section A.3 carries out the statisti-
cal and validation analyses with attendant robustness checks for cost efficiency. These
analyses confirm the complementary nature of SFA and GFA.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter develops and investigates a novel method, generalized frontier analysis, for
the estimation of economic and technological frontiers. This method is nonparametric
and stochastic and hence combines the advantages of previous approaches without in-
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heriting their limitations. I apply this method to the shareholder value efficiency of a
large sample of US commercial banks.
Results document that both the SFA and the GFA methods provide efficiency scores
that have plausible distributional characteristics. This validates GFA as an efficiency
measurement method. Furthermore, the findings show that the efficiency scores from
GFA align with other nonfrontier indicators of bank performance. In particular, I find
relations between these nonfrontier performance measures and SHVE that conform with
reasonable priors derived from the literature. More importantly, however, considering
a sample split by bank size shows that GFA provides efficiency scores that contain
at least as much information about bank performance as equivalent SFA-based scores.
This further corroborates the capacity of GFA to parametrize efficient frontiers.
Moreover, SHVE scores derived from GFA have a greater economic significance in
explaining the value creation of US banks than similar scores derived from SFA. This
also holds when managerial ability is included in the analysis, which implies that SHVE
is an important driver of value creation in its own right and not simply a proxy for the
ability of management. Managerial ability is in turn found to be a statistically signifi-
cant but economically marginal driver of bank value creation. Furthermore, I find the
economic and statistical significance of cost and revenue efficiency to be equally negligi-
ble compared to SHVE. This confirms that cost and revenue efficiency are not sufficient
for the creation of value. These results are robust to a wide variety of robustness checks.
This analysis confirms that shareholder value efficiency can be parametrized by way
of GFA and that it is a meaningful concept that can make a contribution to the un-
derstanding of bank value creation. While results show that managerial ability is an
important variable that influences value creation in banks, it would be of interest to
investigate through which channels managerial ability is able to do so, why its impact
is lower than that of SHVE and why it does not subsume the information in the SHVE
scores completely.
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4. Bank Transparency, too Much of a
Good Thing?
Banks are believed to be opaque to outsiders by virtue of the assets that they hold.
A social planner would like banks to be transparent, riskless and highly efficient inter-
mediators of liquidity. However, these goals appear to be conflicting ones. Whether
and how opacity, fragility and intermediation quality are connected is an important
question of relevance to regulators, investors and the general public. Furthermore, the
theoretical literature makes three conflicting predictions about this relation. To disen-
tangle the competing theories, this chapter conceptualizes a measure of intermediation
quality that overcomes important econometric challenges. It tests the resulting conjec-
tures on a large sample of US banks and finds that intermediation quality is positively
associated with opacity and fragility. These results imply that demanding full disclo-
sure and transparency from banks may bring with it negative externalities in terms of
intermediation quality that policymakers may wish to take into account.
4.1. Introduction
How banks create liquidity, i.e. how they intermediate between borrowers and lenders
is a question of the greatest interest. After all, real economic activity is critically depen-
dent on the free flow of funds and provision of credit. One reason for the recent shortage
of loan provision in the UK (see for example Jenkins and Jones, 2012, O’Donnell, 2012)
may lie with overly zealous regulation in the wake of the financial crisis. In fact, the
resulting unwillingness of banks to lend has triggered government intervention in a direc-
tion opposite to the initially restrictive capital requirements. Banks have been offered
governmental subsidies to encourage more tightly regulated banks to lend more (for
a popular discussion of the funding for lending scheme see for example Nixon, 2013).
Society and regulators care primarily about the availability of credit and less risky,
more transparent banks. These two goals may be conflicting ones however. Thus it is
conceivable that a certain degree of risk-taking respectively in-transparency on the part
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of banks is desirable or even necessary for financial intermediation. Three strands of
the theoretical literature make conflicting predictions with respect to the role of bank
transparency and fragility in the context of bank intermediation (e.g. Dewatripont and
Maskin, 1995, Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, Myers and Rajan, 1998, Diamond and Rajan,
2000, Coval and Thakor, 2005). Whether there is any social cost to bank transparency
in terms of the intermediation quality provided by banks is therefore an empirical ques-
tion of both theoretical and practical relevance. I proceed to disentangle these theories
and thus shed some light on this question.
While there is growing evidence to suggest that banks are in fact opaque (see e.g.
Morgan, 2002, Jones, Lee and Yeager, 2012, Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran, 2013),
it remains an open question whether this is desirable and, if not, whether this can be
changed. Some authors suggest that opacity is inherent to the functioning of banks by
virtue of the nature of the assets that they hold (consider for example Morgan, 2002,
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). On this reading, opacity may not be avoid-
able without incurring prohibitively high information cost and therefore ought to be
tolerated. A more critical viewpoint is taken by research that suggests that insufficient
transparency of counterparties may cause credit chains to break down, which would
ultimately hamper the liquidity supply to the economy (Pritsker, 2010). Also, Dwyer
and Tkac (2009) argue that the turmoil of the recent financial crisis may partly have
arisen due the to insufficient transparency of novel securitized financial products that
were being created and traded. Furthermore, opacity may induce information conges-
tion such that bad news gets initially delayed by management and is then suddenly
and rapidly revealed in the wake of shocks (Balboa, López-Espinosa and Rubia, 2013).
Finally Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) claim that bank opacity fosters collusion, price
manipulation, contagion and excessive risk-taking. Taken together this is powerful ev-
idence to suggest that opacity is negative for financial markets as a whole. Curiously,
Thakor (2005) points out that the Federal Reserve has taken a reserved stance towards
increased disclosure requirements for banks. Given the criticism of opacity voiced in
the literature, this lenient approach can prima facie not be justified.
The view, that both opacity and fragility are detrimental to the quality of financial
intermediation, is formalized by Coval and Thakor (2005), who claim that opaque and
obviously fragile banks are unable to act as intermediaries between pessimistic depos-
itors and optimistic entrepreneurs. For reasons that will become apparent later, I call
this hypothesis “Opacity-Ownership Hypothesis”. On the other hand the theories of Di-
amond and Rajan (2000) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) suggest that both fragility and
opacity will be beneficial for intermediation due to the disciplining effects that fragility
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has on bank managers. I investigate this theory under the “Opacity-Fragility Hypoth-
esis”. In a third strand of the literature Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Berglöf
and Roland (1997) show that, while fragility may impede intermediation quality due to
softer budget constraints, opacity may, in fact, be beneficial due to the disciplining ef-
fect that it has on borrower firms. From this literature I develop the “Opacity-Hardness
Hypothesis”. These three strands of the literature allow for different predictions about
the roles of opacity and fragility in the context of financial intermediation. Ongoing
theoretical work that explicitly accounts for opacity in banks has unfortunately not
progressed sufficiently to be empirically testable.1
This chapter operationalizes the above predictions and takes them to the data. Specif-
ically, it investigates the link between the opacity, fragility and intermediation quality of
banks on a large dataset of US banking data spanning the years 1994-2010 and contain-
ing 118.164 bank-year observations. Intermediation quality is defined as the efficiency
of banks in terms of liquidity creation relative to their peers. To test these alternative
hypotheses the analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it uses stochastic frontier analysis
and generalized frontier analysis together with the liquidity creation measures of Berger
and Bouwman (2009) to parametrize a stochastic frontier. The resulting liquidity effi-
ciency score subsequently proxies for intermediation quality. This approach is necessary
because econometric problems, to be elaborated later, preclude the direct study of the
relation between liquidity creation and both opacity and fragility. Second, I regress
this measure of intermediation quality on a number of control variables and various
balance sheet indicators of opacity and fragility. These regressions provide support for
the “Opacity-Fragility Hypothesis” which posits that both the fragility and opacity of
banks will exert a positive effect on intermediation quality. This indicates that bank
opacity has important positive externalities. Both opacity and fragility are independent
of the level of fragility exhibited in the data but depend on the level of opacity. This
indicates that opacity can be viewed as distinct from but functionally similar to fragility
from the viewpoint of both depositors and banks as postulated by the theory. I carry
1Monnet and Quintin (2013) have begun developing an explicit model in which delegation of decisions
to informationally opaque agents (e.g. banks) is ex ante optimal for all other agents in the economy.
However, the authors themselves label their analysis as “very preliminary and incomplete”. While
a more direct theoretical justification of the present hypotheses would be valuable, their work is as
yet not complete. So far, their advances only allow a prediction about opacity, while their work
remains silent on the role of fragility. As will subsequently be shown, the theoretical literature
provides reasons to suppose that both these factors are at play. Therefore I base my analysis on
this body of research rather than invoking the very promising but unfortunately unfinished work of
Monnet and Quintin (2013).
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out a large number of robustness tests, which are reported in Appendix B, and find
results to be stable.
The results of this chapter yield important directions for future research and policy
implications of note. First, models describing the process of financial intermediation
would do well to explicitly incorporate the effect of opacity in their framework. Second,
policy makers need to take into account the beneficial effects that opacity has on bor-
rower behavior. Specifically, if a regulator wishes to preserve efficient intermediation
while increasing the safety of the financial system, making banks fully transparent may
eliminate positive externalities and thus produce an unanticipated social cost in terms
of a loss of intermediation quality. Thus, if a regulator wishes for more information on
banks’ operations, this additional disclosure should not be made publicly accessible.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 deduces the main hy-
potheses from the literature. Section 4.3 discusses the selection of data and variables
used to capture intermediation quality, opacity and fragility. Section 4.4 presents the
main findings and additional analyses are discussed in Section 4.5. Robustness checks
are discussed in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. Theory and Hypotheses
This section reviews some theoretical literature related to the intermediation behavior
of banks and develops the main hypotheses underlying the remainder of this chapter.
First, Section 4.2.1 discusses the role of opacity and fragility in the context of budget
constraints. Second, Section 4.2.2 provides a brief summary of the literature which leads
to the expectation that opacity and fragility should enhance intermediation behavior.
Finally, Section 4.2.3 uses the literature on agents’ beliefs to deduce a third set of
predictions about the role of opacity and fragility in the context of intermediation
behavior.
4.2.1. Soft Budget Constraints and Opacity
I turn my attention first to the “soft budget constraint” literature. Consider for example
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). These authors formulate a model in which banks have
ex ante incomplete information about the quality of borrowers. Different equilibria,
differing primarily by the size of banks that exist, can arise. They find that, when both
small and large banks coexist in the economy, constellations favoring the “evergreening”
of debt can arise. This practice refers to rolling over loans to debtors who are technically
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insolvent instead of pressing bankruptcy proceedings. In this model banks do so in the
hope of recovering a greater part of their initial investment if the debt is rolled over. The
authors then go on to show that it may be optimal for banks to grant this refinancing,
in effect imposing only soft budget constraints on borrowers, in order to recoup some of
the sunk costs invested into the respective entrepreneur. A similar model is developed
by Berglöf and Roland (1997), who find that budget constraints are usually harder for
large banks because of the fixed costs associated with screening loans. Their model is
similar to Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). However, here banks can expend effort in
monitoring. Banks face a supply of projects, a fixed fraction of which are good, the rest
being poor. Poor projects can succeed without requiring refinancing if the entrepreneur
expends effort, which is of course the preferred outcome for a bank. If they do not
succeed, these projects require refinancing after the first period. It is lucrative for
the bank to refinance such projects because the recovery value relative to the overall
investment will increase. The authors find that budget constraints imposed on firms by
banks are harder when available new projects are better, when fixed costs of monitoring
are lower and when liquidation values of assets are greater. In addition, it is natural to
suppose that entrepreneurs will exert greater effort if these characteristics of the loan
market and the bank are unknown to them in order to avoid the loss of their project.
Hence, in other words, opacity stimulates effort, while transparency stimulates shirking.
These two behavioral traits of borrowers govern the outcome of projects and hence the
quality of the bank’s loan portfolio and thus ultimately its fragility. Figure 4.1 provides
one possible visualization of this mechanism. The bank creates liquidity, primarily
through loans, but loans also leave the bank open to fragility. This is specifically the
case if borrowers shirk on their projects.
In this type of model, opacity works in two ways to increase the intermediation quality
of banks. First, because banks are opaque to outsiders, borrowers do not know exactly
what the quality of alternative projects available to the banks is. If it is high, there is
a danger that the entrepreneur’s project will not be refinanced after the first period if
he shirks on his effort. In this respect opacity of banks motivates existing borrowers to
expend greater effort on their projects. Thus opacity increases the quality of financed
projects and decreases otherwise necessary write-downs. Opacity also increases funds
available for new lending if the bank normally would have rolled over a bad loan,
because this practice would have frozen up assets. The second channel is related to
the liquidation skill of banks and works in much the same way. If banks are opaque,
it is difficult for outsiders to know whether they have high or low liquidation costs and
whether they have any skill in extracting a nonzero liquidation value from firm assets.
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Figure 4.1.:
Liquidity-Opacity Relation in Berglöf and Roland (1997) and Dewatripont and Maskin
(1995).
Light grey boxes symbolize actors, while dark grey ones symbolize actions or features. Black
arrows connect without implying a specific relation, green arrows imply a supporting relation
while red ones imply a inhibiting relation.
Thus banks’ opacity exerts a disciplining effect on the management of borrower firms
and serves to regulate the demand side. In effect, it creates harder budget constraints for
borrowers. Taken together, these theories predict that opacity will positively influence
the intermediation of banks. This first set of theories additionally predicts that banks
that are more opaque will also have higher quality loan portfolios because of the ex
ante natural selection and the disciplining impact on borrowers. Therefore more opaque
banks will also be less fragile.
4.2.2. Fragility and Opacity as Disciplining Mechanisms
As an alternative starting point consider the theories of Diamond and Rajan (2000,
2001). They suggest that bank liquidity creation depends positively on the fragility of
the bank. As banks become more fragile, they can more credibly commit to diligent
monitoring of borrowers, thus securing the trust and funds of lenders. They can do so
because lenders are able to run on the bank, which would cause it to lose its valuable
charter. Although this model does not consider uncertainty explicitly, one might sup-
pose that bank opacity plays an important role in this framework. As banks become
more opaque to outsiders, the propensity of lenders to run on the bank will increase,
holding fragility constant. In the words of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) “... anything
that causes them to anticipate a run will lead to a run.” (p. 410). As opacity increases,
investors, being risk averse, will want to err on the side of caution and run early rather
than late. But then more opaque banks, given a level of fragility measured by the ex-
pectation of the available information, should be systematically better intermediaries
91
than more transparent banks since opacity increases the variation that is attached to
that information. Formulated yet differently, the investor will form an expectation of
fragility as a property of the bank. Opacity will influence the degree of confidence that
the investor associates to that information and thus constitute a feature of the bank that
exacerbates any kind of fragility the bank exhibits. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the
bank and the depositor, opacity and fragility are functionally similar where the threat
to the bank’s charter is concerned. Hence, if a bank is disciplined by its fragility, an
equally fragile but in addition opaque bank will a fortiori be disciplined. In this context
one might argue that managers have an incentive to take measures that will make their
bank become less opaque. However, they may have no practical way of going about
this credibly. If banks are, for example, able and known to engage in practices such as
earnings management, simply professing that one is not engaging in this practice is not
going to enhance one’s credibility with creditors. This will, mutatis mutandis, apply to
opacity. It follows that there likely exists an irreducible impact of opacity on the inter-
mediation quality of the bank and that this impact should work in the same direction
as fragility. Figure 4.2 summarizes this reasoning schematically. Again, fragility enters
banks primarily through the intermediation of loans. From the viewpoint of depositors,
capitalization reduces fragility, while opacity increases it. Hence opacity and fragility
increase the credibility of the screening commitment of the bank, which enables it to
function as a more efficient intermediary.
Bank Loans
Capital
Opacity
Fragility
Credibility
of screening
commitment
Liquidity
Figure 4.2.: Liquidity-Opacity Relation in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001).
Light grey boxes symbolize actors, while dark grey ones symbolize actions or features. Black
arrows connect without implying a specific relation, green arrows imply a supporting relation
while red ones imply a inhibiting relation.
4.2.3. Opacity and Agent Beliefs
Finally, consider the theory of Coval and Thakor (2005). The authors set up a model
framework in which the existence of intermediaries emerges endogenously as a result
of divergent opinions among agents, who are either rational, pessimistic or optimistic,
which can be visualized along the lines of Figure 4.3. The optimists want to obtain
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funding for entrepreneurial projects from the pessimists. However, their optimism, in
conjunction with the counterparty’s pessimism as to the project’s success, creates a
gap of beliefs. This gap will be overcome if intermediaries step in and pre-commit
to screening projects. Intermediaries, formed by rational agents, bridge the gap of
beliefs between the pessimistic and optimistic actors and can thus channel funds from
pessimists to optimists. They can credibly do so because they are composed of rational
agents without a beliefs bias as to the project outcome. This enables the intermediary to
design contracts where risk is distributed in accordance with the agents’ beliefs; i.e. the
riskiest investments are held by the most optimistic agents etc. One of the results that
are of interest in the present context is a setting in which the proportion of optimists
and pessimists in the population is high relative to the number of rationals. Then, if the
ex ante probability of optimists’ (potential entrepreneurs) being rationed is too high,
intermediaries composed of optimists might arise (see Coval and Thakor, 2005, pp. 557-
558). These are unable to pre-commit credibly to project screening and therefore, next
to a demand side problem in the entrepreneurial credit market, a downward spiral in
project quality perception might result when there is uncertainty as to the composition
of the bank. This means that opacity as to the bank ownership’s attitude towards risk
will adversely affect the bank’s ability to intermediate over time (Coval and Thakor’s
(2005) second period lending based on reputation). In this model framework I therefore
expect a negative relation between opacity and intermediation. Moreover, because
conservative capital structure can signal rationality, I expect a negative relation between
fragility and intermediation.
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BankDepositsPessimists
Credibility
and Capital
Rationals
Liquidity Optimists
No Credibility
but Capital
Opacity
if too few Rationals
Figure 4.3.: Liquidity-Opacity Relation in Coval and Thakor (2005).
Light grey boxes symbolize actors, while dark grey ones symbolize actions or features. Black
arrows connect without implying a specific relation, green arrows imply a supporting relation
while red ones imply a inhibiting relation.
4.2.4. Hypotheses and Identification Strategy
Considering these three strands of the literature, it appears that the impact that opacity
has on banks’ intermediation quality is ultimately an empirical question. Although it
is clear that none of the theories cited deals with opacity explicitly on its own, taken
together each of these three bodies of literature allows for the deduction of distinct
predictions about the influence that opacity will have on financial intermediation. In
brief, three conflicting predictions about the relation between opacity, fragility and the
quality of financial intermediation emerge.
First, the theories of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Berglöf and Roland (1997)
predict that better intermediaries will simultaneously be more opaque as well as less
fragile. This is because entrepreneurs cannot expect that the bank will roll over their
loan if they decide to shirk on their project. Thus they will exert effort, resulting
in better bank loan portfolios, lower writedowns and greater intermediation quality.
Second, opacity may function in a similar way as fragility in the Diamond and Rajan
(2000)-setting because it exacerbates the effects of fragility. This would facilitate inter-
mediation quality. Third, fragility and opacity, in this case about who constitutes the
bank, optimists or pessimists, may inhibit liquidity creation in the Coval and Thakor
(2005)-world because of distrust among the economic agents.
Thus, while the null hypothesis assumes that neither opacity nor fragility are relevant
for intermediation quality, I formulate three alternative hypotheses as follows:
A1: Opacity-Hardness Hypothesis: Higher intermediation quality banks are more
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opaque and less fragile.
A2: Opacity-Fragility Hypothesis: Higher intermediation quality banks are more
opaque and more fragile.
A3: Opacity-Ownership Hypothesis: Higher intermediation quality banks are less
opaque and less fragile.
A1 and A2 make identical predictions about the effects of opacity but differ in their
assessment of fragility, while A3 makes the opposite prediction about opacity. Thus,
the following regression can distinguish whether A1 and A2 on the one hand or A3 on
the other hand are supported by the data.
IQi,t = α+ β
′CONTROLi,t + γOPi,t + i,t. (4.1)
Here IQ, intermediation quality, is the dependent variable. OP characterizes the bank’s
level of opacity. Variables that capture other variation not due to opacity are represented
by the vector of control variables CONTROL. If A1 or A2 hold, one would expect to
find a significantly positive coefficient γ. If on the other hand γ is significantly negative,
A1 and A2 must be rejected in favor of A3.
The A1/A2 case can be further disentangled by investigating the influence of bank
fragility on the quality of intermediation. Due to the distinct predictions that A1 and
A2 make about the loan portfolio quality and thus ultimately about the fragility of
the bank, it is possible to distinguish between these by investigating the impact of
opacity and fragility on the quality of financial intermediation separately and jointly.
Specifically, under A1 opacity should be positively related to intermediation quality,
while bank fragility should be negatively related. Under A2 one would expect positive
signs on both opacity and fragility.
IQi,t = α+ β
′CONTROLi,t + γOPi,t + δFRAGi,t + i,t. (4.2)
Here FRAG represents the variable chosen to control for fragility. If δ is significantly
positive both in regressions of the form 4.2 and with γ constrained to zero, the test will
reject A1 in favor of A2. This proposed identification strategy requires the definition
of a number of variables. Concretely, it requires suitable proxies for the quality of
financial intermediation, for opacity and for bank fragility. These are the subject of the
subsequent section.
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4.3. Data and Variables
Data on US commercial banks is obtained from the December Call Reports via the
Chicago Federal Reserve and additionally I collect the CATFAT and CATNONFAT
measures of liquidity creation from Christa Bouwman’s website.2 The data cleaning
procedures are as described in Section 2.3. In total the sample spans the years 1994 -
2010 and contains 118.164 bank-year observations.
In this study intermediation is measured by the ability of banks to transform more
liquid liabilities into less liquid assets and many small units of deposits into fewer larger
units of loans. The extent to which banks are able to do this is reflected in the overall
amount of liquidity created. The recent work by Berger and Bouwman (2009) provides
an operational measure of this feature of bank activity. To obtain their measures,
they separate balance sheet positions into categories related to the ease and cost of
liquidation and attach weights to the respective categories. The weights are chosen
so as to yield maximum liquidity creation when liquid liabilities (e.g. deposits) are
used to finance illiquid assets (e.g. commercial & industrial loans). Both the source
of financing and the use of the funds is weighted by either 12 , 0, or − 12 according
to whether it contributes to or reduces liquidity creation. Thus liquidity creation is a
weighted sum of the bank’s assets. They define two such measures, one which includes
off-balance-sheet items (referred to as CATFAT ) and one which does not include this
category of assets (CATNOFAT ).3 A more narrow precursor to these measures is the
liquidity transformation gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004). However, this measure does
not explicitly consider either off-balance-sheet items or the possibility of both liquidity
creation and its destruction. The latter occurs if, for example, illiquid liabilities are used
to finance liquid assets. Therefore the main analysis is based on the work of Berger
and Bouwman (2009) and their definition of liquidity creation. However, one of the
additional analyses does investigate the implications of the Deep and Schaefer (2004)
measure with encouraging results.
To control for fragility, I use several measures and provide acronyms in brackets.
Simple measures are leverage (LEV RAG) or the ratio of nonperforming loans over
total loans (NPL). Furthermore, the quantity of liquid assets scaled by total assets can
capture the liquidity of a bank (LAGTA). Additionally, the quantity of risk weighted
assets scaled by total assets (CREDRSK) can capture how tightly a bank is financed.
2I thank Christa H. Bouwman for making her data freely available.
3They also discuss equivalentMATFAT andMATNONFAT measures. These take as the criterion
for weighting assets not the category but the maturity of the assets. However, these alternative
measures are not made publicly available.
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Another widely used and useful measure is the Z-Score (see for example De Nicoló,
2000, De Nicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman and Zephirin, 2004). This variable measures by
how many standard deviations the return on assets must fall for capital to become zero.
This variable is computed in two alternative ways to mitigate data availability concerns.
First, I compute the variance of return on assets using the cross sectional, yearly data
(ZINDpool). This specification captures the distance to default where the variability
of returns is driven by the population of banks in a given year and thus conserves
observations because this value will be available and equal for all banks. However,
this is not strictly a bank-specific measure of risk. The alternative parametrization
calculates Z-Score using the three year moving average of ROA for each bank where
sufficient data is available (ZINDMA(3)). This measure is bank-specific but sacrifices
observations.4 Typical alternative measures of bank fragility could be, for example,
the volatility of stock returns or betas. However, these are disregarded in this analysis
for practical reasons: the majority of US commercial banks are not listed, hence the
dataset does not afford access to these measures (for a similar argument see Berger and
Bouwman, 2009).
Opacity itself is a challenging concept to operationalize. In the literature, banks’
asset structure, market microstructure properties and credit ratings have been utilized
to this end. Morgan (2002) investigates the propensity of rating agencies to disagree on
banks’ ratings. He finds systematically higher disagreement for banks than industrials,
which indicates that banks are in fact more opaque. Furthermore, the propensity to
disagree on ratings is systematically related to loans, trading assets and cash. The ratio-
nale behind these associations is that loan portfolios are inherently opaque to outsiders
and that trading assets and cash are easily shiftable, thus lending themselves to agency
problems in the spirit of Myers and Rajan (1998). Related literature includes Jones, Lee
and Yeager (2012) (henceforth JLY). They analyze the effect of bank mergers on the
revaluation of rival banks. They find that more opaque banks (banks holding greater
quantities of opaque assets) benefitted more from revaluations. In their study, assets
are categorized into four groups. The first group contains “commercial and residential
real estate loans”. These are considered transparent. The second group contains “other
loans”, which are considered opaque. The third group contains other opaque assets and
is calculated as a residual of the other three groups. Finally, the fourth group contains
transparent assets (cash, federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to
resell, guaranteed available for sale or held to maturity securities). They analyze the
effect of the financial crisis on share prices of their sample banks, finding that more
4To mitigate the loss of observations I obtain supplementary data on ROA in 1992 and 1993.
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opaque banks suffer more severe reversals while benefitting from higher intra-industry
revaluations during good times. Their results indicate that their classification of assets
is able to capture bank opacity. I also consider the work of Flannery, Kwan and Nimal-
endran (2013) (henceforth FKN). They investigate the relation between balance sheet
indicators of opacity and market microstructure properties of banks. Their results illus-
trate the relation between certain balance sheet positions and bank opacity. Primarily
premises, fixed assets, other assets etc. are found to be important. Their conclusion,
which does resonate with the general literature on bank opacity, is that certain asset
classes are harder for outsiders to understand. Overall, it appears that the consensus in
the literature is that the balance sheet composition of banks matters for their opacity
and that certain asset classes, which are more difficult for outsiders to understand than
others, can signal the opacity of banks. Therefore this chapter is based on three proxies
for bank opacity. Two from JLY, namely other opaque assets (OOAJLY ) and other
loans (OLNJLY ) and one from FKN, specifically OPQFKN (see also Table 4.1). As
has been noted, an alternative approach to proxy for opacity would be to utilize split
ratings or market microstructure data. However, since the vast majority of US com-
mercial banks are small and unlisted, these features are unfortunately not available for
the vast majority of US commercial banks.
Having discussed available measures of opacity, fragility and liquidity creation, it
becomes apparent that an investigation of the relation between liquidity creation on
the one hand and opacity and fragility on the other faces some econometric challenges.
These arise because the main measures of bank opacity and fragility are groups of bal-
ance sheet items. However, in the liquidity creation measure of Berger and Bouwman
(2009), these enter linearly as constituents of liquidity creation. This may induce naïve
regressions of liquidity creation on, for example, opacity to return spurious correla-
tions that are simply due to the way in which components of the opacity variables are
weighted when computing liquidity creation. To resolve this challenge I develop a mea-
sure of intermediation quality. Specifically, this chapter uses stochastic frontier analysis
and generalized frontier analysis to parametrize two types of liquidity frontier and thus
to derive liquidity efficiency as a proxy for bank intermediation quality. The dependent
variable in the frontier parametrization is the CATFAT measure of liquidity creation
from Berger and Bouwman (2009) and hence the resulting intermediation quality vari-
ables are labelled IQCFSFA (IQ
CF
GFA). The selection of the sample, the definition of inputs
and outputs as well as their respective prices follows the discussion in Section 2.3. This
frontier is the boundary of the “liquidity production possibility set” spanned by all banks
in the sample. Stochastic frontiers have been used to investigate many features of banks
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such as technical efficiency, cost, revenue and profit efficiency (see Fethi and Pasiouras,
2010, for a survey) and recently also shareholder value efficiency (Fiordelisi, 2007) and
market value efficiency (Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon and Pagano, 2003). Traditional
methods for the parametrization of efficient frontiers include stochastic frontier analysis
and data envelopment analysis. Since DEA requires the availability of prices that con-
nect the inputs and outputs to the economic quantities of interest, such an approach
will not be viable in the liquidity case (see for example footnote 2 in Chapter 3). SFA
on the other hand imposes a functional form on the relation that it investigates. Fur-
thermore, distributional assumptions with respect to error terms must be made. These
assumptions may not be appropriate in a case like liquidity efficiency where no theory
exists to guide the selection of functional form etc. Nonetheless, the main analysis relies
on this method because SFA is well explored and understood. However, I investigate
the importance of the assumptions that underlie SFA for the main results by simulta-
neously using generalized frontier analysis to parametrize liquidity efficiency (IQCFGFA)
since GFA is able to relax some of the possibly restrictive assumptions underlying SFA.
Isolating the impact of opacity and fragility from other confounding effects requires a
set of control variables. I use a set of control variables that has been found to capture the
salient features of the banking industry in the literature (see e.g. Pi and Timme, 1993,
Mester, 1993, Mester, 1996, Berger and Bouwman, 2009 and Fiordelisi and Molyneux,
2010). Specifically, size (BKSIZE) is chosen to capture differences in banks that are
due to their operational scope and access to funding markets. ROA captures features
of banks relating to profitability. Cost efficiency (CE) is intended to filter out techno-
logical differences between banks related to dimensions other than the transformation
of liquidity. The main analysis uses cost efficiency as parametrized by SFA but unre-
ported results show that the main findings hold if cost efficiency is parametrized by the
alternative GFA method or if this variable is omitted all together. Following Berger
and Bouwman (2009), I also control for organizational characteristics such as holding
company status and recent mergers and acquisitions. This is accomplished by way of
dummy variables that take the value 1 if a bank is part of a multi-bank holding com-
pany (MBHC) or one-bank holding company (OBHC). Additional indicator variables
control for the influence of M&A activity on bank efficiency (for a discussion of mergers
and efficiency see for example Ahmad, Ariff and Skully, 2007). Specifically, MRG is set
to one in the case of a merger and ACQ to 1 in case the bank was acquired during the
last three years. It is further advantageous to control for local market characteristics
by including the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (BKHHI), the log bank-
level population (BKPOP ), population density (BKPDNS), percent income growth
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rates (BKICHG) as well as the market share of medium and large banks in the area
(BKMSML). Bank-level means that the variables in question are computed for all
markets in which banks hold deposits. As markets this chapter defines Metropolitan
Statistical areas (MSAs) or non-MSA counties. It then uses data on the deposits held
by each bank in each of these markets to calculate the relative significance of the market
for the bank. Using these quotients as weights, it then computes the weighted HHI,
population density etc. for each bank. More formally, assuming one of n banks, bank i,
has deposits di,j in market j, which is one of m markets the bank services, the market’s
importance for the bank is computed as:
wi,j =
di,j
m∑
j=1
di,j
. (4.3)
Then let the market have a characteristic cj . To compute the value of characteristic c,
which should be attached to bank i, ci, I take the weighted average like:
ci =
m∑
j=1
wi,jcj . (4.4)
These variables capture the differences between banks that arise from their organi-
zational form or location. Raw demographic data are obtained from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov), while data on bank deposits are obtained from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (www.fdic.gov).
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the variable definitions. It also gives the mean and
standard deviation for the main variables used in the analysis. This data shows that
among the opacity proxies, OLNJLY takes up the greatest proportion of the bank’s
balance sheet on average. Here it is important to stress that the significance of the proxy
variables for bank opacity does not actually depend on their taking up significant potions
of the balance sheet. This is the case for three reasons. Firstly and most importantly,
the mere presence of these variables suggests that the bank in question is opaque. This is
because, as documented by FKN and JLY, these opaque assets are associated with other
bank characteristics that suggest opacity. They are to be understood as indicators of
the difficulty that outsiders have to understand the bank’s balance sheet and strategy.
Secondly, nonperforming loans are typically on the order of less than two percent of
the bank’s balance sheet. However, an increase to three percent would be viewed as
extreme. Moreover, banks report return on assets on the order of about 1%, which is
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consistent with for example Berger (2003). Hence even a rather small percentage of
bank assets has the potential of exerting a substantial influence on the bank’s asset
structure. Finally, it is clear that banks which hold regulatory capital on the order of
8-10% of assets, will find themselves in a very problematic situation if 5% of assets were
to be lost. Therefore not having a clear picture of even a small portion of the bank’s
balance sheet can mean substantial risk. Among the fragility proxies, the two different
specifications of the Z-Score show that when the full sample of banks is used to compute
the variance of the return on assets, banks appear much less risky (ZINDpool). This is
plausible given the averaging out of idiosyncratic noise in the larger sample. The banks
in this sample are also very cost efficient on average (CE). Moreover, the majority
of banks tend to be bank holding companies (MBHC, OBHC). The demographic
variables are generally in line with Berger and Bouwman (2009), especially if one takes
into account the difference in time periods covered. The following section discusses the
empirical results.
Table 4.1.: Definition of Variables.
In the empirical analysis, unless otherwise stated, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile to reduce the influence of outliers.
Variable
Name
Variable Definition Mean SD
Opacity Variables
OOAJLY Other opaque assets (residual of total assets less
transparent assets) (Jones, Lee and Yeager, 2012)
0.0498 0.0464
OLNJLY Other loans (Jones, Lee and Yeager, 2012) 0.2290 0.1199
OPQFKN Premises, fixed assets, investment in unconsolidated
subsidiaries, intangible assets, other assets (Flan-
nery, Kwan and Nimalendran, 2013)
0.0429 0.0220
Fragility Variables
LEV RAG Leverage, ratio of liabilities over gross total assets 9.6336 2.7234
NPL Nonperforming loans over total loans 0.0123 0.0159
CREDRSK Ratio of risk weighted assets to gross total assets 0.5686 0.2655
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable
Name
Variable Definition Mean SD
LAGTA Liquid assets over gross total assets 0.3658 0.1460
ZINDpool Z-Score calculated using variance of return on assets
derived from the pooled sample of banks
15.6875 5.8263
ZINDMA(3) Z-Score calculated using variance of return on assets
derived from the last three bank-year observations
1.4439 1.9242
Control Variables
ROA Return on assets 0.0098 0.0075
BKSIZE Log of gross total assets 11.7406 1.2057
CE Cost efficiency score derived from SFA 0.9285 0.0393
MBHC Dummy variable, set to one if a bank is part of a
multibank holding company
0.2495 0.4327
OBHC Dummy variable, set to one if a bank is part of a
onebank holding company
0.5490 0.4976
MRG Dummy variable, set to one if a bank has been in-
volved in at least one merger in the last three years
0.0002 0.0123
ACQ Dummy variable, set to one if a bank has been ac-
quired in the last three years
0.0650 0.2465
BKHHI Weighted Herfindahl-Hirschmann index calculated
using a bank’s deposits in a given market as weights
0.2319 0.1484
BKMSML Market share of medium and large banks faced by
a bank in its markets, calculated using a bank’s de-
posits in a given market as weights
0.4204 0.3155
BKPDNS Population density of a bank’s markets calculated
using a bank’s deposits in a given market as weights
2.9237 0.9192
BKPOP Population of a bank’s markets calculated using a
bank’s deposits in a given market as weights
12.2655 2.3451
BKICHG Income change of a bank’s markets calculated using
a bank’s deposits in a given market as weights
0.0484 0.0420
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4.4. Empirical Results
In order to understand the relations between opacity, fragility and intermediation qual-
ity and to disentangle the three competing hypotheses, four main steps are required.
In the first instance, correlations between opacity, fragility and intermediation quality
provide a first look at the data. Subsequently, regressions of intermediation quality on
a set of explanatory variables help to understand the impact of various balance sheet
variables on intermediation quality. This will explore the way in which various aspects
of bank behavior are related to intermediation quality and provide a basis for further
exploring opacity in the context of intermediation quality. The second step will add
the variables proxying for OP to the regression and thus examine whether there is any
relation between opacity and liquidity creation. The sign of the coefficient γ in Equa-
tion 4.1 will determine the acceptance or rejection of A1/A2 on the one hand and A3
on the other. As a third step I analyze the relation between intermediation quality
and fragility. This amounts to removing OP from Equation 4.1 and substituting for
it FRAG. This step is necessary so as to understand the effects, if any, that emanate
from fragility in the context of intermediation quality and to ensure that results related
to opacity are stable and not merely driven by fragility. This is the first step needed to
disentangle A1 and A2 by way of the coefficient δ. The fourth step investigates the joint
association between opacity, fragility and intermediation quality by analyzing Equation
4.2. This step asks whether one of the two features, opacity or fragility, subsumes the
other and will strengthen or weaken any conclusions initially drawn about A1 and A2.
The creation of liquidity is essential to the existence of banks as such. It can be
viewed as a necessary by-product of bank operations. Therefore an explicit behavioral
hypothesis is not required to justify considering intermediation quality. Hence endo-
geneity due to reverse causation, as noted for regressions that involve efficiency scores as
the dependent variable by for example Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Mester (1993),
is likely to be a much smaller danger than if one were to investigate, for example, cost
efficiency, which is known to be explicitly considered by managers. Even so the robust-
ness checks (see Section 4.6) discuss and address these issues further, finding the results
to be resilient. Still, care is needed in the interpretation of the results. That is I stress
at the outset that the following analysis presents compelling evidence to suggest that
certain properties of banks are associated with intermediation quality in special ways
rather than to assume that these properties actually cause intermediation quality.
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4.4.1. Exploratory Analyses
At the outset I provide some summary statistics as to the distributional properties
of the resulting intermediation quality measures in Table 4.2. Intermediation quality
defined as liquidity efficiency parametrized by SFA (GFA) using the CATFAT measure
of liquidity creation IQCFSFA (IQ
CF
GFA). These results indicate that banks are foregoing
ca. 40% (30%) of their liquidity creation potential depending on whether a parametric
or nonparametric frontier is used. Efficiency scores obtained from the nonparametric
generalized frontier analysis are somewhat greater. This is not surprising because GFA
relaxes the assumptions of SFA regarding functional form and distribution of errors.
Statistic IQCFSFA IQ
CF
GFA
mean 0.5868 0.7385
median 0.6045 0.7557
min 0.0001 0.0798
max 0.9841 1.0000
std 0.1595 0.0709
skewness -0.9508 -3.4563
Table 4.2.:
Summary Statistics of Interme-
diation Quality.
Distributional properties computed
on a yearly basis and then averaged
across years. SFA indicates stochas-
tic frontier analysis, GFA indicates
generalized frontier analysis and CF
indicates CATFAT as specified in
Berger and Bouwman (2009).
Moreover, univariate correlations can provide first intuition about the relations that
obtain between opacity, fragility and intermediation quality. First, Table 4.3 shows that
the intermediation quality measures are positively but only moderately correlated. This
has frequently been documented for efficiency scores of different provenance (see for ex-
ample Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998). However, the highly significant
and positive correlation indicates that the two measures are picking up similar informa-
tion. Moreover, considering the opacity measures, these are only moderately correlated,
with two out of three correlations being less than 0.05 in absolute value. Additionally,
the largest correlation obtains between OPQFKN and OOAJLY , where it reaches
0.549. Next, the correlations between the fragility proxies are mostly small, variously
positive and negative and plausible. Thus, for instance, both Z-Score variables are pos-
itively correlated with one another and LAGTA, while being negatively correlated with
CREDRSK, LEV RAG and NPL. Since higher Z-Score represents greater distance
to default and hence lower fragility and the same is true of LAGTA, while the opposite
holds for the other three variables, these relations are plausible. Moreover, LAGTA is
negatively associated with CREDRSK, LEV RAG and NPL, which is again plausible.
Similarly, NPL is positively correlated with both CREDRSK and LEV RAG, which is
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plausible since all of these variables indicate greater fragility. Furthermore, when con-
sidering the correlations between the fragility proxies and the intermediation quality
measures, negative correlations with LAGTA and the Z-Score variables obtain. This
suggests that higher intermediation quality banks are also more fragile. This initial im-
pression is confirmed for IQCFSFA, where positive and significant correlations obtain for
LEV RAG and CREDRSK. However, for IQCFGFA these correlations are negative and
significant. On the other hand, here the correlation with NPL is significantly positive.
Moreover, the picture that emerges with regard to opacity is also ambiguous. Thus
correlations between OLNJLY , OPQFKN and IQCFSFA suggest that banks that are
more opaque are simultaneously better intermediaries. This is confirmed by the cor-
relation between IQCFGFA and OPQFKN . However, correlations between IQ
CF
GFA and
OOAJLY and OLNJLY as well as those between IQCFSFA and OOAJLY suggest the
opposite. Thus, the univariate picture is ambiguous when it comes to investigating the
relations between opacity, fragility and intermediation quality. It does show however,
that the available variables are consistent and provide substantial information in the
sense that correlations are generally small. This is especially the case for the opacity
variables where the small and negative coefficients suggest that these capture different
aspects of bank opacity.
As noted, econometric issues prevent the direct investigation of the relation between
opacity and absolute liquidity creation. However, from the point of view of the reg-
ulator and the general public it is ultimately the quantity of liquidity created that
matters. Therefore, to ensure the practical relevance of subsequent findings, one needs
to ascertain that there is in fact a substantial positive relation between CATFAT and
intermediation quality.
The following regression investigates whether this is the case by regressing liquidity
creation, scaled by bank assets on controls, on fixed bank and time effects as well as
intermediation quality. Specifically, the regression uses the same set of controls that is
employed in the subsequent analysis. The specification follows this fixed effects form:
LCi,t
GTAi,t
= α+ β1IQ
CF
m,i,t + β2BKSIZEi,t + β3CEi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5BKHHIi,t
+ β6BKMSMLi,t + β7BKPOPi,t + β8BKPDNSi,t + β9BKICHGi,t
+ β10MBHCi,t + β11OBHCi,t + β12MRGi,t + β13ACQi,t
+
17∑
t=1
θtdt + νi + i,t.
(4.5)
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-0.0003
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-0.0253 ∗∗∗
1
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
-0.0842 ∗∗∗
-0.1060 ∗∗∗
-0.1230 ∗∗∗
0.0838 ∗∗∗
-0.1250 ∗∗∗
0.2990 ∗∗∗
-0.6740 ∗∗∗
-0.2880 ∗∗∗
-0.2570 ∗∗∗
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Here m ∈ {SFA,GFA} and LC = CATFAT . Unreported regressions alternatively
include lags of the independent variables to allow for gradual adaptation of intermedia-
tion quality to changes in bank behavior and find qualitatively similar results. Results
are reported in Table 4.4 and show that larger (BKSIZE), more profitable (ROA)
and cost efficient (CE) banks are better creators of liquidity. Also banks that favor
more populous (BKPOP ) markets where larger banks are active (BKMSML), tend
to produce more liquidity. Bank holding companies also produce more liquidity than
non-holding companies (MBHC,OBHC), while recent merger- and acquisition behav-
ior seems to be unimportant for liquidity creation (MRG,ACQ). More importantly,
the IQCFSFA and IQ
CF
GFA measures of intermediation quality are positively and highly
significantly associated with liquidity creation. This shows that intermediation quality
matters for the quantity of liquidity created.
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Parameter (1) (2)
IQCFSFA 0.333
∗∗∗
(54.96)
IQCFGFA 0.188
∗∗∗
(28.99)
BKSIZE 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗
(10.21) (7.51)
CE 0.372∗∗∗ -0.0456∗∗
(16.91) (-2.09)
ROA 1.080∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗
(16.24) (19.87)
BKHHI 0.00367 0.00298
(0.73) (0.52)
BKMSML 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗
(9.00) (3.67)
BKPOP 0.0140∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗
(10.31) (10.73)
BKPDNS -0.00275 -0.000125
(-0.90) (-0.04)
BKICHG -0.00213 -0.0118∗
(-0.39) (-1.96)
MBHC 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
(5.45) (8.71)
OBHC 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗
(6.74) (8.56)
MRG 0.0195 0.000684
(0.54) (0.02)
ACQ -0.00124 -0.00189
(-0.78) (-1.10)
Constant -0.732∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(-21.18) (-7.79)
Bank FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.460 0.355
N 118164 118164
Table 4.4.:
Liquidity Creation and Inter-
mediation Quality.
Coefficients from regressions
using fixed bank and time effects
and standard errors clustered by
bank. The dependent variable is
Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity
creation scaled by gross total
assets. Stars report significance
at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and
0.01 (***) levels. BKSIZE
stands for the log of gross total
assets, ROA stands for return
on assets, CE is cost efficiency
parametrized by way of SFA.
MBHC (OBHC) are dummy
variables set to 1 if the bank be-
longs to a multibank (onebank)
holding company. MRG (ACQ)
are dummy variables set to 1
if the bank was merged (ac-
quired) within the last three
years. BKHHI, BKPOP ,
BKPDNS, BKICHG and
BKMSML are bank-level de-
mographic variables calculated
by weighting the demographic
variables HHI (Herfindahl index),
population, population density,
income growth and marketshare
of medium and large banks by
the share of deposits each MSA
or non-MSA county represents
of a bank’s total deposits.
Monetary values are in 2005
US Dollars. IQCFSFA (IQ
CF
GFA)
stands for intermediation quality
parametrized using SFA (GFA)
and the CATFAT measure of
liquidity creation from Berger
and Bouwman (2009). Variables
are winsorized at the 0.01 and
0.99 percentiles.
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4.4.2. Analysis of Intermediation Quality
The first step of the main analysis is to investigate drivers of intermediation quality.
The principal results use CATFAT as the measure of liquidity creation on which the
intermediation quality estimates are based and are provided in Table 4.5. The Appendix
(B.2.1) reports these analyses using CATNONFAT as the basis for the parametrization
of intermediation quality with qualitatively similar results. Specifically, similarly to
Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), I estimate the following pooled Tobit regression
because the dependent variable is censored.5:
IQCFm,i,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t +
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i,t.
(4.6)
Here IQCFm,i,t stands for intermediation quality with m ∈ {SFA,GFA}, dt is a set of
year dummies. The remaining variables are as previously defined.
The main findings focus on Specification 1, which uses SFA, and are as follows. First,
from the coefficient on BKSIZE, small banks’ utilization of inputs to create outputs,
appears to be more conducive to the creation of liquidity. Overall this finding implies
that larger banks tend to be further away from the “liquidity creation frontier” than
smaller banks. In other words, in the present sample, large banks are producing large
amounts of liquidity. However their efficiency scores imply that they require dispro-
portionately greater quantities of assets and liabilities to do so relative to small banks.
This makes them less efficient from a frontier perspective. Initially this result may ap-
pear puzzling since it seems to imply that the frontier fits smaller banks more tightly.
Intuitively one might expect that banks which produce greater quantities of the output
should be systematically closer to the frontier. However this kind of reasoning would
5See e.g. Pitt and Lee (1981) for an example of this approach. This two stage method is chosen
over the single stage estimation of Battese and Coelli (1995) for two reasons. First, the present
dataset contains a number of unusual time periods (e.g. the financial crisis 2007-2009). Estimating
a panel data model may thus confound the analysis more than elucidate it. In addition, a panel
Tobit approach was abandoned due to non-convergence of the estimates. Second, the proxy for
intermediation quality, liquidity efficiency, has so far not been investigated in the literature and
there is no theory that explains the mechanics of how banks generate liquidity. Therefore including
into the first stage efficiency estimation variables that influence the shape or location of the frontier
may be inferior to the two stage approach due to confounding effects and lack of a benchmark
model.
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require that there be a linear relationship between the absolute value of intermediation
and liquidity efficiency. Yet this need not be the case because the efficiency scores are
related to the absolute liquidity creation data in a nonlinear fashion. This holds for
both the GFA and SFA results and means that, ex ante, it is not possible to say any-
thing about the relation between bank size and efficiency. This also implies that, ex
post, it is possible to observe greater efficiency in liquidity creation for either large or
small banks.
This finding suggests that there may exist diseconomies of scale in terms of liquidity
creation, which is in and of itself an interesting question for future study. Interestingly
this result may contribute to resolving the puzzle noted by Berger and Bouwman (2009),
namely that small banks appear to be creating very little, if any, liquidity in the absolute
sense. It seems that while they may not be creating a large dollar amount of liquidity,
they are doing this in a very efficient manner, quite possibly by catering to small
localized markets. Examples could be microstructure effects such as relationship lending
and access to local deposit markets. Small banks are also less likely to be strongly
supervised by regulators, which will allow them to pursue a more aggressive capital
structure. They are also likely to be more manageable in the sense that they can more
precisely align assets and liabilities and will thus likely hold smaller quantities of assets
and liabilities that are unproductive from the perspective of Berger and Bouwman’s
(2009) liquidity creation measure. Large banks on the other hand may see the need to
hold greater quantities of liquid assets as they are more likely to face erratic demand
for deposits and lending due to their regional diversification.
Better intermediaries, are also more profitable (ROA). This resonates with the find-
ings of Berger and Bouwman (2009), who note that absolute liquidity creation is pos-
itively value relevant. Although the present results cannot be compared directly with
those of Berger and Bouwman (2009) since absolute liquidity creation and intermedi-
ation quality are two related but quite distinct variables, this qualitative similarity is
reassuring. Cost efficiency (CE) is negatively related to intermediation quality. There is
no reasonable prior that could be imposed on cost efficiency as an explanatory variable
for intermediation quality. On the one hand, a positive association might be expected
as the efficiency measures share a functional form and information set. On the other
hand, cost efficiency measures optimizing behavior of banks along an entirely different
dimension. Furthermore, banks that operate in less concentrated markets (BKHHI)
with fewer large competitors (BKMSML) and high aﬄuence (BKICHG) are more
efficiently creating liquidity. This is again plausible since large competitors tend to
increase the need for resource allocation on efforts such as marketing that are not in
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and of themselves conducive to balance sheet liquidity or efficient intermediation. Fur-
thermore, more aﬄuent markets will tend to have greater access to deposits, which
in turn should improve banks’ ability to intermediate. Holding companies tend to be
more efficient liquidity creators (MBHC,OBHC) and recent acquisitions (ACQ) tend
to facilitate intermediation quality as well. I obtain similar patterns as in the baseline
case when considering IQCFGFA in Specification 2. This holds in terms of BKSIZE,
BKPOP , BKPDNS, MBHC, OBHC, and ACQ. The two measures of intermedi-
ation quality disagree significantly only for ROA and BKPDNS. Overall, the results
on the drivers of intermediation quality are intuitive. Equipped with the knowledge of
signs and significances on these controls, one can investigate the alternative hypotheses
developed at the outset with greater confidence.
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Parameter (1) (2)
BKSIZE -0.0332∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗
(-26.21) (-60.82)
CE -1.512∗∗∗ 0.00197
(-40.85) (0.18)
ROA 1.024∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(8.20) (-7.63)
BKHHI -0.0131 0.00296
(-1.40) (1.49)
BKMSML -0.00801 0.00338∗∗
(-1.46) (2.16)
BKPOP 0.00506∗∗∗ 0.00318∗∗∗
(5.58) (13.34)
BKPDNS -0.0119∗∗∗ 0.000994∗∗∗
(-9.11) (3.01)
BKICHG 0.0695∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(5.63) (15.50)
MBHC 0.0680∗∗∗ 0.00848∗∗∗
(18.25) (8.84)
OBHC 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.00544∗∗∗
(12.75) (7.16)
MRG -0.00563 0.0385
(-0.09) (1.06)
ACQ 0.00831∗∗∗ 0.00216∗∗
(3.22) (2.11)
Constant 2.307∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗
(55.66) (74.41)
Time FE Yes Yes
N 118164 118164
Table 4.5.:
Drivers of Intermediation Quality,
Intermediation Quality Based on
CATFAT .
Coefficients from Tobit regressions us-
ing fixed time effects and standard er-
rors clustered by bank. The dependent
variable is intermediation quality. Stars
report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05
(**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics
are reported in brackets. BKSIZE
stands for the log of gross total assets,
ROA stands for return on assets, CE
is cost efficiency parametrized by way of
SFA.MBHC (OBHC) are dummy vari-
ables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a
multibank (onebank) holding company.
MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set
to 1 if the bank was merged (acquired)
within the last three years. BKHHI,
BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and
BKMSML are bank-level demographic
variables calculated by weighting the
demographic variables HHI (Herfind-
ahl index), population, population den-
sity, income growth and marketshare of
medium and large banks by the share of
deposits each MSA or non-MSA county
represents of a bank’s total deposits.
Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and
0.99 percentiles. Specification 1 is based
on SFA, Specification 2 is based on GFA.
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4.4.3. The Importance of Opacity for Intermediation Quality
This section disentangles A1 and A2 on the one hand from A3 on the other. The
distinguishing feature is opacity. While A1 and A2 predict a positive relation between
opacity and intermediation quality, A3 predicts the opposite. To investigate this, I
regress my intermediation quality proxy on the same set of explanatory variables as
above, adding in turn one of three alternative proxies for opacity to the regression.
Two proxies come from Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012), who provide a categorization of
assets into other opaque assets (OOAJLY ), other loans (OLNJLY ) and non-opaque
categories. OPQFKN represents the subset of bank assets identified as opaque by
Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013). More specifically, for each j = 1 : 3 I now
estimate one Tobit regression
IQCFm,i,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + γOPi,j,t +
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i
(4.7)
where OPi,j,t is the jth of the three opacity proxies and m ∈ {SFA,GFA}.
Table 4.6 reports the results. The signs and significances on the control variables are
very similar to the results in the previous section. Where opacity is concerned, I find a
strong, significantly positive relation between opacity and intermediation quality using
OLNJLY and OPQFKN in the case of IQCFSFA (Specifications 1-3). This is evidence
that the opacity of banks exerts a significantly positive influence on intermediation
quality. The other proxy developed from Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) (OOAJLY ) is
negative but insignificant. Interestingly, however this proxy turns significantly positive
when the variables are winsorized at the 2% tails instead the 1% tails (see Appendix
B.2.2 for details). Hence the insignificance of OOAJLY is outlier driven and if ap-
proached appropriately this variable too supports the main findings. This is confirmed
by Specifications 4-6, which use IQCFGFA. Here I also find a significantly positive co-
efficient for OPQFKN . The coefficient on OLNJLY is significantly negative but it
represents the only significant piece of evidence that speaks against the initial interpre-
tation. Thus, since the bulk of the evidence supports this interpretation, I accept the
notion that only either A1 or A2 should remain as candidate alternatives. This leads
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to the rejection of both the null of no significance of opacity for intermediation quality
and the alternative A3.
Table 4.6.:
Intermediation Quality and Opacity, Intermediation Quality Based on CATFAT .
Coefficients from Tobit regressions using fixed time effects and standard errors clustered by
bank. The dependent variable is intermediation quality. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported in brackets. BKSIZE stands for the
log of gross total assets, ROA stands for return on assets, CE is cost efficiency parametrized
by way of SFA. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a
multibank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the
bank was merged (acquired) within the last three years. BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML are bank-level demographic variables calculated by weighting the
demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth
and marketshare of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA
county represents of a bank’s total deposits. OOAJLY and OLNJLY represent opaque assets
following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents opaque assets following
Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respectively. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles. Intermediation quality is based on
the CATFAT measure of Berger and Bouwman (2009). Specifications 1-3 use SFA and 4-6 use
GFA to obtain intermediation quality.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OOAJLY -0.0103 0.0243
(-0.23) (1.31)
OLNJLY 0.119∗∗∗ -0.0658∗∗∗
(10.02) (-18.62)
OPQFKN 0.820∗∗∗ 0.0966∗∗∗
(14.89) (5.97)
BKSIZE -0.0331∗∗∗ -0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗ -0.0301∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗
(-25.21) (-24.85) (-27.85) (-61.20) (-61.21) (-60.99)
CE -1.511∗∗∗ -1.528∗∗∗ -1.526∗∗∗ 0.000266 0.0111 0.000264
(-40.66) (-41.08) (-41.53) (0.02) (1.01) (0.02)
ROA 1.015∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 1.444∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(7.94) (7.78) (11.47) (-6.57) (-6.96) (-6.13)
BKHHI -0.0130 -0.0107 -0.0155∗ 0.00281 0.00163 0.00268
(-1.39) (-1.17) (-1.68) (1.42) (0.80) (1.36)
BKMSML -0.00797 -0.00595 -0.0101∗ 0.00329∗∗ 0.00224 0.00313∗∗
(-1.45) (-1.09) (-1.86) (2.10) (1.45) (2.01)
BKPOP 0.00506∗∗∗ 0.00636∗∗∗ 0.00532∗∗∗ 0.00318∗∗∗ 0.00246∗∗∗ 0.00321∗∗∗
(5.58) (6.94) (5.91) (13.35) (10.30) (13.51)
BKPDNS -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.00966∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ 0.00101∗∗∗ -0.000236 0.00104∗∗∗
(-9.10) (-7.38) (-8.87) (3.04) (-0.71) (3.19)
BKICHG 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗∗
(5.64) (5.46) (5.26) (15.51) (15.93) (15.40)
MBHC 0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗ 0.00822∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.00771∗∗∗
(18.26) (17.26) (16.77) (8.35) (11.83) (7.99)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.6 – Continued from previous page
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OBHC 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0382∗∗∗ 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.00533∗∗∗ 0.00741∗∗∗ 0.00498∗∗∗
(12.76) (11.90) (11.79) (6.96) (9.84) (6.56)
MRG -0.00532 -0.00946 -0.0176 0.0378 0.0406 0.0371
(-0.08) (-0.14) (-0.29) (1.05) (1.06) (1.00)
ACQ 0.00834∗∗∗ 0.00898∗∗∗ 0.00473∗ 0.00207∗∗ 0.00179∗ 0.00174∗
(3.23) (3.49) (1.84) (2.02) (1.76) (1.69)
Constant 2.306∗∗∗ 2.266∗∗∗ 2.311∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗
(55.37) (53.02) (55.87) (74.14) (76.47) (74.47)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 118164 118164 118164 118164 118164 118164
4.4.4. The Influence of Fragility
This section further disentangles A1 and A2. In so doing, it investigates whether the
fragility of banks is an important driver of intermediation quality. The work of Diamond
and Rajan (2000, 2001) suggests that fragility disciplines banks and thus leads to the
“Opacity-Fragility Hypothesis” (A2). If this alternative holds, the association between
fragility and intermediation quality should be positive. On the other hand Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995) and associated work suggests that fragility is in fact detrimental
to the quality of financial intermediation because it reduces the hardness of budget
constraints that banks impose on borrowers and thus invites poor debtors (“Opacity-
Hardness Hypothesis”, A1). The analyses below investigate these two alternatives. They
measure fragility along several dimensions. There are four simple measures, leverage
(LEV RAG), nonperforming loans as a fraction of total loans (NPL), the ratio of risk
weighted assets to total assets (CREDRSK) and the ratio of liquid assets over total
assets (LAGTA). Moreover, two specifications of Z-Score, ZINDpool, ZINDMA(3),
are used to capture a bank’s distance to default (De Nicoló, 2000). If A2 holds and
more fragile banks are better at creating liquidity, then one would expect positive signs
on leverage, nonperforming loans and risk weighted assets over total assets. Also one
would expect to observe negative signs for Z-Score and LAGTA. The opposite is the
expectation if A1 holds. Section 4.4.4.1 investigates the effects of fragility on liquid-
ity creation in isolation. This will allow for a better assessment whether opacity and
fragility subsume similar intermediation quality effects and it will broadly distinguish
between A1 and A2. In order to ensure valid results, the subsequent analysis then
proceeds to investigate the results with opacity and fragility jointly included in Section
4.4.4.2.
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4.4.4.1. Fragility and Intermediation Quality
This section takes a first step towards disentangling A1 and A2 by examining fragility.
It first provides results on the relation between intermediation quality and fragility
alone. The regressions are again Tobit and take the following form:
IQCFm,i,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + δFRAGi,k,t +
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i,
(4.8)
where FRAGi,t,k is the kth of the six fragility proxies and m ∈ {SFA,GFA}. Table
4.7 reports the corresponding results.
The signs of the control variables are similar relative to the previous analyses. As
regards fragility there is clear evidence that more fragile banks are better intermediaries.
Specifically, higher intermediation quality banks have fewer liquid assets (LAGTA), are
more highly leveraged (LEV RAG) and hold lower quality loan portfolios (NPL). These
banks also hold greater quantities of risk weighted assets (CREDRSK) and are closer
to default (ZINDMA(3), ZINDpool). All these signs are as would be expected under
A2. All of the above findings, with the exception of NPL, where the coefficient is
significantly negative in the GFA case, hold for both IQCFSFA and IQ
CF
GFA (Specifications
1-6 and 7-12 respectively). Thus, overall, the overwhelming majority of the evidence
points to a rejection of A1 in favor of A2.
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4.4.4.2. Intermediation Quality in the Opacity-Fragility Nexus
Results in the previous section indicate that A2, the hypothesis that more fragile banks
are better intermediators of liquidity, should be accepted. The present reading of the
theory advanced by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) suggests that opacity and fragility
are functionally similar. It might, for example, be the case that due to extensive bank
regulation along the lines of Basel II, or due to a perceived too-big-to-fail policy, de-
positors view banks as essentially riskless as long as their signal about bank fragility is
not noisy. If the signal becomes more noisy, for example due to opacity, the confidence
of depositors is shaken and only then do they seriously consider running on banks. To
gain more robust insight into the joint influence of opacity and fragility on intermedia-
tion quality, this section reruns the analysis including both fragility and opacity in the
specification, which takes the following form.
IQCFm,i,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + γOPi,j,t + δFRAGi,k,t
+
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i.
(4.9)
Results are reported in Tables 4.8-4.10. Results show across all of the analyses that
neither opacity nor fragility lose their explanatory power nor do they change sign as
regards intermediation quality in the vast majority of cases. OOAJLY is again insignif-
icant across most regressions although it turns positive for SFA in most instances. In
addition, it turns significantly positive for the GFA-based intermediation quality mea-
sure when fragility is measured using pooled Z-Score, liquid assets over total assets and
leverage. Moreover, when winsorizing at the 2% tails, OOAJLY becomes significantly
positive throughout (see Appendix B.2.2). When intermediation quality is measured by
way of SFA, OLNJLY is significantly positively associated with intermediation quality
as before except when fragility is proxied by LAGTA and CREDRSK. It remains
significantly negative for the GFA-based intermediation quality. Also, NPL loses its
significance when it is used to control for fragility. This points to a small degree of
interaction between fragility and opacity as parametrized by OLNJLY . The measure
derived from Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013), OPQFKN , maintains its posi-
119
tive and highly significant relation with intermediation quality throughout the analysis.
Both the SFA and the GFA-based measures of intermediation quality support these
findings. Taken together, this evidence suggests that intermediation quality increases
with opacity regardless of whether fragility is controlled for or not. This confirms that
A1 should be rejected in favor of A2.
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4.5. Additional Analysis
In order to gain further insight into the relation between the quality of financial in-
termediation, opacity and fragility, this section conducts a number of supplementary
analyses. Specifically, it investigates further whether the effects of opacity and fragility
depend on the level of opacity present. It also uses an alternative parametrization of
intermediation quality to test the robustness of the results. All tables are reported in
Appendix C.
4.5.1. Split Sample Analysis by Opacity
So far results have supported the argument that opacity and fragility function in sim-
ilar ways when it comes to disciplining banks and thus facilitate intermediation qual-
ity. However, an interesting additional question is whether the effects of opacity and
fragility depend on the level of opacity present. Thus, while the theory is silent in this
respect, it seems plausible to suppose that if opacity becomes excessive, it will impair a
bank’s ability to do business. The danger of a run will become so imminent that bank
management is preoccupied with preventing this event more than with conducting in-
termediation. This is because opacity exacerbates the effect of any fragility, which the
bank may already be experiencing.
To investigate this conjecture, I split the sample by opacity. Specifically, I rerun
the analyses separately for the first and fourth quartiles of the opacity distribution
as measured by the OOAJLY , OLNJLY and OPQFKN variables. These results
are tabulated in Appendix B.1.1. Findings show that for low opacity banks (Q1),
the results are as in the main analysis. Specifically, the fragility proxies LAGTA,
ZINDMA(3) and ZINDpool are significantly negatively associated with intermedia-
tion quality, while LEV RAG, NPL and CREDRSK exhibit a significantly positive
relation. This indicates that low opacity banks’ intermediation quality benefits from
fragility. Furthermore, all three opacity variables OOAJLY , OLNJLY and OPQFKN
are significantly positively associated with intermediation quality in a large majority
of instances; both these findings are consistent with A2. However, in high opacity
banks only OPQFKN remains significantly positive. When splitting the sample by
OOAJLY , both OOAJLY and OLNJLY become significantly negative. When split-
ting by OLNJLY , both OOAJLY and OLNJLY become insignificantly negative.
When splitting by OPQFKN , OOAJLY and OLNJLY are often significantly nega-
tive for high opacity banks. Moreover, this is the only instance when a coefficient on
OPQFKN turns negative. Furthermore, when considering the fragility controls, three
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of these become insignificant (LEV RAG, ZINDMA(3), ZINDpool) and one switches
sign (NPL). This indicates that in high opacity banks, reducing fragility or opacity is
beneficial for intermediation quality or that fragility is of no importance.
Taken together, this suggests that the effects of opacity and fragility are dependent
on the level of opacity that is already present. An excessive level of opacity reduces
the disciplining mechanism exerted by fragility in the Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001)
models because sceptical depositors may find it difficult to accurately evaluate the
fragility of the bank if it is extremely opaque. An additional, analysis can further make
the explanation that depositors find it difficult to evaluate bank fragility if opacity is
excessive more robust. Thus I split the sample by some of the fragility proxies (Z-
Score, leverage and nonperforming loans) and rerun the analysis (unreported). If the
explanation given above for the differential impact of opacity is false, one should expect
a similar pattern in this additional analysis. Concretely, one would expect that for
high fragility banks fragility and opacity become insignificant or detrimental in the
context of intermediation quality. If, on the other hand, the explanation that high
opacity clouds depositors’ ability to assess banks’ balance sheets and thus destroys
the disciplining effects of fragility and opacity, is true one should expect a picture
that is qualitatively unchanged compared with the main analysis. This is the picture
that obtains when splitting the sample by some of the fragility proxies. Specifically,
opacity maintains sign and significance and in fact for high fragility firms, the previously
insignificantly negative OOAJLY tends to become significantly positive. Fragility, on
the other hand, exhibits a virtually identical pattern as in the main analysis and hence
the results remain unreported. Together this analysis shows that opacity and fragility
are functionally similar but nonetheless distinct features of banks, which have direct
bearing on intermediation quality.
4.5.2. An Alternative Measure of Bank Intermediation
Section 4.3 has briefly discussed the Deep and Schaefer (2004) liquidity gap measure.
This measure is more restrictive in its understanding of liquidity creation, which it de-
fines as the gap between liquid assets and liquid liabilities. Its underlying assumption
is that whatever liquid liabilities are not used in financing liquid assets are employed
in financing assets of longer duration respectively lower liquidity. This metric has been
criticized by, for example, Berger and Bouwman (2009) because it does not include
important categories of assets such as off-balance-sheet items and does not consider
liquidity destruction, which invariably occurs in the course of banking business if, for
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instance, long term liabilities are used to finance short term assets. Furthermore, the
liquidity transformation gap does not directly capture the “quality” of financial inter-
mediation but rather tries to approximate its quantity. However, from the econometric
viewpoint, this measure has some advantages over the Berger and Bouwman (2009)
measures in that it is less likely to be collinear or trivially correlated with the opacity
and fragility proxies. Therefore I use this alternative measure of bank intermediation
to verify the results. Specifically I run a fixed effects regression with time and bank
effects and bank level clustering of the following form:
LTGi,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + γOPi,t,j + δFRAGi,t,k
+
17∑
t=1
θtdt + νi + i,t.
(4.10)
Here LTG is the liquidity transformation gap scaled by total assets, all regressors are as
previously defined and ν is a bank fixed effect. This regression is run three times, once
unmodified, once setting γ to zero and once setting δ to zero for each opacity (fragility)
measure j (k). This replicates the steps of the main analysis. A succinct discussion of
these tables is given below, while a more complete discussion and the tables themselves
are reported in Section B.1.2 of the appendix for brevity.
Given that this is a conceptually entirely different measure of the intermediation
activity of banks, and that a different econometric parametrization is used for infer-
ence, the results exhibit a remarkable similarity with the main analysis. Thus, in all
regressions the coefficients on OLNJLY and OPQFKN are significantly positive (the
coefficient on OOAJLY is significantly negative), affirming the importance of opacity
in the context of financial intermediation and inducing the rejection of A3 in favor of A1
or A2. Furthermore, the proxies for bank fragility display an identical pattern as before.
Thus, higher intermediation quality banks have fewer liquid assets, higher leverage and
more risk weighted assets (LAGTA, LEV RAG and CREDRSK). They also have a
higher level of nonperforming loans (NPL) and lower distance to default (ZINDpool).
These findings continue to hold when both opacity and fragility are included in the
regression. This is strong evidence for the robustness of the claim that A1 should be
rejected in favor of A2.
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4.6. Robustness Checks
This section conducts a number of checks for the robustness of the reported results.
The first step is to check that the results are not driven by data preprocessing, which
in the present case is comprised of winsorization at the 1% and 99% level. Rerunning
the main analyses without winsorizing gives weaker but qualitatively similar results
(unreported). Moreover, rerunning the main analyses with winsorization at the 2%
tails yields results that support the main findings in a very emphatic way. Specifically,
the previously insignificant OOAJLY is now positively significantly associated with
intermediation quality throughout the analysis (see Appendix B.2.2 for results and a
detailed discussion).
Berger and DeYoung (1997) note potential endogeneity of regressors when efficiency
is a dependent variable due to reverse causation. I have given plausible reasons why this
problem should be much less prevalent in the present case. Specifically, cost, revenue,
and profit efficiency are likely to be known and targeted by management. Liquidity
efficiency, however, is not only a novel concept it is also not clear how it would enter
the managerial decision making process. Furthermore, the set of covariates used in this
study is based around variables that are difficult for management to influence at least
in the short run (organizational form, geographical location). Therefore it is much less
likely that endogeneity obtains in the present case. However, to alleviate this concern
Berger and DeYoung (1997) rest their analysis on both multi and univariate regressions.
They argue that potentially endogenous variables will be likely to change sign in the
uni and multivariate case. Thus, I also rerun all regressions using only one independent
variable and a constant to determine that signs and significances of the correlates used
are the same as in the multivariate case. This check holds for all variables except
bank level population (BKPOP ). Since re-estimating all regressions omitting this
explanatory variable yields results that are virtually unchanged these findings remain
untabulated.
One important robustness check is to investigate the results that obtain when CAT −
NONFAT is used as the proxy for liquidity creation in parametrizing the intermedia-
tion quality measure. This analysis, along with a more extensive discussion, is reported
in Appendix B.2.1. Results are again extremely similar to the main findings. In fact,
while the opacity proxy OLNJLY was significantly negative when intermediation qual-
ity was parametrized using GFA, this effect has now vanished and a significantly positive
coefficient obtains. This shows the robustness of the influence of opacity on interme-
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diation quality. In addition, the fragility results are also robust. This holds also when
both opacity and fragility are included.
A further confounding factor in the analysis might be the presence of the financial
crisis in which both fragility and opacity played important roles (see e.g. Brunnermeier,
2009). While this is already somewhat mitigated by preferring to estimate the inter-
mediation quality proxy yearly rather than using a panel data efficiency model, it may
still confound inference in a pooled Tobit setting. Thus, as an additional check, I rerun
all main analyses over a reduced sample that excludes 2007 and all subsequent years,
which leaves 100,745 bank-year observations in the sample. Results regarding opacity
are qualitatively unchanged. In terms of fragility, results are qualitatively unchanged
except for the coefficient on NPL, which is now significantly negative. Since the results
are so similar they remain untabulated for brevity.
Although the analysis is dealing with a censored dependent variable, previous studies
investigating efficiency measures have used OLS to generate their results (Pi and Timme,
1993). This may be justified on the grounds mentioned by Simar and Wilson (2007),
who note that the apparent truncation of efficiency scores may be an artifact of finite
samples, and not the true model (p. 40). Therefore, to ensure that the method of
estimation is not driving results, I rerun all analyses using a panel data model including
fixed effects for banks and years following Pi and Timme (1993) (see Appendix B.2.3).
Results are again qualitatively unaffected and, with respect to opacity, slightly stronger.
The same is the case if, following Simar and Wilson (2007), I use truncated regression
instead (see Appendix B.2.4).
The main motivation for using intermediation quality as dependent variable in the
main analysis is the econometric conundrum of investigating relations between an all
encompassing balance sheet measure of liquidity creation and balance sheet measures of
opacity and fragility. Intermediation quality is introduced to avoid trivial coefficients.
However one could also approach the issue from the direction of the independent vari-
ables of interest. Specifically, in a separate robustness check, I use various approaches
of generating opacity and fragility indices in order to proxy for these features of banks.
Concretely I investigate principal components analysis, summation, ranking and average
ranks. This allows the analysis to proceed using CATFAT and CATNONFAT liq-
uidity creation as dependent variable directly while reducing the danger of tautological
results. This analysis is reported in Section B.2.6. Results are encouraging in that they
show that all four opacity and fragility indices are significantly and positively related
to liquidity creation. This holds both individually and with opacity and fragility jointly
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included in the regression specification. Therefore the main results are also robust to
this modified approach.
I have also rerun regressions across samples split by bank size in the spirit of Berger
and Bouwman (2009) without major qualitative changes to the reported results (see
Appendix B.2.5). Thus, overall, findings are extremely robust.
4.7. Conclusion
The regulation of banks in the wake of the financial crisis has been geared towards
increasing capital requirements and bank transparency. While more stringent capital
requirements have led to a shortage in loan provision, there may be a similar but more
latent cost to greater disclosure. The theory provides three distinct hypotheses about
the relations between the quality of financial intermediation, fragility and opacity. A
first set of theories related to the soft budget constraint literature predicts that opacity
will be beneficial because it will exert demand side disciplining pressure on borrowers,
while fragility will have the opposite effect. Bank borrowers with bad projects cannot
know whether an opaque bank will roll over their project’s loan and thus are compelled
to expend greater effort, which ultimately leads to better loan portfolios and less fragile
banks (“Opacity-Hardness Hypothesis”). A second set of theories indicates that opacity
should have a positive influence alongside fragility because it is the threat of a bank
run that disciplines banks and induces them to commit full effort to the monitoring
of borrowers (“Opacity-Fragility Hypothesis”). A third set of theories predicts that
both opacity and fragility should have a negative relation with the quality of financial
intermediation. This strand of the literature emphasizes that opaque banks cannot
bridge a gap of beliefs existing between optimistic borrowers and pessimistic lenders
(“Opacity-Ownership Hypothesis”).
I investigate and disentangle these hypotheses using a large sample of the US banking
population. To obtain an econometrically efficacious indicator of intermediation quality
that will not be trivially associated with available balance sheet opacity and fragility
measures, stochastic frontier analysis and generalized frontier analysis and the liquidity
creation measures of Berger and Bouwman (2009) are used in order to parametrize a
“liquidity frontier”. Using the resulting liquidity efficiency scores as a proxy for interme-
diation quality, this chapter tests the above hypotheses and finds that there is a strong,
positive and persistent association between opacity and intermediation quality. Results
also provide support for theories that predict that fragility will positively influence the
quality of financial intermediation. Furthermore, the effect of opacity and fragility on
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intermediation quality is at least partly dependent on the opacity of the bank. Intu-
itively, less opaque banks again benefit more strongly from opacity than do more opaque
ones. This finding aligns well with the “Opacity-Fragility Hypothesis”. This indicates
that the trust problems that both lenders and borrowers will have with respect to a
bank are exacerbated by opacity.
The results reported in this chapter hold under a variety of robustness checks. More-
over, they point out interesting directions for future research and highlight important
policy implications. First, it would be of considerable interest to see the development of
theoretical models of the intermediation process that explicitly incorporate the finding
that opacity is a salient feature of this activity. The, as yet unfinished, work of Mon-
net and Quintin (2013) may indeed be a first step in this direction. Second, from the
perspective of the regulator, a certain forbearance with respect to bank opacity may be
in order if the goal of high intermediation quality between lenders and borrowers is to
be achieved. This could, for example, be accomplished by keeping additional disclosure
requirements for banks that fail stress tests confidential etc.
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5. Managerial Ability, Liquidity Creation
and Risk-Taking
This chapter hypothesizes that more able bank managers create more liquidity and take
greater risks. These hypotheses find support in the data. In addition, different strands
of the literature disagree on the reaction of bank liquidity creation to crisis shocks.
While the empirical literature suggests that increasing liquidity creation improves the
competitive position of the bank post crisis, theoretical work indicates that a reduction
in liquidity creation may be individually optimal. Therefore, using a difference-in-
differences approach, this chapter also studies the impact of pre-crisis managerial ability
on the liquidity creation of banks during the financial crisis. Findings indicate that
the impact of pre-crisis managerial ability on bank liquidity creation is negative as
suspected. Additional findings show that more ably managed banks also reduce risk as
a reaction to the crisis.
5.1. Introduction
While the liquidity creation of banks is one of the central services they provide to
the economy, it has only recently received attention in the empirical literature (see for
example Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Similarly, managerial ability has for a long time
been ignored, under the assumption that managers are largely homogeneous entities
that follow identical goals. Only recently has this view been challenged by a growing
body of literature that recognizes the impact that managers have on firm performance
(see for example Bamber, Jiang andWang, 2010, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, Demerjian,
Lev and McVay, 2012).
Thus, more able managers have, for example, been found to be positively performance
relevant in industrial firms (see for example Demerjian, Lev and McVay, 2012) and to
report higher quality earnings in banks (see for example Cantrell, 2013). Furthermore,
more able managers have been shown to provide their firms with superior reactions
to crisis events (Andreou, Ehrlich and Louca, 2013) and to decisively influence firm
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decisions and governance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Motivated by these results, this
chapter hypothesizes that more able managers will run banks that create more liquidity.
In addition, this chapter postulates that, because of their superior ability, more able
bank managers can and do take more risk. Both of these assertions find support in the
data.
A related empirical question of interest is whether more able managers react to shocks
by expanding or by contracting the liquidity creation of their banks. Thus, Bebchuk and
Goldstein (2011) argue on theoretical grounds that it may be individually optimal for
banks to curtail their intermediation activity in the face of shocks to the economy. Nat-
urally, banks led by more able managers should be in a better position to carry out such
an adjustment if it is indeed optimal for them to do so. However, Berger and Bouwman
(2008) present empirical evidence to the contrary. Their findings suggest that banks
may even increase liquidity creation during crises and that such an increase improves
these banks’ value creation and competitiveness. This in turn provides managerial
incentives to expand intermediation activity during crises and it seems reasonable to
suppose that more able managers will pursue such a strategy more effectively. This
chapter uses a difference-in-differences approach to investigate these conflicting predic-
tions. In so doing it isolates the effect of pre-crisis managerial ability on bank liquidity
creation during the recent financial crisis. Results suggest that the impact of pre-crisis
managerial ability on liquidity creation is negative during the crisis. This provides sup-
port to the theory of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011). In addition, this chapter posits
that more able managers are more effective at de-risking their banks in times of crisis.
Using the same identification strategy, I find support for this final prediction. This is
consistent with the interpretation of the reduction in liquidity creation as an optimal
reaction to the crisis shock.
In brief, this investigation contributes to the understanding of the banking industry
in several important ways. First, it provides further insight into bank liquidity cre-
ation and risk-taking by showing the importance of managerial ability for these key
features of banks. It also provides valuable evidence on the impact of financial crises
on bank liquidity creation and risk-taking through the channel of managerial ability.
Furthermore, this work extends the analysis of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) by
considering various implementations of their managerial ability measure. This not only
makes the present analysis robust but also demonstrates the robustness of Demerjian,
Lev and McVay’s (2012) managerial ability measure.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the various
strands of the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 5.3 discusses the data
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and variables used in the investigation. The results of the empirical analysis are reported
in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 discusses various robustness checks. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2. Review of the Literature
This section discusses the literature that underpins the analysis in this chapter. Firstly,
it summarizes the literature related to managerial ability and defines the proxy of
managerial ability to be used in this investigation. Secondly, this section discusses
liquidity creation of banks and how to measure this important quantity. Thirdly and
finally, this discussion motivates predictions about the impact of managerial ability on
liquidity creation and risk-taking. Furthermore, it offers an additional set of predictions
about the relation between managerial ability and liquidity creation as well as risk-
taking in crisis times.
5.2.1. The Importance and Quantification of Managerial Ability
The management literature has long been aware of the importance of the manager,
or of the top management team, for the outcomes achieved by the enterprise. This
body of research shows, for instance, that the composition of the top management team
matters for important strategic decisions such as globalization (Carpenter and Fredrick-
son, 2001). Furthermore, it has been found that top management team demographics
and constructive conflict may be decisive for the success or failure of new technology
ventures (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). One theoretical approach, and much of
the related literature, that has formalized reasons for the pervasiveness of management
factors in driving success is summarized by Hambrick’s (2007) upper echelons theory.
This theory predicts that the complexity of actual decision making situations necessi-
tates an idiosyncratic importance of managers for industrial outcomes. Specifically, he
draws on the seminal work of Hambrick and Mason (1984), in arguing that managers
are instrumental in influencing the behavior of the organizations they govern. This is
especially believed to be the case if one considers not only the CEO but also the top
management team (TMT) as a whole. Strikingly, economics and finance research has
been reluctant to abandon the neoclassical paradigm, which leaves limited space for
manager idiosyncrasies. Thus, for example, managerial ability has, until recently, been
denied existence altogether in the empirical asset pricing literature studying mutual
fund performance (Berk and Stanton, 2007). It is therefore not surprising that the
banking literature has explored questions related to the behavior of managers largely
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through a neoclassical lens or, at best, through the lens of agency theory. Although this
paradigm relaxes the stringency of the neoclassical view somewhat, it still posits that
individuals are more or less homogeneous and merely react rationally to the regulatory
and incentive framework they find themselves in (see Bamber, Jiang and Wang, 2010,
for further discussion).
However, more recent research has recognized the role of managers more explicitly.
Thus, for example, Khanna and Poulsen (1995) show that, while firm distress or failure
cannot conclusively be attributed to them, managers do matter for firm performance.
Other work has documented even more far reaching and specific influences emanating
from the managers to the firm. An important contribution by Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) investigates the impact of managerial ability on firm behavior. The authors
use manager fixed effects to determine managers’ impact on corporate behavior along
multiple dimensions such as investment, financing, capital structure and profitability.
They find that managers systematically influence their organization’s behavior over and
above time- and firm-specific characteristics and that these influences can be traced
back to demographic properties of managers. They further document that different
managers develop distinctive styles of management. Furthermore, Bamber, Jiang and
Wang (2010) isolate the effect that an individual manager has on a firm’s disclosure
policies from the effects of the firm and the environment. Using manager fixed effects,
they find that managers contribute substantially to firm disclosure policy and that these
effects can be linked to demographic traits of individual managers. Similarly, Rajgopal,
Shevlin and Zamora (2006) find that CEO compensation is systematically linked to
talent. This indicates that the ability of managers is recognizable to owners, who are
willing to remunerate it. Significant effects of managerial influence on accounting behav-
ior of firms have also been documented for CFOs (Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang, 2011).
Finally, Leverty and Grace’s (2012) work on insurance firms suggests that managers
are important and economically significant in terms of influencing firm efficiency. A
concept similar to managerial ability (management quality) is explored by Beatty and
Liao (2011). Their main objective is the investigation of suspected pro-cyclicality in
the generally accepted incurred loss method as applied to loan loss provisions. They
find support for the conjecture that more ably managed banks will foresee loan losses
earlier and thus recognize these earlier.
So far managerial ability, being latent, has been a challenging concept to operational-
ize empirically. A main contribution of the body of literature discussed above is that
it has developed feasible operationalizations of managerial ability. However, its specific
choice of ability measure also represents its greatest limitation. Thus the focus has been
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primarily on manager fixed effects and, in the case of Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora
(2006), on manager press visibility and firm performance. Constructing manager fixed
effects requires firm and manager observations over time. However, the availability of
the required data is limited and favors large firms. The same holds for press visibility,
where a substantial bias towards large and listed firms is likely. Furthermore, Benned-
sen, Pérez-González and Wolfenzon (2006) investigate the ex-post impact of managers
on firms by considering how the death of senior managers or of their family members
impacts performance. While this study provides further evidence that managers matter
for firm performance, it also highlights another potential problem of manager fixed ef-
fects, namely that manager turnovers are frequently endogenous to circumstances that
are also otherwise problematic for the firm in question. This casts doubt on the relia-
bility of results obtained from manager fixed effects. In addition, focussing on only the
CEO or CFO ignores the fact that it is most probably the top management team as a
whole that drives firm outcomes as argued for example in Hambrick (2007). Therefore
mainstream research on managerial ability has heretofore been hampered in breadth
and accuracy by the lack of a measure of managerial ability that reliably disentangles
it from other factors and is readily available for large numbers of firms.
Alternatives to the managerial fixed effects approach have been rather limited. Thus,
for instance, Leverty and Grace’s (2012) analysis postulates that efficiency can be con-
sidered a valid indicator of managerial ability. However, they use as their proxy firm
efficiency scores, derived from the common DEA method. Even the authors themselves
recognize that it is not only the manager who influences this indicator but also other
firm and industry related aspects. A similar criticism can be raised against the work of
Barr, Seiford and Siems (1993). The authors use DEA for the quantification of manage-
rial ability in banking. They find that technical efficiency can function as a predictor of
bank default (see also Barr and Siems, 1997). However, their method exhibits a number
of problems. Firstly, they utilize a highly non-standard definition of bank inputs and
outputs for use with DEA, following none of the established approaches (intermedia-
tion, production, user-cost or value added). Secondly, similar to Leverty and Grace
(2012), they use the raw DEA efficiency score to measure managerial ability. Simi-
larly, Beatty and Liao (2011) argue that past return on assets depends on the ability of
management and, hence, should be able to proxy for their closely related management
quality concept. While the return on assets of a bank no doubt reflects the overall
management quality of the institution, such a definition subsumes many factors that
are not attributable to management alone, such as the ability to operate at optimal
scale, functional organizational structures, the goodwill of clients that has accrued to
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the institution over its lifespan etc. Therefore using ROA as a proxy for the ability or
quality of management is prone to the same objection made to the approaches of Barr,
Seiford and Siems (1993), Barr and Siems (1997) and Leverty and Grace (2012).
It follows from this discussion that any efficiency- or profitability-based measure of
managerial ability needs to be purged of any effects that ought to be attributed to the
firm. This contribution is made in recent research by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012),
who construct a broad and reliable measure of managerial ability that can be obtained
with relatively frugal data requirements. Specifically, they realize that only the portion
of firm efficiency not attributed to firm-specific characteristics ought to be attributed
to the manager. Revenue efficiency indicates the ability to generate revenues with a
given bundle of inputs and outputs relative to other, similar firms. Thus it necessarily
subsumes industry and firm influences. However, a firm’s ability to generate revenues
is in no small part dependent on the ability of management to, for example, choose and
bring to fruition positive NPV projects. Thus, once a revenue efficiency score is in hand,
managerial ability can be obtained by purging firm- and industry-specific effects from
it statistically. This is achieved by running Tobit regressions of the efficiency scores on
characteristics that are assumed to be specific to the firm and outside the manager’s
influence. Given its wide coverage, this measure lends itself particularly to the study
of the US banking industry, where a majority of banks are small, not covered by the
financial press and not publicly traded. Therefore this chapter adopts the approach of
Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) to operationalize managerial ability.
5.2.2. Liquidity Creation
In contrast to managerial ability, bank liquidity creation has never been denied its
importance. However, systematic studies of bank liquidity creation have been hampered
by the unavailability of a suitable operationalization of this variable. Arguably, one
of the first attempts to operationalize liquidity creation was conducted by Deep and
Schaefer (2004), who developed a measure for what they call the liquidity transformation
gap. This measure of banks’ liquidity creation postulates that the intermediation of
banks can be captured by the difference between short-term assets and liabilities. They
argue that any short-term liabilities that are not matched up by short-term assets
are used to finance assets of longer duration. This, on their reading, translates into
liquidity creation. However, Berger and Bouwman (2009) note that this measure of
liquidity creation is not completely satisfactory. This is, for example, because it ignores
the possibility of bank liquidity destruction. Such a constellation could, for instance,
138
obtain if a bank used long term liabilities to finance short term assets. Then it is
effectively withdrawing liquidity from the wider economy. Deep and Schaefer’s (2004)
measure also does not account for the possibility of creating liquidity off the balance
sheet or through, for example, transforming medium term liabilities into long term
assets etc. Consequently, Berger and Bouwman (2009) develop a variety of broader
measures of bank liquidity creation.
The measures of Berger and Bouwman (2009) differ both in terms of scope and
construction. The construction criteria are chosen to reflect the effort, duration and
cost required to liquidate a given asset or liability in the market. They classify assets
and liabilities according to maturity (MAT ) as well as according to asset categories
(CAT , e.g. loans vs securities etc.). Furthermore, they distinguish between measures
in and exclusive of off-balance-sheet items (FAT , NONFAT ). The classification with
respect to maturity is straightforward: shorter maturities require less effort to liquidate.
The classification with respect to categories relies on judgement. Thus the authors
assert, for instance, that residential real estate loans are likely easier to securitize or sell
than, for example, commercial and industrial loans and, therefore, should be considered
more liquid. Similar considerations govern the classification of all assets and liabilities.
They then assign heuristic weights of 0, 12 or −12 to each class, according to whether
it is deemed to create or destroy liquidity. This heuristic choice of weights reflects the
postulate that maximum liquidity of unity should be created or destroyed if a liquid
liability is used to create an illiquid asset or vice versa. Semiliquid assets and liabilities
are assigned zero weights, presumably so as to err on the side of caution in terms of the
classification procedure outlined above.
Berger and Bouwman (2009) go on to show that it is primarily large banks that create
liquidity, that liquidity creation is value relevant and that it is sensitive to crises. Berger
and Bouwman (2012) provide interesting evidence on the reaction of bank liquidity
creation to monetary policy. They find that monetary policy designed to stimulate
bank liquidity creation, as represented for example by expansive interest rates, is nearly
ineffectual during normal times. This holds particularly for the most liquidity creating
banks in their sample. Moreover, in crises the efficacy of such policies is found to
be even weaker. This indicates that, as crises hit, managers may disregard incentives
provided by monetary policy in favor of keeping their institution viable by whatever
means are necessary. Berger and Bouwman (2008) also find that banks that were
better capitalized and thus more resilient prior and during financial crises benefitted
with respect to their market share in terms of liquidity creation as well as value creation
post crisis. In this sense the liquidity creation of banks can be said to reflect managers’
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trade off between risk and return in a unique way. Thus managers balance profit and
wealth maximization objectives against risk. They do so by choosing optimal sources
of funding and corresponding allocations for those funds according to the risk-return
characteristics of the available assets and liabilities. This process ultimately determines
the quantity of liquidity created. Given the greater refinement of their metric compared
to Deep and Schaefer’s (2004), this chapter adopts the CATFAT measure of Berger
and Bouwman (2009) as the key indicator of liquidity creation.1
5.2.3. Managerial Ability, Liquidity Creation and Risk
The discussion in Section 5.2.1 has shown that more able managers tend to run more
successful, better governed firms (see for example Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, Bamber,
Jiang and Wang, 2010 or Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang, 2011). By the same token, banks
managed by more able top management teams can also be expected to display a superior
performance. As discussed in Section 5.2.2 one key feature of banks is the creation of
liquidity by providing intermediation services to the economy. Hence it seems reasonable
to suppose that more ably managed banks will also be creating more liquidity. Notice
that this hypothesis does not require the assumption that managers explicitly target
liquidity creation. It simply relies on the superior funding and allocation choices made
by more able managers. This claim has so far not been investigated in the empirical
or theoretical literature and immediately motivates the first hypothesis, here stated in
alternative form:
A1: Ability-Intermediation Hypothesis: More ably managed banks create more
liquidity.
A second important question is the impact that more able managers have on bank
risk-taking. Intuitively, more able managers should be confident in their ability to take
desirable, controlled risk. Hence one might expect that more able managers will be
found to take more risk overall. If ability is positively correlated with education, as
might reasonably be assumed, this view is supported by the evidence in Bertrand and
Schoar (2003), who document that managers who hold MBAs are prone to more risky
behavior. This view would also be consistent with the evidence in Beatty and Liao
(2011), who show that better managers write down nonperforming loans in a more
timely fashion. This suggests that the risk that has been taken by managers of greater
ability has been reliably estimated beforehand and need not be hidden from outsiders
by, for example, rolling over bad loans (see for example Aghion, Bolton and Fries, 1999,
1However, both Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) and Deep and Schaefer’s (2004) measure is examined
for robustness in Appendix 5.
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Mitchell, 2001). Moreover, more avid risk-taking by more able managers allows for a
more aggressive funding/allocation strategy and therefore is compatible with the first
hypothesis. Hence I formulate the second hypothesis, again in alternative form:
A2: Ability-Risk Hypothesis: More ably managed banks take greater risk.
Another interesting question relates to the interplay between managerial ability and
liquidity creation as well as managerial ability and risk during times of crisis. To form a
reasonable prior on the impact that managerial ability is likely to have on liquidity cre-
ation in crisis times is not straightforward. On the one hand, the findings of Berger and
Bouwman (2008) document that banks’ reaction to crises can be to both increase and
decrease liquidity creation. In addition, they argue that banks that were well capitalized
and expanded their liquidity creation market share during and post crises were able to
benefit in terms of value creation. This suggests that there is an incentive for managers
to increase liquidity creation during crises in order to take advantage of subsequent
value gains. Ceteris paribus, more able managers should be better able to exploit these
opportunities. It follows that one ought to expect more ably managed banks to expand
liquidity creation during and post crises. On the other hand, the theory of Bebchuk
and Goldstein (2011) suggests the opposite. More specifically, in an economy where
the success of loans to industrial firms depends on the overall volume of loans extended
by banks, it may be individually rational for banks to reduce intermediation activity
following a negative shock to the economy. This follows from each bank’s expectation
that other banks will also curtail their intermediation activity and hence failure rates
among industrial firms will be high. The financial crisis would certainly qualify as such
a negative shock. Therefore one can argue that it is individually optimal for banks to
reduce intermediation activity in this case. Again, more able managers should have
been able to react more forcefully in order to protect their banks from risk. Hence the
third hypothesis has two elements, here stated in alternative form:
A3a: Ability-Value Hypothesis: More ably managed banks increase liquidity cre-
ation during crisis times.
A3b: Ability-Risk Aversion Hypothesis: More ably managed banks decrease liq-
uidity creation during crisis times.
Finally, crisis events are frequently marked by a flight to quality, and de-leveraging
respectively de-risking (see for example Brunnermeier, 2009). This is the natural re-
action of a bank to shocks because it serves to protect its valuable charter from the
impact of the shock. Again, ceteris paribus, more able managers should be in a better
position to actively respond to such a shock. Hence one would expect to observe a more
thorough de-risking behavior in more ably managed banks. This motivates the final
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alternative hypothesis underlying this chapter:
A4: Ability-Reaction Hypothesis: More ably managed banks decrease risk during
crisis times.
If managerial ability exerts a significant impact on bank liquidity creation, manage-
rial ability has the potential to act as an important indicator variable for regulators.
From the viewpoint of the regulator, distinguishing high and low quality banks will
enable her to target intervention efforts more purposefully. Additionally, if managerial
ability has a clear relation with risk, it can further inform the prudential supervision
of banks. Specifically, this measure allows one to flesh out the “M” component of the
CAMELS rating criteria because, as discussed for example in Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco (1999), this component specifically targets the quality of bank manage-
ment. In normal times, bank characteristics that are beneficial to liquidity creation
can be used to govern the distribution of support such as the injection of subsidized
funds to stimulate lending (for a discussion of the UK’s funding for lending initiative
see for example Nixon, 2013). Moreover, information about factors that facilitate inter-
mediation activity and risk-taking becomes even more valuable in times of crisis. Here
the regulator needs to trade off moral hazard concerns and limited funds against the
risk of premature liquidation of positive NPV projects by banks and financial contagion
between banks. Thus, if managerial ability can predict liquidity creation and risk of
banks during crises, one heuristic which the regulator can resort to is to attach some
weight to managerial ability when deciding which banks to support and which to allow
to fail.
5.3. Data and Variables
Data are obtained from the Call Reports provided by the Chicago Federal Reserve
bank starting with the year 1994 and ending in 2010. All data pre-processing is as
described in Section 2.3. Data on banks’ liquidity creation follows Berger and Bouwman
(2009).2 Hence the selection of control variables also follows these authors. Among the
controls several demographic variables on various regional subdivisions such as county-
level population, population density and income growth are required. The raw data
can be obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov) and the the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (www.fdic.gov) and the bank-level demographic
variables are computed as in Section 4.3. Because the regression specifications are in
keeping with Berger and Bouwman (2009), the basic setup uses 3-year moving averages
2I thank Christa H. Bouwman, who has kindly made the data freely available on her website.
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of the regressors to combat endogeneity concerns. Hence the final dataset spans the
years 1996-2010 and contains 100,976 bank-year observations. The definition of the
financial crisis is also consistent with the literature. While Watts and Zuo (2012) suggest
that August 1st 2007 might be a correct starting period, the NBER definition focuses
on December 2007. Milestone events that precipitated the crisis started occurring in the
summer of 2007 when UBS and Bear Sterns hedgefunds experienced liquidity shortages
and the commercial paper market began freezing up (Brunnermeier, 2009). Thus it
seems justified to assume that 2006 was the last full year in the sample not affected by
the crisis. The end of the crisis is usually dated to mid 2009 (e.g. NBER). Hence the
base specification considers 2007-2009 as the crisis years.
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps, two of these are related to the hy-
potheses formulated at the outset while one is preliminary. The first, preliminary, step
is to compute bank efficiency using data envelopment analysis (DEA), stochastic fron-
tier analysis (SFA) and generalized frontier analysis (GFA). As has been discussed in
Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 as well as in Chapter 3, the character of these three methods
is different and therefore the information contained in the revenue-efficiency scores ob-
tained from these methods will differ somewhat. Therefore considering all three methods
will constitute a valuable robustness check. More specifically, DEA is a deterministic
technique. As such it attributes any noise that is contained in the data to (in-)efficiency.
SFA does not require the data to be observed without errors. However, it does postulate
a functional form that underlies the production process. Although studies have shown
that the common parametrizations, such as the Translog, can capture cost and revenue
efficiency, such an assumption may prove unjustified in a practical application. GFA is
the most general method as it does not impose assumptions of any kind on the data gen-
erating process. Because SFA is a well established method in the Banking literature and
because it has been shown to be able to parametrize revenue efficiency appropriately,
this chapter focuses on SFA as the baseline efficiency measurement method. However,
results obtained using GFA and DEA are investigated at length in Appendix C and
generally are in line with the main conclusions.
The first step of the actual analysis is to use the approach of Demerjian, Lev and Mc-
Vay (2012) to purge the efficiency scores of any bank-specific influences that cannot be
attributed to the management team. This is accomplished by running a Tobit regression
of the efficiency scores on a set of controls. Since prior evidence on the managerial abil-
ity of banks is limited, it is necessary to assess the plausibility of the managerial ability
scores. This is achieved first, by examining correlations between managerial ability and
common bank performance characteristics and, second, by regressing profitability char-
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acteristics on managerial ability and a set of controls. The expectation here is that a
plausible managerial ability indicator should exhibit positive relevance for profitability.
The results show that the MA scores are related to profitability in plausible ways and
thereby validate this variable.
The second step constitutes the bulk of the analysis. Specifically, it investigates the
influence that managerial ability exerts on liquidity creation and bank risk characteris-
tics during normal (Section 5.4.2) and during crisis times (Section 5.4.3). In considering
the financial crisis the analysis follows Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) by applying a
difference-in-differences approach so as to to isolate the effects of pre-crisis managerial
ability on liquidity creation while mitigating endogeneity concerns.
5.4. Empirical Results
This section presents the main results. Specifically, Section 5.4.1 provides evidence
on the plausibility of the managerial ability proxy used in this analysis. Section 5.4.2
examines the impact of managerial ability on the liquidity creation and risk-taking
behavior of banks. Finally, Section 5.4.3 analyzes the role of managerial ability with
respect to bank liquidity creation and risk-taking during the financial crisis.
5.4.1. Obtaining and Validating Managerial Ability
Having obtained the efficiency scores of the banks in question, the next step is to
disentangle managerial ability from bank-specific effects. To this end this section follows
Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). Their approach is to derive a measure of managerial
ability from a regression of bank revenue efficiency on a set of bank-specific explanatory
variables. They argue that the residual from such a regression captures that component
of revenue efficiency, which cannot be explained by the other regressors and thus can
be attributed to the manager. Cantrell (2013) shows that this measure has power to
explain the quality of reporting in banks. Specifically, he demonstrates that it can
explain the relation between actual and predicted fair values of securities and loan
losses, as predicted by bank managers. Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) further show
that the measure is positively correlated with other common metrics that have been
proposed to describe managerial ability such as past returns, manager fixed effects, etc.
Therefore this chapter follows the literature in its choice of regressors. Specifically, it
includes leverage and the number of employees as recommended by Cantrell (2013) as
well as the size of the bank, a dummy variable that indicates free cash flow and the age
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Table 5.1.:
Regression Results for Managerial Abil-
ity.
Coefficients from yearly Tobit regressions for
the year 2004. The dependent variable is the
profit efficiency score obtained from data en-
velopment analysis. Stars report significance
at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
BKSIZE stands for the natural log of gross
total assets, NUMEMP is the natural log
of the number of thousand full-time equiva-
lent employees, AGE is the log of bank age,
LEV RAG is the leverage of the bank, while
FCF is a dummy variable set to one if the
bank has free cash flow. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars.
BKSIZE 0.0677∗∗∗
(8.72)
NUMEMP -0.0836∗∗∗
(-10.45)
AGE 0.0196∗∗∗
(11.64)
LEV RAG 0.00387∗∗∗
(5.68)
FCF 0.0394∗∗∗
(6.45)
Constant -0.596∗∗∗
(-9.04)
N 6505
of the bank following Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). In keeping with Demerjian,
Lev and McVay (2012), it runs a Tobit regression of efficiency on some bank-specific
variables and year fixed effects, while clustering by bank. However, Demerjian, Lev and
McVay (2012) run their regressions over a pooled sample of banks. This creates the
potential for look-ahead bias in the estimation of managerial ability. Hence this chapter
chooses a yearly regression approach. Moreover it is likely that the objective of managers
is the maximization of profits rather than revenues. Hence the present approach chooses
a broader efficiency measure, namely profit efficiency as the dependent variable in the
regression. The residual from this regression constitutes the measure of managerial
ability. Concretely, the regression takes the following form:
pi − effDEA,i,t =α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2NUMEMPi,t + β3AGEi,t + β4LEVRAGi,t
+ β5FCFi,t +MAi,t.
(5.1)
Here pi − effDEA,i,t represents profit efficiency as computed by DEA. BKSIZE is the
log of gross total assets, NUMEMP is the log of the number of full time equivalent
employees in thousands, AGE is the log of the age of the bank in years, LEV RAG
represents leverage and FCF is an indicator variable that takes the value one when
cash flow for the year is positive. The residual, MA, captures all effects that are
specific to the manager and not the bank. Table 5.1 reports the results.
The measure of managerial ability will clearly heavily influence the outcome of the
subsequent analysis. Therefore it is important to thoroughly check the robustness of
the subsequent results to different specifications of managerial ability. Specifically,
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the original study by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) assumes that the managerial
objective is, in fact, revenue maximization. Furthermore, the approach assumes that the
covariates used in the regression from which MA is obtained accurately and exhaustively
capture all bank-specific effects that are not attributable to the actions of the manager.
Finally, the MA measure can be computed using both pooled as well as yearly data.
The robustness checks (5.5) and Section C.1 in the appendix investigate and discuss the
implications of various choices for the parametrization of MA at length. Specifically,
I compute MA using DEA, SFA and GFA revenue efficiency as well as DEA profit
efficiency, using both pooled and yearly regressions and using three different sets of
regressors. Overall, this analysis reveals that the specific parametrization of managerial
ability is secondary for the general conclusions.
Once the managerial ability measure has been obtained, it is important to investigate
its plausibility. To do so I check whether it is value- and performance relevant. I first
investigate the correlations between this measure and generic performance indicators.
As performance indicators this chapter uses ROA and ROE and the shareholder
value ratio (SHV R), which, in the spirit of Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012), is defined
as the quotient between economic value added and gross total assets. These provide
first evidence on the value relevance of the managerial ability measure. This analysis
also considers how managerial ability is related to the Z-Score (ZIND)3, the three
year moving standard deviation of ROA (SDROA), the ratio of risk weighted assets
over total assets (CREDRSK), nonperforming loans (NPL) and tier 1 ratio (T1R).
These variables capture the association between managerial ability and risk. Results
are reported in Table 5.2.
As can be seen from Table 5.2, managerial ability displays a significantly positive,
albeit modest, correlation with the value creation characteristics. The correlation is on
the order of magnitude reported by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). Evidence on the
riskiness characteristics is mixed. Thus it seems that more ably managed banks have
smaller variation in return on assets (SDROA) and commensurately but insignificantly
greater Z-Score and thus less risk (ZIND). This may well be grounded in a better skill
3Z-Score is computed using the moving standard deviation of return on assets over the last three
observations. This chapter, as opposed to Chapter 4, includes only one specification of Z-Score since
the subsequent regressions include both the standard deviation of return on assets computed as the
moving standard deviation over three observations within one firm. Thus including an alternative
parametrization of Z-Score, where the variability of returns is driven by the population of banks
would be inconsistent in this setting. One could argue that a pooled approach would provide the
benefit of conserving observations. However, this does not hold in the present case since all of the
later stage regressors are calculated as moving three year averages and observations with unavailable
data are therefore lost regardless of the choice made with respect to Z-Score.
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Table 5.2.:
Correlations of Managerial Ability with General Per-
formance Measures.
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients of man-
agerial ability and bank performance characteristics. Stars
report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***)
levels. ROA (ROE) stands for return on assets (equity).
CREDRSK is the quantity of risk weighted assets over
total assets. ZIND stands for the Z-Score measure of dis-
tance to default where the variance of the return on assets
has been computed for each bank individually using the last
three observations. The corresponding standard deviation
of return on assets is given by SDROA. T1R stands for
the tier 1 ratio, LAGTA stands for liquid assets scaled by
total assets. MA represents managerial ability as obtained
following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay
(2012) using DEA-based profit efficiency and regressions
across yearly subsamples.
MA
ROA 0.0498∗∗∗
ROE 0.0528∗∗∗
SHV R 0.0313∗∗∗
CREDRSK 0.0975∗∗∗
NPL 0.00422
T1R -0.0295∗∗∗
SDROA -0.0173∗∗∗
ZIND 0.00251
LAGTA -0.0781∗∗∗
of more able managers to anticipate and accordingly smooth out earnings, suggested
by the negative correlation with volatility of return on assets (SDROA). On the other
hand, the sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total assets (CREDRSK) in-
creases in managerial ability, which suggests that these managers run a generally riskier
operation. The positive correlation between NPL and MA, albeit insignificant, indi-
cates that the quality of the loan portfolio decreases in managerial ability. Furthermore,
the tier 1 ratio (T1R) and the quantity of liquid assets (LAGTA) is lower for banks
that are more ably managed. Thus the bulk of this preliminary evidence points towards
more ably managed banks being more profitable and value creating but also more risky.
An ideal additional check on the plausibility of the MA measures would be to consider
the alignment of MA scores with CEO tenure and compensation. Specifically one would
expect more able managers to be more generously remunerated and remain with a
given bank for longer. However, the information that the Call Report provides on the
authorized signatory of the report, presumably the CEO or CFO, is confidential and thus
not available. Nor does the Call Report provide access to the remuneration of executives.
However, an alternative check is available. The literature on managerial ability has so far
mainly concentrated on showing the importance of MA for industrial firm performance
(Demerjian, Lev and McVay, 2012). Evidence that this measure is appropriate for banks
is provided by Cantrell (2013) who shows that the MA measure is indicative of superior
reporting quality. However, evidence that Demerjian, Lev and McVay’s (2012) measure
is significant for bank performance is as yet incomplete. Therefore, as an alternative
validation step, I regress ROA and ROE on managerial ability along with the first order
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lag of MA. If MA is a useful predictor of bank performance, one would expect positive
relations with return on assets and return on equity. The specification can be formalized
as follows:
PMj,i,t = α+
1∑
k=0
βk+1MAi,t−k + ξ′zi,t +
14∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t, (5.2)
where PMj signifies the jth performance measure for j ∈ {ROA,ROE}. MA denotes
the managerial ability measure. dt are year dummies and z is a vector containing con-
trol variables. The control variables include the log of gross total assets (BKSIZE)
to capture differences in profitability due to bank size such as economies of scale, and
cost efficiency parametrized by SFA (CE) to capture differences in technology and al-
location which may drive profitability. Furthermore, the regression controls for bank
holding company status: MBHC (OBHC) is a dummy set to one if a bank is part of a
multibank (onebank) holding company. It also controls for merger and acquisition ac-
tivity: MRG (ACQ) is a dummy variable set to 1 if the bank has experienced a merger
(acquisition) in the last 3 years. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), I also obtain
a number of variables that cover banks’ demographic characteristics. Specifically, the
regression controls for bank-level concentration using the Herfindahl index (BKHHI).
It also controls for bank-level population and population density in the markets it ser-
vices (BKPOP, BKPDNS). Furthermore, the performance of banks could depend
on the aﬄuence of their markets. Hence the regression introduces the income change of
each bank’s markets (BKICHG) as a control. Finally, competition in a given market
is likely a driving factor behind a bank’s performance. Therefore the regression con-
trols for the bank-level presence of medium and large banks in the markets it services
(BKMSML). Bank-level means the weighted average of market-specific values, where
a bank’s deposits in a given market relative to the bank’s total deposits function as
weights. For details see Section 4.3.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 5.3. The coefficients show
that for both ROA and ROE, managerial ability has a strongly significant and positive
impact, both contemporaneously and in lagged form. This documents that the MA
measure can capture bank profitability and, hence, supports its validity. The controls
show that size is negatively associated with profitability (BKSIZE) as is cost effi-
ciency (CE). Banks that operate in more aﬄuent (BKICHG), less densely populated
(BKPOP, BKPDNS) markets with a greater presence of medium and large banks
(BKMSML) tend to be more profitable. This latter feature may point to the superior
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Table 5.3.:
Bank Profitability and Managerial Ability.
This table reports results from fixed effects regres-
sions of return on assets (ROA) and return on eq-
uity (ROE) on managerial ability (MA), lagged
managerial ability and controls with bank and
time fixed effects and standard errors clustered
by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are re-
ported in brackets. Controls are three year moving
averages and include the log of gross total assets
(BKSIZE), cost efficiency (CE) and bank demo-
graphic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP ,
BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML and are
calculated by weighting the demographic vari-
ables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, popu-
lation density, income growth and market share
of medium and large banks by the share of de-
posits each MSA or non-MSA county represents
of a bank’s total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are
dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to
a multibank (onebank) holding company. MRG
(ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the
last three years. MA represents managerial abil-
ity as obtained following the methodology of De-
merjian, Lev and McVay (2012) using DEA-based
profit efficiency and the standard first stage re-
gressors in yearly Tobit regressions.
ROA ROE
MAt 0.00138∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗
(3.03) (2.81)
MAt−1 0.000347 0.00345
(0.78) (0.62)
CE -0.00489∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(-3.14) (-6.37)
BKSIZE -0.000668∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗
(-3.32) (-6.78)
BKHHI 0.00110 0.0130
(1.27) (1.27)
BKMSML 0.00314∗∗∗ 0.0390∗∗∗
(7.19) (7.43)
BKPOP -0.000818∗∗∗ -0.00900∗∗∗
(-5.69) (-5.33)
BKPDNS -0.00105∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗
(-3.66) (-3.86)
BKICHG 0.0374∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(17.97) (19.37)
MBHC 0.000346 0.0122∗∗∗
(1.19) (3.64)
OBHC 0.000603∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(2.62) (5.15)
MRG -0.00255∗∗ -0.0340∗
(-2.24) (-1.78)
ACQ -0.000201 -0.00344∗∗
(-1.57) (-2.25)
Constant 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(9.40) (12.76)
Bank FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Adj. R2 0.153 0.154
N 84356 84356
ability of larger institutions to identify more attractive markets. Apparently, this ef-
fect overcompensates any detrimental influence of greater competition exerted by these
institutions in such markets. Bank holding companies are more profitable than non-
bank holding companies (MBHC, OBHC). Recent mergers and acquisitions impair
profitability (MRG, ACQ). This may be due to integration costs that are incurred
before the benefits of economies of scale and scope due to mergers or acquisitions can
be fully realized. Overall, the control variables provide plausible information; but more
importantly, the regressions confirm the expected positive relation between managerial
ability and profitability and thus validate the MA measure.
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5.4.2. Managerial Ability, Liquidity Creation and Risk-Taking
This section analyzes the relation between managerial ability and bank performance
in normal times. Liquidity creation is addressed first. Subsequently, this section also
investigates bank risk along a number of dimensions.
In line with Berger and Bouwman (2009), this section analyzes liquidity creation
using data that is stratified by bank size. It is well known (see e.g. Feng and Serletis,
2009) that the US banking industry is composed of a large number of small banks
and substantially smaller numbers of medium and very large banks. Accordingly, this
chapter uses cutoffs at 1bn USD and 3bn USD to separate small, medium and large
banks and runs the analysis for each subsample of the population separately as well as
for the full sample of banks.
Table 5.4 reports summary statistics for the main variables of interest. The measure
of managerial ability (MA) shows that large banks have greater managerial ability than
other banks but also that the variation in managerial ability among large banks is great-
est among the three subsamples. Since MA is constructed as a residual, it is natural
to observe that for the full sample managerial ability is close to zero on average. Con-
sistent with findings in Berger and Bouwman (2009), liquidity creation relative to total
assets (CATFAT ) is much greater in large banks. Also, the numerical values match up
well with theirs especially if one takes into account the difference in time period. Large
banks also exhibit lower levels of nonperforming loans (NPL) and tier 1 capital (T1R).
They also have greater quantities of risk weighted assets on their books (CREDRSK).
They usually are more risky in terms of distance to default as well, while the variation of
return on assets also tends to be greater (ZIND, SDROA). Medium and large banks
tend to be more cost efficient than small banks (CE) and they operate in more populous,
aﬄuent and less concentrated markets (BKPOP, BKPDNS, BKICHG, BKHHI).
Medium banks also exhibit the highest merger and acquisition activity in the sample
(MRG ACQ) as well as the lowest level of liquid assets (LAGTA). Overall, the charac-
teristics of the sample are in line with those reported by Berger and Bouwman (2009).
The only distinctly different values appear for the merger and acquisition dummies. It
is likely that this difference results from the different time periods examined.
Next, this section investigates bank liquidity creation in more detail in order to test
A1, the hypothesis that more ably managed banks create more liquidity. The speci-
fication is a fixed effects regression using bank and year fixed effects and computing
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standard errors clustered by bank. Specifically,
CATFATi,t
GTAi,t
= α+ β1MAi,t−1 + ξ′zi,t +
14∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t, (5.3)
where CATFAT is the liquidity creation measure as defined by Berger and Bouwman
(2009) and GTA represents gross total assets. The main variable of interest, MA, is
lagged by one period so as to avoid possible endogeneity issues. z is a vector of con-
trol variables. This approach again follows the specification in Berger and Bouwman
(2009) and uses as regressors three year moving averages of the sum of risk weighted
assets scaled by gross total assets (CREDRSK), the moving standard deviation of the
ROA (SDROA) and the Z-Score (ZIND) to capture risk.4 I further use the log of
gross total assets to control for bank size (BKSIZE). The regression also controls for
organizational characteristics such as holding company status and recent mergers and
acquisitions as before. In addition, the regression controls for local market characteris-
tics as defined above. While this section essentially follows the research design of Berger
and Bouwman (2009), it deviates from their approach in that it does not include the
equity over asset ratio (EA). This is because in their analysis they extensively discuss,
highlight and address the possible problems of endogeneity between the EA ratio and
liquidity creation. I avoid this conundrum by omitting this variable all together. I
investigate the impact of this choice on results in the appendix (Section C.2.3) and find
that this does not drive the findings. If A1 holds, one would expect a positive associ-
ation between managerial ability and liquidity creation. Table 5.5 reports the results
of the regression analysis, where each subsample of the bank population is treated in a
separate column.
4Since these variables all measure risk, the last two are orthogonalized by regressing ZIND and
SDROA on each other, CREDRSK and all other explanatory variables and using the resulting
errors as the eventual independent variable. Orthogonalizing these measures against one another
and the remaining covariates, ensures that the impact of collinearity is minimized and that the
orthogonalized variables capture only the dimension not covered by the other variables. Moreover,
this procedure ensures comparability of the present results with those provided in Berger and
Bouwman (2009) who introduce this regression specification.
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Table 5.5.:
Bank Liquidity Creation and Managerial Ability, MA Based on DEA Profit Efficiency.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on lagged managerial ability
(MAt−1) and controls with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank.
Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported
in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the log of gross total assets
(BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total assets (CREDRSK), the
standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score (ZIND) capture risk. The
last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The regressions also include bank
demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML
and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), popula-
tion, population density, income growth and market share of medium and large banks by the
share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. MBHC
(OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank (onebank) holding
company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was involved in mergers
(acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial ability as obtained fol-
lowing the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA profit efficiency and
standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Parameter Small Medium Large Full
MAt−1 0.0136∗∗ 0.0511∗∗ -0.0220 0.0114∗
(1.99) (2.27) (-0.64) (1.69)
CREDRSK 0.621∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(55.42) (14.36) (10.99) (57.70)
ZIND -0.000948∗∗∗ -0.00199 0.00148 -0.000762∗∗
(-2.79) (-1.47) (0.59) (-2.33)
SDROA -0.00704∗∗∗ -0.0315∗∗∗ -0.0324∗∗ -0.00944∗∗∗
(-3.11) (-4.14) (-2.06) (-4.36)
BKSIZE -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0174 0.00302 -0.0127∗∗∗
(-4.52) (-1.56) (0.22) (-5.55)
BKHHI 0.0157∗∗ -0.0254 0.0159 0.0124
(1.98) (-0.45) (0.10) (1.52)
BKMSML 0.0195∗∗∗ -0.00371 -0.0927 0.0174∗∗∗
(4.35) (-0.14) (-1.61) (4.00)
BKPOP 0.00764∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0251 0.00829∗∗∗
(4.54) (2.59) (1.49) (5.15)
BKPDNS 0.000321 -0.0188 -0.0107 -0.00185
(0.09) (-1.36) (-0.28) (-0.54)
BKICHG 0.202∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(10.72) (4.44) (2.00) (11.85)
MBHC 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0132 0.0285 0.0193∗∗∗
(5.22) (0.82) (0.66) (5.51)
OBHC 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0206 0.0365 0.0166∗∗∗
(5.45) (1.36) (0.86) (5.86)
MRG 0.0217 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.0293∗ 0.0529∗∗∗
(1.15) (4.76) (1.90) (4.76)
ACQ -0.000539 0.00355 -0.00773 -0.000761
(-0.35) (0.48) (-0.62) (-0.50)
Constant -0.114∗∗∗ -0.118 -0.390 -0.1000∗∗∗
(-3.40) (-0.60) (-1.41) (-3.24)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.473 0.460 0.376 0.470
N 79152 3341 1863 84356
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The main result relates to managerial ability (MA). Importantly, I find that man-
agerial ability is significantly positively associated with liquidity creation for small and
medium banks as well as the full bank population. This is as initially hypothesized
and suggests that hypothesis A1 should be accepted. In addition, the findings on the
control variables are very similar to those reported in the literature. Thus, in keeping
with Berger and Bouwman (2009), results show that Z-Score is negatively associated
with liquidity creation for small banks (ZIND). While they find a significantly positive
association for large banks, the coefficient in the present analysis, while also positive,
is insignificant. Similarly, the volatility of ROA is negative for all subsamples of banks
(SDROA). Berger and Bouwman (2009) find a negative association for CREDRSK
for small banks and a positive one for medium sized banks. In this sample CREDRSK
is positively associated with liquidity creation throughout. While in their sample, the
size of the bank (BKSIZE) is weakly significantly positive for medium banks and in-
significantly negative otherwise, I find significantly negative relations for the medium
bank subsample and insignificant relations otherwise. Similar to their findings, being
a bank holding company (MBHC,OBHC) is beneficial for liquidity creation in small
banks. This is likely due to better access to resources channelled through the hold-
ing company. In their sample, bank merger activity is significantly positive only for
small banks, while in the present sample this association holds also for medium banks
and the full sample (MRG). Acquisitions are insignificant in my sample as opposed
to theirs, where a significantly positive relation obtains for small banks and a signifi-
cantly negative one holds for medium banks. Where bank demographics are concerned,
the results show that small banks that are active in markets with more medium and
large banks (BKMSML), more populous (BKPOP ) and aﬄuent (BKICHG) mar-
kets create more liquidity. The latter finding is highly significant for medium banks
in the present sample as well. Population density is insignificant in the present analy-
sis (BKPDNS). Overall, these findings are similar to those in Berger and Bouwman
(2009). I attribute any remaining differences to the different time periods covered by
the two samples as well as the exclusion of EA and the inclusion of MAt−1 in the
present analysis.
Naturally, one would assume that managerial ability will have an influence on a
number of important bank characteristics, especially risk. Specifically, A2 posits that
more able managers will take more risk, perhaps, for instance, due to their greater
confidence in their ability to manage such risk. If so, this would be an important
feature of banks, which has heretofore not been examined. Hence the following analysis
studies these aspects of bank performance by regressing proxies for risk on the usual
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control variables as well as managerial ability. As risk proxies I choose the ratio between
nonperforming loans and total loans (NPL), the tier 1 ratio (T1R) and the ratio of
liquid assets to total assets (LAGTA). The choice of risk proxies is motivated by their
ability to capture three important dimensions of bank operations. First, nonperforming
loans capture the quality of the loan portfolio, which is a core function of banks. Second,
the tier 1 ratio is a key regulatory measure of capitalization, which banks are likely to
target in their decision making more strongly than, for example, the equity over asset
ratio. Third, the quantity of liquid assets captures the liquidity of a bank, which is
a key dimension of it’s resilience to shocks. This quantity is defined by using the
CAT classification approach of Berger and Bouwman (2009) and considering only liquid
assets.
If hypothesis A2 holds, I therefore expect a positive association between managerial
ability and NPL and a negative association between managerial ability and T1R and
LAGTA. The regressions take the form in 5.4:
KRIk,i,t = α+ β1MAi,t−1 + ξ′zi,t +
14∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t, (5.4)
whereKRIk represents the key risk indicator where k indexes into {NPL, T1R,LAGTA}.
All other regressors are as previously defined. Table 5.6 reports the results.
Again, the focus is on managerial ability. Panel A reports results regarding the quality
of the loan portfolio as measured by nonperforming loans. Nonperforming loans are
mostly insignificantly negatively associated with managerial ability except for medium
banks where the coefficient is significant. Panel B considers the tier 1 ratio. It seems that
more able managers prefer to hold substantially lower levels of tier 1 capital. This finding
is significant for small banks and present but insignificant for the full sample. Finally,
Panel C shows that managers of small banks and banks overall (and insignificantly also
medium banks) prefer to hold lower quantities of liquid assets. Overall these findings
point to an acceptance of A2: more able managers seem to take greater risk.
In terms of the other covariates, I find that greater holdings of risk weighted assets
per unit assets (CREDRSK) tend to be negatively associated with capitalization and
positively associated with nonperforming loans. Both results are intuitive. Thus one
would expect greater quantities of risk weighted assets to coincide with more nonper-
forming loans. On the other hand, greater quantities of risk weighted assets relative to
unit assets implies that fewer assets will qualify for tier 1 capital respectively will be
held in short term, riskless, liquid assets. This is consistent with the finding that bank
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capitalization and, for small banks, also liquid assets decreases with size (BKSIZE,
Panel B & C). However, larger banks also prefer to hold more nonperforming loans
(BKSIZE, Panel A). Furthermore, banks with greater quantities of nonperforming
loans tend to have more volatile ROA and lower Z-Score, which indicates that NPL
is positively associated with risk. Conversely, the opposite relation holds for T1R and
LAGTA. In terms of demographics, being present in markets that are serviced by
medium and large banks (BKMSML) and more aﬄuent (BKICHG) tends to re-
duce nonperforming loans, while operating in more populous and less aﬄuent markets
(BKPOP, BKPDNS) has the opposite effect for small banks. All of these results
are intuitive. Thus less aﬄuent borrowers tend to default more easily, more densely
populated markets tend to be cities, where anonymity reduces moral pressure to repay
loans and a greater population overall increases the potential for awarding loans, some
of which will likely be nonperforming in the future. Bank holding companies also tend
to be more aggressively capitalized and hold less liquidity as is indicated by the negative
coefficients on OBHC, MBHC in Panels B and C.
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Overall, this section provides support for the hypothesis that more able bank man-
agers generally contribute positively to liquidity creation in the economy during normal
times. Furthermore, as the split sample analysis shows, this finding is not driven merely
by larger banks that may pay more. Managerial ability matters for small banks’ liq-
uidity creation as well. In addition, results suggest that more able bank managers tend
to pursue more risky strategies in terms of liquidity and capitalization while eschewing
loan portfolio risk. The next section addresses the question how managerial ability
influences liquidity creation during crisis times.
5.4.3. Effects of Managerial Ability on Liquidity Creation and
Risk-Taking During the Crisis
This section investigates the third and fourth hypotheses, namely it asks how the ability
of bank management influences the liquidity creation of banks as well as their risk during
crisis times.
Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) study the impact of the pre-crisis cash holdings
of industrial firms on firm investment in response to the financial crisis. They stress
that potential endogeneity may confound an investigation such as this. Endogeneity in
their setting can arise if the firms’ asset structure covaries with the latent investment
opportunities open to these firms. In the present setting endogeneity seems much less
likely. For endogeneity to arise there would have to exist simultaneous determination of
contemporaneous liquidity creation and lagged managerial ability. However, while it is
difficult to imagine that managerial ability depends on liquidity creation in some way, it
seems very reasonable to posit the reverse. In addition, if one investigates the financial
crisis, it seems plausible to assert that managerial ability is predetermined with respect
to the crisis. One could argue that owners, anticipating a crisis, may have tried to hire
more able managers in the last minute. However, the market for managerial talent is
limited and therefore, even if such a behavior were to obtain, it can only affect a very
small fraction of the sample of banks. This is especially the case because the majority
of the sample consists of small banks where the mobility of managers in terms of their
workplace as well as their visibility to competitors is much smaller than, for example, in
listed banks where news coverage and disclosure make for much more visible managers.
More importantly, given the time needed to decide to replace, to find and to actually
recruit a top management team, it seems extremely unlikely that owners will have been
able to replace their banks’ management in anticipation of an impending crisis event.
Moreover, the fact that very few banks actually benefitted from bets against the secu-
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ritized mortgage market indicates that such foresight did not prevail in broad strata of
the market. It is, of course, conceivable that a number of managers were simply fired
and replaced with internal successors as a reaction to the crisis. This may have occurred
under pressure from regulators or owners as a short-circuit reaction to the onset of the
financial crisis. While this is not the same as the time consuming external replacement
of the entire top management team, it would nonetheless constitute a source of endo-
geneity. This, however, can be controlled for by excluding contemporaneous managerial
ability from the regressions and focusing only on pre-crisis MA. This thesis achieves an
additional mitigation of endogeneity concerns by following the difference-in-differences
approach of Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010). Specifically, to disentangle A3a from
A3b I regress the creation of liquidity on an indicator set to one if the respective year is
a crisis year and pre-crisis MA interacted with the crisis dummy as well as control vari-
ables. This approach isolates the effect of pre-crisis managerial ability on performance
during the crisis.
This section considers the financial crisis as encompassing the years 2007-2009. Duchin,
Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) study the impact of pre-crisis financial positions on crisis in-
vestment opportunities. Their main interest is the supply side effect of the crisis, hence
they distinguish two sub-periods within the 2007-2009 timeframe. Since the focus in
the present context is on the shock’s effect on banks’ liquidity creation mediated by
pre-crisis managerial ability, it seems unnecessary to distinguish between supply- and
demand-side periods as they do. Rather I allow the sample to encompass the main
period of financial turmoil 2007-2009.5 The specification runs as follows:
CATFATi,t
GTAi,t
= α+ β1δc + β2MAi,06 × δc + ξ′zi,t + υi + i,t. (5.5)
Here δc is a dummy variable set to 1 if the year in question falls into the interval 2007-
2009. MAi,06 is MA parametrized by DEA profit efficiency as measured at the end of
2006. All other variables are as above.
I expect that the crisis dummy should enter with a strongly significant negative sign
because of the disruptive effects that the financial crisis had on bank intermediation.
The coefficient that is observed on the interaction term will allow one to disentangle
5Robustness checks that let the crisis range from 2007-2008 or 2008-2009 show that the main effects
that support Bebchuk and Goldstein’s (2011) hypothesis emanate from the early portion of the crisis
(2007-2008), while the latter part of the crisis in fact associates greater intermediation activity with
more able managers. Not only do these results conform with one’s expectations, but also do they
serve to explain the low significance of the coefficients of interest in the main analysis. (see Appendix
C.2.5).
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alternative A3a from alternative A3b. Specifically, this regression asks the question
whether value orientation motivated managers to extend intermediation during the
crisis consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2008) and A3a or whether anticipation of
risk led them to reduce it consistent with Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) and A3b. The
results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis,
MA Based on DEA Profit Efficiency.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2006 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA06 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the
log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total
assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score
(ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The
regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI
(Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth and market share of medium
and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s
total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multi-
bank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial
ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA
profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars.
Parameter Small Medium Large Full
MA06 × δc 0.00653 -0.0592 -0.0697 -0.00757
(0.56) (-1.41) (-1.44) (-0.68)
δc -0.00531∗∗∗ -0.00733∗ -0.0106 -0.00648∗∗∗
(-6.16) (-1.82) (-1.57) (-7.74)
CREDRSK 0.774∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗
(29.80) (6.88) (4.28) (31.05)
ZIND 0.00164∗∗∗ 0.00260 0.00542 0.00158∗∗∗
(2.72) (0.96) (1.04) (2.70)
SDROA -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0343∗∗∗ -0.0321∗ -0.0246∗∗∗
(-6.31) (-4.02) (-1.97) (-7.32)
BKSIZE -0.0626∗∗∗ -0.0271 -0.0196 -0.0531∗∗∗
(-8.87) (-1.12) (-1.16) (-8.62)
BKHHI -0.00263 -0.134∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.0186
(-0.21) (-2.41) (-3.30) (-1.51)
BKMSML 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0653 0.0363∗∗∗
(5.25) (2.68) (0.58) (5.59)
BKPOP 0.00351 0.00634 -0.0216 0.00265
(1.18) (0.57) (-0.60) (0.94)
BKPDNS -0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0453∗ -0.00432 -0.0247∗∗∗
(-3.30) (-1.78) (-0.07) (-3.98)
BKICHG 0.213∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.401 0.250∗∗∗
(10.08) (4.35) (1.46) (12.05)
MBHC 0.000770 0.0256 0.0587 0.00247
(0.11) (1.10) (1.54) (0.36)
OBHC 0.00311 0.0346 0.0396 0.00399
(0.53) (1.56) (1.27) (0.70)
MRG 0 0.0765∗∗∗ 0 0.0843∗∗∗
(.) (4.62) (.) (15.75)
ACQ 0.00559∗ -0.0235 -0.0320 0.00422
(1.67) (-1.13) (-0.89) (1.26)
Constant 0.495∗∗∗ 0.219 0.471 0.419∗∗∗
(5.78) (0.71) (1.05) (5.45)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.225 0.310 0.317 0.230
N 19793 1059 529 21381
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As expected, results show that the crisis has a strongly significant negative impact
on liquidity creation (δc). Furthermore, the main variable of interest, the interaction of
pre-crisis MA with the crisis dummy, MA06× δc, indicates that banks reduced liquidity
creation consistent with A3b. However this finding is insignificant. Yet, when one
considers multiple parametrizations of MA, as is done in the appendix (see Appendix
C.1.4.1), results show that the impact that MA has on liquidity creation is strongly
significantly negative during the crisis and much greater than the mere effect of the
crisis alone. This indicates that more able managers reduced the liquidity creation of
their banks more forcefully, which is in keeping with hypothesis A3b.
The other regressors provide reasonable coefficients. Thus, while increasing levels
of risk weighted assets is still beneficial for liquidity creation (CREDRSK), it is
banks with greater Z-Scores and lower volatility of ROA that create more liquidity
(ZIND, SDROA). This aligns with the flight to quality that is known to have taken
place during the financial crisis. In addition, the positive impact of CREDRSK remains
because risk weighted assets constitute a substantial portion of overall intermediation
volume on the asset side. Within the small bank stratum, larger banks produce less
liquidity (BKSIZE). Merger activity is recorded only for medium banks during this
period and hence omitted in the small and large bank subsamples. For medium banks
it has a positive effect on liquidity creation. The demographic variables change in some
important respects relative to the main analysis. Thus the presence of medium and large
banks in banking markets still catalyzes liquidity creation for small, medium banks and
the full sample (BKMSML). However, more concentrated markets significantly reduce
liquidity creation in medium and large banks (BKHHI). This is consistent with possi-
bly prevailing contagion and more aggressive strategies in more concentrated markets.
Previously significant BKPOP has lost significance, while the previously insignificantly
negative BKPDNS has become significant for small and medium banks as well as over-
all. This suggests that liquidity creation contracted more in more densely populated
markets. Bank holding companies are still more robust liquidity creators than non-bank
holding companies (OBHC, MBHC) but insignificantly so.
Next, in order to investigate the fourth hypothesis, I consider the behavior of key risk
indicators during the crisis. Concretely, A4 posits that more ably managed banks were
better able to react to the crisis shock by reducing the risk exposure of their operations.
The preceding analyses have shown that, during normal times, more able managers
tend to prefer running more risky banks in terms of capitalization (T1R) and liquidity
(LAGTA). If more able managers have indeed taken more controlled risks in normal
times, they should be more successful in de-risking during the crisis. Therefore, if A4
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holds, I would expect a negative sign on NPL and positive signs on T1R and LAGTA.
The following analysis considers the results during crisis times by running the following
regression:
KRIk,i,t = α+ β1δc + β2MAi,06 × δc + ξ′zi,t + υi + i,t, (5.6)
where again KRIk represents the key risk indicator with k ∈ {NPL, T1R,LAGTA}.
All other regressors are as previously defined. Table 5.8 reports the results.
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These results suggest that management deliberately reduced risk as a reaction to the
crisis. Thus results show that pre-crisis MA increases both tier 1 ratio (T1R) and the
ratio of liquid assets over total assets (LAGTA) and decreases nonperforming loans as
a reaction to the crisis (NPL). This holds in particular for small banks but, albeit
not always significantly also for medium banks and the full sample. It does not hold
for large banks, where, for T1R, coefficients are the opposite sign but insignificant. A
possible explanation for this difference is the likely greater interconnectedness of large
financial institutions. Here, rapid de-risking is much more difficult due to the greater
volumes, greater time-lags and, most importantly, greater danger of contagion. This
aligns well with the insignificantly positive coefficient on managerial ability in large
banks for liquidity creation. Together, this may be tentative evidence that very large
banks may have been “too big to manage” even for able managers. In contrast to their
more successful colleagues at small and medium banks, large bank managers may have
been overconfident in normal times. This could potentially have induced risk-taking
that subsequently proved hard to control under the shock of the crisis.
Furthermore, the coefficient on the crisis dummy, δc, also exhibits plausible signs.
Thus one would expect that when funding is scarce, liquidity reserves will be depleted
as a reaction to the onset of the financial crisis. In addition, one would also expect that,
in an environment where asset values drop precipitously, losses accumulate and equity
is hard to raise, tier 1 capital will decline. Furthermore, the coefficient on δc in Panel
A is also as expected. Even though bad news on loans may have been kept hidden
by managers during good times, a strong exogenous shock will likely have induced its
revelation, resulting in increased loan provisions as indicated by a significantly positive
δc (see also Balboa, López-Espinosa and Rubia, 2013). Hence the majority of the
evidence supports the interpretation that managerial ability facilitated banks’ reactions
to the financial crisis in terms of risk reduction and therefore provides support for A4.
In sum, the analyses show at least tentatively that, first, that banks that were more
ably managed before the crisis reduce their liquidity creation activity more strongly
than other banks, which supports hypothesis A3b. Second, the findings indicate more
emphatically that more ably managed banks find it easier to react to the crisis by
increasing their capitalization and liquidity holdings. This supports the view expressed
in hypothesis A4 that more able managers are better able to react to exogenous shocks
by de-risking. Together these findings strongly suggest that the resilience of banks to
exogenous shocks depends, at least in part, on the ability of their managers.
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5.5. Robustness Checks
In order to ensure that the main findings are robust, this section discusses results from
a number of tests. Many of these are reported in greater detail in Appendix C. First,
as the main findings rely on winsorized data, I want to ascertain that this manipulation
is not driving results. Therefore unreported analyses replicate the regressions without
winsorizing, with qualitatively unchanged results.
Second, Berger and Bouwman (2009) argue that to combat endogeneity, one strategy
is to use 3-year lagged moving average values of the independent variables. The main
analysis has used 3-year moving averages. Hence I replicate Berger and Bouwman’s
(2009) strategy and find robust results (see the appendix, Section C.2.7).
Third, the main source of endogeneity in the data is likely the presence of bank
size, risk weighted assets, volatility of ROA and the Z-Score as regressors because com-
ponents of these can enter into the calculation of liquidity creation, as well as being
involved in managerial decision making. Arguably, it is much more difficult to sug-
gest endogeneity between the remaining variables such as bank holding company status
or bank-market characteristics and liquidity creation. The main reasons are twofold.
First, these characteristics are drawn from outside the balance sheet and thus do not
enter into the calculation of liquidity creation in any way. Second, characteristics like
bank holding company status or population growth in the bank’s markets are much
more difficult, if not impossible, for management to influence and very slow to react.
One can, for instance, envision that management might be tempted to leave low growth
markets and relocate operations to more dynamic ones. However, such a project suf-
fers from time-lags of various sorts. Thus the problem must be identified, a decision
taken, alternative facilities bought or leased and existing operations divested. In con-
trast, liquidity creation can be influenced much more rapidly by, for example, simply
varying capitalization or the asset mix on the balance sheet. Hence it is very un-
likely that there will be endogeneity between the slow-moving remaining variables and
rapidly changing liquidity creation. Therefore Section C.2.2 reruns the analyses omit-
ting BKSIZE, CREDRSK, SDROA and ZIND. The results are robust to this
modification. Moreover they indicate that if any endogeneity is driving results, the
effects are biasing results against the outcomes asserted in this investigation. This
becomes apparent from the fact that previously insignificant coefficients on managerial
ability during the crisis become significantly negative when these potentially endogenous
regressors are removed from the analysis.
Fourth, it is important to investigate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of
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liquidity creation measure. Therefore Section C.1.3 replicates the main analysis using
both Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) CATNONFAT measure as well as the liquidity
transformation gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004). While it has been noted that this
latter variable is somewhat more crude than that of Berger and Bouwman (2009), it
does provide a useful check on the robustness of the main results. Using these measures
of liquidity creation I find that the results for the whole sample period as well as the
results for the financial crisis hold in qualitative terms.
Fifth, the base case analysis uses the entire period (1996-2010) to identify the influence
that managerial ability has on liquidity creation and the other bank characteristics in
normal times. As this period includes the financial crisis itself, results could be driven
by these effects. Therefore Section C.2.4 reruns the base case regressions for the 1996-
2006 subsample. Results are not sensitive to the sample period. In addition, Section
C.2.5 also investigates whether restricting the crisis to 2008-2009 or 2007-2008 instead
of 2007-2009 influences the results. In this case results reveal that it is primarily the
period 2007-2008 that is responsible for the reduction in liquidity creation by more able
managers. This is consistent with one’s expectation given Bebchuk and Goldstein’s
(2011) hypothesis: under this hypothesis a shock makes the liquidity creation of all
other banks more uncertain and thus makes a reduction in liquidity creation individually
more desirable for any given bank. This effect is primarily driven by uncertainty. This
uncertainty is likely to have been greatest in 2007-2008 when regulators and central
banks were only beginning to react to the shock of the financial crisis and the full extent
of the balance sheet contamination experienced by the various banks may not have been
well understood. This is likely to have changed in 2008-2009 with the introduction of
more robust measures for the support of the financial system. Furthermore, Section
C.2.1 analyzes the results that obtain for a placebo crisis between 2003 and 2004. The
observed effects are either opposite to the main analysis (liquidity creation) or far too
small to account for the full effects observed in the main analysis. Hence the analysis
is also robust to this modification.
Finally, one main source of concern with the validity of the results is the use of a
regression error term as proxy for managerial ability. While Demerjian, Lev and McVay
(2012) demonstrate the validity of this approach, there are many possible parametriza-
tions of the MA measure that each have their specific strengths and weaknesses. Thus
efficiency scores can be obtained from various methods such as data envelopment anal-
ysis (DEA), stochastic frontier analysis and, more recently, generalized frontier analysis
(GFA). While DEA makes the assumption that the data is observed without noise,
SFA requires the assumption of a known functional form for the revenue function as
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well as the distributions of error terms. GFA on the other hand requires neither of
these assumptions. In addition, Demerjian, Lev and McVay’s (2012) work postulates
revenue maximization as the goal of management whereas this analysis assumes that
profit maximization is the main objective. Hence Appendix C.1 considers the different
outcomes of the analysis if MA is parametrized using revenue efficiency obtained var-
iously from SFA, DEA and GFA. Furthermore, for each of these efficiency scores, the
first stage Tobit regressions that eventually yield MA as the residual can plausibly be
conducted with various sets of regressors. The appendix investigates whether this choice
has any effect on the results. Specifically, it investigates whether including the bank
holding company type as a regressor along with the original control variables changes
results. This approach is chosen because this characteristic is both likely to influence
bank performance (bank holding company members typically have access to the BHC’s
resources in crisis times) and likely to be beyond the individual manager’s immediate
control. In addition, one could argue that out of the original regressors that are inspired
by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) and Cantrell (2013), BKSIZE, NUMEMP and
LEV RAG have the potential to be endogenous to bank efficiency. Therefore the ap-
pendix introduces a third set of regressors that excludes these potentially endogenous
variables while instead including the bank demographic controls as defined in the main
analysis. Finally, the Tobit regressions can be conducted over yearly subsamples of
banks, as in the main analysis, or for a pooled sample of bank data separately. The
former approach, chosen in the main analysis, has the advantage that any potential
confounding look-ahead effects that emanate from including future data in the regres-
sion can be avoided. The appendix also checks whether the pooled sample approach,
advocated by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), affects results. In sum, Appendix C.1
replicates the analysis for 24 different specifications of managerial ability and finds very
robust results.
5.6. Conclusion
This chapter investigates the importance of managerial ability for the performance of
banks. In particular, it analyzes the influence of managerial ability on liquidity creation
and risk-taking. While liquidity creation is a primary and crucial function of banking
organizations, their risk-taking behavior is also important to regulators and the general
public. Common wisdom suggests that more able managers should be creating more
liquidity with their institution in normal times. In addition, this chapter hypothesizes
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that more ably managed banks also take more risk. The results provide support for
both hypotheses.
The analysis then proceeds to ask what the impact of the shock represented by the
financial crisis of 2007-09 may have been regarding liquidity creation and risk-taking
and what role managerial ability has to play in this context. The impact of the crisis, as
mediated by managerial ability, on liquidity creation is an empirical question since the
theoretical literature suggests that banks should decrease their liquidity creation, while
some empirical findings contest this assertion. This chapter investigates this question
using a difference-in-differences approach and finds tentative evidence that the former
case holds true: more ably managed banks reduce liquidity creation during the financial
crisis than their less well managed peers.
Finally, the investigation analyzes the significance of managerial ability for bank risk
during the crisis using the same identification strategy. The hypothesis is that more
able managers are better at de-risking their bank during the crisis. Consistent with this
hypothesis, the findings show that more ably managed banks do in fact reduce their
bank’s risk during the crisis. All of the results are found to be robust to a large number
of checks.
These findings imply that regulators may do well in favoring better managed banks
in normal times in order to maximize the creation of liquidity in the economy. In crisis
times, on the other hand, more ably managed banks may require additional incentives
to lend.
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6. Limitations and Directions for
Further Research
In the broadest sense, this thesis stands in the tradition of empirical research in Finance.
As such, it is subject to a number of general limitations that are common to the field. As
I will argue in the following, I have attempted to forestall as many of these limitations
as possible by way of copious robustness checks. However, given the limited scope of
any thesis, room for improvement of the proposed methods and findings remains. This
section briefly discusses these issues. In addition, some suggestions for future research
emanate specifically from the limitations to the present work. This chapter also sketches
some of these points.
General concerns that might be raised with respect to the findings reported in this
thesis include problems of the data used, the way it was gathered as well as the com-
putational methods used to obtain the results. Specifically, panel datasets in Finance
suffer from survivorship bias. As unsuccessful banks are bought or closed, only the
“fittest” survive. Thus financial datasets are inherently biased towards successful insti-
tutions. In the present context this may bias results towards more efficient banks. This
issue is mitigated by the large sample size used in this work. Specifically, because the
frontier specifications used in this thesis rely on a relatively densely populated sample
space, the presence or absence of a small number of failed banks is less likely to severely
skew results than it would be in a more sparse sample. A further mitigating factor is
the fact that the present sample begins during a period where the bulk of the consoli-
dation in the US banking industry, documented for example by Tregenna (2009), had
already taken place. However, the possibility that survivorship bias remains can not be
conclusively eliminated. A further concern relates to the data gathering and processing
procedures. The data was mainly obtained from the Call Reports made available by
the Chicago Federal Reserve. This large database of detailed bank balance sheet data
requires a substantial amount of collation and organization in order to become empir-
ically exploitable. Therefore ample room for data processing errors exists. However,
in so far as this was possible I have tried to mitigate potential issues of this nature by
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grounding the rules for computing key variables as well as eliminating variables and
observations in the literature. In addition, prior studies make it possible for the resul-
tant data to be compared against previous results at least on a cross-sectional basis.
Thus, for instance, I have compared the average values of inputs and outputs as well as
prices obtained in this thesis against those reported in Berger and Mester (2003) and
found very small differences on average. Hence the risk of data manipulation errors
has been substantially reduced. Finally, the present work has required the implemen-
tation of a variety of algorithms for the computation of efficiency. One reason for this
is the fact that standard software packages that are available for this purpose, such as
FRONTIER 4.1 (see e.g. Coelli, 1996), have proved unable to handle the size of the
present dataset. In addition, the GFA method is entirely new and therefore had to be
custom-implemented. Thus the routines required for the calculation of DEA, SFA and
GFA efficiency scores were implemented in MATLAB. This, however, creates the possi-
bility that programming errors may be driving some of the results. In order to address
this issue, care was taken to thoroughly debug the code by using results and datasets
available in the literature (see e.g. Battese and Coelli, 1995, Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell and
Battese, 2005). These exercises showed no discrepancies between results computed by
way of the hand-coded versus the publicly available algorithms, to the level of accu-
racy available in the printed sources. This has substantially reduced the concern that
computational errors are driving the results presented in this thesis.
In terms of the specific empirical work carried out in this thesis, one could argue
that the GFA method itself is of a class of algorithms that are met with skepticism
in the financial literature. This is because nonparametric methods are in general not
underpinned by theoretical considerations. This thesis has made the effort to mitigate
precisely this concern in the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3). There it is shown
that GFA efficiency scores exhibit plausible properties relative to other, established
efficiency parametrization methods as well as relative to performance indicators, which
do not rely on the frontier concept. In addition, this thesis has argued that a method
that is data driven is precisely what is required in cases where a theoretical foundation
is absent such as, for example, in the case of shareholder value efficiency. One could
argue that Chapter 3 should also have considered revenue and profit efficiency. In
fact, the corresponding efficiency scores have been computed for all methods and the
statistical and validation analyses have also been run. However, from the perspective
of validating the GFA algorithm, reporting these results is redundant. This is because,
once it has been shown that GFA is able to fit both a lower frontier (for example a
cost frontier) and upper frontier (for example a shareholder value frontier) to the data,
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then revenue and profit efficiency bring no new or more exacting standards to the task
since they are both upper frontiers, similar to SHVE. Hence the analyses of revenue
and profit efficiency are not tabulated in the interest of brevity. However, it is the
case that the GFA algorithm can be improved to facilitate future research. Specifically,
at present the algorithm requires a manual setting of the asymmetry parameter. In
this thesis, this decision was made using a grid search across various configurations
of the parameter space. However, it would be desirable to be able to provide future
researchers with, at the very least, a heuristic rule of thumb similar to that proposed
for the number of orthogonal series terms in the Flexible Fourier approach (Mitchell
and Onvural, 1996). A further refinement along these lines could be the development
of an algorithm that automatically selects the ANN parametrization, in particular the
asymmetry parameter, based on the given dataset. Furthermore, the GFA method
is, in principle, able to predict cost, revenue, profit and shareholder value efficiency
simultaneously. Implementing this capability would give it a further advantage over
SFA and DEA since both these methods need to be run separately for each efficiency
score. This extension also has the potential to improve the quality of predictions due to
the richer information set. This, however, would require some non-trivial modifications
to the algorithm. Specifically, these modifications would have to allow for the frontier
component of the algorithm to take into account both upper frontiers (for example
profit frontiers) and lower frontiers (for example cost frontiers) simultaneously. Finally,
the SFA method has been extended so as to be able to handle panel data (Battese
and Coelli, 1995). A similar development would constitute an important extension
of GFA. Although Crone and Kourentzes (2010) show that ANNs of the type used
in this thesis can be used for time series data, it is not unlikely that, given the high
level of persistence of efficiency scores, better results for sequential data processing may
be achieved with recurrent neural networks (see for example Graves, Mohamed and
Hinton, 2013). Finally, and this possible extension applies to all chapters, a possible
refinement of the present work could be to use methods that take into account exogenous
parameters that influence the shape and position of an efficient frontier when estimating
SFA efficiency scores (see for example Good, Nadiri, Röller and Sickles, 1993). In the
present thesis this approach has been omitted in order to allow for comparability with
the GFA method which, as yet, does not allow for the inclusion of exogenous variables
into the frontier specification. Hence, if an appropriate panel data approach for GFA
can be devised, it would be worthwhile to also incorporate exogenous variables into this
frontier estimation method.
Chapter 4 may raise four important questions. First, the definition of the liquidity
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efficiency score as a proxy for intermediation quality may be scrutinized. While this
choice is grounded in the literature1, the definition of liquidity efficiency as a proxy
for intermediation quality may nonetheless appear somewhat ad hoc. To mitigate this
concern, this thesis first considers the relation between liquidity efficiency and liquid-
ity creation. Only once a significantly positive relation has been established, does it
proceed to the investigation of the empirical questions. Furthermore, Chapter 4 in-
vestigates the liquidity transformation gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004), which does
not depend on the efficiency methodology, and finds supporting results. Additionally,
the chapter parametrizes the liquidity frontier in two ways, using both SFA and GFA.
This constitutes another important check of the robustness of the findings. Secondly,
Chapter 4 uses Tobit regressions as the main method of inference, where the dependent
variable is itself an estimated quantity. Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that this may
make inference imprecise and propose a bootstrapping approach that has been imple-
mented for example by Delis and Tsionas (2009). While applying different estimation
methods (Tobit, truncated regression, fixed effects) and using a nonfrontier liquidity
measure for robustness, goes some way towards mitigating this concern, an important
future extension of this work will be to also conduct a similar bootstrapping exercise.
Early attempts at implementing such an approach have proved unsuccessful due to
computational constraints outside the scope of this thesis. The third issue that comes
to mind regarding Chapter 4 is also relevant for Chapter 5. This limitation is, similar
to the preceding one, outside the scope of the present work. Specifically, skepticism
is warranted with respect to the liquidity creation measures of Berger and Bouwman
(2009). The main point here is that, while their heuristic derivation of the asset and
liability classes and the corresponding weights seems plausible enough in normal times,
this need not hold in times of crises. Thus the authors classify assets and liabilities
according to the ease, cost and time which is required to liquidate these. This classi-
fication presupposes the liquidity of securities markets. However, the recent financial
crisis has shown that these markets can easily “freeze up”. In this case, it is unclear
how well actual intermediation activity of banks is captured by the liquidity creation
measures proposed in Berger and Bouwman (2009). Again, investigating an entirely un-
related measure of liquidity creation for robustness, the liquidity transformation gap of
Deep and Schaefer (2004), both in Chapter 4 and 5 contributes towards alleviating this
concern. Nonetheless, investigating the robustness of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
1As an example consider Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), who, in one of their robustness checks,
substitute changes in shareholder value efficiency for shareholder value creation and thus treat
SHVE as a proxy for value creation.
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measure of liquidity creation to asset market behavior and developing refinements of
this measure constitutes an important component of future research in this area. Fourth
and finally, Chapter 4 could be extended by an explicit analysis of market measures of
risk and opacity such as return volatility, trading properties or split ratings. This has
proved outside the ambit of the present work simply because of the available sample of
data, which is limited to mostly non-listed commercial banks. Therefore the findings
could be made more robust by investigating similar questions for listed bank holding
companies using non-balance sheet measures of fragility and opacity.
While Chapter 4 argues for the use of intermediation quality as a dependent variable,
Chapter 5 uses absolute liquidity creation. I argue that these choices are appropriate for
two reasons. On the one hand, econometric problems regarding naïve relations between
the main variable of interest and liquidity creation, which were the primary motivation
for the use of intermediation quality in Chapter 4, do not arise in this context. This is
due to the way in which the managerial ability proxy is derived (Demerjian, Lev and
McVay, 2012). On the other hand, the predictions of the theories tested in Chapter 5
relate directly to the quantity of liquidity created. The fact that bank liquidity creation
depends on the asset mix is of subordinate importance in this context because it is
not even implicitly required to address “how” the liquidity arises in order to test the
hypotheses of Chapter 5. Second, the results presented in Chapter 5 certainly depend on
the measure of managerial ability which comprises the heart of this analysis. Again, the
construction of the sample precludes the use managerial fixed effects or press visibility
as a robustness check. Such checks certainly constitute a fruitful potential avenue for
future research. However, in so far as the sample allows, the present thesis has made
every effort to alleviate any remaining concerns with the managerial ability proxy by
investigating a total of 24 different specifications of this variable and finding robust
results.
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7. Conclusion
This thesis complements and expands two strands of the literature. First, the present
research contributes to the efficiency literature by developing and testing a new effi-
ciency parametrization method, which relaxes the undesirable assumptions of previous
methods. Second, it contributes to the banking literature at large and specifically to the
strands of the literature studying intermediation, managerial ability and value creation.
In so doing, this present work illuminates a number of previously untested questions
raised by the theoretical literature and also provides the impetus for the theoretical
literature to consider additional factors in its modeling efforts. In this chapter I briefly
summarize the main findings that are developed in Chapters 3-5.
A thorough review of the efficiency literature shows that conventional efficiency
parametrization methods rely on assumptions that may not be doing justice to the
data generating process at hand. However, the discussion of the literature also shows
that existing attempts to use a class of promising nonparametric methods, artificial
neural networks, for the purpose of efficiency measurement has so far relied on equally
untenable assumptions. This motivates the development of a novel efficiency measure-
ment method, generalized frontier analysis, in Chapter 3. This method’s generality
gives it the potential of being utilized quite flexibly for efficiency analyses in industries
other than banking. However, a credible investigation of the capabilities of this new
method requires the comparison of the GFA efficiency scores with the efficiency scores
obtained from other methods on various types of efficiency. This exercise is the subject
of Chapter 3. This chapter together with the corresponding appendix shows, using the
examples of cost and shareholder value efficiency, that GFA can parametrize quite gen-
eral efficient frontiers. In addition, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that the efficiency
scores obtained from GFA and SFA are distinct and complementary but informationally
similar. Thus GFA is a valuable alternative method to SFA, especially because it can
be applied in cases where other traditional methods like DEA are not available. A par-
ticular example of such a case is the concept of shareholder value efficiency, advanced
by Fiordelisi (2007). In this context Chapter 3 investigates and validates the SHVE
concept by comparing the economic and statistical significance of the SFA- and GFA-
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SHVE scores when it comes to explaining value creation. In addition, the SHVE scores
are compared to managerial ability in terms of their capability to explain value creation.
The results show that SHVE is a more important concept than managerial ability when
studying the creation of value. Moreover, findings suggest that GFA scores are more
informative about the value creation of US banks. Thus, SFA and GFA can be thought
of as complementary methods. Chapters 4 and 5 exploit the resulting availability of
a new efficiency parametrization method to ensure the robustness of their respective
findings. In sum, Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by devising a new method and
investigating and validating this method and the SHVE concept using new data and by
showing that the informational value of SHVE exceeds that of managerial ability.
In Chapter 4 the thesis shifts its focus to the question of bank intermediation. The
theoretical literature allows for the development of a variety of conflicting but testable
hypotheses about the impact that bank fragility and bank opacity will have on the inter-
mediation behavior of the bank. This chapter formalizes these hypotheses and proceeds
to disentangle them, using balance sheet measures of opacity and fragility. Recent
research by Berger and Bouwman (2009) has made available indicators of liquidity cre-
ation. These are used to develop measures of intermediation quality by computing SFA
and GFA liquidity efficiency scores. This approach overcomes the problem of potentially
spurious, naïve regressions. The chapter finds that the operationalization of fragility
and opacity enables a clear rejection of two out of the three alternative hypotheses
investigated, leading to the acceptance of the theoretical view of Diamond and Rajan
(2001). This result documents that banks’ intermediation quality benefits from opacity
and from fragility. From the viewpoint of policy makers this finding stresses the need for
some level of bank secretiveness. Thus, if regulators wish to extract further information
from banks for prudential purposes, these results suggest that any such information
should not enter the public domain in order to avoid negative externalities with respect
to intermediation quality. The findings in this chapter further show that the impact
that opacity has on intermediation quality depends on the opacity of the bank. Thus
if banks are already very opaque, the beneficial effects of opacity and fragility for in-
termediation quality diminish substantially. Overall, this chapter extends the empirical
banking literature by disentangling a number of as yet untested hypotheses about the
interplay of opacity, fragility and intermediation quality. It also points out that theo-
retical models of intermediation would do well to explicitly account for the effects of
opacity.
The final empirical chapter (Chapter 5) combines the available information on bank
intermediation and managerial ability in order to investigate whether the ability of
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managers plays a role for the volume of bank intermediation activity and for the riskiness
of banks. Common wisdom leads one to expect a positive influence of managerial ability
on liquidity creation in regular times. However, in times of crisis the evidence is mixed.
On the one hand, empirical research shows that managers may have value incentives
to increase their liquidity market share during crises. Theoretical work, on the other
hand, emphasizes the strong incentives for banks to curtail their lending activity in
the face of an exogenous shock. Similarly, while one would expect more able, more
confident managers to take more risk in normal times, these same managers should
be better able to de-risk their banks during crises. This chapter is the first empirical
work to investigate these hypotheses. Specifically, the results show that the hypothesis
about the positive impact of managerial ability on liquidity creation in normal times
is justified. Furthermore, results indicate that more able managers have a penchant
for risk-taking during these periods. However, in the face of crises, this greater risk-
taking is offset by a stronger de-risking on the part of more able managers. In addition,
as postulated by the theoretical literature, more ably managed banks reduce liquidity
creation during crises more than other banks. This finding points to a dilemma on
the part of the regulator. On the one hand, more able managers clearly de-risk more
effectively and thus contribute to the resilience of the banking system. On the other
hand, they commensurately and pro-cyclically reduce their liquidity creation activity
at a time when a “freezing up” of the interbank and lending markets is least welcome.
Regulators could exploit these findings by providing incentives to more ably managed
banks during crises in order to ensure that intermediation activity continues.
Taken together, the findings reported in this thesis provide substantial new insights
into the functioning of the banking industry as well as new tools for its investigation.
This work further points to promising avenues for future research and provides impor-
tant conclusions of potential value to policy makers.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 3
This chapter provides supplementary information to the main analysis in Chapter 3.
Specifically, Section A.1 discusses the data used to parametrize the efficiency scores.
Subsequently, Section A.2 provides evidence on some of the robustness checks regarding
the analysis of shareholder value efficiency. Finally, Section A.3 conducts a statistical
and validation analysis for the case of cost efficiency. This demonstrates the capability
of GFA to parametrize this type of efficiency measure and allows for a comparison of the
resulting efficiency scores against data envelopment analysis (DEA), another established
efficiency measurement method.
A.1. Description of the Data
Table A.1 provides a description of the dataset, in particular it reports summary statis-
tics for the variables used to parametrize the efficient frontier for the period under
study. Since the sample encompasses the broad population of US banks, values for
stock quantities are on average somewhat smaller than those reported in Bauer, Berger,
Ferrier and Humphrey (1998), who use a balanced sample. Data is obtained from the
December Call Reports at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Currency values are
in 2005 US dollars. To ensure consistency of the data I compare the summary statistics
against the results in Berger (2003) for the year 1997 (not reported) and find discrepan-
cies of less than 5% on average. When considering input quantities, x1 signifies labor,
x2 denotes financial capital and x3 stands for core deposits. On the output side, y1
implies consumer loans, y2 denotes business loans, y3 stands for real estate loans and
y4 indicates securities. Off-balance-sheet items as fixed output are represented by z1.
Accordingly, w1 signifies the price of labor, w2 denotes the price of financial capital and
w3 stands for the price of core deposits.
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Table A.1.: Summary Statistics, Averages Across Banks and Sample Years.
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used to compute efficiency scores.
Specifically, x1 = labor, x2 = financial capital, x3 = core deposits y1 = consumer loans, y2 =
business loans, y3 = real estate loans, y4 = securities, z1 = off-balance-sheet items (fixed),
w1 = price of labor, w2 = price of financial capital and w3 = price of core deposits. EVA
stands for economic value added. Values for input and output quantities, equity, fixed assets,
cost and EVA are in millions of 2005 US dollars, where adjustment to this basis period was
achieved using the GDP implied deflator. Labor (x1) is measured in the number of full-time
equivalent employees. All data are obtained from the December Call Reports available from
the US Federal Reserve (Chicago Branch).
Variable Mean Standard Deviation MIN MAX
x1 197.55 2,732.24 2 213,967.00
x2 354.78 9,387.34 0.07 969,472.10
x3 492.22 6,567.28 0.61 636,319.30
y1 60.55 1,005.37 0 84,001.81
y2 184.92 4,040.78 0 401,295.80
y3 266.61 3,641.24 0 370,750.80
y4 337.55 7,926.45 0.48 998,783.20
z1 101.59 2,797.38 0 379,477.90
w1 53.16 11.99 5.22 286.31
w2 0.07 0.02 0.007 0.49
w3 0.04 0.01 0.003 0.26
Equity 76.67 1,319.38 0.53 117,810.60
Fixed Assets 10.23 120.53 0 7,997.87
Cost 33.18 616.59 0.17 62,396.95
EVA 7.16 196.10 -19,675.90 22,382.43
EV At
Capital Investedt−1 0.05 0.09 -3.18 7.67
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A.2. Robustness Checks - Shareholder Value Efficiency
First, Section A.2.1 investigates whether the SHVE scores obtained from SFA and
GFA are able to predict future nonfrontier performance by computing the correlations
between efficiency scores in period t and nonfrontier performance indicators in period
t+ 1. Second, the results in Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998) are obtained
for a balanced sample. Therefore Section A.2.2 reruns the complete analysis for a
balanced sample of banks. This includes the predictability analysis. In addition, I
extend the analysis by investigating the correlation between efficiency scores averaged
across time and nonfrontier performance indicators likewise averaged across time, a
technique employed by Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998) to reduce noise
in the estimates. Finally, Section A.2.3 provides additional regression results including
lags of the independent variables as well as separate estimates for the subsamples split
by size and for an alternative specification of managerial ability. Moreover this section
replicates the main analysis using lagged instead of contemporaneous SHVE measures.
A.2.1. Full Sample - Predictability Analysis
This section provides results on the ability of shareholder value efficiency scores to
predict nonfrontier performance of banks. Results are reported in Table A.2. The
findings show that, as in the main analysis, the efficiency parametrization methods
agree in sign where they provide significant correlations. Furthermore, again similar to
the main analysis, the signs conform to one’s expectation and the GFA efficiency scores
are more frequently significant, which suggests that these are more informative than
comparable SFA scores. This holds for small and medium banks in particular.
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A.2.2. Balanced Sample
This section reports results obtained from a balanced sample of banks. Results indicate
that the main analysis is robust to sample selection.
A.2.2.1. Statistical Analysis
Table A.3 reports results regarding the statistical analysis.
Here I find that GFA and SFA provide quite similar distributions of efficiency scores
(Panel A). The measures of central tendency are now somewhat higher for SFA than
for GFA. Moreover, the correlations between the different efficiency scores increase
substantially (Panel B). Furthermore, the overlaps between top and bottom performers
(Panel C) remain large, significant and remarkably balanced between top and bottom
banks. Hence I conclude that the statistical analysis is qualitatively unaffected by
transitioning from a full to a balanced sample.
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Table A.3.:
Statistical Analysis of Shareholder
Value Efficiency Parametrization
Methods, Balanced Sample. This
table reports results relating to the
statistical analysis. Panel A shows
distributional properties computed on a
yearly basis and then averaged across
years. Panel B reports correlations
between the two efficiency measures.
Stars indicate significance levels at 0.01
(***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) levels. Panel
C reports the overlap between top and
bottom percentiles of banks as classified
by the two efficiency parametriza-
tion methods. * indicates significant
difference from 25% (10%, 5%, 1%)
at the 10% level (Chi-square test,
two-tailed). SFA indicates stochastic
frontier analysis, GFA indicates gen-
eralized frontier analysis (asymmetry
parameter a = 1000).
Panel A: Distributional Properties
SFA GFA
mean 0.7792 0.6836
median 0.8027 0.7058
min 0.0317 -0.6851
max 0.9868 1.0000
std 0.1231 0.0973
skewness -2.0211 -4.1556
Panel B: Correlations
Pearson 0.5239***
Spearman 0.5587***
Kendall 0.4274***
Panel C: Overlaps
Top 25% Bottom 25%
0.5586* 0.5912*
Top 10% Bottom 10%
0.4282* 0.4858*
Top 5% Bottom 5%
0.3644* 0.3987*
Top 1% Bottom 1%
0.3082* 0.3096*
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A.2.2.2. Validation Analysis
This section discusses the results obtained from the validation analysis run on a balanced
sample of banks. Specifically, Table A.4 reports the main findings.
Panel A reports results based on rank correlations between contemporaneous effi-
ciency scores and nonfrontier performance measures for the balanced sample of banks.
As in the main analysis, I find that, whenever significant, GFA and SFA efficiency scores
seem to agree on the relation with nonfrontier performance indicators. Again, and this
result likewise permeates the analyses in Panels B and C, the GFA scores are more
frequently significantly different from zero, which further strengthens the conclusion
that these scores are more informative than those obtained from SFA. Panel B repeats
the analysis with nonfrontier performance measures shifted one period into the future,
while Panel C considers the relation between the time-series average of efficiency scores
and nonfrontier performance measures. Both cases deliver results that are qualitatively
unchanged vis-à-vis the main analysis.
186
Table A.4.:
Correlation of Bank Shareholder Value Efficiency with Nonfrontier Performance Mea-
sures, Balanced Sample.
This table reports Spearman rank correlations between different efficiency measures and non-
frontier indicators of performance for the population of banks. Panel A shows results for con-
temporaneous nonfrontier indicators. In Panel B the correlation is between efficiency in period
t and nonfrontier indicators in period t+ 1. Panel C reports the correlation between the time
series average of efficiency scores and the corresponding average of nonfrontier indicators. Stars
indicate significance levels at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) levels. SFA indicates stochastic
frontier analysis. GFA indicates generalized frontier analysis (asymmetry parameter a = 1000).
ROA represents return on assets, EP denotes economic profit, EV A denotes economic value
added.
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Contemporaneous Leading Average
Correlates E[sgn] SFA GFA SFA GFA SFA GFA
ROA + 0.2042*** 0.2013* 0.1771 0.1515* 0.2387*** 0.1647***
Total Cost
Total Assets − 0.0131 -0.0740** 0.0089 -0.0609* 0.0115 -0.1007***
Total Revenue
Total Assets + 0.0595 0.0995** 0.0668* 0.1070*** 0.0838*** 0.1212***
Equity
Total Assets ± -0.0783** -0.0980 -0.0722** -0.1001* -0.0713***-0.0540**
EV A
Total Assets + 0.4424** 0.3881** 0.3171* 0.2384* 0.4114*** 0.1751***
EP
Total Assets + 0.4639** 0.3707*** 0.3681* 0.2551** 0.4819*** 0.2387***
CapitalCharge
Total Assets − -0.3481***-0.5110*** -0.3076* -0.5029*** -0.5818***-0.7719***
Liquid Assets
Total Assets ± 0.0245 -0.0198** 0.0089 -0.0286 0.0674*** 0.0524**
Nonperf. Loans
Total Loans − -0.0645 -0.0764 -0.0433 -0.0536 -0.0331 -0.0536**
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A.2.3. Further Regression Results
This section provides a number of additional regression scenarios for shareholder value
efficiency. Specifically, the analyses consider the results obtained if the regressions are
run separately for subsamples of the bank population (Section A.2.3.1), the case in which
lags of the independent variables are included in the regressions (Section A.2.3.2) and
results obtained with a different specification of managerial ability (Section A.2.3.3).
A.2.3.1. Regressions for Subsamples
The following discussion considers the results obtained for regressions of value creation
on shareholder value efficiency separately for subsamples of the bank population. First,
Tables A.5-A.7 investigate the regression results and the economic significance of the
coefficients. Subsequently, Table A.8 considers the contribution of the SFA and GFA
efficiency scores to the explanation of the value creation of US banks.
In terms of the general regression results and the economic significance of the effi-
ciency scores, I find strong support for the main findings. Thus, Specifications 1, 3 and
5 show that the coefficients on the GFA scores are much greater than those on SFA.
Furthermore, the substantial reduction of the t-statistic for SFA-SHVE when GFA-
SHVE is included in the regression (Specification 5) holds for small and medium banks
in particular. And even for large banks (Table A.7), while the SFA-SHVE coefficient
is greater than GFA-SHVE, the t-statistic of GFA increases while that of SFA-SHVE
decreases when both are included as regressors. These findings are supported by re-
sults in Specifications 2, 4 and 6, which include control variables. This confirms the
conclusion drawn in the main analysis, namely that the economic significance and infor-
mation content of GFA-SHVE with respect to value creation is greater that of the SFA
shareholder value efficiency scores. Similarly, robust findings hold for Specifications
7-10. Specifically, these show that the economic significance of the GFA-SHVE scores
is greater, especially for small and medium banks, when control variables are included.
Results also document that medium and large bank findings confirm the signs observed
for cost and revenue efficiency in the main analysis. Finally, considering the impact
of managerial ability in Specifications 11 and 12, results are also robust, especially for
small and medium banks. Here, managerial ability is highly significantly and positively
associated with value creation but the economic relevance of this measure is small, as in
the main analysis. Furthermore, GFA-SHVE scores are economically more important
than those from SFA. This changes in the case of large banks. In addition, for large
banks, managerial ability becomes insignificant. Overall, across Specifications 2, 4, 6,
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8, 10, 11 and 12, coefficients on the control variables are robust. Thus, as in the main
analysis, I find that profitability (ROA), size (BKSIZE) and leverage (LEV RAG)
all contribute to value creation. While the main analysis finds a negative influence of
nonperforming loans (NPL), this finding is not confirmed for small banks, but does
hold for medium and large banks.
Next, in Table A.8, I consider the contribution of the SHVE scores to the explanation
of value creation in US banks across subsamples of the bank population. The main
analysis found that GFA-SHVE scores contribute substantially more to the explanation
of value creation than comparable SFA scores, in particular when control variables
were excluded. When considering the same analysis split by subsamples of the bank
population, I find results to be robust. In fact, while for large banks (Panel C) SFA
and GFA perform roughly on par, the advantage of GFA for small and medium banks
(the majority of observations in the sample) is even more pronounced than in the main
analysis when considering the subsamples separately (Panels A and B). This holds even
in the presence of managerial ability, whose explanatory contribution is low across all
subsamples. This strongly confirms the findings of the main analysis.
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Table A.8.:
Contribution of Efficiency Measures to Adjusted R2 in % of Adjusted R2 for Subsamples
of the Bank Population Split by Size.
This table reports the contribution to adjusted R2 made by each variable in the regressions in
Tables A.5-A.7 in Panels A-C respectively. Specifically, each cell indicates how much the re-
gressor contributes to the explanatory power of the regression indicated by the column heading.
The contribution to adjusted R2 was computed as Cj =
R2−R2j
R2 , where Cj is the contribution
of the jth variable, R2j is the adjusted R2 computed without that variable and R2 is the total
adjusted R2. ψ−eff represents shareholder value efficiency, while x−eff and τ−eff indicate cost
and revenue efficiency. SFA indicates stochastic frontier analysis. GFA indicates generalized
frontier analysis (asymmetry parameter a = 1000). MA stands for managerial ability and has
been computed following Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012).
Panel A: Small Banks (0-50%)
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ψ − effSFA 11.3 2.0 1.6 0.9 11.3 2.0 0.9 1.8
ψ − effGFA 30.7 6.8 23.0 5.7 30.3 6.8 5.7 20.7
x− effSFA 0.6 0.0
τ − effSFA 0.2 0.0
x− effGFA 0.0 0.0
τ − effGFA 0.2 0.0
MA 0.1 0.1
Panel B: Medium Banks (50-90%)
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ψ − effSFA 24.9 4.4 5.1 2.0 24.6 4.4 2.0 5.0
ψ − effGFA 36.3 7.6 19.5 5.2 36.3 7.6 5.3 15.5
x− effSFA 0.0 0.1
τ − effSFA 0.0 0.0
x− effGFA 0.0 0.0
τ − effGFA 0.0 0.0
MA 0.0 0.1
Panel C: Large Banks (90-100%)
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ψ − effSFA 13.3 3.3 8.7 2.8 13.2 3.3 2.8 7.5
ψ − effGFA 11.4 2.3 6.8 1.7 12.0 2.4 1.7 5.8
x− effSFA 0.1 0.0
τ − effSFA 0.0 0.0
x− effGFA 1.4 0.4
τ − effGFA 0.1 0.0
MA 0.0 0.0
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A.2.3.2. Regressions Including Lags of the Efficiency Scores
This section reruns the main analysis but includes lags of the various efficiency scores to
account for the fact that processes such as changes in efficiency may take time in order
to affect the bank’s outcome. This exercise not only provides robustness to the results
from the main analysis, but specifically investigates the low explanatory contribution
obtained from the cost and revenue efficiency scores. Concretely, if efficiency enhancing
strategies take time to implement, the low explanatory power of contemporaneous cost
and revenue efficiency might be mitigated by including lags of these variables.
Table A.9 reports the results relating to the economic significance of shareholder value
efficiency. Results suggest that the main conclusions hold. Specifically, the economic
significance of the GFA SHVE scores in Specification 3 is greater than that of SFA
SHVE in Specification 1 and likewise, when both SFA and GFA scores are included in
Specification 5. In Specification 2, vs. 4 and in Specification 6, SFA has a slight edge
however. A similar picture presents itself when cost and revenue efficiency are included
in Specifications 7-10. Finally, this main result holds in the presence of managerial
ability in Specifications 11 and 12. Importantly, I find that managerial ability is still
significantly positive but not economically significant for the explanation of SHVE.
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Table A.10.:
Contribution of Efficiency Measures to Adjusted R2 in % of Adjusted R2 for Regressions
Including Lagged Independent Variables.
This table reports the contribution to adjusted R2 made by each group of variables in the
regressions in Table A.9. Specifically, each cell indicates how much the group of regressors
contribute to the explanatory power of the regression indicated by the column heading. The
contribution to adjusted R2 was computed as Cj =
R2−R2j
R2 , where Cj is the contribution of
the jth group of regressors, R2j is the adjusted R2 computed without that group of regressors
and R2 is the total adjusted R2. ψ − eff represents shareholder value efficiency, while x − eff
and τ − eff indicate cost and revenue efficiency. SFA indicates stochastic frontier analysis.
GFA indicates generalized frontier analysis (asymmetry parameter a = 1000). MA stands for
managerial ability and has been computed following Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012).
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ψ − effSFA 35 -0.8 7.5 3.4 16.1 3.7 3.4 7.6
ψ − effGFA 40.3 -1.7 15 2.5 24.3 3.5 2.6 12.3
x− effSFA 0.4 0.4
τ − effSFA 0.0 0.0
x− effGFA 0.9 0.5
τ − effGFA 0.1 0.1
MA 0.1 0.1
When considering the statistical value of the two efficiency scores in explaining value
creation in Table A.10 I find that the GFA SHVE scores continue to have an advantage
over SFA. That is the case when the other control variables are not included in the anal-
ysis. Interestingly, in Specifications 2 and 4, the contribution to the adjusted R2 made
by both methods becomes negative, probably due to the proliferation of coefficients
with a strongly similar information content. As has been noted from the viewpoint
of economic significance, cost and revenue efficiency continue to be negligible when it
comes to explaining value creation in US banks. The same is true for managerial ability.
Overall, this analysis again confirms the main findings.
A.2.3.3. Regressions Using an Alternative Parametrization of Managerial Ability
Finally, one might suspect that the particular parametrization of managerial ability that
is used in the main analysis drives results in some critical fashion. In order to investi-
gate this question, Table A.11 replicates the regressions which include MA but uses a
different specification of this variable. Specifically, it uses stochastic frontier analysis for
the parametrization of managerial ability instead of using data envelopment analysis.
These results show that the decision to follow Demerjian, Lev and McVay’s (2012) orig-
inal specification in parametrizing managerial ability is not driving results. Specifically,
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(1) (2)
ψ − effSFA 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗
(26.07) (31.04)
ψ − effGFA 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗
(15.45) (19.48)
MA 0.000418 0.00209∗∗∗
(1.30) (5.89)
ROA 0.0376∗∗∗
(33.33)
NPL -0.00122∗ -0.0109∗∗∗
(-1.72) (-15.77)
BKSIZE 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗
(8.17) (9.23)
LEV RAG 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗
(31.94) (19.22)
Constant 0.0517∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗
(34.93) (-8.75)
Bank Effects yes yes
Year Effects yes yes
Adj. R2 0.604 0.539
N 106564 106564
Table A.11.:
Regression Analysis of Shareholder Value Effi-
ciency, Alternative MA Parametrization
This table reports results from regressions of EVA
scaled by lagged total assets on shareholder value ef-
ficiency (ψ − eff) as well as a set of control vari-
ables. These include return on assets (ROA), leverage
(LEV RAG), the ratio of nonperforming loans to total
loans (NPL) and bank size (BKSIZE). x − eff and
τ − eff indicate cost and revenue efficiency. MA stands
for managerial ability and has been computed follow-
ing Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). SFA stands for
stochastic frontier analysis, GFA stands for generalized
frontier analysis. All regressions include year and bank
fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses
and stars indicate significance levels at 0.01 (***), 0.05
(**) and 0.1 (*) levels. Standard errors are clustered
by bank; all regressors are z-transformed.
the managerial ability measure is insignificantly positive when ROA is also included
among the controls and significantly positive but economically small when ROA is ex-
cluded. Moreover, the SHVE measure parametrized by GFA is still economically more
meaningful than its SFA-based counterpart. In addition, Table A.12 shows that the
contribution of MA to value creation is nearly unchanged vis-à-vis the main analysis.
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Table A.12.:
Contribution of Efficiency Measures to Adjusted
R2 in % of Adjusted R2, Alternative MA
Parametrization.
This table reports the contribution to adjusted R2
made by each variable in the regressions in Table A.11.
Specifically, each cell indicates how much the regressor
contributes to the explanatory power of the regression
indicated by the column heading. The contribution to
adjusted R2 was computed as Cj =
R2−R2j
R2 , where Cj is
the contribution of the jth variable, R2j is the adjusted
R2 computed without that variable and R2 is the total
adjusted R2. ψ − eff represents shareholder value effi-
ciency. SFA indicates stochastic frontier analysis. GFA
indicates generalized frontier analysis (asymmetry pa-
rameter a = 1000). MA stands for managerial ability
and has been computed following Demerjian, Lev and
McVay (2012) and using SFA to parametrize revenue
efficiency.
(1) (2)
ψ − effSFA 2.9 6.4
ψ − effGFA 3.4 15.5
MA 0.0 0.1
A.2.3.4. Regressions Using Lagged Shareholder Value Efficiency
This section replicates the main analysis using lags of SHVE instead of contemporaneous
values to mitigate possible endogeneity concerns. Table A.13 reports the main results.
These indicate that the qualitative findings of the main analysis are unchanged. More
specifically, especially when excluding other controls, the GFA efficiency scores are
economically more significant for the creation of value in banks. Cost and revenue
efficiency are of only marginal importance on the other hand. Moreover managerial
ability, when included is both economically and statistically insignificant when ROA is
also among the regressors and of only marginal importance when excluding ROA.
These results are generally confirmed when considering the contribution to adjusted
R2 made by the various efficiency scores in Table A.14. Specifically, the statistical
significance of the GFA efficiency scores is strictly greater than that of SFA when
controls are excluded from the regressions and comparable otherwise. Moreover, cost
and revenue efficiency as well as managerial ability contain almost no information on
the creation of value in banks, which is similar to the main analysis.
Overall these additional findings confirm the main results.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
ψ
−
eff
S
F
A
,t−
1
0.0119 ∗∗∗
0.00487 ∗∗∗
0.00901 ∗∗∗
0.00435 ∗∗∗
0.0119 ∗∗∗
0.00500 ∗∗∗
0.00437 ∗∗∗
0.00865 ∗∗∗
(28.70)
(15.47)
(21.48)
(14.03)
(28.73)
(15.87)
(14.09)
(21.97)
ψ
−
eff
G
F
A
,t−
1
0.0137 ∗∗∗
0.00325 ∗∗∗
0.0116 ∗∗∗
0.00232 ∗∗∗
0.0136 ∗∗∗
0.00328 ∗∗∗
0.00232 ∗∗∗
0.00974 ∗∗∗
(19.67)
(8.87)
(17.93)
(6.54)
(19.62)
(8.96)
(6.54)
(16.38)
x
−
eff
S
F
A
-0.00598 ∗∗∗
-0.00615 ∗∗∗
(-9.37)
(-11.34)
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
0.00130 ∗∗∗
-0.000561 ∗
(3.10)
(-1.66)
x
−
eff
G
F
A
0.00136 ∗∗∗
-0.00165 ∗∗∗
(3.09)
(-5.09)
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
-0.0000415
0.00177 ∗∗∗
(-0.12)
(6.35)
M
A
-0.000252
0.00156 ∗∗∗
(-0.80)
(4.20)
R
O
A
0.0518 ∗∗∗
0.0519 ∗∗∗
0.0514 ∗∗∗
0.0519 ∗∗∗
0.0519 ∗∗∗
0.0514 ∗∗∗
(61.34)
(60.80)
(60.03)
(61.26)
(60.86)
(59.97)
N
P
L
0.000425
0.000452
0.000448
0.000424
0.000395
0.000461
-0.0163 ∗∗∗
(0.54)
(0.58)
(0.58)
(0.55)
(0.51)
(0.59)
(-22.58)
B
K
S
I
Z
E
0.0117 ∗∗∗
0.00927 ∗∗∗
0.0112 ∗∗∗
0.0108 ∗∗∗
0.00969 ∗∗∗
0.0113 ∗∗∗
0.0133 ∗∗∗
(4.80)
(3.81)
(4.61)
(4.39)
(4.03)
(4.61)
(4.89)
L
E
V
R
A
G
0.0286 ∗∗∗
0.0286 ∗∗∗
0.0284 ∗∗∗
0.0287 ∗∗∗
0.0289 ∗∗∗
0.0284 ∗∗∗
0.0159 ∗∗∗
(43.34)
(42.60)
(42.46)
(43.47)
(42.27)
(42.36)
(20.15)
C
on
stan
t
0.0410 ∗∗∗
0.0688 ∗∗∗
0.0546 ∗∗∗
0.0723 ∗∗∗
0.0483 ∗∗∗
0.0701 ∗∗∗
0.0372 ∗∗∗
0.0654 ∗∗∗
0.0450 ∗∗∗
0.0170 ∗∗∗
0.0701 ∗∗∗
0.0579 ∗∗∗
(36.49)
(54.45)
(51.58)
(54.25)
(43.31)
(57.27)
(31.18)
(51.45)
(38.78)
(14.10)
(56.85)
(39.63)
A
d
j.
R
2
0.424
0.653
0.429
0.652
0.436
0.653
0.427
0.656
0.429
0.652
0.653
0.473
N
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
100186
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Table A.14.:
Contribution of Efficiency Measures to Adjusted R2 in % of Adjusted R2.
This table reports the contribution to adjusted R2 made by each variable in the regressions
in Table A.13. Specifically, each cell indicates how much the regressor contributes to the
explanatory power of the regression indicated by the column heading. The contribution to
adjusted R2 was computed as Cj =
R2−R2j
R2 , where Cj is the contribution of the j
th variable, R2j
is the adjusted R2 computed without that variable and R2 is the total adjusted R2. ψ − eff
represents shareholder value efficiency, while x − eff and τ − eff indicate cost and revenue
efficiency. SFA indicates stochastic frontier analysis. GFA indicates generalized frontier analysis
(asymmetry parameter a = 1000). MA stands for managerial ability and has been computed
following Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012).
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ψ − effSFA 17.7 14.2 1.6 0.2 17.7 14.2 0.2 1.3
ψ − effGFA 18.7 14.0 2.8 0.1 18.6 14.0 0.1 1.8
x− effSFA 0.7 0.5
τ − effSFA 0.0 0.0
x− effGFA 0.0 0.0
τ − effGFA 0.0 0.0
MA 0.0 0.0
A.3. Analysis of Cost Efficiency
Generalized frontier analysis has been formulated so as to be able to accommodate
various types of efficiency. To illustrate this capability, this section conducts the analysis
previously performed for SHVE also in the case of cost efficiency. The analysis of cost
efficiency allows a direct comparison of GFA not only with SFA but also with DEA as
well as with the previous results of Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998). This
investigation serves to further deepen the understanding of the performance of the GFA
method vis-à-vis the other, established methods.
A.3.1. Statistical Analysis
The first step is to investigate the statistical properties of the cost efficiency scores
provided by the various methods. Table A.15 reports the results of the analysis for the
full sample of banks.
These results show a striking similarity between the cost efficiency scores provided
by SFA and GFA (Panel A). This holds both for the order of magnitude in terms of the
measures of central tendency as well as minimum, maximum, dispersion and skewness.
The results further document that the distributional properties of the DEA efficiency
scores are substantially different from the other methods except for minima and maxima.
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Most importantly, DEA cost efficiency scores are positively skewed. This is unexpected
in a mature and highly technological industry like banking. The correlations between
the various methods (Panel B), confirm findings in the prior literature (specifically in
Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998) and Huang and Wang (2002)). Thus
correlations between the full distribution of efficiency scores are low between SFA and
DEA and, in the case of the linear Pearson correlation between GFA and DEA, even
negative. On the other hand, the correlations between SFA and GFA are positive,
sizeable and highly significant. This confirms that these two methods produce efficiency
scores that are quite comparable. Panel C analyzes the overlaps between subsamples of
banks classified as either highly efficient or very inefficient by any two methods and finds
additional confirmatory results. Thus the scores obtained from SFA and DEA and those
from DEA and GFA are in moderate agreement at best, a result confirmed by Bauer,
Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998). SFA and GFA, on the other hand, classify very
similar banks as highly efficient. The agreement between these two methods in terms of
classification of inefficient banks is somewhat lower, but still significantly greater than
chance.
The next step is to examine the distributional properties of the efficiency scores
obtained for a balanced sample of banks. The distributional properties in Panel A of
Table A.16 show that the main findings are generally supported. Thus the SFA and
GFA methods still produce very similar results. Interestingly, the DEA scores are now
much more compatible with the scores obtained from the other two methods. Given
this strong change in the DEA scores and the small change in the GFA or SFA scores,
one can also conclude that the much greater correlations between DEA and GFA as
well as the greater overlaps that now obtain in Panels B and C are due to the change
in the DEA scores to align better with the GFA scores. This confirms prior findings
which show that DEA is very sensitive to the composition of the sample in terms of the
efficiency scores that it delivers. Fortunately, this shortcoming is not observed in either
SFA or GFA. This further strengthens the conclusion that GFA is a plausible efficiency
parametrization method. The strong association between SFA and GFA in terms of
overlaps and correlation remains, in particular for very efficient banks.
Overall, these findings are both comparable with prior literature and also rule out
the possibility that the GFA efficiency scores are simply an artifact. However, in order
to form a more complete picture, the validation analysis, reported in Section A.3.2, will
be necessary.
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Table A.15.: Statistical Analysis of Cost Efficiency.
This table reports results relating to the statistical analysis. Panel A shows distributional prop-
erties computed on a yearly basis and then averaged across years. Panel B reports correlations
between the efficiency measures. Stars indicate significance levels at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and
0.1 (*) levels. Panel C reports the overlap between top and bottom percentiles of banks as
classified by the efficiency parametrization methods. * indicates significant difference from 25%
(10%, 5%, 1%) at the 10% level (Chi-quare test, two-tailed). SFA indicates stochastic fron-
tier analysis, DEA indicates data envelopment analysis and GFA indicates generalized frontier
analysis (asymmetry parameter b = 1000).
Panel A: Distributional Properties
SFA DEA GFA
mean 0.9264 0.6321 0.9101
median 0.9337 0.6255 0.9238
min 0.1617 0.1561 0.1604
max 0.9889 1.000 1.000
std 0.0443 0.1153 0.0528
skewness -4.5383 0.4154 -5.6337
Panel B: Correlations
Pearson Spearman Kendall
(SFA - DEA) 0.1680*** 0.1938*** 0.1325***
(SFA - GFA) 0.1597*** 0.4665*** 0.3633***
(DEA - GFA) -0.0402** 0.0082* 0.0052*
Panel C: Overlaps
Top 25% Bottom 25%
(SFA - DEA) 0.3291* 0.3500*
(SFA - GFA) 0.6798* 0.3254*
(DEA - GFA) 0.2963* 0.2208*
Top 10% Bottom 10%
(SFA - DEA) 0.1662* 0.2099*
(SFA - GFA) 0.6285* 0.1082*
(DEA - GFA) 0.1570* 0.0811*
Top 5% Bottom 5%
(SFA - DEA) 0.1067* 0.1640*
(SFA - GFA) 0.5450* 0.0817*
(DEA - GFA) 0.1145* 0.0488*
Top 1% Bottom 1%
(SFA - DEA) 0.0782* 0.1989*
(SFA - GFA) 0.1865* 0.0901*
(DEA - GFA) 0.0605* 0.0435*
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Table A.16.: Statistical Analysis of Cost Efficiency, Balanced Sample.
This table reports results relating to the statistical analysis. Panel A shows distributional prop-
erties computed on a yearly basis and then averaged across years. Panel B reports correlations
between the efficiency measures. Stars indicate significance levels at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and
0.1 (*) levels. Panel C reports the overlap between top and bottom percentiles of banks as
classified by the efficiency parametrization methods. * indicates significant difference from 25%
(10%, 5%, 1%) at the 10% level (Chi-square test, two-tailed). SFA indicates stochastic fron-
tier analysis, DEA indicates data envelopment analysis and GFA indicates generalized frontier
analysis (asymmetry parameter b = 1000).
Panel A: Distributional Properties
SFA DEA GFA
mean 0.9582 0.7686 0.9013
median 0.9635 0.7616 0.9131
min 0.4650 0.3207 0.4244
max 0.9931 1.000 0.9996
std 0.0291 0.1049 0.0516
skewness -5.7458 0.1566 -1.9893
Panel B: Correlations
Pearson Spearman Kendall
(SFA - DEA) 0.2310*** 0.2507*** 0.1727***
(SFA - GFA) 0.1938*** 0.4032*** 0.3176***
(DEA - GFA) 0.0851 0.1335** 0.0907**
Panel C: Overlaps
Top 25% Bottom 25%
(SFA - DEA) 0.3576* 0.3945*
(SFA - GFA) 0.6621* 0.2844*
(DEA - GFA) 0.3547* 0.2789*
Top 10% Bottom 10%
(SFA - DEA) 0.1575* 0.2731*
(SFA - GFA) 0.6186* 0.1030*
(DEA - GFA) 0.1956* 0.1235*
Top 5% Bottom 5%
(SFA - DEA) 0.0987* 0.2296*
(SFA - GFA) 0.5917* 0.0756*
(DEA - GFA) 0.1212* 0.0842*
Top 1% Bottom 1%
(SFA - DEA) 0.0786* 0.2236*
(SFA - GFA) 0.3032* 0.0800*
(DEA - GFA) 0.1334* 0.0893*
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A.3.2. Validation Analysis
This section discusses the results of the validation analysis regarding cost efficiency.
First, I turn to results obtained from the full sample of banks and for subsamples split by
bank size. As in the case of SHVE, following Feng and Serletis (2009), the analysis splits
the sample into strata holding the 50% smallest, the medium 40% and the largest 10%
of banks, and efficiency is estimated separately for each stratum. This re-estimation
of efficiency for each subsample implements the hypothesis that instead of a shared
production function there might be meaningful differences in the technologies used by
small, medium and large banks. Correlations are reported between cost efficiency scores
on the one hand and nonfrontier performance indicators on the other.
If a bank engages in aggressive cost reduction efforts in order to become more cost
efficient, the motive will usually be profit maximization. Hence it is natural to expect a
positive association with return on assets (ROA). Correspondingly, one would expect
that the component of EVA that relates to the cost of capital will be lower for more
cost efficient banks, assuming that they extend their cost saving efforts to capital bud-
geting decisions. Hence a negative association between cost efficiency and Cap. ChargeTotal Assets
is expected. Similarly, provided cost saving initiatives are successful, economic prof-
its should be positively associated with cost efficiency. This leads to the expectation
of a positive correlation between cost efficiency and EPTotal Assets . Note, however, that,
because of the univariate nature of the analysis, this does not necessarily imply that
more cost efficient banks need be more value creating because observing the expected
signs on economic profits and capital charge does not guarantee that banks are both
efficient managers of capital and strong generators of economic profits. However, both
would be necessary for value creation. In addition, less tangible adverse effects of cost
saving initiatives can include demotivation of staff as well as less thorough management
of market risk etc. (Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010). Hence the association between
cost efficiency and value creation ( EV ATotal Assets) is difficult to anticipate. The focus on
risk management also influences the amount of liquid assets held. While these assets
are costly in an opportunity cost sense, they ensure low bank risk, which may decrease
funding cost. Hence the expectation is equally ambiguous for Liquid AssetsTotal Assets . Intuitively,
more cost efficient banks should also have lower overall cost so that one would expect
correlations between cost efficiency and Total CostTotal Assets to be negative. However, the in-
fluence on revenue is not so clear. Thus cost reduction initiatives may well lead to a
decrease in the overall volume of operations that is more than offset by a decrease in
revenue, for example because of branch closures that may lead to loss of market share.
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However, a leaner organizational structure, induced by greater cost efficiency, may well
lead to a greater revenue generation relative to the asset base of the bank. Hence the
coefficient on Total RevenueTotal Assets is difficult to pin down ex ante. The same holds for equity
over total assets. Whether a more cost efficient structure entails a reduction of risk
and thus a reduction of borrowing costs or a tighter financing structure with the aim
of achieving lower dollar cost of capital is difficult to predict. The “Efficiency Risk Hy-
pothesis” posits that a more efficient bank, in the expectation of higher future returns,
will maintain a lower capital base (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). However,
part of the related “Efficient Structure Hypothesis” predicts that more efficient banks
will persistently generate higher profits, which may be driving higher equity ratios (e.g.
Berger, 1995, Mester, 1996 and Casu and Girardone, 2006). Both are plausible yet con-
flicting predictions as to the association between cost efficiency and EquityTotal Assets . Hence
it is difficult to form a prior about this variable. Finally, the cost to banks from nonper-
forming loans can be substantial. Anticipating this, I expect that banks will steer their
cost efficiency initiatives in such a way as to ensure a high quality loan portfolio. This is
equivalent to the “Efficiency Lending Quality Hypothesis” of Chortareas, Girardone and
Ventouri (2011). Therefore the expectation is to observe a negative sign on Nonp. LoansTotal Loans .
The main findings bear out many of these conjectures. Concretely, I find that banks
that are highly ranked on cost efficiency also tend to be highly ranked in terms of return
on assets (ROA). This is an intuitive result and holds both for all banks and across all
subsamples. However, only GFA is consistently able to provide a significant correlation.
Similarly straightforward is the finding that more cost efficient banks have lower levels
of cost ( Total CostTotal Assets), which is robust across methods and subsamples as well. GFA and
DEA are in agreement in terms of the association between cost efficiency and revenue
as a fraction of assets as well, while SFA is uninformative in this respect (Total RevenueTotal Assets ).
Specifically, the coefficient indicates that more cost efficient banks will also be more rev-
enue generating, which suggests that the “lean organization” interpretation, sketched
above, appears more likely. While SFA and GFA suggest that, across all banks, holding
more equity is positively associated with cost efficiency, thus emphasizing the risk mo-
tive, DEA suggests the opposite, i.e. stresses the cost of capital motive ( EquityTotal Assets).
All methods agree, at least for the full sample of banks, that more cost efficiency is on
average detrimental for value creation ( EV ATotal Assets). On the other hand, GFA suggests
that for small and medium sized banks the opposite may be the case. SFA and DEA
are uninformative in this regard. All methods are in agreement that this observation is
due to a lower economic profit ( EPTotal Assets) that is partially offset by an equally lower
(in the case of DEA higher) capital charge (Cap. ChargeTotal Assets ). Consistent with expectations,
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small and medium banks hold lower levels of liquid assets to the extent that they are
more cost efficient (Liquid AssetsTotal Assets ). This is confirmed by GFA and DEA, while SFA is
uninformative. However, in the full sample case, SFA and GFA indicate the opposite.
It is not surprising that subsamples may create different rankings than the full sam-
ple, especially given that the cost efficiency estimates were computed for the different
samples separately. Nonetheless, the higher holdings of liquid assets in the full sample
indicated by these methods are puzzling. It may be the case that the risk aversion
motive is more pervasive for the full sample of banks. In any event, the coefficients
for small and medium banks are plausible in light of the revenue coefficients observed
before. Lower levels of liquid assets should translate to greater revenue. Finally, all
methods seem to agree that more cost efficient banks are also better loan monitors,
as expected (Nonp. LoansTotal Loans ). I observe some important changes in sign between the full
sample of banks and the subsamples. This provides support for the conjecture that
banks of different sizes are subject to somewhat different production functions as noted
for example in the economies of scale literature (see e.g. McAllister and McManus,
1993, Wheelock and Wilson, 2001, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005, and
Asaftei, 2008). Overall, GFA aligns well with both SFA and DEA, while more frequently
providing significant information about bank performance as in the shareholder value
efficiency case.
As before, in the case of shareholder value efficiency, I rerun my analysis of rank
correlations between efficiency scores and nonfrontier performance indicators as a pre-
dictability analysis. This analysis considers the correlation between cost efficiency in
period t and the nonfrontier performance measures in period t+ 1. Numerous observa-
tions made in the previous analysis hold in the predictability analysis as well. Thus, for
example, more cost efficient banks are likely to have higher profitability as well as lower
levels of cost in the future (ROA, Total CostTotal Assets), a finding borne out by all methods.
Furthermore, as in the main analysis, present cost efficiency is likely to be associated
with higher future revenue generation (Total RevenueTotal Assets ). While full sample results indi-
cate that present cost efficiency tends to correlate with greater future levels of equity
( EquityTotal Assets) in the full sample, GFA suggests that the opposite is the case for small
banks. This result again mirrors the principal analysis. As before, GFA suggests that
contemporaneous cost efficiency is positively associated with future value creation for
small and medium banks, while all methods conclude that the opposite holds in the
main sample ( EV ATotal Assets). This is confirmed by compatible results for economic profits
( EPTotal Assets). Finally, findings regarding
Cap. Charge
Total Assets ,
Nonp. Loans
Total Loans and
Liquid Assets
Total Assets are
again similar to the main analysis. This investigation shows that the cost efficiency
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scores have the ability to meaningfully predict future bank performance. It also con-
firms that GFA is more frequently significant than either DEA or SFA, which further
strengthens the conclusion that the efficiency scores obtained from this method are
more informative.
Finally, I consider the validation analysis for cost efficiency across a balanced sample
of banks. As in the shareholder value efficiency case, I investigate three different settings
reported in Panels A-C of Table A.19. Panel A analyzes the rank correlation between
cost efficiency scores and nonfrontier performance measures for a balanced sample of
banks. Panel B considers the predictability analysis for the balanced sample and Panel
C consider the rank correlation between time-series averages of cost efficiency scores
and nonfrontier performance measures.
This analysis confirms across all settings and methods many of the previous findings.
Specifically, more cost-efficient banks have lower levels of cost and are more profitable,
both contemporaneously and in the future (ROA). While only significant in the av-
erage case (Panel C), GFA and DEA also confirm the finding that cost efficiency is
positively associated with revenue generation (Total RevenueTotal Assets ). The previous finding of
greater capitalization being associated with more cost efficiency is also confirmed across
methods and settings, although DEA is uninformative in Panels A and B ( EquityTotal Assets).
Furthermore, the surprising finding that more cost-efficient banks are not more value-
creating, neither contemporaneously nor in the future, is also robust ( EV ATotal Assets). This
robustness also extends to the components of EVA, economic profits and the capital
charge. Furthermore, the finding that more cost-efficient banks prefer to hold greater
quantities of liquid assets is likewise confirmed.
Given this extensive analysis of cost efficiency, several salient points emerge. First, all
three methods, SFA, DEA and GFA, produce reasonably similar statistical properties,
possibly with the exception of the positive skewness exhibited by DEA. Second, I obtain
plausible and robust associations with a comprehensive set of nonfrontier performance
measures. This validates the information content of the efficiency measures. Third, the
GFA method is the most informative across the majority of analyses and nonfrontier
criteria. Given that it is both nonparametric and stochastic, that is, it combines the
advantages of SFA and DEA without inheriting their drawbacks, this may not come as
a surprise. Nonetheless, this finding represents an additional, important vindication of
GFA.
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B. Appendix to Chapter 4
This appendix provides further evidence regarding the results in Chapter 4. Specifically,
Section B.1 tabulates the results that have been discussed in Section 4.5 of the main
analysis. Section B.2 tabulates and discusses results regarding the robustness checks.
These robustness checks support the conclusions drawn in the main analysis.
B.1. Additional Analysis
This Section contains the tables that support the conclusions drawn in Section 4.5. Sec-
tion B.1.1 investigates results that obtain when the sample is split by opacity. It reports
results using both SFA and GFA as well as using the CATFAT and CATNONFAT
measures of liquidity creation as the basis for intermediation quality.1 These analy-
ses report only the coefficients on the main variables of interest (opacity and fragility
proxies) to conserve space. As the results are discussed in Section 4.5 at length, I
merely provide the tabulations in the following. Furthermore, Section B.1.2 considers
the effects of using a measure of intermediation quantity that follows Deep and Schaefer
(2004) as the dependent variable.
B.1.1. Split Sample Analysis by Opacity
B.1.1.1. Sample Split by OOAJLY
1The main analysis for CATNONFAT is replicated in the robustness checks (Section B.2.1).
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Table B.1.: Intermediation Quality and Opacity, Split Sample Analysis by OOAJLY .
Coefficients from Tobit regressions using fixed time effects and standard errors clustered by
bank. The dependent variable is intermediation quality. Stars report significance at the 0.1
(*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions
include the following control variables: the log of gross total assets, the return on assets,
cost efficiency parametrized by way of SFA, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs
to a multibank (onebank) holding company, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was merged
(acquired) within the last three years, bank-level demographic variables calculated by weighting
the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income
growth and marketshare of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or
non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. OOAJLY and OLNJLY represent
opaque assets following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents opaque assets
following Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respectively. Monetary values are in 2005
US Dollars. Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles.
Panel A: SFA, CATFAT
Panel A1: 1st Quartile Panel A2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
3.834∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.0429∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗
(10.90) (13.23) (4.14) (-7.52) (-2.26) (5.83)
Panel B: GFA, CATFAT
Panel B1: 1st Quartile Panel B2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.648∗∗∗ -0.0652∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ -0.0824∗∗∗ -0.0596∗∗∗ -0.0766∗∗
(7.88) (-11.69) (-4.50) (-3.00) (-8.03) (-2.05)
Panel C: SFA, CATNONFAT
Panel C1: 1st Quartile Panel C2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
2.446∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.0217 0.656∗∗∗
(9.00) (12.97) (5.19) (-6.05) (-1.28) (6.72)
Panel D: GFA, CATNONFAT
Panel D1: 1st Quartile Panel D2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.238∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ 0.00128 0.213∗∗∗
(3.43) (7.30) (4.56) (-6.11) (0.18) (5.78)
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O
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ag
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ty
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pl
e
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na
ly
si
s
by
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O
A
J
L
Y
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ci
ty
B
as
ed
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O
O
A
J
L
Y
.
C
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ffi
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en
ts
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ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s
us
in
g
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ed
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
:
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s,
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
,c
os
t
effi
ci
en
cy
pa
ra
m
et
ri
ze
d
by
w
ay
of
SF
A
,d
um
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
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ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
,
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m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
m
er
ge
d
(a
cq
ui
re
d)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s,
ba
nk
-le
ve
l
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
l
de
po
si
ts
.
L
A
G
T
A
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
th
e
qu
an
ti
ty
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
L
E
V
R
A
G
st
an
ds
fo
r
le
ve
ra
ge
,
N
P
L
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
no
np
er
fo
rm
in
g
lo
an
s
ov
er
to
ta
l
lo
an
s,
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
th
e
po
ol
ed
sa
m
pl
e
of
ba
nk
s,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
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de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
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ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
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se
ts
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s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
ba
nk
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
us
in
g
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
O
pa
ci
ty
is
ba
se
d
on
Jo
ne
s,
Le
e
an
d
Y
ea
ge
r
(2
01
2)
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
V
ar
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bl
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e
w
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d
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e
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T
able
B
.4.:Interm
ediation
Q
uality,O
pacity
and
Fragility,Split
Sam
ple
A
nalysis
by
O
O
A
J
L
Y
,O
pacity
B
ased
on
O
L
N
J
L
Y
.
C
oeffi
cients
from
T
obit
regressions
using
fixed
tim
e
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
T
he
dependent
variable
is
interm
ediation
quality.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
A
llregressions
include
the
follow
ing
controlvariables:
the
log
of
gross
totalassets,the
return
on
assets,cost
effi
ciency
param
etrized
by
w
ay
ofSFA
,dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany,
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
w
as
m
erged
(acquired)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years,
bank-level
dem
ographic
variables
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahl
index),
population,
population
density,
incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arketshare
of
m
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
of
deposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
of
a
bank’s
total
deposits.
L
A
G
T
A
is
the
ratio
of
liquid
assets
over
total
assets.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
the
quantity
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
over
total
assets.
L
E
V
R
A
G
stands
for
leverage,
N
P
L
stands
for
the
ratio
of
nonperform
ing
loans
over
total
loans,
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
across
the
pooled
sam
ple
of
banks,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
for
each
bank
individually
using
the
last
three
observations.
O
pacity
is
based
on
Jones,Lee
and
Y
eager
(2012).
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
V
ariables
are
w
insorized
at
the
0.01
and
0.99
percentiles.
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B.1.1.2. Sample Split by OLNJLY
Table B.6.: Intermediation Quality and Opacity, Split Sample Analysis by OLNJLY .
Coefficients from Tobit regressions using fixed time effects and standard errors clustered by
bank. The dependent variable is intermediation quality. Stars report significance at the 0.1
(*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions
include the following control variables: the log of gross total assets, the return on assets,
cost efficiency parametrized by way of SFA, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs
to a multibank (onebank) holding company, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was merged
(acquired) within the last three years, bank-level demographic variables calculated by weighting
the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income
growth and marketshare of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or
non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. OOAJLY and OLNJLY represent
opaque assets following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents opaque assets
following Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respectively. Monetary values are in 2005
US Dollars. Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles.
Panel A: SFA, CATFAT
Panel A1: 1st Quartile Panel A2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.131 0.724∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ -0.0939 0.0109 0.415∗∗∗
(1.37) (9.40) (10.29) (-1.61) (0.49) (4.98)
Panel B: GFA, CATFAT
Panel B1: 1st Quartile Panel B2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
-0.0928∗∗∗ 0.00991 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ -0.0659∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(-3.48) (0.52) (2.92) (5.28) (-6.94) (5.09)
Panel C: SFA, CATNONFAT
Panel C1: 1st Quartile Panel C2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.119 0.670∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ 0.000562 0.297∗∗∗
(1.43) (10.51) (9.56) (-4.35) (0.03) (3.56)
Panel D: GFA, CATNONFAT
Panel D1: 1st Quartile Panel D2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
-0.0192 0.262∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.0246 -0.0338∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(-0.66) (12.52) (10.17) (0.77) (-4.43) (4.85)
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r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
th
e
po
ol
ed
sa
m
pl
e
of
ba
nk
s,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
ba
nk
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
us
in
g
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
0.
01
an
d
0.
99
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s.
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n
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n
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R
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P
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T
able
B
.8.:Interm
ediation
Q
uality,O
pacity
and
Fragility,Split
Sam
ple
A
nalysis
by
O
L
N
J
L
Y
,O
pacity
B
ased
on
O
O
A
J
L
Y
.
C
oeffi
cients
from
T
obit
regressions
using
fixed
tim
e
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
T
he
dependent
variable
is
interm
ediation
quality.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
A
llregressions
include
the
follow
ing
controlvariables:
the
log
of
gross
totalassets,the
return
on
assets,cost
effi
ciency
param
etrized
by
w
ay
ofSFA
,dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany,
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
w
as
m
erged
(acquired)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years,
bank-level
dem
ographic
variables
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahl
index),
population,
population
density,
incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arketshare
of
m
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
of
deposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
of
a
bank’s
total
deposits.
L
A
G
T
A
is
the
ratio
of
liquid
assets
over
total
assets.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
the
quantity
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
over
total
assets.
L
E
V
R
A
G
stands
for
leverage,
N
P
L
stands
for
the
ratio
of
nonperform
ing
loans
over
total
loans,
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
across
the
pooled
sam
ple
of
banks,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
for
each
bank
individually
using
the
last
three
observations.
O
pacity
is
based
on
Jones,Lee
and
Y
eager
(2012).
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
V
ariables
are
w
insorized
at
the
0.01
and
0.99
percentiles.
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Y
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-0.0190
-0.00657
0.0340
0.0288
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F
ragility
-0.0969 ∗∗∗
0.00267 ∗∗∗
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0.159 ∗∗∗
-0.000981 ∗∗∗
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0.00144 ∗∗∗
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T
ab
le
B
.9
.:
In
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y,
O
pa
ci
ty
an
d
Fr
ag
ili
ty
,S
pl
it
Sa
m
pl
e
A
na
ly
si
s
by
O
L
N
J
L
Y
,O
pa
ci
ty
B
as
ed
on
O
L
N
J
L
Y
.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
fr
om
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s
us
in
g
fix
ed
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
:
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s,
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
,c
os
t
effi
ci
en
cy
pa
ra
m
et
ri
ze
d
by
w
ay
of
SF
A
,d
um
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
,
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
m
er
ge
d
(a
cq
ui
re
d)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s,
ba
nk
-le
ve
l
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
l
de
po
si
ts
.
L
A
G
T
A
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
th
e
qu
an
ti
ty
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
L
E
V
R
A
G
st
an
ds
fo
r
le
ve
ra
ge
,
N
P
L
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
no
np
er
fo
rm
in
g
lo
an
s
ov
er
to
ta
l
lo
an
s,
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
th
e
po
ol
ed
sa
m
pl
e
of
ba
nk
s,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
ba
nk
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
us
in
g
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
O
pa
ci
ty
is
ba
se
d
on
Jo
ne
s,
Le
e
an
d
Y
ea
ge
r
(2
01
2)
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
0.
01
an
d
0.
99
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s.
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B.1.1.3. Sample Split by OPQFKN
Table B.11.:
Intermediation Quality and Opacity, Split Sample Analysis by OPQFKN .
Coefficients from Tobit regressions using fixed time effects and standard errors clustered by
bank. The dependent variable is intermediation quality. Stars report significance at the 0.1
(*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions
include the following control variables: the log of gross total assets, the return on assets,
cost efficiency parametrized by way of SFA, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs
to a multibank (onebank) holding company, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was merged
(acquired) within the last three years, bank-level demographic variables calculated by weighting
the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income
growth and marketshare of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or
non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. OOAJLY and OLNJLY represent
opaque assets following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents opaque assets
following Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respectively. Monetary values are in 2005
US Dollars. Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles.
Panel A: SFA, CATFAT
Panel A1: 1st Quartile Panel A2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
-0.424∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 3.813∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.0315∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(-2.80) (12.56) (7.77) (-3.54) (-1.78) (3.21)
Panel B: GFA, CATFAT
Panel B1: 1st Quartile Panel B2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
-0.143∗∗∗ -0.0550∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗ -0.0144 -0.0625∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(-2.75) (-9.22) (2.52) (-0.44) (-9.45) (-5.54)
Panel C: SFA, CATNONFAT
Panel C1: 1st Quartile Panel C2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
-0.434∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 2.676∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.0189 0.367∗∗∗
(-3.13) (11.64) (7.27) (-2.34) (-1.29) (3.67)
Continued on next page
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Table B.11 – Continued from previous page
Panel D: GFA, CATNONFAT
Panel D1: 1st Quartile Panel D2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
-0.233∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ -0.0998∗∗∗ -0.00986∗ -0.0388
(-4.98) (6.43) (4.51) (-3.40) (-1.70) (-1.16)
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d
at
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R
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T
able
B
.13.:Interm
ediation
Q
uality,O
pacity
and
Fragility,Split
Sam
ple
A
nalysis
by
O
P
Q
F
K
N
,O
pacity
B
ased
on
O
O
A
J
L
Y
.
C
oeffi
cients
from
T
obit
regressions
using
fixed
tim
e
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
T
he
dependent
variable
is
interm
ediation
quality.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
A
llregressions
include
the
follow
ing
controlvariables:
the
log
of
gross
totalassets,the
return
on
assets,cost
effi
ciency
param
etrized
by
w
ay
ofSFA
,dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany,
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
w
as
m
erged
(acquired)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years,
bank-level
dem
ographic
variables
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahl
index),
population,
population
density,
incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arketshare
of
m
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
of
deposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
of
a
bank’s
total
deposits.
L
A
G
T
A
is
the
ratio
of
liquid
assets
over
total
assets.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
the
quantity
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
over
total
assets.
L
E
V
R
A
G
stands
for
leverage,
N
P
L
stands
for
the
ratio
of
nonperform
ing
loans
over
total
loans,
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
across
the
pooled
sam
ple
of
banks,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
for
each
bank
individually
using
the
last
three
observations.
O
pacity
is
based
on
Jones,Lee
and
Y
eager
(2012).
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
V
ariables
are
w
insorized
at
the
0.01
and
0.99
percentiles.
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Y
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F
ragility
-0.0730 ∗∗∗
0.00250 ∗∗∗
0.119 ∗∗∗
0.0864 ∗∗∗
-0.000515 ∗∗∗
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T
ab
le
B
.1
4.
:I
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y,
O
pa
ci
ty
an
d
Fr
ag
ili
ty
,S
pl
it
Sa
m
pl
e
A
na
ly
si
s
by
O
P
Q
F
K
N
,O
pa
ci
ty
B
as
ed
on
O
L
N
J
L
Y
.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
fr
om
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s
us
in
g
fix
ed
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
:
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s,
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
,c
os
t
effi
ci
en
cy
pa
ra
m
et
ri
ze
d
by
w
ay
of
SF
A
,d
um
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
,
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
m
er
ge
d
(a
cq
ui
re
d)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s,
ba
nk
-le
ve
l
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
l
de
po
si
ts
.
L
A
G
T
A
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
th
e
qu
an
ti
ty
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
L
E
V
R
A
G
st
an
ds
fo
r
le
ve
ra
ge
,
N
P
L
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
no
np
er
fo
rm
in
g
lo
an
s
ov
er
to
ta
l
lo
an
s,
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
th
e
po
ol
ed
sa
m
pl
e
of
ba
nk
s,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
ba
nk
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
us
in
g
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
O
pa
ci
ty
is
ba
se
d
on
Jo
ne
s,
Le
e
an
d
Y
ea
ge
r
(2
01
2)
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
0.
01
an
d
0.
99
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s.
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n
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n
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B.1.2. Analysis of an Alternative Measure of Bank Intermediation
This section provides results on the relation between opacity, fragility and intermedia-
tion in the case where bank intermediation is measured by the liquidity transformation
gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004). Although this measure has some shortcomings in
terms of measuring the liquidity created by banks, it also brings with it several ad-
vantages. First, it enables one to investigate the robustness of the results to both the
choice of dependent variable (intermediation quality as proxied by liquidity efficiency
in the main analysis) and the estimation method (Tobit in the main analysis). This is
because it relies neither on efficiency nor on Tobit regressions but rather estimates a
fixed effects model of the form
LTGi,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + γOPi,t,j + δFRAGi,t,k
+
17∑
t=1
θtdt + νi + i,t,
(B.1)
where LTG denotes the liquidity transformation gap scaled by total assets and all
other variables are as previously defined. In the first instance, δ is constrained to
zero for all k so as to investigate the results for opacity alone, which will allow one to
distinguish A1/A2 from the null and A3. The findings are summarized in Table B.16.
The control variables indicate similar relations as before, i.e. better intermediaries
are smaller (BKSIZE) and more profitable (ROA). They operate in more populous
and more aﬄuent (BKPOP,BKICHG) markets and they are organized as holding
companies (MBHC,OBHC). In contrast to previous results, better intermediaries
are more cost efficient (CE) and operate in markets where larger banks are present
(BKMSML). As regards the main variables of interest, these indicate that even in this
changed scenario, opacity is significantly positively associated with intermediation for
the OLNJLY and OPQFKN measures, while it is significantly negative for OOAJLY .
Overall, this confirms the main results and leads to the rejection of the null as well as
A3.
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Table B.16.:
Intermediation and Opacity, Intermediation Measured by the LT-Gap of Deep and
Schaefer (2004).
Coefficients from fixed effects regressions using fixed bank and time effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. The dependent variable is the LT-Gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004). Stars
report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported in
brackets. BKSIZE stands for the log of gross total assets, ROA stands for return on assets,
CE is cost efficiency parametrized by way of SFA. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set
to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy
variables set to 1 if the bank was merged (acquired) within the last three years. BKHHI,
BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML are bank-level demographic variables cal-
culated by weighting the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population
density, income growth and marketshare of medium and large banks by the share of deposits
each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. OOAJLY and OLNJLY
represent opaque assets following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents
opaque assets following Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respectively. Monetary val-
ues are in 2005 US Dollars. Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles.
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
OOAJLY -0.219∗∗∗
(-7.46)
OLNJLY 0.591∗∗∗
(52.00)
OPQFKN 0.0957∗∗
(2.08)
BKSIZE -0.0313∗∗∗ -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.0334∗∗∗
(-11.61) (-7.57) (-12.33)
CE 0.198∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(7.88) (9.02) (7.33)
ROA 2.047∗∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗ 2.230∗∗∗
(23.99) (23.54) (26.26)
BKHHI -0.00773 -0.00902 -0.00793
(-1.17) (-1.47) (-1.21)
BKMSML 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗
(4.04) (3.66) (4.03)
BKPOP 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
(11.33) (12.91) (11.12)
BKPDNS 0.00190 0.00506 0.00107
(0.47) (1.33) (0.26)
BKICHG 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗
(3.26) (3.78) (3.47)
MBHC 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗
(4.55) (2.79) (3.68)
OBHC 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table B.16 – Continued from previous page
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
(8.11) (6.50) (7.93)
MRG 0.0282 0.0235 0.0235
(0.75) (0.52) (0.62)
ACQ -0.00434∗∗ -0.00299 -0.00513∗∗∗
(-2.21) (-1.61) (-2.59)
Constant -0.0170 -0.329∗∗∗ 0.0119
(-0.42) (-8.27) (0.29)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.134 0.245 0.132
N 118164 118164 118164
The next step is to constrain γ to zero for all j so as to analyze the impact of fragility
on intermediation. Table B.17 provides the results. As in the main analysis, I find that,
overall, fragility exerts a positive influence on intermediation. Thus, banks that create
more liquidity have fewer liquid assets, higher leverage and more risk weighted assets
(LAGTA, LEV RAG and CREDRSK). They also have a higher level of nonperforming
loans (NPL) and lower distance to default (ZINDpool). Overall, the evidence indicates
that A1 should be rejected in favor of A2.
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In order to investigate the robustness of the findings from the joint analysis of opacity
and fragility, the third step of the analysis combines both of these variable sets. In
other words, it allows both γ and δ to differ from zero in Equation B.1. These results
are reported in Tables B.18-B.20. In line with the main results, findings suggest that
both opacity and fragility proxies maintain their respective signs and significances.
Specifically, OOAJLY remains significantly negative, OLNJLY significantly positive
and OPQFKN remains significantly positive in the majority of cases with the exception
of the regressions where LAGTA and CREDRSK proxy for fragility. Taken together,
this indicates that the influence of both opacity and fragility on bank intermediation is
robust and thus increases the confidence with which A1 is rejected in favor of A2, the
“Opacity-Fragility Hypothesis”.
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B.2. Robustness Checks
This section discusses several checks on the robustness of the results. First, it investi-
gates whether results are affected by using the CATNONFAT measure of Berger and
Bouwman (2009) as the basis for intermediation quality. This is done in Section B.2.1.
Second, this section investigates the impact that winsorization has on results. Specif-
ically, Section B.2.2 considers the case where the variables of interest are winsorized
at 2% and 98% instead of 1% and 99%. It finds strong support for the main findings.
Moreover, related literature suggests that both OLS and truncated regression may be
appropriate estimation methods in the context of efficiency scores. Hence Sections B.2.3
and B.2.4 investigate the impact of the estimation method choice on the results. Fi-
nally, Section B.2.5 also considers whether results change when the sample is split by
bank size.
B.2.1. CATNONFAT Underlies Intermediation Quality
The first check on the robustness of the results is to rerun the main analysis using
the CATNONFAT measure of liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) to
parametrize the proxy of intermediation quality. Table B.21 reports results for the dis-
tributional properties of intermediation quality calculated on the basis of this measure.
I find that the overall level of intermediation quality reported in the sample is about
20% greater than in the baseline case. This is not surprising given that CATFAT in-
cludes off-balance-sheet items. Thus, while the inputs and outputs used in the frontier
analysis remain the same, the CATFAT measure assumes that banks are able to pro-
duce a greater level of liquidity. Also the dispersion of the intensity with which banks
use off-balance-sheet items is likely to be large, with large banks being heavy users and
small banks more reliant on traditional assets and liabilities. This extra variation in
the dependent variable of the efficiency analysis also leads to a lower average level of
productivity of some banks relative to the most efficient ones and hence lower minima.
In addition, Table B.22 reports correlations between the intermediation quality, opac-
ity and fragility variables. In the main analysis, the intermediation quality measures
were positively and negatively correlated with the opacity variables equally frequently.
Similarly, if intermediation quality is based on CATNONFAT and SFA, OLNJLY
and OPQFKN are positively associated while OOAJLY is negatively associated with
intermediation quality. For IQCNFGFA , OOAJLY is significantly negatively related while
OLNJLY and OPQFKN are significantly positively related with intermediation qual-
ity. Both intermediation quality parametrizations are positively (negatively) related to
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Statistic IQCNFSFA IQ
CNF
GFA
mean 0.7068 0.8468
median 0.7329 0.8636
min 0.0001 -0.4997
max 0.9840 1.0000
std 0.1428 0.0678
skewness -1.7910 -5.6556
Table B.21.:
Summary Statistics of Interme-
diation Quality.
Distributional properties computed
on a yearly basis and then aver-
aged across years. SFA indicates
stochastic frontier analysis, GFA in-
dicates generalized frontier analysis
and CNF indicates CATNONFAT
as specified in Berger and Bouwman
(2009).
CREDRSK (LAGTA, ZINDMA(3)) but differ in their associations with the remain-
ing fragility variables. This is similar to the main analysis and confirms the need for a
multivariate analysis.
The second step is to investigate the association that holds between intermediation
quality and liquidity creation in the absolute sense, both based on CATNONFAT .
Results, reported in Table B.23, are extremely similar to the main analysis. The only
difference is that the previously insignificant coefficient on BKICHG gains significance
while retaining its original sign. Moreover, SFA and GFA now agree on the association
between intermediation quality and cost efficiency. It appears plausible that less aﬄuent
markets contribute to credit growth and thus absolute liquidity creation. Overall, as in
the baseline case, higher liquidity creation is positively associated with larger, more cost
efficient (CE) and profitable (ROA) banks that are holding companies and active in
more populated markets (BKPOP ) where large banks prefer to operate (BKMSML).
More importantly, the association between the measures of intermediation quality and
liquidity creation in the absolute is still significantly positive (IQCNFSFA , IQ
CNF
GFA ).
Third, Table B.24 considers the drivers of intermediation quality. Specifically, it runs
the following regression.
IQCNFm,i,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t +
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i.
(B.2)
Here IQCNFm,i,t stands for intermediation quality, based on CATNONFAT with m ∈
{SFA,GFA}. All other variables are as defined in the main analysis. As found previ-
ously, bank size is negative, while return on assets is positive for intermediation quality.
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Table B.22.:
Correlations of Opacity, Fragility and
Intermediation Quality.
Pearson correlation coefficients between
opacity, fragility and intermediation
quality variables. Stars report signifi-
cance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01
(***) levels. LAGTA represents liquid
assets over total assets. CREDRSK
is the quantity of risk weighted assets
over total assets. LEV RAG stands for
leverage, NPL stands for the ratio of
nonperforming loans over total loans,
ZINDpool stands for the Z-Score mea-
sure of distance to default where the
variance of the return on assets has
been computed across the pooled sam-
ple of banks, ZINDMA(3) stands for the
Z-Score measure of distance to default
where the variance of the return on as-
sets has been computed for each bank
individually using the last three obser-
vations. OOAJLY and OLNJLY rep-
resent opaque assets following Jones, Lee
and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN rep-
resents opaque assets following Flannery,
Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respec-
tively. IQCNFSFA (IQ
CNF
GFA ) stands for in-
termediation quality parametrized using
SFA (GFA) and Berger and Bouwman’s
(2009) CATNONFAT measure of liq-
uidity creation.
Parameter IQCNFSFA IQ
CNF
GFA
IQCNFGFA 0.3070
∗∗∗ 1.0000
OOAJLY -0.1310∗∗∗ -0.2450∗∗∗
OLNJLY 0.0923∗∗∗ 0.1070∗∗∗
OPQFKN 0.0549∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗
LAGTA -0.1640∗∗∗ -0.1080∗∗∗
LEV RAG 0.0060∗∗ -0.0515∗∗∗
NPL 0.1350∗∗∗ -0.0195∗∗∗
CREDRSK 0.1680∗∗∗ 0.2230∗∗∗
ZINDMA(3) -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗
ZINDpool -0.2550∗∗∗ 0.1060∗∗∗
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Parameter (1) (2)
IQCNFSFA 0.288
∗∗∗
(52.83)
IQCNFGFA 0.164
∗∗∗
(28.36)
BKSIZE 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
(9.66) (7.16)
CE 0.428∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗
(22.54) (3.61)
ROA 0.652∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗
(11.04) (14.91)
BKHHI 0.00166 0.00105
(0.37) (0.21)
BKMSML 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.00594∗∗
(6.91) (2.02)
BKPOP 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(10.57) (10.87)
BKPDNS 0.00142 0.00367
(0.52) (1.21)
BKICHG -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0270∗∗∗
(-3.73) (-4.97)
MBHC 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗
(5.97) (8.98)
OBHC 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗
(7.89) (9.47)
MRG 0.0129 -0.00338
(0.45) (-0.11)
ACQ -0.00104 -0.00160
(-0.74) (-1.05)
Constant -0.767∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗
(-24.87) (-12.03)
Bank FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.436 0.337
N 118164 118164
Table B.23.:
Liquidity Creation and Intermediation
Quality.
Coefficients from regressions using fixed bank
and time effects and standard errors clustered
by bank. The dependent variable is Berger
and Bouwman’s (2009) CATNONFAT mea-
sure of liquidity creation scaled by gross
total assets. Stars report significance at
the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) lev-
els. T-statistics are reported in brackets.
BKSIZE stands for the log of gross to-
tal assets, ROA stands for return on assets,
CE is cost efficiency parametrized by way of
SFA.MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables
set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank
(onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ)
are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was merged (acquired) within the last three
years. BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML are bank-level
demographic variables calculated by weight-
ing the demographic variables HHI (Herfind-
ahl index), population, population density,
income growth and marketshare of medium
and large banks by the share of deposits
each MSA or non-MSA county represents of
a bank’s total deposits. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars. IQCNFSFA (IQ
CNF
GFA ) stands
for intermediation quality parametrized using
SFA (GFA) and the CATNONFAT measure
of liquidity creation from Berger and Bouw-
man (2009). Variables are winsorized at the
0.01 and 0.99 percentiles.
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Furthermore, the table indicates that CE has a negative influence on intermediation
quality just as in the baseline analysis. Intermediation quality is also lower in more con-
centrated markets (BKHHI) with stronger competitor presence (BKMSML). Again,
as in the baseline case, holding companies that operate in aﬄuent markets generally
exhibit higher intermediation quality, especially if they have made recent acquisitions
(OBHC, MBHC, BKICHG, ACQ). As in the main analysis, most of the relations
between the explanatory variables and intermediation quality (with the exception of
BKHHI) are confirmed by GFA in Specification 2.
Fourth, I turn to the investigation of the relation between intermediation quality and
opacity. This is the first step required to disentangle the A1/A2 hypotheses from A3.
More concretely, I run a Tobit regression of the form
IQCNFm,i,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + γOPi,j,t +
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i,
(B.3)
where OPi,j,t is the jth of the three opacity proxies. The findings are reported in Table
B.25. The control variables exhibit identical signs and significances as in the analysis of
the drivers of intermediation quality. More importantly, the opacity controls, OLNJLY
and OPQFKN exhibit significant and positive associations with intermediation qual-
ity throughout for both IQCNFSFA and IQ
CNF
GFA . As in the baseline case, OOAJLY is
insignificant. This finding reaffirms the results and conclusions obtained in the main
analysis, namely that it is safe to reject both the null of no importance of opacity as
well as the alternative A3, which embodies the “Opacity-Ownership Hypothesis”.
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Parameter (1) (2)
BKSIZE -0.0555∗∗∗ -0.0354∗∗∗
(-51.42) (-67.42)
CE -0.983∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(-30.46) (-24.93)
ROA 1.336∗∗∗ -0.00839
(14.44) (-0.25)
BKHHI -0.0172∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗
(-2.43) (5.73)
BKMSML -0.000869 -0.000221
(-0.20) (-0.15)
BKPOP 0.00148∗∗ 0.00357∗∗∗
(2.11) (15.29)
BKPDNS -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.00135∗∗∗
(-10.02) (-4.28)
BKICHG 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗
(10.15) (4.48)
MBHC 0.0581∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(19.14) (11.51)
OBHC 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗
(13.78) (12.83)
MRG 0.0277 0.0422
(0.43) (1.57)
ACQ 0.00884∗∗∗ 0.00334∗∗∗
(3.99) (4.29)
Constant 2.224∗∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗
(62.13) (105.47)
Time FE Yes Yes
N 118164 118164
Table B.24.:
Drivers of Intermediation Quality,
Intermediation Quality Based on
CATNONFAT .
Coefficients from Tobit regressions using
fixed time effects and standard errors clus-
tered by bank. The dependent variable
is intermediation quality. Stars report
significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and
0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported
in brackets. BKSIZE stands for the log of
gross total assets, ROA stands for return on
assets, CE is cost efficiency parametrized by
way of SFA. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy
variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to
a multibank (onebank) holding company.
MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to
1 if the bank was merged (acquired) within
the last three years. BKHHI, BKPOP ,
BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML are
bank-level demographic variables calculated
by weighting the demographic variables HHI
(Herfindahl index), population, population
density, income growth and marketshare of
medium and large banks by the share of
deposits each MSA or non-MSA county rep-
resents of a bank’s total deposits. Monetary
values are in 2005 US Dollars. Variables are
winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles.
Specification 1 is based on SFA, Specification
2 is based on GFA.
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Table B.25.:
Intermediation Quality and Opacity, Intermediation Quality Based on CATNONFAT .
Coefficients from Tobit regressions using fixed time effects and standard errors clustered by
bank. The dependent variable is intermediation quality. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported in brackets. BKSIZE stands for the
log of gross total assets, ROA stands for return on assets, CE is cost efficiency parametrized
by way of SFA. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a
multibank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the
bank was merged (acquired) within the last three years. BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML are bank-level demographic variables calculated by weighting the
demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth
and marketshare of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA
county represents of a bank’s total deposits. OOAJLY and OLNJLY represent opaque assets
following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents opaque assets following
Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respectively. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles. Intermediation quality is based on
the CATNONFAT measure of Berger and Bouwman (2009). Specifications 1-3 use SFA and
4-6 use GFA to obtain intermediation quality.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
OOAJLY -0.0228 0.00787
(-0.55) (0.44)
OLNJLY 0.0954∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗
(10.28) (4.83)
OPQFKN 0.676∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(14.76) (14.94)
BKSIZE -0.0552∗∗∗ -0.0548∗∗∗ -0.0575∗∗∗ -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.0353∗∗∗ -0.0361∗∗∗
(-48.97) (-50.34) (-52.60) (-66.47) (-67.09) (-68.34)
CE -0.981∗∗∗ -0.996∗∗∗ -0.995∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(-30.05) (-30.71) (-30.82) (-24.52) (-24.96) (-25.26)
ROA 1.316∗∗∗ 1.296∗∗∗ 1.682∗∗∗ -0.00153 -0.0149 0.112∗∗∗
(13.40) (13.96) (17.59) (-0.04) (-0.44) (3.18)
BKHHI -0.0171∗∗ -0.0153∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗
(-2.42) (-2.19) (-2.73) (5.74) (5.90) (5.38)
BKMSML -0.000780 0.000791 -0.00261 -0.000252 0.0000521 -0.000826
(-0.18) (0.18) (-0.60) (-0.17) (0.04) (-0.57)
BKPOP 0.00147∗∗ 0.00252∗∗∗ 0.00169∗∗ 0.00357∗∗∗ 0.00374∗∗∗ 0.00364∗∗∗
(2.10) (3.54) (2.43) (15.27) (15.73) (15.67)
BKPDNS -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.00845∗∗∗ -0.00988∗∗∗ -0.00135∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.00123∗∗∗
(-10.02) (-8.19) (-9.75) (-4.26) (-3.30) (-3.92)
BKICHG 0.108∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗
(10.20) (10.00) (9.85) (4.48) (4.39) (4.06)
MBHC 0.0584∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0528∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.00976∗∗∗
(19.04) (18.17) (17.45) (11.30) (11.04) (9.73)
OBHC 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.00977∗∗∗ 0.00914∗∗∗
(13.76) (12.92) (12.66) (12.72) (12.33) (11.55)
MRG 0.0283 0.0246 0.0178 0.0420 0.0417 0.0388
(0.44) (0.37) (0.28) (1.57) (1.58) (1.40)
Continued on next page
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Table B.25 – Continued from previous page
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ACQ 0.00892∗∗∗ 0.00938∗∗∗ 0.00589∗∗∗ 0.00331∗∗∗ 0.00342∗∗∗ 0.00231∗∗∗
(4.01) (4.24) (2.67) (4.22) (4.40) (2.97)
Constant 2.221∗∗∗ 2.190∗∗∗ 2.227∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗
(61.06) (60.19) (62.21) (104.04) (104.86) (105.81)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 118164 118164 118164 118164 118164 118164
The next step in the analysis requires one to disentangle A1 and A2. This is accom-
plished by way of a Tobit regression such as
IQCNFm,i,t = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + δFRAGi,k,t +
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i,
(B.4)
where FRAGi,k,t is the kth of the six fragility proxies. Table B.26 reports the cor-
responding results. The results document that better intermediation quality is asso-
ciated with greater fragility. Specifically, better intermediaries have higher leverage
(LEV RAG), hold fewer liquid assets (LAGTA) and have lower quality loan portfolios
(NPL). They have smaller Z-Scores (ZINDMA(3), ZINDpool) as well as more risk
weighted assets (CREDRSK). Both the SFA and GFA specifications support these
findings. These results confirm that fragility is positively associated with the quality
of intermediation and suggest that the acceptance of A2 in favor of A1 in the main
analysis is warranted.
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Finally, to conclude the investigation, I run the regressions including both opacity
and fragility together. Results can be found in Tables B.27-B.29. The specification is
as follows
IQCNFm,i = α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2CEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4BKHHIi,t + β5BKMSMLi,t
+ β6BKPOPi,t + β7BKPDNSi,t + β8BKICHGi,t + β9MBHCi,t
+ β10OBHCi,t + β11MRGi,t + β12ACQi,t + γOPi,j,t + δFRAGi,k,t
+
17∑
t=1
θtdt + i.
(B.5)
As these results confirm, the positive association between fragility and intermedia-
tion quality holds irrespective of whether opacity is included in the specification or
not. Specifically, in the case of OOAJLY , the variable remains insignificant, while
OLNJLY retains its sign and significance in most cases. Exceptions are the regres-
sions where LAGTA and CREDRSK proxy for fragility. This change of sign indicates
that OLNJLY contains information on some dimension of fragility, in particular to the
extent that it is related to risk weighted assets. This is plausible given that OLNJLY
is constructed on the basis of other loans. However, the remaining conclusions are un-
changed. Finally, OPQFKN remains highly significant and positive. Thus using the
CATNONFAT measure as the basis for the intermediation quality proxy does not
change the results and leads to the acceptance of the “Opacity-Fragility Hypothesis”.
251
T
ab
le
B
.2
7.
:I
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y,
O
pa
ci
ty
an
d
Fr
ag
ili
ty
,I
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y
B
as
ed
on
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
,O
pa
ci
ty
B
as
ed
on
O
O
A
J
L
Y
.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
fr
om
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s
us
in
g
fix
ed
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
B
K
S
I
Z
E
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s,
R
O
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
,
C
E
is
co
st
effi
ci
en
cy
pa
ra
m
et
ri
ze
d
by
w
ay
of
G
FA
.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
m
er
ge
d
(a
cq
ui
re
d)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
B
K
H
H
I
,B
K
P
O
P
,B
K
P
D
N
S
,B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
ar
e
ba
nk
-le
ve
l
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
l
de
po
si
ts
.
O
O
A
J
L
Y
an
d
O
L
N
J
L
Y
re
pr
es
en
t
op
aq
ue
as
se
ts
fo
llo
w
in
g
Jo
ne
s,
Le
e
an
d
Y
ea
ge
r
(2
01
2)
an
d
O
P
Q
F
K
N
re
pr
es
en
ts
op
aq
ue
as
se
ts
fo
llo
w
in
g
F
la
nn
er
y,
K
w
an
an
d
N
im
al
en
dr
an
(2
01
3)
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
L
A
G
T
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
th
e
qu
an
ti
ty
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
L
E
V
R
A
G
st
an
ds
fo
r
le
ve
ra
ge
,
N
P
L
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
no
np
er
fo
rm
in
g
lo
an
s
ov
er
to
ta
ll
oa
ns
,Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
th
e
po
ol
ed
sa
m
pl
e
of
ba
nk
s,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
ba
nk
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
us
in
g
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
0.
01
an
d
0.
99
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s.
Li
qu
id
it
y
cr
ea
ti
on
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
m
ea
su
re
of
B
er
ge
r
an
d
B
ou
w
m
an
(2
00
9)
.
In
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
1-
6,
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y
is
ba
se
d
on
SF
A
,i
n
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
7-
12
it
is
ba
se
d
on
G
FA
.
P
ar
am
et
er
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
O
O
A
J
L
Y
0.
00
10
0
-0
.0
02
40
-0
.0
25
7
-0
.0
82
7∗
∗
-0
.0
16
6
0.
00
50
1
0.
01
56
0.
01
61
0.
00
57
6
-0
.0
10
5
0.
00
67
4
0.
01
62
(0
.0
3)
(-
0.
06
)
(-
0.
62
)
(-
2.
10
)
(-
0.
40
)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.9
2)
(0
.8
8)
(0
.3
2)
(-
0.
61
)
(0
.3
7)
(0
.8
9)
L
A
G
T
A
-0
.2
39
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
77
4∗
∗∗
(-
29
.5
6)
(-
35
.5
7)
L
E
V
R
A
G
0.
00
48
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
19
7∗
∗∗
(1
2.
59
)
(1
7.
16
)
N
P
L
0.
15
4∗
∗∗
0.
11
2∗
∗∗
(3
.0
7)
(5
.8
8)
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
0.
32
4∗
∗∗
0.
09
93
∗∗
∗
(3
5.
34
)
(3
6.
42
)
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(
3
)
-0
.0
01
61
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
54
2∗
∗∗
(-
7.
78
)
(-
7.
20
)
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
-0
.0
03
59
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
08
∗∗
∗
(-
13
.5
1)
(-
16
.3
5)
B
K
S
I
Z
E
-0
.0
58
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
57
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
55
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
58
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
54
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
57
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
35
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
35
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
0∗
∗∗
(-
51
.6
4)
(-
49
.7
1)
(-
48
.9
9)
(-
52
.2
6)
(-
48
.1
2)
(-
49
.8
1)
(-
70
.0
6)
(-
67
.7
8)
(-
66
.3
7)
(-
71
.1
1)
(-
65
.5
4)
(-
67
.5
4)
C
E
-0
.9
65
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
50
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
80
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
60
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
80
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
38
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
71
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
63
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
75
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
69
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
72
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
63
∗∗
∗
(-
31
.2
4)
(-
28
.9
9)
(-
30
.0
0)
(-
30
.9
5)
(-
29
.9
2)
(-
28
.5
7)
(-
25
.2
9)
(-
23
.4
2)
(-
24
.4
5)
(-
25
.1
3)
(-
24
.2
2)
(-
23
.3
4)
R
O
A
1.
50
7∗
∗∗
1.
71
2∗
∗∗
1.
40
7∗
∗∗
1.
39
6∗
∗∗
1.
42
1∗
∗∗
2.
10
5∗
∗∗
0.
06
04
∗
0.
15
9∗
∗∗
0.
06
44
∗
0.
02
28
-0
.0
13
3
0.
23
5∗
∗∗
(1
6.
12
)
(1
7.
36
)
(1
3.
09
)
(1
4.
87
)
(1
3.
91
)
(2
0.
46
)
(1
.7
0)
(4
.3
1)
(1
.6
8)
(0
.6
4)
(-
0.
35
)
(6
.1
7)
B
K
H
H
I
-0
.0
11
9∗
-0
.0
16
0∗
∗
-0
.0
17
9∗
∗
-0
.0
13
5∗
∗
-0
.0
18
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
15
8∗
∗
0.
01
25
∗∗
∗
0.
01
13
∗∗
∗
0.
01
03
∗∗
∗
0.
01
20
∗∗
∗
0.
01
05
∗∗
∗
0.
01
12
∗∗
∗
(-
1.
84
)
(-
2.
29
)
(-
2.
53
)
(-
2.
09
)
(-
2.
59
)
(-
2.
27
)
(7
.0
6)
(6
.0
5)
(5
.4
4)
(6
.7
5)
(5
.5
3)
(6
.0
2)
B
K
M
S
M
L
-0
.0
11
7∗
∗∗
-0
.0
00
84
8
-0
.0
00
42
6
-0
.0
04
98
-0
.0
01
02
-0
.0
01
32
-0
.0
03
78
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
27
9
0.
00
00
05
75
-0
.0
01
54
-0
.0
00
31
1
-0
.0
00
41
4
(-
2.
86
)
(-
0.
20
)
(-
0.
10
)
(-
1.
24
)
(-
0.
23
)
(-
0.
31
)
(-
2.
72
)
(-
0.
19
)
(0
.0
0)
(-
1.
12
)
(-
0.
21
)
(-
0.
29
)
B
K
P
O
P
0.
00
11
6∗
0.
00
09
92
0.
00
14
2∗
∗
0.
00
06
88
0.
00
14
5∗
∗
0.
00
09
77
0.
00
34
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
33
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
35
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
33
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
35
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
34
2∗
∗∗
(1
.7
7)
(1
.4
4)
(2
.0
4)
(1
.0
8)
(2
.0
4)
(1
.4
2)
(1
5.
61
)
(1
4.
67
)
(1
5.
13
)
(1
5.
23
)
(1
5.
07
)
(1
4.
84
)
B
K
P
D
N
S
-0
.0
11
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
09
95
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
10
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
08
70
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
10
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
10
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
01
66
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
23
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
37
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
87
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
01
30
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
29
∗∗
∗
(-
11
.6
6)
(-
9.
84
)
(-
10
.0
5)
(-
9.
20
)
(-
9.
69
)
(-
9.
96
)
(-
5.
56
)
(-
3.
95
)
(-
4.
32
)
(-
2.
97
)
(-
4.
10
)
(-
4.
13
)
B
K
I
C
H
G
0.
11
9∗
∗∗
0.
09
53
∗∗
∗
0.
11
0∗
∗∗
0.
11
5∗
∗∗
0.
10
7∗
∗∗
0.
09
15
∗∗
∗
0.
01
85
∗∗
∗
0.
00
97
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
66
∗∗
∗
0.
01
71
∗∗
∗
0.
01
40
∗∗
∗
0.
00
98
5∗
∗∗
(1
1.
88
)
(9
.1
6)
(1
0.
44
)
(1
1.
42
)
(1
0.
18
)
(8
.8
2)
(5
.8
1)
(2
.9
9)
(5
.0
3)
(5
.3
5)
(4
.2
7)
(3
.0
3)
M
B
H
C
0.
04
80
∗∗
∗
0.
05
12
∗∗
∗
0.
05
84
∗∗
∗
0.
04
85
∗∗
∗
0.
05
78
∗∗
∗
0.
04
92
∗∗
∗
0.
00
81
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
86
4∗
∗∗
0.
01
16
∗∗
∗
0.
00
85
1∗
∗∗
0.
01
12
∗∗
∗
0.
00
88
0∗
∗∗
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
252
T
ab
le
B
.2
7
–
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
vi
o
u
s
pa
ge
P
ar
am
et
er
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
6.
79
)
(1
7.
07
)
(1
9.
06
)
(1
7.
26
)
(1
8.
48
)
(1
6.
50
)
(8
.4
1)
(8
.5
4)
(1
1.
34
)
(8
.9
5)
(1
0.
86
)
(8
.6
9)
O
B
H
C
0.
02
97
∗∗
∗
0.
03
03
∗∗
∗
0.
03
59
∗∗
∗
0.
02
89
∗∗
∗
0.
03
58
∗∗
∗
0.
02
85
∗∗
∗
0.
00
81
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
79
2∗
∗∗
0.
01
02
∗∗
∗
0.
00
80
5∗
∗∗
0.
01
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
79
7∗
∗∗
(1
2.
32
)
(1
1.
84
)
(1
3.
76
)
(1
2.
24
)
(1
3.
39
)
(1
1.
22
)
(1
0.
70
)
(1
0.
05
)
(1
2.
69
)
(1
0.
81
)
(1
2.
25
)
(1
0.
10
)
M
R
G
0.
01
88
0.
03
47
0.
02
86
0.
00
77
7
0.
02
62
0.
03
46
0.
03
89
0.
04
45
∗
0.
04
21
0.
03
56
0.
04
10
0.
04
38
(0
.2
9)
(0
.5
3)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.4
0)
(0
.5
2)
(1
.4
6)
(1
.6
5)
(1
.5
7)
(1
.4
3)
(1
.5
4)
(1
.6
4)
A
C
Q
0.
00
59
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
02
∗∗
∗
0.
00
90
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
65
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
85
7∗
∗∗
0.
01
04
∗∗
∗
0.
00
23
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
38
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
33
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
25
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
30
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
37
6∗
∗∗
(2
.7
4)
(4
.6
1)
(4
.0
4)
(3
.0
9)
(3
.8
5)
(4
.7
1)
(3
.0
8)
(4
.9
3)
(4
.2
9)
(3
.4
4)
(3
.9
2)
(4
.8
4)
C
on
st
an
t
2.
34
1∗
∗∗
2.
17
1∗
∗∗
2.
21
7∗
∗∗
2.
06
4∗
∗∗
2.
21
6∗
∗∗
2.
26
1∗
∗∗
1.
51
0∗
∗∗
1.
45
1∗
∗∗
1.
46
8∗
∗∗
1.
42
3∗
∗∗
1.
46
6∗
∗∗
1.
48
3∗
∗∗
(6
7.
55
)
(5
9.
18
)
(6
0.
91
)
(5
8.
42
)
(6
0.
73
)
(6
2.
56
)
(1
10
.3
3)
(1
02
.4
5)
(1
03
.9
5)
(1
06
.6
4)
(1
03
.8
1)
(1
05
.7
6)
T
im
e
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
50
03
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
50
03
11
81
64
T
ab
le
B
.2
8.
:I
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y,
O
pa
ci
ty
an
d
Fr
ag
ili
ty
,I
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y
B
as
ed
on
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
,O
pa
ci
ty
B
as
ed
on
O
L
N
J
L
Y
.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
fr
om
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s
us
in
g
fix
ed
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
B
K
S
I
Z
E
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s,
R
O
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
,
C
E
is
co
st
effi
ci
en
cy
pa
ra
m
et
ri
ze
d
by
w
ay
of
G
FA
.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
m
er
ge
d
(a
cq
ui
re
d)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
B
K
H
H
I
,B
K
P
O
P
,B
K
P
D
N
S
,B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
ar
e
ba
nk
-le
ve
l
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
l
de
po
si
ts
.
O
O
A
J
L
Y
an
d
O
L
N
J
L
Y
re
pr
es
en
t
op
aq
ue
as
se
ts
fo
llo
w
in
g
Jo
ne
s,
Le
e
an
d
Y
ea
ge
r
(2
01
2)
an
d
O
P
Q
F
K
N
re
pr
es
en
ts
op
aq
ue
as
se
ts
fo
llo
w
in
g
F
la
nn
er
y,
K
w
an
an
d
N
im
al
en
dr
an
(2
01
3)
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
L
A
G
T
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
th
e
qu
an
ti
ty
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
L
E
V
R
A
G
st
an
ds
fo
r
le
ve
ra
ge
,
N
P
L
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
no
np
er
fo
rm
in
g
lo
an
s
ov
er
to
ta
ll
oa
ns
,Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
th
e
po
ol
ed
sa
m
pl
e
of
ba
nk
s,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
ba
nk
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
us
in
g
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
0.
01
an
d
0.
99
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s.
Li
qu
id
it
y
cr
ea
ti
on
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
m
ea
su
re
of
B
er
ge
r
an
d
B
ou
w
m
an
(2
00
9)
.
In
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
1-
6,
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y
is
ba
se
d
on
SF
A
,i
n
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
7-
12
it
is
ba
se
d
on
G
FA
.
P
ar
am
et
er
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
O
L
N
J
L
Y
-0
.0
11
5
0.
08
79
∗∗
∗
0.
09
47
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
46
5∗
∗∗
0.
09
35
∗∗
∗
0.
08
38
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
20
8∗
∗∗
0.
01
26
∗∗
∗
0.
01
49
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
30
6∗
∗∗
0.
01
46
∗∗
∗
0.
01
21
∗∗
∗
(-
1.
23
)
(9
.6
1)
(1
0.
25
)
(-
5.
09
)
(9
.9
8)
(9
.2
0)
(-
5.
95
)
(3
.8
9)
(4
.5
9)
(-
9.
22
)
(4
.4
8)
(3
.7
4)
L
A
G
T
A
-0
.2
42
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
82
9∗
∗∗
(-
28
.4
8)
(-
34
.1
0)
L
E
V
R
A
G
0.
00
45
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
19
2∗
∗∗
(1
2.
12
)
(1
6.
65
)
N
P
L
0.
09
45
∗
0.
10
4∗
∗∗
(1
.9
2)
(5
.5
4)
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
0.
34
1∗
∗∗
0.
11
1∗
∗∗
(3
5.
52
)
(3
9.
30
)
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(
3
)
-0
.0
01
40
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
51
6∗
∗∗
(-
6.
90
)
(-
6.
91
)
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
253
T
ab
le
B
.2
8
–
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
vi
o
u
s
pa
ge
P
ar
am
et
er
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
-0
.0
03
38
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
04
∗∗
∗
(-
12
.9
9)
(-
15
.5
9)
B
K
S
I
Z
E
-0
.0
58
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
56
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
54
8∗
∗∗
-0
.0
60
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
54
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
56
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
35
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
35
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
37
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
35
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
35
7∗
∗∗
(-
54
.1
6)
(-
51
.1
5)
(-
50
.3
5)
(-
55
.1
4)
(-
49
.3
4)
(-
51
.1
7)
(-
70
.2
3)
(-
68
.1
5)
(-
67
.0
5)
(-
72
.2
7)
(-
66
.1
9)
(-
67
.9
1)
C
E
-0
.9
63
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
64
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
95
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
58
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
95
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
51
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
66
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
64
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
77
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
65
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
74
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
64
∗∗
∗
(-
31
.4
6)
(-
29
.6
2)
(-
30
.6
8)
(-
31
.2
9)
(-
30
.6
1)
(-
29
.1
7)
(-
25
.4
2)
(-
23
.7
3)
(-
24
.9
0)
(-
25
.4
4)
(-
24
.6
9)
(-
23
.6
3)
R
O
A
1.
51
3∗
∗∗
1.
65
6∗
∗∗
1.
35
4∗
∗∗
1.
49
4∗
∗∗
1.
38
6∗
∗∗
2.
02
2∗
∗∗
0.
05
93
∗
0.
13
5∗
∗∗
0.
04
83
0.
04
96
-0
.0
26
9
0.
20
8∗
∗∗
(1
7.
25
)
(1
8.
02
)
(1
3.
07
)
(1
7.
11
)
(1
4.
38
)
(2
1.
15
)
(1
.8
2)
(4
.0
4)
(1
.3
3)
(1
.5
3)
(-
0.
76
)
(5
.9
7)
B
K
H
H
I
-0
.0
12
1∗
-0
.0
14
3∗
∗
-0
.0
15
8∗
∗
-0
.0
14
8∗
∗
-0
.0
16
6∗
∗
-0
.0
14
2∗
∗
0.
01
23
∗∗
∗
0.
01
16
∗∗
∗
0.
01
07
∗∗
∗
0.
01
14
∗∗
∗
0.
01
09
∗∗
∗
0.
01
16
∗∗
∗
(-
1.
86
)
(-
2.
07
)
(-
2.
26
)
(-
2.
27
)
(-
2.
35
)
(-
2.
06
)
(6
.9
3)
(6
.2
0)
(5
.6
1)
(6
.4
3)
(5
.6
9)
(6
.1
6)
B
K
M
S
M
L
-0
.0
12
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
06
70
0.
00
09
89
-0
.0
06
34
0.
00
05
40
0.
00
01
81
-0
.0
04
32
∗∗
∗
0.
00
00
01
58
0.
00
02
69
-0
.0
02
27
∗
-0
.0
00
03
20
-0
.0
00
13
5
(-
2.
94
)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.2
3)
(-
1.
58
)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.0
4)
(-
3.
12
)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.1
8)
(-
1.
68
)
(-
0.
02
)
(-
0.
09
)
B
K
P
O
P
0.
00
10
3
0.
00
19
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
24
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
01
47
0.
00
25
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
19
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
32
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
35
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
37
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
29
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
37
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
35
6∗
∗∗
(1
.5
3)
(2
.8
2)
(3
.4
9)
(0
.2
2)
(3
.4
6)
(2
.7
4)
(1
4.
17
)
(1
4.
97
)
(1
5.
57
)
(1
3.
35
)
(1
5.
47
)
(1
5.
11
)
B
K
P
D
N
S
-0
.0
11
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
08
33
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
08
48
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
09
45
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
08
26
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
08
49
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
02
08
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
01
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
09
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
38
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
04
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
07
∗∗
∗
(-
11
.6
7)
(-
8.
15
)
(-
8.
21
)
(-
9.
85
)
(-
7.
91
)
(-
8.
34
)
(-
6.
84
)
(-
3.
19
)
(-
3.
40
)
(-
4.
67
)
(-
3.
21
)
(-
3.
39
)
B
K
I
C
H
G
0.
12
0∗
∗∗
0.
09
42
∗∗
∗
0.
10
7∗
∗∗
0.
11
6∗
∗∗
0.
10
5∗
∗∗
0.
09
08
∗∗
∗
0.
01
93
∗∗
∗
0.
00
97
3∗
∗∗
0.
01
62
∗∗
∗
0.
01
79
∗∗
∗
0.
01
38
∗∗
∗
0.
00
99
3∗
∗∗
(1
1.
90
)
(9
.0
4)
(1
0.
14
)
(1
1.
45
)
(9
.9
9)
(8
.7
4)
(6
.0
6)
(2
.9
9)
(4
.9
0)
(5
.5
9)
(4
.2
0)
(3
.0
4)
M
B
H
C
0.
04
84
∗∗
∗
0.
04
80
∗∗
∗
0.
05
43
∗∗
∗
0.
04
90
∗∗
∗
0.
05
38
∗∗
∗
0.
04
64
∗∗
∗
0.
00
89
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
83
7∗
∗∗
0.
01
10
∗∗
∗
0.
00
92
6∗
∗∗
0.
01
07
∗∗
∗
0.
00
85
6∗
∗∗
(1
7.
09
)
(1
6.
39
)
(1
8.
19
)
(1
7.
64
)
(1
7.
67
)
(1
5.
89
)
(9
.3
8)
(8
.5
4)
(1
1.
08
)
(9
.9
4)
(1
0.
61
)
(8
.7
2)
O
B
H
C
0.
03
00
∗∗
∗
0.
02
80
∗∗
∗
0.
03
30
∗∗
∗
0.
02
96
∗∗
∗
0.
03
30
∗∗
∗
0.
02
64
∗∗
∗
0.
00
87
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
76
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
97
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
86
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
95
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
77
5∗
∗∗
(1
2.
48
)
(1
1.
14
)
(1
2.
92
)
(1
2.
57
)
(1
2.
59
)
(1
0.
58
)
(1
1.
51
)
(9
.8
9)
(1
2.
31
)
(1
1.
74
)
(1
1.
90
)
(9
.9
8)
M
R
G
0.
01
91
0.
03
14
0.
02
47
0.
00
56
2
0.
02
29
0.
03
17
0.
03
98
0.
04
45
∗
0.
04
18
0.
03
55
0.
04
08
0.
04
39
(0
.3
0)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.3
7)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.3
4)
(0
.4
6)
(1
.4
4)
(1
.6
5)
(1
.5
8)
(1
.4
0)
(1
.5
5)
(1
.6
4)
A
C
Q
0.
00
58
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
06
∗∗
∗
0.
00
94
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
58
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
90
7∗
∗∗
0.
01
08
∗∗
∗
0.
00
22
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
39
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
34
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
22
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
31
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
38
7∗
∗∗
(2
.7
0)
(4
.8
1)
(4
.2
5)
(2
.7
8)
(4
.0
9)
(4
.9
0)
(2
.9
3)
(5
.1
1)
(4
.4
6)
(3
.0
7)
(4
.0
9)
(5
.0
1)
C
on
st
an
t
2.
34
7∗
∗∗
2.
14
4∗
∗∗
2.
18
9∗
∗∗
2.
08
5∗
∗∗
2.
18
6∗
∗∗
2.
22
9∗
∗∗
1.
51
8∗
∗∗
1.
44
5∗
∗∗
1.
46
2∗
∗∗
1.
43
0∗
∗∗
1.
46
0∗
∗∗
1.
47
6∗
∗∗
(6
9.
08
)
(5
8.
40
)
(6
0.
15
)
(6
0.
26
)
(5
9.
80
)
(6
1.
83
)
(1
11
.3
9)
(1
03
.1
0)
(1
04
.8
6)
(1
09
.6
1)
(1
04
.6
8)
(1
06
.5
1)
T
im
e
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
50
03
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
50
03
11
81
64
254
T
ab
le
B
.2
9.
:I
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y,
O
pa
ci
ty
an
d
Fr
ag
ili
ty
,I
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ti
on
Q
ua
lit
y
B
as
ed
on
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
,O
pa
ci
ty
B
as
ed
on
O
P
Q
F
K
N
.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
fr
om
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s
us
in
g
fix
ed
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
B
K
S
I
Z
E
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s,
R
O
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
,
C
E
is
co
st
effi
ci
en
cy
pa
ra
m
et
ri
ze
d
by
w
ay
of
G
FA
.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
m
er
ge
d
(a
cq
ui
re
d)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
B
K
H
H
I
,B
K
P
O
P
,B
K
P
D
N
S
,B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
ar
e
ba
nk
-le
ve
l
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
l
de
po
si
ts
.
O
O
A
J
L
Y
an
d
O
L
N
J
L
Y
re
pr
es
en
t
op
aq
ue
as
se
ts
fo
llo
w
in
g
Jo
ne
s,
Le
e
an
d
Y
ea
ge
r
(2
01
2)
an
d
O
P
Q
F
K
N
re
pr
es
en
ts
op
aq
ue
as
se
ts
fo
llo
w
in
g
F
la
nn
er
y,
K
w
an
an
d
N
im
al
en
dr
an
(2
01
3)
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
L
A
G
T
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
th
e
qu
an
ti
ty
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
L
E
V
R
A
G
st
an
ds
fo
r
le
ve
ra
ge
,
N
P
L
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
no
np
er
fo
rm
in
g
lo
an
s
ov
er
to
ta
ll
oa
ns
,Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
th
e
po
ol
ed
sa
m
pl
e
of
ba
nk
s,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
st
an
ds
fo
r
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
ha
s
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
ba
nk
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
us
in
g
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
0.
01
an
d
0.
99
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s.
Li
qu
id
it
y
cr
ea
ti
on
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
m
ea
su
re
of
B
er
ge
r
an
d
B
ou
w
m
an
(2
00
9)
.
In
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
1-
6,
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
qu
al
it
y
is
ba
se
d
on
SF
A
,i
n
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
7-
12
it
is
ba
se
d
on
G
FA
.
P
ar
am
et
er
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
O
P
Q
F
K
N
0.
48
9∗
∗∗
0.
74
7∗
∗∗
0.
67
4∗
∗∗
0.
45
5∗
∗∗
0.
69
3∗
∗∗
0.
73
8∗
∗∗
0.
17
5∗
∗∗
0.
26
3∗
∗∗
0.
23
3∗
∗∗
0.
16
7∗
∗∗
0.
23
5∗
∗∗
0.
25
3∗
∗∗
(1
1.
38
)
(1
6.
20
)
(1
4.
74
)
(1
0.
44
)
(1
4.
74
)
(1
6.
12
)
(1
1.
61
)
(1
6.
97
)
(1
4.
85
)
(1
1.
08
)
(1
4.
58
)
(1
6.
42
)
L
A
G
T
A
-0
.2
32
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
74
7∗
∗∗
(-
28
.7
2)
(-
33
.9
3)
L
E
V
R
A
G
0.
00
54
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
21
6∗
∗∗
(1
4.
26
)
(1
9.
30
)
N
P
L
0.
12
8∗
∗∗
0.
10
5∗
∗∗
(2
.5
8)
(5
.5
9)
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
0.
31
3∗
∗∗
0.
09
55
∗∗
∗
(3
4.
48
)
(3
5.
51
)
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(
3
)
-0
.0
01
36
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
46
6∗
∗∗
(-
6.
74
)
(-
6.
34
)
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
-0
.0
03
85
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
16
∗∗
∗
(-
14
.7
8)
(-
17
.9
9)
B
K
S
I
Z
E
-0
.0
59
7∗
∗∗
-0
.0
59
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
57
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
60
7∗
∗∗
-0
.0
57
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
59
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
8∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
37
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
35
8∗
∗∗
-0
.0
36
6∗
∗∗
(-
55
.0
0)
(-
53
.4
9)
(-
52
.6
4)
(-
55
.3
5)
(-
51
.6
3)
(-
53
.4
5)
(-
71
.3
1)
(-
69
.7
6)
(-
68
.3
1)
(-
72
.7
7)
(-
67
.4
3)
(-
69
.4
3)
C
E
-0
.9
74
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
59
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
94
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
74
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
93
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
47
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
73
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
65
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
79
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
73
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
76
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
65
∗∗
∗
(-
31
.8
6)
(-
29
.6
3)
(-
30
.7
8)
(-
31
.6
0)
(-
30
.6
6)
(-
29
.2
0)
(-
25
.9
0)
(-
24
.0
3)
(-
25
.2
1)
(-
25
.8
5)
(-
24
.9
8)
(-
23
.9
5)
R
O
A
1.
75
1∗
∗∗
2.
14
2∗
∗∗
1.
75
9∗
∗∗
1.
69
6∗
∗∗
1.
78
9∗
∗∗
2.
53
5∗
∗∗
0.
13
4∗
∗∗
0.
29
4∗
∗∗
0.
17
5∗
∗∗
0.
11
6∗
∗∗
0.
10
1∗
∗∗
0.
36
9∗
∗∗
(1
9.
33
)
(2
2.
31
)
(1
6.
50
)
(1
8.
66
)
(1
7.
99
)
(2
5.
31
)
(3
.9
4)
(8
.4
6)
(4
.6
4)
(3
.3
9)
(2
.7
5)
(1
0.
24
)
B
K
H
H
I
-0
.0
13
5∗
∗
-0
.0
18
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
19
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
15
5∗
∗
-0
.0
20
7∗
∗∗
-0
.0
17
8∗
∗∗
0.
01
21
∗∗
∗
0.
01
07
∗∗
∗
0.
00
96
7∗
∗∗
0.
01
14
∗∗
∗
0.
00
98
7∗
∗∗
0.
01
06
∗∗
∗
(-
2.
09
)
(-
2.
60
)
(-
2.
83
)
(-
2.
38
)
(-
2.
91
)
(-
2.
58
)
(6
.7
3)
(5
.6
9)
(5
.0
9)
(6
.3
2)
(5
.1
6)
(5
.6
6)
B
K
M
S
M
L
-0
.0
12
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
02
78
-0
.0
02
32
-0
.0
06
32
-0
.0
02
82
-0
.0
03
23
-0
.0
04
04
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
89
3
-0
.0
00
58
8
-0
.0
01
96
-0
.0
00
87
3
-0
.0
01
01
(-
3.
09
)
(-
0.
65
)
(-
0.
53
)
(-
1.
57
)
(-
0.
64
)
(-
0.
76
)
(-
2.
93
)
(-
0.
63
)
(-
0.
41
)
(-
1.
44
)
(-
0.
60
)
(-
0.
71
)
B
K
P
O
P
0.
00
13
3∗
∗
0.
00
11
7∗
0.
00
16
5∗
∗
0.
00
08
72
0.
00
16
6∗
∗
0.
00
11
8∗
0.
00
35
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
34
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
36
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
33
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
36
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
34
9∗
∗∗
(2
.0
3)
(1
.7
1)
(2
.3
7)
(1
.3
6)
(2
.3
4)
(1
.7
2)
(1
5.
89
)
(1
5.
02
)
(1
5.
53
)
(1
5.
53
)
(1
5.
43
)
(1
5.
21
)
B
K
P
D
N
S
-0
.0
10
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
09
52
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
09
90
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
08
47
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
09
65
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
09
63
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
57
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
09
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
25
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
80
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
01
19
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
16
∗∗
∗
(-
11
.4
0)
(-
9.
50
)
(-
9.
76
)
(-
8.
96
)
(-
9.
43
)
(-
9.
65
)
(-
5.
26
)
(-
3.
54
)
(-
3.
98
)
(-
2.
72
)
(-
3.
79
)
(-
3.
76
)
B
K
I
C
H
G
0.
11
6∗
∗∗
0.
08
89
∗∗
∗
0.
10
5∗
∗∗
0.
11
2∗
∗∗
0.
10
3∗
∗∗
0.
08
56
∗∗
∗
0.
01
74
∗∗
∗
0.
00
76
6∗
∗
0.
01
50
∗∗
∗
0.
01
58
∗∗
∗
0.
01
28
∗∗
∗
0.
00
80
0∗
∗
(1
1.
59
)
(8
.6
4)
(1
0.
05
)
(1
1.
08
)
(9
.9
0)
(8
.3
4)
(5
.4
8)
(2
.3
8)
(4
.5
8)
(4
.9
7)
(3
.9
3)
(2
.4
8)
M
B
H
C
0.
04
45
∗∗
∗
0.
04
44
∗∗
∗
0.
05
28
∗∗
∗
0.
04
44
∗∗
∗
0.
05
24
∗∗
∗
0.
04
28
∗∗
∗
0.
00
70
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
64
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
97
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
71
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
94
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
67
5∗
∗∗
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
255
T
ab
le
B
.2
9
–
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
vi
o
u
s
pa
ge
P
ar
am
et
er
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
5.
63
)
(1
5.
09
)
(1
7.
47
)
(1
5.
85
)
(1
6.
98
)
(1
4.
60
)
(7
.3
4)
(6
.5
5)
(9
.7
5)
(7
.6
2)
(9
.3
5)
(6
.8
5)
O
B
H
C
0.
02
76
∗∗
∗
0.
02
61
∗∗
∗
0.
03
26
∗∗
∗
0.
02
67
∗∗
∗
0.
03
26
∗∗
∗
0.
02
45
∗∗
∗
0.
00
74
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
65
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
91
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
73
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
89
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
66
7∗
∗∗
(1
1.
49
)
(1
0.
34
)
(1
2.
65
)
(1
1.
30
)
(1
2.
34
)
(9
.7
7)
(9
.8
8)
(8
.4
5)
(1
1.
51
)
(9
.8
4)
(1
1.
15
)
(8
.6
2)
M
R
G
0.
01
19
0.
02
45
0.
01
79
-0
.0
00
57
4
0.
01
58
0.
02
45
0.
03
69
0.
04
14
0.
03
89
0.
03
32
0.
03
78
0.
04
08
(0
.1
9)
(0
.3
9)
(0
.2
8)
(-
0.
01
)
(0
.2
5)
(0
.3
8)
(1
.3
4)
(1
.4
7)
(1
.4
0)
(1
.3
1)
(1
.3
7)
(1
.4
6)
A
C
Q
0.
00
38
6∗
0.
00
71
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
59
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
43
5∗
∗
0.
00
55
1∗
∗
0.
00
73
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
16
6∗
∗
0.
00
28
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
23
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
18
4∗
∗
0.
00
20
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
27
5∗
∗∗
(1
.8
1)
(3
.2
5)
(2
.7
0)
(2
.0
7)
(2
.4
9)
(3
.3
6)
(2
.2
0)
(3
.6
3)
(3
.0
3)
(2
.4
7)
(2
.6
6)
(3
.5
7)
C
on
st
an
t
2.
34
0∗
∗∗
2.
16
9∗
∗∗
2.
22
4∗
∗∗
2.
08
3∗
∗∗
2.
22
2∗
∗∗
2.
26
7∗
∗∗
1.
50
7∗
∗∗
1.
44
8∗
∗∗
1.
46
9∗
∗∗
1.
42
7∗
∗∗
1.
46
6∗
∗∗
1.
48
3∗
∗∗
(6
8.
82
)
(6
0.
05
)
(6
2.
14
)
(5
9.
73
)
(6
1.
81
)
(6
3.
90
)
(1
11
.8
0)
(1
03
.9
8)
(1
05
.8
3)
(1
08
.7
6)
(1
05
.6
8)
(1
07
.6
3)
T
im
e
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
50
03
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
81
64
11
50
03
11
81
64
.
256
B.2.2. Regressions with Data Winsorized at 2% and 98%
This section investigates whether and how results change if the data is winsorized at 2
and 98% instead of at 1 and 99%. This is so as to avoid outliers driving the results.
Findings are similar when the winsorization is instead chosen at 5 and 95% and hence
these additional results remain unreported.
The main analysis shows that for the parametrization of intermediation quality that
uses SFA and CATFAT , both OLNJLY and OPQFKN are significantly positively as-
sociated with intermediation quality. In the case of GFA, OPQFKN is also significantly
positive, while OLNJLY is significantly negative. OOAJLY is insignificant in all cases.
This last finding extends to the instance when intermediation quality is parametrized
by way of CATNONFAT . However, the negative coefficient on OLNJLY for GFA
intermediation quality turns significantly positive in this case.
Consider in contrast the results reported in Panel A of Table B.30. While here the
significantly negative coefficient on OLNJLY when GFA and CATFAT parametrize
intermediation quality holds, OOAJLY is now significantly positive throughout. This
provides strong confirmation for the results found in the main analysis. This confir-
mation is further strengthened by the findings on fragility. These are almost com-
pletely unchanged. Only the coefficient on NPL loses significance in the case where
CATFAT and SFA parametrize intermediation quality (Panel B1). The results when
CATNONFAT is used to obtain the intermediation quality measure are qualitatively
unaffected.
Finally, in the joint analysis of opacity and fragility, the main investigation shows
that OOAJLY is mostly insignificant, OLNJLY mostly significantly positive except
when using GFA to obtain intermediation quality, and OPQFKN is significantly posi-
tively associated with intermediation quality throughout. Even stronger results obtain
when CATNONFAT is used to obtain intermediation quality but OOAJLY remains
insignificant.
In contrast, Table B.30 shows that in the case of OLNJLY , as previously, when
GFA and CATFAT define the intermediation quality measure, the coefficients are
significantly negative (Panel C2). Also when LAGTA and CREDRSK parametrize
fragility, OLNJLY is significantly negative throughout (Panels C2, D2). However, it
is significantly positive in the remainder of cases. Moreover, Panels C1 and D1 show
that OOAJLY is positively and significantly associated with intermediation quality
throughout and that the same holds for OPQFKN (Panels C3 and D3).
This additional analysis once again confirms the main findings and shows that previ-
257
ously insignificant results running counter to the main interpretation are at least partly
driven by outliers.
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B.2.3. Analysis Using Fixed Effects Regression
This section reports results that obtain when, instead of Tobit regressions, estimations
are carried out using a linear regression model as has been done for example by Pi and
Timme (1993). Specifically, this section uses a regression including both time and bank
fixed effects and clusters standard errors by bank.
Results reported in Table B.31 are very much in line with the main analysis. Thus
Panel A reports findings on opacity. Results show that the initial finding of a positive
relation between opacity and intermediation quality persists in the majority of cases
and is particularly strong when CATNONFAT is used to parametrize intermediation
quality.
In addition, the signs and significances of the fragility proxies reported in Panel B1
and B2 are also mostly in line with the main findings. Thus, in Panel B1 only LEV RAG
and ZINDMA(3) lose their significance and ZINDpool switches sign when SFA is used
to obtain intermediation quality and NPL loses significance when GFA is used for this
purpose. All other variables maintain their sign and significance relative to the main
analysis. In Panel B2, when CATNONFAT is the basis for intermediation quality,
results are even stronger. Here only NPL and ZINDMA(3) lose significance when SFA
is used to obtain intermediation quality. Again, the remaining variables are as in the
main analysis.
Finally, Panels C1 and D1 show that if fixed effects regressions are used for the
purposes of estimation, OOAJLY , which is insignificant in the main analysis, be-
comes positive and significant. This specifically holds when intermediation quality
is parametrized by SFA. It also holds when intermediation quality is parametrized
by GFA and CATNONFAT . When intermediation quality is parametrized using
CATFAT , OOAJLY is positive and significant for the settings where fragility is prox-
ied by LEV RAG and ZINDpool. Moreover, the findings on fragility are also robust.
Thus only LEV RAG, ZINDMA(3) and ZINDpool lose significance when CATFAT and
SFA define intermediation quality. Only NPL loses significance in the GFA case. When
CATNONFAT is used to obtain intermediation quality, results are even stronger.
Here only ZINDMA(3) and NPL become insignificant for SFA. While the evidence on
OLNJLY is mixed, the majority of coefficients is significantly positive, the exception
being those in regressions also including LAGTA and CREDRSK when SFA is the
basis for intermediation quality. Additionally, when GFA and CATFAT are used to
obtain the frontier all coefficients on OLNJLY are significantly negative. However,
this changes when CATNONFAT is used to obtain intermediation quality. Here, with
261
the exception of the case where LAGTA proxies for fragility, all opacity coefficients are
significantly positive. As can be seen from Panels C3 and D3, OPQFKN is consistently
positive and significant, with the exception of some insignificant coefficients in the case
of GFA in Panel C3. Finally, the fragility results in Panels C2, C3, D2 and D3 are also
very much in line with the main analysis.
Therefore, overall, the evidence strongly suggests that resorting to a linear regression
analysis over a Tobit regression will leave the conclusions qualitatively unaffected.
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B.2.4. Analysis Using Truncated Regression
This robustness check re-estimates the analyses regarding opacity and fragility using
truncated regression as argued by Simar and Wilson (2007). Specifically, Table B.32
reports results on opacity for both the CATFAT and CATNONFAT measures of
liquidity creation and both SFA and GFA underlying intermediation quality.
Results in Panel A relate to opacity and are extremely similar to the main anal-
ysis not only in sign but also in the magnitude and significance of the coefficients.
Specifically, OOAJLY is mostly insignificant but positive. With the exception of the
case where intermediation quality is parametrized by GFA and CATFAT , OLNJLY is
also positive and significant. Finally, OPQFKN is consistently positive and significant.
This suggests that the theoretical issues raised by Simar and Wilson (2007) are of only
limited practical importance in the present analysis. The coefficients on the opacity
proxies once again confirm that the majority of the evidence supports the conclusion
that opacity is positively associated with intermediation quality.
Panels B1 and B2 report results for fragility alone. Here too, the main findings
find confirmation. Specifically, LAGTA, ZINDMA(3) and ZINDpool are significantly
negatively associated with intermediation quality. In addition, LEV RAG, NPL and
CREDRSK display a significantly positive relation. All of these point towards a posi-
tive association between fragility and intermediation quality. Thus, the results suggest
that fragility is beneficial for intermediation quality.
Finally, Panels C1-C3 and D1-D3 include both opacity and fragility for the CATFAT
and CATNONFAT measures respectively. Again, the main findings are confirmed
in sign, magnitude and significance of the coefficients. Thus the previously insignifi-
cant OOAJLY becomes positively significant in some cases when GFA is the efficiency
parametrization method (Panel C1, D1). The corresponding fragility coefficients point
in the same direction as in the main analysis. The majority of the coefficients on
OLNJLY are significantly positive (Panel C2, SFA; Panel D2). They tend to become
negative either when CREDRSK or LAGTA measure fragility or when GFA and the
CATFAT liquidity creation measure are used to parametrize intermediation quality.
The fragility results are qualitatively unaffected by the use of OLNJLY as opacity
proxy. Finally, when OPQFKN proxies for opacity this variable is significantly posi-
tive throughout (Panels C3, D3). In addition, the fragility results are also very similar
to the main analysis, with the exception of NPL which tends to lose significance when
SFA parametrizes intermediation quality. These findings support the original conclu-
sion, that both opacity and fragility are beneficial for intermediation quality.
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Hence, overall, I conclude that the choice of Tobit regressions over truncated regres-
sions has not materially affected the findings.
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B.2.5. Split Sample Analysis by Size
This section conducts the analysis separately for the first and fourth quartiles of the
bank population split by bank size in the spirit of Berger and Bouwman (2009). The
findings on opacity are somewhat stronger for small banks (Table B.33, Panel A)
than large banks (Panel B). For large banks, OOAJLY is insignificant except when
CATNONFAT and GFA parametrize intermediation quality (Panel D2). OLNJLY
is significantly negative for large banks in the CATFAT cases but significantly positive
in the CATNONFAT cases. Finally, OPQFKN is significantly positively associated
with intermediation quality in Panels A2, C2 and D2. Hence, overall, opacity is pos-
itively associated with intermediation quality in most cases in both subsamples and
hypothesis A3 is again rejected.
Table B.33.:
Intermediation Quality and Opacity, Split Sample Analysis by Bank Size.
Coefficients from Tobit regressions using fixed time effects and standard errors clustered by
bank. The dependent variable is intermediation quality. Stars report significance at the 0.1
(*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions
include the following control variables: the log of gross total assets, the return on assets,
cost efficiency parametrized by way of SFA, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs
to a multibank (onebank) holding company, dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was merged
(acquired) within the last three years, bank-level demographic variables calculated by weighting
the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income
growth and marketshare of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or
non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. OOAJLY and OLNJLY represent
opaque assets following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents opaque assets
following Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013) respectively. Monetary values are in 2005
US Dollars. Variables are winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles.
Panel A: SFA, CATFAT
Panel A1: 1st Quartile Panel A2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.745∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.0288 -0.127∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(14.69) (25.51) (13.52) (0.48) (-4.81) (6.81)
Panel B: GFA, CATFAT
Panel B1: 1st Quartile Panel B2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.0982∗∗∗ -0.00373∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0237 -0.130∗∗∗ -0.0663
(12.20) (-2.68) (12.39) (0.82) (-11.91) (-1.37)
Continued on next page
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Table B.33 – Continued from previous page
Panel C: SFA, CATNONFAT
Panel C1: 1st Quartile Panel C2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.465∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ -0.0424 0.0540∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(14.58) (18.85) (13.97) (-0.72) (2.19) (5.96)
Panel D: GFA, CATNONFAT
Panel D1: 1st Quartile Panel D2: 4th Quartile
OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN OOAJLY OLNJLY OPQFKN
0.0735∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0798∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(17.64) (24.88) (17.38) (4.15) (7.64) (7.43)
The analysis of fragility is reported in Table B.34 and shows that there are no major
differences between small and large banks when it comes to the influence of fragility on
intermediation quality. Only in the CATFAT and GFA case do LAGTA, LEV RAG
and ZINDpool lose significance. Otherwise coefficients are as in the main analysis for
both subsamples. Hence the bulk of the evidence still supports the rejection of A1.
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The final tables (B.35-B.37) show that the findings noted above are robust to the in-
clusion of both opacity and fragility into the analysis. First, when consideringOOAJLY ,
this variable is now mostly significantly positive for small banks. While this also holds
for large banks when intermediation quality is parametrized using CATNONFAT and
GFA (Panel D2), this variable is mostly insignificant but positive for large banks. This
mirrors the results obtained in Table B.33. Moreover, with the exception of NPL in the
small bank subsample when GFA and CATFAT determine intermediation quality, the
fragility results are strong and in line with the main analysis. The same holds for large
banks with the exception of Panel A2, where SFA and CATFAT parametrize the fron-
tier. Here, LAGTA, LEV RAG and ZINDpool lose significance while all other variables
maintain signs and significances. This is, at least in part, confirmed by the analysis of
OLNJLY . Here, results for small banks are generally as in the main analysis, that is
opacity and fragility are beneficial for intermediation quality. Concretely, OLNJLY
is significantly positively associated with intermediation quality, except when this is
parametrized with GFA and CATFAT . Similarly, for large banks, OLNJLY is neg-
atively associated with intermediation quality when CATFAT underlies the frontier.
In contrast, the relation is often significantly positive when CATNONFAT is used to
obtain the frontier. This again mirrors Table B.33. Moreover, there is no apparent
qualitative difference in the findings for fragility between small and large banks. Fi-
nally, results for OPQFKN are entirely as in the main analysis for both small and
large banks. This also holds qualitatively for the fragility results.
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.36.:Interm
ediation
Q
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pacity
and
Fragility,Split
Sam
ple
A
nalysis
by
B
ank
Size,O
pacity
B
ased
on
O
L
N
J
L
Y
.
C
oeffi
cients
from
T
obit
regressions
using
fixed
tim
e
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
T
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dependent
variable
is
interm
ediation
quality.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
A
llregressions
include
the
follow
ing
controlvariables:
the
log
of
gross
totalassets,the
return
on
assets,cost
effi
ciency
param
etrized
by
w
ay
ofSFA
,dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany,
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
w
as
m
erged
(acquired)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years,
bank-level
dem
ographic
variables
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahl
index),
population,
population
density,
incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arketshare
of
m
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
of
deposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
of
a
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total
deposits.
L
A
G
T
A
is
the
ratio
of
liquid
assets
over
total
assets.
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
is
the
quantity
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
over
total
assets.
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E
V
R
A
G
stands
for
leverage,
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P
L
stands
for
the
ratio
of
nonperform
ing
loans
over
total
loans,
Z
I
N
D
p
o
o
l
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
across
the
pooled
sam
ple
of
banks,
Z
I
N
D
M
A
(3
)
stands
for
the
Z-Score
m
easure
of
distance
to
default
w
here
the
variance
of
the
return
on
assets
has
been
com
puted
for
each
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individually
using
the
last
three
observations.
O
pacity
is
based
on
Jones,Lee
and
Y
eager
(2012).
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
V
ariables
are
w
insorized
at
the
0.01
and
0.99
percentiles.
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re
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nk
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is
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rm
ed
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ls
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re
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e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
,c
os
t
effi
ci
en
cy
pa
ra
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e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
,
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
m
er
ge
d
(a
cq
ui
re
d)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s,
ba
nk
-le
ve
l
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
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M
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no
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M
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pr
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en
ts
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a
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nk
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l
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ts
.
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ra
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ra
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e
Z-
Sc
or
e
m
ea
su
re
of
di
st
an
ce
to
de
fa
ul
t
w
he
re
th
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re
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at
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pa
ci
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F
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nn
er
y,
K
w
an
an
d
N
im
al
en
dr
an
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01
3)
.
M
on
et
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va
lu
es
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e
in
20
05
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d
at
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e
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0.
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pe
rc
en
ti
le
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B.2.6. Analysis Using Raw Liquidity Creation as Dependent Variable
Generally this thesis has chosen to approach the econometric challenge of investigating
the relation between bank intermediation and opacity and fragility by focusing on an
alternative measure of intermediation, specifically intermediation quality. In that sense
the issue is being approached from the perspective of the dependent variable. However
these challenges could also be approached from the perspective of the independent
variables. More specifically, to avoid regressions of an all encompassing balance sheet
measure of liquidity creation on balance sheet indicators of opacity and fragility, one
could construct alternative opacity and fragility measures from the available data.
This section summarizes the results that obtain when various indices are used to
proxy for opacity and fragility. Specifically, I use four ways of creating indices.
1. Principal Components Analysis: I consider the first (OPPCA1, FRAGPCA1)
or second components (OPPCA2, FRAGPCA2).
2. Simple sums across the opacity/fragility variables (OPSUM , FRAGSUM).
3. Ranks based on the sums across the opacity/fragility variables (OPRKS, FRAGRKS).
4. Average of the ranks obtained for each opacity/fragility variable in turn (OPRKA,
FRAGRKA).
In the case of PCA and opacity I obtain the following components and loadings. The
first component explains a sizeable 51% of the variation across OOAJLY , OLNJLY
and OPQFKN . Moreover it loads strongly positively on OOAJLY and OPQFKN
which is plausible. The low negative loading on OLNJLY is unexpected however. The
second component contributes another 33% to the picture. It loads positively on all
three opacity variables but focuses mostly on OLNJLY .
Table B.38.: Factor Loadings for Opacity Variables.
For opacity OOAJLY and OLNJLY represent opaque assets following Jones, Lee and
Yeager (2012) and OPQFKN represents opaque assets following Flannery, Kwan and
Nimalendran (2013) respectively.
Variable C1 C2 C3
OOAJLY 0.7052 0.0502 0.7072
OLNJLY -0.0750 0.9972 0.0040
OPQFKN 0.7050 0.0559 -0.7070
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In terms of fragility, the following components and loadings result. The first compo-
nent explains 35% of the common variation in LAGTA, LEV RAG, NPL, CREDRSK,
ZINDMA(3) and ZINDpool, while the second contributes another 21%. The loadings
on the first principal component are fully consistent with the interpretation as a risk
factor. Specifically, LAGTA and the Z-Scores load negatively while the other variables
load positively on this component, all consistent with greater fragility. The loadings
on the second component reverse sign for LEV RAG and ZINDpool and are hence
somewhat less consistent with a risk interpretation. However the positive loading on
ZINDpool may be due to the fact that for this variable volatility of the return on assets
is computed across all banks. Hence it is not exclusively indicative of bank-level risk.
Table B.39.: Factor Loadings for Fragility Variables.
For fragility LAGTA is the ratio of liquid assets over total assets. CREDRSK is the
quantity of risk weighted assets over total assets. LEV RAG stands for leverage, NPL
stands for the ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans, ZINDpool stands for the
Z-Score measure of distance to default where the variance of the return on assets has
been computed across the pooled sample of banks, ZINDMA(3) stands for the Z-Score
measure of distance to default where the variance of the return on assets has been
computed for each bank individually using the last three observations.
Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
LAGTA -0.4658 -0.3167 -0.0552 0.3894 0.7169 0.1188
LEV RAG 0.4410 -0.6219 0.0017 -0.0917 -0.0441 0.6391
NPL 0.3260 0.3284 -0.0025 0.8506 -0.1396 0.2071
CREDRSK 0.3871 0.5422 0.0217 -0.3183 0.6228 0.2577
ZINDMA(3) -0.0361 -0.0263 0.9982 0.0303 0.0249 0.0027
ZINDpool -0.5754 0.3323 -0.0034 -0.1196 -0.2757 0.6842
The other metrics require little separate discussion. It is worth mentioning, however,
that the simple summations that are the basis of the third index are carried out only
after standardizing all variables by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Additionally, the summation uses the negative of LAGTA and the Z-Scores
because these are negatively associated with fragility. Moreover, the first ranking-based
index is derived from the sum-based index. In addition, the ranks are subsequently
standardized to avoid numerical problems that may obtain for variables that exhibit
an extremely large range. The last ranking-based measure is computed by ranking
banks on each opacity or fragility measure and then taking the average rank within the
category. Thus, for example, in the case of opacity the ranks on OOAJLY , OLNJLY
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and OPQFKN are averaged to obtain the index. Similarly, the index value is then
standardized.
Using these indices the analysis can be carried out using CATFAT and CATNONFAT
as the dependent variables. It is adequate to use the quantities of liquidity creation di-
rectly as dependent variables when indices are constructed to proxy for opacity and
fragility since the indices are much less likely to be trivially associated with the quan-
tity of liquidity creation than the raw opacity and fragility proxies. The results reported
in Table B.40 were obtained from a linear panel data model with bank and year fixed
effects and data winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles. Winsorization at 0.02 and
0.98 percentiles does not affect results. The indices were computed after winsorizing.
The results in Panels A and B show both that opacity and fragility as proxied by the
various indices is individually significantly positively associated with both CATFAT
and CATNONFAT . This is independent of the mechanism used to construct the
opacity index.
Panels C1-C5 show that the individual results obtained for opacity and fragility
are also upheld when both opacity and fragility are included among the independent
variables. Overall this emphatically confirms that opacity and fragility are significantly
positively associated with bank intermediation.
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C. Appendix to Chapter 5
This appendix provides additional analyses and robustness checks for the results re-
ported in Chapter 5. Specifically, Section C.1 tabulates and discusses a variety of
different specifications of managerial ability, while Section C.2 tabulates the results of
various robustness checks.
C.1. Various Managerial Ability Specifications
This section replicates the main analysis for a number of different managerial ability
specifications in order to investigate the robustness of the main results. It is similar in
structure to the main analysis. Thus Section C.1.1 discusses various managerial ability
specifications and Section C.1.2 assesses their validity. Sections C.1.3 and C.1.4 report
the findings on the various hypothesis tests.
C.1.1. Deriving Managerial Ability
As in the main analysis, this section uses efficiency scores to obtain managerial ability by
way of purging bank-specific effects from the efficiency scores. Concretely, this section
runs the regression in Equation C.1 with r = 1 as the baseline case. r defines the set
of regressors used to obtain managerial ability from efficiency scores. It also augments
or changes the set of regressors as needed to obtain Specifications r = 2 and r = 3.
The various specifications are discussed below. This is done for four types of efficiency
(m), also discussed further below. In addition, each of these twelve specifications is run
both for pooled data with year fixed effects (s = p) and for yearly (s = y) data. The
residual, MArm,s, captures all effects that are specific to the manager and not the bank
for the parametrization.1
mi,t =α+ ξ
′zri,t +
15∑
t=1
θtdt +MA
r
m,s,i,t. (C.1)
1The set of subscripts rm,s should, for completeness, also be attached to the coefficients. However,
since there is little room for ambiguity and writing out these indices would clutter the notation,
this thesis suppresses these indices.
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Here, m represents the efficiency score used to obtain managerial ability, where m ∈
{τ−effDEA, τ−effSFA, τ−effGFA, pi−effDEA}. τ−eff denotes revenue efficiency, while
pi− eff represents profit efficiency. In terms of regressors, zri,t, the baseline specification
(r = 1) contains year fixed effects, θ, and the following controls: BKSIZE is the
log of gross total assets, NUMEMP is the log of the number of full time equivalent
employees in thousands, AGE is the log of the age of the bank in years, LEV RAG
represents leverage and FCF is an indicator variable that takes the value one when
cash flow for the year is positive.
It has been noted in the empirical banking literature (Berger and Bouwman, 2009),
that the status of a commercial bank as a member of a bank holding company is sig-
nificant, for example because this status affords the member bank greater access to
resources. The individual bank manager is unlikely to be able to influence the BHC
membership status, certainly not in the short run. Moreover, managers whose banks are
part of a BHC are likely to be subject to strategic guidelines from the holding company.
Therefore this section argues that BHC membership is an important bank-specific at-
tribute, unique to the banking industry, and therefore should be included in the model.
Hence Specification r = 2 augments the regression by adding MBHC and OBHC to
z. These are dummy variables that take the value 1 if, during the last three years,
the bank is a multi-bank (one-bank)-holding company member respectively. Addition-
ally, the selection of covariates in Specification r = 1, suggested by Cantrell (2013)
and Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), may itself invite skepticism. Thus Demerjian,
Lev and McVay (2012) argue that the Tobit regressions are intended to purge the effi-
ciency scores of influences that are due to the bank and not to the manager. However,
LEV RAG, NUMEMP and BKSIZE are certainly influenced by managerial decision
making both in the short and the long term. For this reason Specification r = 3 omits
these variables and replaces them with a different set of regressors. These are less likely
to be subject to managerial discretion, at least in the short term, and thus more ap-
propriately align with the Demerjian, Lev and McVay-methodology. Specifically, this
specification includes the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (BKHHI), the log
bank-level population (BKPOP ), population density (BKPDNS), percent income
growth rates (BKICHG) as well as the market share of medium and large banks in
the area (BKMSML).
In the main analysis the regression to obtain managerial ability used DEA-based
profit efficiency (pi− effDEA) and the set of regressors suggested by Demerjian, Lev and
McVay (2012) and Cantrell (2013). The underlying assumption of this approach is that
the managerial objective is, in fact, profit maximization. The main analysis follows this
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approach because, intuitively, profit maximization seems to be the natural managerial
objective. However this is not the kind of MA measure that has been investigated
in the prior literature and has been shown to subsume information otherwise inherent
in manager fixed effects, for instance. Therefore it is necessary to recognize that the
ultimate managerial objective may, for example, be revenue maximization as postulated
by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). Hence, as a further robustness check, this section
also examines results obtained from various revenue efficiency measures. Specifically, I
consider revenue efficiency based on SFA, DEA and GFA.
Finally, the Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012)-methodology advocates a pooled To-
bit regression approach (s = p). The main analysis estimates MA based on each yearly
subsample (s = y) in order to avoid look-ahead bias. Therefore this Section repli-
cates the main analysis with pooled sample regressions. Overall, this gives twenty four
different specifications of managerial ability, MArm,s.
Table C.1 reports an example of the yearly regression (s = y). Specifically, it re-
ports regression results for the year 2004 for each of the twelve combinations between
dependent variable, m, and set of regressors, r. Results for pooled regressions are also
reported in Table C.2.
First, I discuss the findings for the yearly regressions. Table C.1 is organized in
four panels, each devoted to a particular efficiency score as the basis for managerial
ability. Specifically, Panel A is based on revenue efficiency parametrized by way of
DEA (τ − effDEA), Panel B uses SFA (τ − effSFA) and Panel C uses GFA (τ − effGFA).
Finally, Panel D uses profit efficiency obtained from DEA as its efficiency specification
(pi− effDEA) and replicates the results given in the main analysis. Each panel has three
columns, which represent different sets of regressors. Specification 1 uses the original
regressors from Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) and Cantrell (2013), Specification
2 adds bank holding company status variables and Specification 3 removes potentially
unsuitable regressors and replaces them by bank demographic variables as discussed
above. Results show similar coefficients in Specifications 1 and 2 across Panels A, B and
D as well as for Specification 3 across Panels A, C and D. Overall, more efficient banks
tend to be older (AGE), bigger (BKSIZE) more highly leveraged (LEV RAG) and
generate more cash flow (FCF ) with smaller workforce (NUMEMP ). Among the bank
demographic variables substantial similarities obtain only for BKPOP , BKMSML
and BKPDNS, which generally indicate that more efficient banks are active in less
populous markets with fewer medium and large banks. It is not surprising that the use
of different efficiency scores as the dependent variable results in different coefficients
on the regressors since different efficiency parametrization methods will tend to pick
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up similar yet distinct information sets (Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998).
Therefore different combinations of the regressors are required to purge each of these
scores of bank-specific influences.
Although somewhat more heterogeneous, the pooled Tobit regressions confirm many
of the observations made above. Thus, size is still mostly positively associated with
efficiency, albeit insignificantly in Panel A (BKSIZE). Age, leverage and free cash
flow are still mostly positively associated with efficiency (AGE, LEV RAG, FCF ).
The bank demographic variables indicate that concentration of local bank markets
(BKHHI), presence of medium and large banks (BKMSML) and market population
(BKPOP , BKPDNS) are all mostly negatively related to bank efficiency. Overall,
similarities notwithstanding some differences between the regression coefficients exist.
This is natural, given the different dependent variables used to obtain them. These
differences underpin the value of using various MA specifications as a robustness check.
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C.1.2. Validation of Managerial Ability
To validate the various parametrizations of MA and to gain first insight into the relations
between MA and bank behavior, this section investigates the correlations that obtain
between the various parametrizations of managerial ability and indicators of bank value
creation and risk. As in the main analysis, ROA and ROE as well as the ratio of EVA
over total assets (SHV R) are the value indicators. The Z-Score (ZIND) and the
standard deviation of ROA (SDROA), the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets
(CREDRSK), the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL), the tier 1 ratio
(T1R) and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (LAGTA) indicate risk-taking. Table
C.3 displays the results.
First, considering the value and profitability indicators, results show a remarkably
robust picture. Regardless of the specification used, a highly significant and positive
association between MA and all three value/profitability indicators obtains. The only
exception is the specification that uses generalized frontier analysis and the third set
of regressors to obtain managerial ability for both the yearly and pooled approach
(MA3τ−effGFA,y and MA
3
τ−effGFA,p). Regression results in Tables C.1 and C.2 indicated
that GFA seems to be picking up somewhat different information than SFA and DEA,
so that different correlations are not entirely surprising. Furthermore, reassuringly,
the second stage regressions using regressor sets 1 and 2 deliver managerial ability
scores that are consistent across methods (DEA, SFA and GFA). Overall, as expected,
managerial ability appears to promote bank profitability respectively value creation.
Second, for the indicators of risk, the overall picture suggests that more ably man-
aged banks are also more risky. Thus, for CREDRSK, all parametrizations of MA
indicate that more ably managed banks hold greater quantities of risk weighted assets
per unit of assets. In addition, the majority of MA specifications indicates that more
ably managed banks have greater quantities of nonperforming loans per unit of loans
(NPL) on the books, which suggests that they are more aggressive and thus possibly
more risky. Furthermore, the results indicate that more ably managed banks are more
aggressively capitalized; the tier 1 ratio T1R is significantly negatively associated with
MA. This holds with the exception of the MA parametrization that relies on DEA and
revenue efficiency and regressor sets 1 and 2 (MA1,2τ−effDEA) as well as the GFA revenue
efficiency with regressor set 3 (MA3τ−effGFA). Additionally and consistently across MA
parametrizations, more ably managed banks appear to hold lower levels of liquid assets
(LAGTA). Finally, most parametrizations indicate, albeit insignificantly, that more
able management signals a greater distance to default as proxied by Z-Score and lower
287
variation of ROA (ZIND and SDROA respectively). These variables, as in the main
analysis, suggest that more ably managed banks are less risky. Hence a multivariate
analysis is required to clarify this question.
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Since univariate correlations ignore extraneous influences on profitability, I also con-
duct multivariate regression analyses to further validate the MA proxies. Specifically,
as in the main analysis, I regress ROA and ROE on managerial ability along with the
first order lag of MA and control variables. This specification follows:
PMj,i,t = α+
1∑
k=0
βk+1MA
r
m,s,i,t−k + ξ
′zi,t +
14∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t, (C.2)
where PMj ∈ {ROA,ROE} signifies the jth performance measure. MArm,s denotes
the managerial ability measure, which has been computed over sample s (pooled vs
yearly), using the set of regressors r = 1, . . . , 3 based on method m, with m ∈ {τ −
effDEA, τ − effSFA, τ − effGFA, pi − effDEA}. dt are year dummies and z is a vector
containing control variables. The control variables include the log of gross total assets
to capture scale effects, cost efficiency parametrized by SFA as well as bank holding
company status indicators and bank demographic variables as defined above. Table
C.4 displays the results. These are organized in panels according to the efficiency
parametrization method used to obtain managerial ability. Each panel, A-D, uses a
different efficiency metric as basis for MA. Then each subpanel, A1, A2 etc. conducts
the first stage Tobit regressions either on a pooled sample (s = p) or on a yearly sample
(s = y). Finally, each set of two columns represents one of the three choices of first stage
regressors, r = 1, . . . , 3. For brevity, I report only the coefficients on MA and lagged
MA. From Panel A it becomes apparent that the DEA revenue efficiency-based measure
displays positive correlations with all performance metrics at lag 1. Contemporaneous
instances are usually negative. Panel B indicates that SFA-based MA carries strong
explanatory power in terms of performance, both contemporaneously and lagged. Panel
C shows that the yearly Tobit regressions provide a GFA-based MA measure that is
also positively and significantly associated with profitability, as long as the first stage
Tobit regressors are either r = 1 or r = 2. For r = 3 and the pooled Tobit regressions,
contemporaneous MA becomes significantly negative and insignificant at lag 1. Finally,
Panel D shows that MA derived from DEA profit efficiency has the expected positive
and significant association with profitability regardless of sample (s = y, p) or first stage
regressors (r = 1, . . . , 3). Overall, this evidence confirms that the MA measures behave
as expected with respect to profitability, which validates the MA specifications.
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C.1.3. Managerial Ability, Liquidity Creation and Risk-Taking
This section assesses the robustness of the main findings regarding liquidity creation,
risk and managerial ability. Specifically, it investigates the impact of different manage-
rial ability parametrizations on the outcome of the hypothesis tests. It also considers
the impact that the choice of liquidity creation metric has on the findings.
C.1.3.1. Summary Statistics
Table C.5 reports summary statistics for the variables that play a role in the robustness
checks and additional analyses. Thus it considers all the various parametrizations of
managerial ability as well as two additional measures of liquidity creation: Berger and
Bouwman’s (2009) CATNONFAT measure which excludes off-balance-sheet-items and
Deep and Schaefer’s (2004) LTG, the liquidity transformation gap, which is defined as
the difference between short term assets and short term liabilities scaled by total assets.
Interestingly, the table shows that there is some substantial variation in the mea-
sures of managerial ability. Thus, for example, SFA and GFA-based MA for medium
banks is lower than for other banks, while DEA revenue and profit efficiency-based
MA mostly points to higher managerial ability for these banks. Furthermore, DEA
suggests that small banks have low managerial ability and medium and large banks
have greater managerial ability. Interestingly, average MA based on DEA profit effi-
ciency is systematically larger than the other MA parametrizations although still close
to zero. This suggests that profit efficiency may be harder to explain by the first
stage Tobit regressions than the other efficiency measures. The additional liquidity
creation indicators show, in keeping with Berger and Bouwman (2009), that includ-
ing off-balance-sheet items yields substantially greater liquidity creation on average
(CATFAT > CATNONFAT ). Also, the liquidity transformation gap of Deep and
Schaefer (2004), LTG, confirms that large banks tend to produce more liquidity per
unit of assets. However, this measure understandably indicates a lower total level of
liquidity creation than that of Berger and Bouwman (2009) since it is based on a more
narrow conception of how liquidity is created.
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C.1.3.2. Managerial Ability and Liquidity Creation
As in the main analysis, the first step is concerned with the relation that holds between
liquidity creation and managerial ability, which is encapsulated in hypothesis A1. If
this hypothesis holds, one would expect managerial ability to exert a positive influence
on liquidity creation. Again this analysis uses the following specification:
LCj,i,t
GTAi,t
= α+ β1MA
r
m,s,i,t−1 + ξ
′zi,t +
14∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t. (C.3)
LC is a liquidity creation measure with LC ∈ {CATFAT,CATNONFAT,LTG} in-
dexed by j and GTA representing gross total assets. All controls and other regressors
are as previously defined.
First, Tables C.6-C.9 report the results for the CATFAT and CATNONFAT mea-
sures of liquidity creation. The results for CATFAT show that the findings are quite
robust to a) the parametrization of efficiency, b) choice of first stage regressors and c)
pooled vs. yearly Tobit regressions. Specifically for this set of regressors (r = 1), DEA
revenue efficiency-based MA confirms the positive relation between MA and CATFAT
liquidity creation for small banks and the full sample. This last result holds regardless of
first stage regressors (Panel A), which suggests robustness to the efficiency parametriza-
tion method. Furthermore, the results in Panel B show that, given that SFA is used
to obtain revenue efficiency, the findings do not depend on the choice of first stage re-
gressors; coefficients on managerial ability are significantly positive for small and large
banks as well as the full sample. In addition, Panel D shows that, when DEA-based
profit efficiency is used to parametrize MA as in the main analysis, a robust and signif-
icantly positive relation between MA and CATFAT obtains for medium sized banks.
Coefficients in Panel C are insignificant. The only coefficients that speak against this
reading of the results are the small bank and full sample coefficients for Panel D with
r = 3. Hence the bulk of the evidence confirms the findings in the main analysis.
Moreover, these findings are emphatically supported by results obtained for a pooled
Tobit regression approach, which is reported in Table C.7. This provides an additional
confirmation of the previous findings.
Next, I consider how results change, if off-balance-sheet items are omitted from the
definition of liquidity creation by investigating the CATNONFAT measure. Results
are tabulated in Tables C.8-C.9. Let the base case again be Panel D, r = 1 in Ta-
ble C.8. As in the main analysis using CATFAT the coefficients indicate that more
ably managed banks create greater liquidity. This result is significant for small banks.
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When SFA revenue efficiency is used to parametrize MA results also support the main
analysis Concretely, small and large banks as well as the full sample report significant
coefficients. This holds regardless of regressors (r = 1, . . . , 3 within Panel B). Further-
more, Panel A again shows supporting evidence from DEA revenue efficiency, which is
qualitatively similar to the CATFAT case. In addition, GFA also supports the find-
ings with significantly positive coefficients for small banks and the full sample (Panel
C, r = 1, . . . , 3). What is more, none of these findings are driven by running yearly
Tobit regressions vis-á-vis pooled ones as can be seen from Table C.9, which reaffirms
the earlier findings.
The third step is to consider how results change if the Berger and Bouwman method
for defining liquidity creation is abandoned all together. To this end I analyze results
obtained using the liquidity transformation gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004) scaled by
total assets as dependent variable. These results are reported in Tables C.10-C.11.
Again, consider as the base case Table C.10, Panel D, r = 1. This provides very strong
support for the main analysis. Specifically, MA is strongly significantly positively related
to liquidity creation regardless of first stage regressors (r = 1, . . . , 3) for small and
medium banks and the full sample. Results for SFA-based revenue efficiency in panel
B are somewhat weaker than for CATFAT and CATNONFAT but still qualitatively
surprisingly similar. Concretely, all coefficients on MA are positive and, for small banks
and the pooled sample, also significant. This finding is not driven by the selection
of first stage regressors (Panel B, r = 1, . . . , 3). Nor is this finding driven by the
efficiency parametrization method used to obtain managerial ability. Thus, DEA and
GFA revenue efficiency both confirm the positive and frequently significant impact
that MA has on liquidity creation as proxied by LTG (Panels A, C). Interestingly,
DEA revenue efficiency-based MA is more sensitive to effects that obtain for medium
banks, while GFA seems to be picking up more large bank effects. Again, results are
independent of the set of first stage regressors. Finally, these results prove robust to
the use of pooled or yearly Tobit regressions in obtaining MA, as Table C.11 indicates.
The only change is that the GFA-based gain additional significance for large banks.
To sum up, the analysis of various specifications of liquidity creation and managerial
ability shows that the relation between these two facets of bank behavior is robustly
and significantly positive during normal times. This provides strong support for the
acceptance of A1, as advocated in the main analysis.
298
T
ab
le
C
.8
.:
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
Li
qu
id
it
y
C
re
at
io
n
an
d
M
an
ag
er
ia
lA
bi
lit
y,
s
=
y
.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
om
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
B
er
ge
r
an
d
B
ou
w
m
an
’s
(2
00
9)
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
m
ea
su
re
of
liq
ui
di
ty
cr
ea
ti
on
sc
al
ed
by
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
on
la
gg
ed
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
(M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
)
an
d
co
nt
ro
ls
w
it
h
ba
nk
an
d
ti
m
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
C
on
tr
ol
s
ar
e
th
re
e
ye
ar
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
es
an
d
ar
e
su
pp
re
ss
ed
.
T
he
y
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
su
m
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
sc
al
ed
by
gr
os
s
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
(S
D
R
O
A
)
an
d
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
(Z
I
N
D
)
ca
pt
ur
e
ri
sk
.
T
he
la
st
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
or
th
og
on
al
iz
ed
ag
ai
ns
t
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
al
so
in
cl
ud
e
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
fa
ct
or
s.
T
he
se
ar
e
B
K
H
H
I
,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
an
d
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
e
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
ld
ep
os
it
s.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
in
vo
lv
ed
in
m
er
ge
rs
(a
cq
ui
si
ti
on
s)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
M
A
r m
,s
re
pr
es
en
ts
m
an
ag
er
ia
la
bi
lit
y
as
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
llo
w
in
g
th
e
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
of
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
us
in
g
m
et
ho
d
m
fo
r
effi
ci
en
cy
as
w
el
la
s
sa
m
pl
e
s
(p
oo
le
d,
p
or
ye
ar
ly
y
)
an
d
re
gr
es
so
r
se
t
r
fo
r
th
e
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
1
us
es
re
gr
es
so
rs
fo
llo
w
in
g
C
an
tr
el
l(
20
13
)
an
d
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
,S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
r
=
2
ad
ds
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
st
at
us
va
ri
ab
le
s,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
3
av
oi
ds
po
te
nt
ia
lly
en
do
ge
no
us
va
ri
ab
le
s
al
lt
og
et
he
r
an
d
su
bs
ti
tu
te
s
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
m
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
effi
ci
en
cy
sc
or
e
us
ed
as
a
ba
si
s
fo
r
m
an
ag
er
ia
la
bi
lit
y.
H
er
e
τ
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
re
ve
nu
e
effi
ci
en
cy
,w
hi
le
pi
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
pr
ofi
t
effi
ci
en
cy
.
D
E
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
da
ta
en
ve
lo
pm
en
t
an
al
ys
is
,
SF
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
st
oc
ha
st
ic
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
an
d
G
FA
st
an
ds
fo
r
ge
ne
ra
liz
ed
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
P
an
el
A
:m
=
τ
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
03
62
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
10
3
-0
.0
03
20
0.
02
86
∗∗
∗
0.
03
61
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
11
1
-0
.0
00
73
9
0.
02
86
∗∗
∗
0.
03
64
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
07
47
0.
00
04
24
0.
03
14
∗∗
∗
(6
.4
3)
(-
0.
41
)
(-
0.
11
)
(5
.2
0)
(6
.3
9)
(-
0.
43
)
(-
0.
02
)
(5
.1
8)
(6
.9
4)
(-
0.
30
)
(0
.0
1)
(6
.1
0)
P
an
el
B
:m
=
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
06
31
∗∗
∗
0.
00
26
7
0.
01
71
∗
0.
05
14
∗∗
∗
0.
06
40
∗∗
∗
0.
00
29
2
0.
01
73
∗
0.
05
21
∗∗
∗
0.
06
75
∗∗
∗
0.
00
47
6
0.
01
67
∗
0.
05
39
∗∗
∗
(1
2.
52
)
(0
.2
9)
(1
.8
7)
(1
2.
34
)
(1
2.
73
)
(0
.3
2)
(1
.9
0)
(1
2.
56
)
(1
3.
84
)
(0
.5
4)
(1
.9
4)
(1
3.
30
)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
06
68
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
15
9
0.
01
44
0.
04
69
∗∗
∗
0.
06
66
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
16
2
0.
01
47
0.
04
69
∗∗
∗
0.
05
03
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
14
6
0.
01
62
0.
04
56
∗∗
∗
(5
.8
7)
(-
1.
04
)
(0
.6
6)
(5
.4
2)
(5
.8
4)
(-
1.
06
)
(0
.6
8)
(5
.4
1)
(5
.0
4)
(-
0.
99
)
(0
.8
3)
(6
.0
2)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
01
39
∗∗
0.
02
49
-0
.0
51
4
0.
00
83
1
0.
01
44
∗∗
0.
02
36
-0
.0
48
8
0.
00
87
3
-0
.0
05
90
0.
03
25
-0
.0
53
5∗
-0
.0
09
19
(2
.2
8)
(1
.0
7)
(-
1.
58
)
(1
.3
6)
(2
.3
6)
(1
.0
1)
(-
1.
51
)
(1
.4
3)
(-
1.
02
)
(1
.5
2)
(-
1.
70
)
(-
1.
58
)
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T
able
C
.9.:
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
Liquidity
C
reation
and
M
anagerialA
bility,
s
=
p.
T
his
table
reports
results
from
fixed
effects
regressions
of
B
erger
and
B
ouw
m
an’s
(2009)
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
m
easure
of
liquidity
creation
scaled
by
total
assets
on
lagged
m
anagerial
ability
(M
A
rm
,s
,t−
1 )
and
controls
w
ith
bank
and
tim
e
fixed
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
C
ontrols
are
three
year
m
oving
averages
and
are
suppressed.
T
hey
include
the
log
of
gross
total
assets
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
sum
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
scaled
by
gross
total
assets
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
the
standard
deviation
of
return
on
assets
(S
D
R
O
A
)
and
the
Z-Score
(Z
I
N
D
)
capture
risk.
T
he
last
tw
o
variables
are
orthogonalized
against
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
regressions
also
include
bank
dem
ographic
factors.
T
hese
are
B
K
H
H
I,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
and
B
K
M
S
M
L
and
are
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahl
index),
population,
population
density,
incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arket
share
of
m
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
of
deposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
ofa
bank’s
totaldeposits.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
w
as
involved
in
m
ergers
(acquisitions)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years.
M
A
rm
,s
represents
m
anagerialability
as
obtained
follow
ing
the
m
ethodology
ofD
em
erjian,Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012)
using
m
ethod
m
for
effi
ciency
as
w
ellas
sam
ple
s
(pooled,
p
or
yearly
y)
and
regressor
set
r
for
the
T
obit
regressions.
Specification
r
=
1
uses
regressors
follow
ing
C
antrell(2013)
and
D
em
erjian,Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012),Specification
r
=
2
adds
the
holding
com
pany
status
variables,
Specification
r
=
3
avoids
potentially
endogenous
variables
alltogether
and
substitutes
bank
dem
ographic
variables.
m
indicates
the
effi
ciency
score
used
as
a
basis
for
m
anagerialability.
H
ere
τ−
eff
represents
revenue
effi
ciency,w
hile
pi−
eff
represents
profit
effi
ciency.
D
E
A
stands
for
data
envelopm
ent
analysis,
SFA
stands
for
stochastic
frontier
analysis
and
G
FA
stands
for
generalized
frontier
analysis.
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
P
an
el
A
:m
=
τ
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,t−
1
0.0275 ∗∗∗
-0.0133
0.00514
0.0243 ∗∗∗
0.0269 ∗∗∗
-0.0137
0.00512
0.0236 ∗∗∗
0.0331 ∗∗∗
-0.00916
0.00163
0.0293 ∗∗∗
(5.15)
(-0.54)
(0.18)
(4.66)
(5.04)
(-0.55)
(0.18)
(4.54)
(6.33)
(-0.39)
(0.06)
(5.73)
P
an
el
B
:m
=
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,t−
1
0.0630 ∗∗∗
0.00111
0.0163 ∗
0.0506 ∗∗∗
0.0641 ∗∗∗
0.00133
0.0165 ∗
0.0515 ∗∗∗
0.0687 ∗∗∗
0.00352
0.0161 ∗
0.0538 ∗∗∗
(12.58)
(0.12)
(1.78)
(12.09)
(12.83)
(0.14)
(1.81)
(12.35)
(13.89)
(0.39)
(1.88)
(13.10)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,t−
1
0.0242 ∗∗
-0.0139
0.0223
0.0353 ∗∗∗
0.0247 ∗∗
-0.0139
0.0221
0.0355 ∗∗∗
0.0291 ∗∗∗
-0.0125
0.0169
0.0370 ∗∗∗
(2.45)
(-0.94)
(1.06)
(4.75)
(2.50)
(-0.94)
(1.06)
(4.79)
(2.96)
(-0.84)
(0.86)
(5.04)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,t−
1
0.0109 ∗
0.0283
-0.0519
0.00842
0.0107 ∗
0.0273
-0.0506
0.00810
-0.00501
0.0293
-0.0541 ∗
-0.00719
(1.85)
(1.22)
(-1.58)
(1.42)
(1.81)
(1.18)
(-1.53)
(1.37)
(-0.88)
(1.38)
(-1.72)
(-1.26)
300
T
ab
le
C
.1
0.
:L
T
G
Li
qu
id
it
y
C
re
at
io
n
an
d
M
an
ag
er
ia
lA
bi
lit
y,
s
=
y
.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
om
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
D
ee
p
an
d
Sc
ha
ef
er
’s
(2
00
4)
liq
ui
di
ty
tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n
ga
p
(L
T
G
)
m
ea
su
re
of
liq
ui
di
ty
cr
ea
ti
on
sc
al
ed
by
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
on
la
gg
ed
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
(M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
)
an
d
co
nt
ro
ls
w
it
h
ba
nk
an
d
ti
m
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
C
on
tr
ol
s
ar
e
th
re
e
ye
ar
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
es
an
d
ar
e
su
pp
re
ss
ed
.
T
he
y
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
su
m
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
sc
al
ed
by
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
(S
D
R
O
A
)
an
d
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
(Z
I
N
D
)
ca
pt
ur
e
ri
sk
.
T
he
la
st
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
or
th
og
on
al
iz
ed
ag
ai
ns
t
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
al
so
in
cl
ud
e
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
fa
ct
or
s.
T
he
se
ar
e
B
K
H
H
I
,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
an
d
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
e
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
ld
ep
os
it
s.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
in
vo
lv
ed
in
m
er
ge
rs
(a
cq
ui
si
ti
on
s)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
M
A
r m
,s
re
pr
es
en
ts
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
as
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
llo
w
in
g
th
e
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
of
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
us
in
g
m
et
ho
d
m
fo
r
effi
ci
en
cy
as
w
el
la
s
sa
m
pl
e
s
(p
oo
le
d,
p
or
ye
ar
ly
y
)
an
d
re
gr
es
so
r
se
t
r
fo
r
th
e
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
1
us
es
re
gr
es
so
rs
fo
llo
w
in
g
C
an
tr
el
l
(2
01
3)
an
d
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
2
ad
ds
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
st
at
us
va
ri
ab
le
s,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
3
av
oi
ds
po
te
nt
ia
lly
en
do
ge
no
us
va
ri
ab
le
s
al
lt
og
et
he
r
an
d
su
bs
ti
tu
te
s
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
m
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
effi
ci
en
cy
sc
or
e
us
ed
as
a
ba
si
s
fo
r
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
.
H
er
e
τ
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
re
ve
nu
e
effi
ci
en
cy
,w
hi
le
pi
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
pr
ofi
t
effi
ci
en
cy
.
D
E
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
da
ta
en
ve
lo
pm
en
t
an
al
ys
is
,S
FA
st
an
ds
fo
r
st
oc
ha
st
ic
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
an
d
G
FA
st
an
ds
fo
r
ge
ne
ra
liz
ed
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
P
an
el
A
:m
=
τ
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
17
4∗
∗∗
0.
09
95
∗∗
∗
0.
05
49
0.
15
7∗
∗∗
0.
17
4∗
∗∗
0.
09
93
∗∗
∗
0.
05
53
0.
15
7∗
∗∗
0.
15
8∗
∗∗
0.
09
52
∗∗
∗
0.
04
60
0.
14
9∗
∗∗
(2
2.
29
)
(2
.9
3)
(1
.1
9)
(1
9.
97
)
(2
2.
32
)
(2
.8
9)
(1
.1
9)
(1
9.
99
)
(2
1.
52
)
(2
.7
6)
(0
.9
7)
(2
0.
23
)
P
an
el
B
:m
=
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
07
52
∗∗
∗
0.
01
41
0.
01
64
0.
06
43
∗∗
∗
0.
07
73
∗∗
∗
0.
01
43
0.
01
72
0.
06
58
∗∗
∗
0.
07
67
∗∗
∗
0.
01
56
0.
01
72
0.
06
31
∗∗
∗
(1
0.
67
)
(0
.9
4)
(1
.1
0)
(1
0.
59
)
(1
0.
99
)
(0
.9
5)
(1
.1
5)
(1
0.
86
)
(1
1.
18
)
(1
.0
5)
(1
.2
1)
(1
0.
61
)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
11
9∗
∗∗
0.
01
21
0.
04
44
0.
08
02
∗∗
∗
0.
12
1∗
∗∗
0.
01
18
0.
04
43
0.
08
10
∗∗
∗
0.
12
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
94
1
0.
05
22
∗
0.
10
5∗
∗∗
(7
.1
2)
(0
.4
5)
(1
.4
6)
(6
.0
0)
(7
.1
8)
(0
.4
4)
(1
.4
5)
(6
.0
5)
(8
.6
3)
(0
.3
6)
(1
.9
4)
(9
.3
4)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,t
−
1
0.
08
45
∗∗
∗
0.
12
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
32
6
0.
07
29
∗∗
∗
0.
08
64
∗∗
∗
0.
12
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
38
2
0.
07
48
∗∗
∗
0.
03
36
∗∗
∗
0.
12
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
23
6
0.
02
64
∗∗
∗
(1
0.
21
)
(4
.3
7)
(0
.0
8)
(8
.6
7)
(1
0.
44
)
(4
.2
9)
(0
.0
9)
(8
.9
2)
(4
.1
6)
(3
.8
6)
(-
0.
56
)
(3
.2
4)
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T
able
C
.11.:
L
T
G
Liquidity
C
reation
and
M
anagerialA
bility,
s
=
p.
T
his
table
reports
results
from
fixed
effects
regressions
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C.1.3.3. Managerial Ability and Bank Risk-Taking
Following the logic of the main analysis, the next step is to investigate the robustness
of findings regarding bank risk and managerial ability as formalized in hypothesis A2.
This is accomplished by replicating the risk regressions for all permutations of the MA
specification. If the main results hold, one would expect positive associations between
MA and NPL and negative associations between MA and T1R and LAGTA. To test
this conjecture, this section runs regressions of the form
KRIk,i,t = α+ β1MA
r
m,s,i,t−1 + ξ
′zi,t +
14∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t. (C.4)
Here KRIk represents the key risk indicator with k ∈ {NPL, T1R,LAGTA}. All
other regressors and controls are as previously defined. Results are reported in Tables
C.12-C.17.
Table C.12, Panel D for r = 1 replicates the basic findings regarding nonperforming
loans (NPL). Thus the main analysis tentatively suggests that more able managers
favor a less risky bank strategy, which induces a lower level of nonperforming loans.
Panel D, r = 1, . . . , 3 shows that this result does not depend on the set of regressors
used to obtain MA. Evidence from the other methods (Panels A-C) is limited. However
it does seem that the majority of the evidence indicates that more able managers prefer
greater levels of nonperforming loans and thus more risky bank operations. Specifically,
the results for GFA confirm this finding for small banks and the full sample (Panel C).
Furthermore, DEA and SFA-revenue efficiency also provide support for this conclusion
in Panels A and B. This would be consistent with the fact that the other risk indicators
(LAGTA and T1R) indicate that more able managers prefer to take on greater risk.
This is supported by the pooled Tobit regressions in Table C.13.
I proceed in a similar manner to validate the robustness of findings regarding capi-
talization. The dependent variable here is the tier 1 ratio (T1R) and Tables C.14-C.15
report the results. The initial analysis shows that more ably managed banks are also
more thinly capitalized (Table C.14, Panel D, r = 1). Further analysis shows, that, as
in the main investigation this result holds across all sets of first stage regressors (Panel
D, r = 1, . . . , 3). Specifically, the full sample additionally shows a significantly negative
coefficient when r = 2, 3. Similar results obtain for SFA revenue efficiency in panel
B with the exception of medium banks where significantly positive coefficients obtain
for medium banks for r = 1, 2. Medium banks may need to hold greater amounts of
tier 1 capital because they neither have access to wholesale funding markets nor are
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they firmly rooted in local deposit markets. Moreover, support for this reading comes
from the GFA method in Panel C (r = 3) and from DEA revenue efficiency in Panel A
(r = 3). Transitioning from yearly to pooled Tobit regressions in Table C.15 does not
qualitatively affect results.
Finally, Tables C.16-C.17 replicate the same procedure for the analysis of LAGTA.
Initial findings suggest that more ably managed banks tended to hold lower levels of
liquid assets per unit of assets (Table C.16 Panel D, r = 1). These findings are very ro-
bust. Specifically, neither the choice of first stage Tobit regressors (r = 1, . . . , 3) nor the
base efficiency used to parametrize MA (τ − effDEA, τ − effSFA, τ − effGFA, pi− effDEA)
weakens this finding: all parametrizations show significantly negative coefficients for
small banks and the full sample. In addition, for GFA, significantly negative coeffi-
cients obtain also for large banks and (Panels C). Moreover, these results are strongly
confirmed by Table C.17, i.e. by MA based on pooled Tobit regressions. Hence the
finding of more managerial ability being associated with less liquid banks is robust.
The main analysis concludes that more able managers tend to run somewhat more
risky banks. Overall, this section has offered substantial evidence that the initial conclu-
sion is robust to the type of MA parametrization that is used. Although this robustness
is not as strong as that of the liquidity creation results, it still suggests that the initial
reading is justified: more ably managed banks are riskier in normal times and hypothesis
A2 ought to be accepted.
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C.1.4. Effects of Managerial Ability on Liquidity Creation and
Risk-Taking During the Crisis
This section subjects the analysis of the financial crisis to additional validation by
considering a variety of modifications to the base case. As in the preceding sections
these modifications relate to the MA measure and to the indicators of bank liquidity
creation.
C.1.4.1. Effects on Liquidity Creation
The main analysis of the financial crisis shows that more able management pre-crisis
led banks to contract their liquidity creation activity more during the crisis, consistent
with hypothesis A3b. Moreover, the main results show that the crisis itself exerted a
negative effect on bank liquidity creation. This section now investigates the robustness
of these findings to the parametrization of the managerial ability measure and to the
choice of liquidity creation indicator. To do so, I run difference-in-differences regressions
with bank fixed effects of the form
LCj,i,t
GTAi,t
= α+ β1δc + β2MA
r
m,s,i,06 × δc + ξ′zi,t + υi + i,t. (C.5)
All variables are as previously defined and Tables C.19-C.22 report the results. If the
main results are robust, one would expect to find significantly negative coefficients on
δc and MArm,s,06.
Indeed, the crisis dummy is significantly negative in the vast majority of cases and
never significantly positive. Hence results related to this variable are not discussed
further. In terms of the results regarding managerial ability, the first step is to con-
sider the liquidity creation measures of Berger and Bouwman (2009), CATFAT and
CATNONFAT .
The findings for CATFAT include the baseline specification in Table C.18, Panel
D, r = 1. Panel D shows that the main results regarding MA are very robust to the
selection of first stage Tobit regressors (r = 1, . . . , 3). In addition, the SFA results
in Panel B, with strongly significantly positive coefficients throughout, emphatically
suggest that the initially insignificant coefficients are underestimating the actual effects.
Moreover, the DEA results in Panel A for small banks and the full sample also confirm
that more able pre-crisis management led banks to contract their liquidity creation more
during the crisis. Only the GFA results in Panel C provide contrary evidence with a
number of significantly positive coefficients. The picture does not change qualitatively
311
if one uses pooled instead of yearly Tobit regressions to obtain MA, as can be seen from
Table C.19. Thus, the majority of the evidence supports the main conclusion.
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m
pl
e
s
(p
oo
le
d,
p
or
ye
ar
ly
y
)
an
d
re
gr
es
so
r
se
t
r
fo
r
th
e
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
1
us
es
re
gr
es
so
rs
fo
llo
w
in
g
C
an
tr
el
l
(2
01
3)
an
d
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
2
ad
ds
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
st
at
us
va
ri
ab
le
s,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
3
av
oi
ds
po
te
nt
ia
lly
en
do
ge
no
us
va
ri
ab
le
s
al
lt
og
et
he
r
an
d
su
bs
ti
tu
te
s
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
m
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
effi
ci
en
cy
sc
or
e
us
ed
as
a
ba
si
s
fo
r
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
.
H
er
e
τ
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
re
ve
nu
e
effi
ci
en
cy
,
w
hi
le
pi
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
pr
ofi
t
effi
ci
en
cy
.
D
E
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
da
ta
en
ve
lo
pm
en
t
an
al
ys
is
,S
FA
st
an
ds
fo
r
st
oc
ha
st
ic
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
an
d
G
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st
an
ds
fo
r
ge
ne
ra
liz
ed
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
.
M
on
et
ar
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es
ar
e
in
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U
S
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la
rs
.
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A
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eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
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=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
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L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,0
6
×
δ
c
-0
.0
24
9∗
∗
-0
.0
31
4
-0
.0
67
1
-0
.0
31
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
24
9∗
∗
-0
.0
29
1
-0
.0
68
1
-0
.0
31
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
20
0∗
∗
-0
.0
05
10
-0
.0
29
4
-0
.0
21
0∗
∗
(-
2.
53
)
(-
0.
67
)
(-
0.
85
)
(-
3.
19
)
(-
2.
54
)
(-
0.
61
)
(-
0.
85
)
(-
3.
19
)
(-
2.
28
)
(-
0.
13
)
(-
0.
37
)
(-
2.
41
)
δ
c
-0
.0
05
30
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
07
72
∗
-0
.0
10
4
-0
.0
06
58
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
05
30
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
07
75
∗
-0
.0
10
4
-0
.0
06
58
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
05
22
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
08
10
∗∗
-0
.0
14
8∗
∗
-0
.0
06
57
∗∗
∗
(-
6.
30
)
(-
1.
94
)
(-
1.
45
)
(-
8.
05
)
(-
6.
30
)
(-
1.
95
)
(-
1.
46
)
(-
8.
04
)
(-
6.
20
)
(-
2.
04
)
(-
2.
37
)
(-
8.
03
)
P
an
el
B
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=
τ
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eff
S
F
A
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=
1
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=
2
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3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
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F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
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ge
F
u
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M
A
r m
,s
,0
6
×
δ
c
-0
.0
23
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
66
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
36
0
-0
.0
12
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
22
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
66
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
36
6
-0
.0
11
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
18
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
70
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
49
1
-0
.0
12
5∗
∗∗
(-
4.
92
)
(-
3.
33
)
(0
.1
1)
(-
3.
24
)
(-
4.
78
)
(-
3.
34
)
(0
.1
1)
(-
3.
13
)
(-
4.
03
)
(-
3.
45
)
(0
.1
5)
(-
3.
24
)
δ
c
-0
.0
04
65
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
25
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
14
0
-0
.0
06
61
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
04
68
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
25
8∗
∗∗
-0
.0
14
0
-0
.0
06
61
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
04
95
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
22
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
14
0
-0
.0
06
64
∗∗
∗
(-
5.
45
)
(-
3.
99
)
(-
0.
79
)
(-
8.
05
)
(-
5.
48
)
(-
4.
00
)
(-
0.
79
)
(-
8.
06
)
(-
5.
84
)
(-
4.
15
)
(-
0.
98
)
(-
8.
09
)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
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G
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
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=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
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S
m
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l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
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L
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u
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M
A
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∗∗
0.
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∗
-0
.0
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6
0.
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3∗
∗∗
0.
18
4∗
∗∗
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9∗
∗
-0
.0
37
6
0.
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5∗
∗∗
0.
03
23
0.
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0∗
∗
-0
.0
33
5
0.
06
32
∗∗
∗
(3
.6
8)
(2
.5
2)
(-
0.
51
)
(4
.6
9)
(3
.7
7)
(2
.5
2)
(-
0.
50
)
(4
.7
4)
(0
.8
2)
(2
.3
6)
(-
0.
57
)
(3
.4
1)
δ
c
-0
.0
05
97
∗∗
∗
0.
00
45
9
-0
.0
18
1∗
∗
-0
.0
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58
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
05
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∗∗
∗
0.
00
45
5
-0
.0
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0∗
∗
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.0
06
57
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∗
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.0
05
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∗∗
∗
0.
00
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9
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.0
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∗
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.0
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∗∗
∗
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)
(0
.7
7)
(-
2.
38
)
(-
8.
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)
(-
6.
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)
(0
.7
7)
(-
2.
37
)
(-
8.
02
)
(-
6.
09
)
(1
.0
3)
(-
2.
02
)
(-
8.
09
)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,0
6
×
δ
c
0.
00
65
3
-0
.0
59
2
-0
.0
69
7
-0
.0
07
57
0.
00
82
0
-0
.0
57
6
-0
.0
69
5
-0
.0
05
73
0.
00
63
2
-0
.0
57
2
-0
.0
80
8
-0
.0
08
45
(0
.5
6)
(-
1.
41
)
(-
1.
44
)
(-
0.
68
)
(0
.7
0)
(-
1.
33
)
(-
1.
42
)
(-
0.
51
)
(0
.5
3)
(-
1.
15
)
(-
1.
58
)
(-
0.
74
)
δ
c
-0
.0
05
31
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
07
33
∗
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.0
10
6
-0
.0
06
48
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
05
33
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
07
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∗
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.0
10
7
-0
.0
06
51
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
05
29
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
05
99
-0
.0
08
08
-0
.0
06
48
∗∗
∗
(-
6.
16
)
(-
1.
82
)
(-
1.
57
)
(-
7.
74
)
(-
6.
18
)
(-
1.
82
)
(-
1.
59
)
(-
7.
76
)
(-
6.
18
)
(-
1.
34
)
(-
1.
22
)
(-
7.
77
)
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C
.19.:
C
A
T
F
A
T
Liquidity
C
reation
and
M
anagerialA
bility
D
uring
the
F
inancialC
risis,
s
=
p.
T
his
table
reports
results
from
fixed
effects
regressions
of
B
erger
and
B
ouw
m
an’s
(2009)
C
A
T
F
A
T
m
easure
of
liquidity
creation
scaled
by
total
assets
on
m
anagerial
ability
as
ofD
ecem
ber
2006
interacted
w
ith
a
dum
m
y
for
w
hether
the
observation
is
in
the
financialcrisis
(M
A
0
6 ×
δ
c ),a
crisis
dum
m
y
(δ
c )
and
controls
w
ith
bank
fixed
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),
0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
C
ontrols
are
three
year
m
oving
averages
and
are
suppressed.
T
hey
include
the
log
of
gross
total
assets
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
sum
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
scaled
by
gross
total
assets
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
the
standard
deviation
of
return
on
assets
(S
D
R
O
A
)
and
the
Z-Score
(Z
I
N
D
)
capture
risk.
T
he
last
tw
o
variables
are
orthogonalized
against
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
regressions
also
include
bank
dem
ographic
factors.
T
hese
are
B
K
H
H
I,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
and
B
K
M
S
M
L
and
are
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahlindex),population,population
density,incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arket
share
ofm
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
of
deposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
of
a
bank’s
total
deposits.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
w
as
involved
in
m
ergers
(acquisitions)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years.
M
A
rm
,s
represents
m
anagerial
ability
as
obtained
follow
ing
the
m
ethodology
of
D
em
erjian,
Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012)
using
m
ethod
m
for
effi
ciency
as
w
ell
as
sam
ple
s
(pooled,
p
or
yearly
y)
and
regressor
set
r
for
the
T
obit
regressions.
Specification
r
=
1
uses
regressors
follow
ing
C
antrell
(2013)
and
D
em
erjian,
Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012),
Specification
r
=
2
adds
the
holding
com
pany
status
variables,
Specification
r
=
3
avoids
potentially
endogenous
variables
alltogether
and
substitutes
bank
dem
ographic
variables.
m
indicates
the
effi
ciency
score
used
as
a
basis
for
m
anagerial
ability.
H
ere
τ−
eff
represents
revenue
effi
ciency,
w
hile
pi−
eff
represents
profit
effi
ciency.
D
E
A
stands
for
data
envelopm
ent
analysis,SFA
stands
for
stochastic
frontier
analysis
and
G
FA
stands
for
generalized
frontier
analysis.
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
P
an
el
A
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=
τ
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
-0.0217 ∗∗
-0.0245
-0.0544
-0.0247 ∗∗∗
-0.0226 ∗∗
-0.0227
-0.0573
-0.0255 ∗∗∗
-0.0202 ∗∗
-0.0120
-0.0391
-0.0208 ∗∗
(-2.40)
(-0.61)
(-0.71)
(-2.76)
(-2.51)
(-0.56)
(-0.74)
(-2.86)
(-2.34)
(-0.31)
(-0.51)
(-2.43)
δ
c
-0.00522 ∗∗∗
-0.00830 ∗∗
-0.0135 ∗∗
-0.00655 ∗∗∗
-0.00522 ∗∗∗
-0.00829 ∗∗
-0.0134 ∗∗
-0.00655 ∗∗∗
-0.00518 ∗∗∗
-0.00832 ∗∗
-0.0151 ∗∗
-0.00655 ∗∗∗
(-6.20)
(-2.10)
(-2.11)
(-8.01)
(-6.19)
(-2.10)
(-2.11)
(-8.01)
(-6.15)
(-2.07)
(-2.36)
(-8.00)
P
an
el
B
:m
=
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
-0.0227 ∗∗∗
-0.0698 ∗∗∗
0.00340
-0.0132 ∗∗∗
-0.0222 ∗∗∗
-0.0694 ∗∗∗
0.00355
-0.0128 ∗∗∗
-0.0189 ∗∗∗
-0.0730 ∗∗∗
0.00282
-0.0136 ∗∗∗
(-4.89)
(-3.41)
(0.10)
(-3.47)
(-4.76)
(-3.40)
(0.11)
(-3.35)
(-4.28)
(-3.57)
(0.09)
(-3.54)
δ
c
-0.00475 ∗∗∗
-0.0253 ∗∗∗
-0.0142
-0.00662 ∗∗∗
-0.00477 ∗∗∗
-0.0252 ∗∗∗
-0.0142
-0.00663 ∗∗∗
-0.00497 ∗∗∗
-0.0224 ∗∗∗
-0.0147
-0.00665 ∗∗∗
(-5.58)
(-4.03)
(-0.84)
(-8.07)
(-5.60)
(-4.03)
(-0.84)
(-8.08)
(-5.87)
(-4.18)
(-1.05)
(-8.11)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
0.317 ∗∗∗
0.211 ∗∗
-0.0307
0.131 ∗∗∗
0.330 ∗∗∗
0.211 ∗∗
-0.0298
0.134 ∗∗∗
0.0570
0.162 ∗∗
-0.0345
0.0684 ∗∗∗
(4.92)
(2.48)
(-0.43)
(4.96)
(5.09)
(2.48)
(-0.42)
(5.03)
(1.37)
(2.35)
(-0.58)
(3.69)
δ
c
-0.00703 ∗∗∗
0.00673
-0.0183 ∗∗
-0.00659 ∗∗∗
-0.00710 ∗∗∗
0.00669
-0.0182 ∗∗
-0.00659 ∗∗∗
-0.00579 ∗∗∗
0.00835
-0.0204 ∗∗
-0.00664 ∗∗∗
(-7.48)
(1.00)
(-2.14)
(-8.04)
(-7.55)
(1.00)
(-2.14)
(-8.04)
(-6.25)
(1.08)
(-2.00)
(-8.11)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
0.00758
-0.0633
-0.0785
-0.00381
0.00884
-0.0615
-0.0792
-0.00235
0.00736
-0.0639
-0.0842 ∗
-0.00714
(0.66)
(-1.48)
(-1.57)
(-0.35)
(0.77)
(-1.40)
(-1.56)
(-0.21)
(0.63)
(-1.31)
(-1.67)
(-0.63)
δ
c
-0.00531 ∗∗∗
-0.00873 ∗∗
-0.0126 ∗∗
-0.00655 ∗∗∗
-0.00532 ∗∗∗
-0.00869 ∗∗
-0.0127 ∗∗
-0.00657 ∗∗∗
-0.00528 ∗∗∗
-0.00697 ∗
-0.00949
-0.00653 ∗∗∗
(-6.19)
(-2.21)
(-1.98)
(-7.88)
(-6.19)
(-2.20)
(-2.00)
(-7.89)
(-6.20)
(-1.70)
(-1.50)
(-7.87)
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Next I consider the CATNONFAT liquidity measure, which excludes off-balance-
sheet items in the calculation of liquidity creation in Tables C.20-C.21.
In general, the results are very similar to those found for CATFAT . Specifically,
the SFA-based MA variable strongly suggests that banks that were more ably managed
before the crisis contracted their liquidity creation more as a reaction to the crisis.
Again, this result is supported by DEA for both revenue- and profit efficiency-based
MA (Panel A and D). Additionally, the contrary evidence provided by GFA in Panel C
is now much weaker than in the CATFAT case. In fact, this method now confirms the
main findings for large banks with significantly negative coefficients for all choices of
first stage Tobit regressors (r = 1, . . . , 3). These findings are not sensitive to the choice
of pooled Tobit regressions versus the yearly approach, as is documented by Table C.21.
Again, this analysis shows that the main conclusions are not merely driven by the choice
of MA measure.
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C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
Liquidity
C
reation
and
M
anagerialA
bility
D
uring
the
F
inancialC
risis,
s
=
y.
T
his
table
reports
results
from
fixed
effects
regressions
ofB
erger
and
B
ouw
m
an’s
(2009)
C
A
T
N
O
N
F
A
T
m
easure
ofliquidity
creation
scaled
by
totalassets
on
m
anagerial
ability
as
ofD
ecem
ber
2006
interacted
w
ith
a
dum
m
y
for
w
hether
the
observation
is
in
the
financialcrisis
(M
A
0
6 ×
δ
c ),a
crisis
dum
m
y
(δ
c )
and
controls
w
ith
bank
fixed
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),
0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
C
ontrols
are
three
year
m
oving
averages
and
are
suppressed.
T
hey
include
the
log
of
gross
total
assets
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
sum
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
scaled
by
gross
total
assets
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
the
standard
deviation
of
return
on
assets
(S
D
R
O
A
)
and
the
Z-Score
(Z
I
N
D
)
capture
risk.
T
he
last
tw
o
variables
are
orthogonalized
against
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
regressions
also
include
bank
dem
ographic
factors.
T
hese
are
B
K
H
H
I,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
and
B
K
M
S
M
L
and
are
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahlindex),population,population
density,incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arket
share
ofm
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
of
deposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
of
a
bank’s
total
deposits.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
w
as
involved
in
m
ergers
(acquisitions)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years.
M
A
rm
,s
represents
m
anagerial
ability
as
obtained
follow
ing
the
m
ethodology
of
D
em
erjian,
Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012)
using
m
ethod
m
for
effi
ciency
as
w
ell
as
sam
ple
s
(pooled,
p
or
yearly
y)
and
regressor
set
r
for
the
T
obit
regressions.
Specification
r
=
1
uses
regressors
follow
ing
C
antrell
(2013)
and
D
em
erjian,
Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012),
Specification
r
=
2
adds
the
holding
com
pany
status
variables,
Specification
r
=
3
avoids
potentially
endogenous
variables
alltogether
and
substitutes
bank
dem
ographic
variables.
m
indicates
the
effi
ciency
score
used
as
a
basis
for
m
anagerial
ability.
H
ere
τ−
eff
represents
revenue
effi
ciency,
w
hile
pi−
eff
represents
profit
effi
ciency.
D
E
A
stands
for
data
envelopm
ent
analysis,SFA
stands
for
stochastic
frontier
analysis
and
G
FA
stands
for
generalized
frontier
analysis.
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Finally, I consider the findings that obtain if the liquidity transformation gap of
Deep and Schaefer (2004) is used as indicator of liquidity creation. These findings are
tabulated in C.22-C.23.
Again, with the exception of large banks, the SFA-based MA results indicate that
more able pre-crisis management led banks to reduce their liquidity creation more after
the onset of the crisis. Moreover, for r = 2, 3 a significantly negative relation obtains also
for medium banks. These findings are confirmed by the DEA revenue efficiency-based
results in Panel A for small banks and the full sample and by the negative coefficients
that mostly prevail in Panel D. GFA in Panel C suggests a contrary interpretation for
the first and second set of first stage Tobit regressors (r = 1, 2), however this evidence
disappears for r = 3. This contrary evidence is also substantially weakened (fewer and
less significant coefficients) as one transitions to pooled Tobit regressions in Table C.23.
So, once more, the main conclusions do not appear to be driven by the choice of MA
parametrization.
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Overall, this section shows that there is robust support for the interpretation that
more able pre-crisis management of banks induced these institutions to curtail their
intermediation activity more strongly during the crisis itself, consistent with A3b. This
interpretation of the data is particularly salient when SFA-based revenue efficiency is
used for the parametrization of MA and proves robust to changes in the parametrization
of efficiency scores that are used as a basis for the MA measure, to the sampling of the
first stage Tobit regressions (yearly vs pooled) as well as to the choice of regressors
employed in these first stage regressions.
C.1.4.2. Effects on Bank Risk-Taking
As before for the case of liquidity creation, I investigate the robustness of the findings
regarding bank risk. Again the main concern is with the impact that the choice of MA
parametrization has on the findings. The regressions are of the following form, with all
variables as previously defined:
KRIk,i,t = α+ β1δc + β2MA
r
m,s,i,06 × δc + ξ′zi,t + υi + i,t. (C.6)
In terms of nonperforming loans, the main analysis finds, tentatively, that pre-crisis
managerial ability further decreased the quantity of nonperforming loans during the
crisis. Tables C.24-C.25, show that this result, replicated in Panel D, for r = 1 of Table
C.24, is robust to the choice of first stage Tobit regressors (r = 2, 3). Moreover, the
table also shows that this result is strongly supported by the results in Panels A and C.
This holds for yearly regressions (see Table C.24) as well as, albeit in somewhat weaker
form for pooled regressions (see Table C.25). The only contrary evidence is provided by
the results using SFA-based revenue efficiency as the basis for managerial ability (Panel
B).
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brackets.
C
ontrols
are
three
year
m
oving
averages
and
are
suppressed.
T
hey
include
the
log
of
gross
totalassets
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
sum
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
scaled
by
gross
totalassets
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),the
standard
deviation
of
return
on
assets
(S
D
R
O
A
)
and
the
Z-Score
(Z
I
N
D
)
capture
risk.
T
he
last
tw
o
variables
are
orthogonalized
against
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
regressions
also
include
bank
dem
ographic
factors.
T
hese
are
B
K
H
H
I,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
and
B
K
M
S
M
L
and
are
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahlindex),population,population
density,incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arket
share
ofm
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
ofdeposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
ofa
bank’s
totaldeposits.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
w
as
involved
in
m
ergers
(acquisitions)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years.
M
A
rm
,s
represents
m
anagerialability
as
obtained
follow
ing
the
m
ethodology
ofD
em
erjian,Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012)
using
m
ethod
m
for
effi
ciency
as
w
ellas
sam
ple
s
(pooled,
p
or
yearly
y)
and
regressor
set
r
for
the
T
obit
regressions.
Specification
r
=
1
uses
regressors
follow
ing
C
antrell
(2013)
and
D
em
erjian,
Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012),
Specification
r
=
2
adds
the
holding
com
pany
status
variables,
Specification
r
=
3
avoids
potentially
endogenous
variables
alltogether
and
substitutes
bank
dem
ographic
variables.
m
indicates
the
effi
ciency
score
used
as
a
basis
for
m
anagerial
ability.
H
ere
τ−
eff
represents
revenue
effi
ciency,
w
hile
pi−
eff
represents
profit
effi
ciency.
D
E
A
stands
for
data
envelopm
ent
analysis,
SFA
stands
for
stochastic
frontier
analysis
and
G
FA
stands
for
generalized
frontier
analysis.
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
P
an
el
A
:m
=
τ
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
-0.0212 ∗∗∗
-0.00627
-0.00769
-0.0176 ∗∗∗
-0.0212 ∗∗∗
-0.00552
-0.00782
-0.0176 ∗∗∗
-0.0145 ∗∗∗
0.000634
-0.00286
-0.0133 ∗∗∗
(-8.58)
(-0.44)
(-0.60)
(-7.29)
(-8.58)
(-0.39)
(-0.60)
(-7.29)
(-6.47)
(0.05)
(-0.24)
(-6.04)
δ
c
0.00561 ∗∗∗
0.00822 ∗∗∗
0.0103 ∗∗∗
0.00640 ∗∗∗
0.00561 ∗∗∗
0.00821 ∗∗∗
0.0103 ∗∗∗
0.00640 ∗∗∗
0.00568 ∗∗∗
0.00817 ∗∗∗
0.00974 ∗∗∗
0.00641 ∗∗∗
(23.79)
(6.49)
(6.13)
(28.03)
(23.79)
(6.49)
(6.19)
(28.03)
(23.95)
(6.53)
(7.14)
(28.09)
P
an
el
B
:m
=
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
0.00972 ∗∗∗
0.00408
0.00410
0.00382 ∗∗∗
0.00961 ∗∗∗
0.00358
0.00411
0.00370 ∗∗∗
0.00765 ∗∗∗
0.00378
0.00611
0.00425 ∗∗∗
(7.95)
(0.69)
(0.55)
(3.80)
(7.82)
(0.61)
(0.56)
(3.67)
(6.81)
(0.66)
(0.79)
(4.28)
δ
c
0.00543 ∗∗∗
0.00925 ∗∗∗
0.0114 ∗∗∗
0.00640 ∗∗∗
0.00544 ∗∗∗
0.00911 ∗∗∗
0.0114 ∗∗∗
0.00640 ∗∗∗
0.00555 ∗∗∗
0.00894 ∗∗∗
0.0116 ∗∗∗
0.00641 ∗∗∗
(23.06)
(4.53)
(3.07)
(28.01)
(23.07)
(4.53)
(3.13)
(28.01)
(23.54)
(5.12)
(3.76)
(28.08)
P
an
el
C
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=
τ
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eff
G
F
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=
1
r
=
2
r
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3
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m
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M
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u
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u
ll
M
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rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
0.0514 ∗∗∗
-0.0560 ∗∗
-0.0281
-0.0114
0.0506 ∗∗∗
-0.0562 ∗∗
-0.0281
-0.0118
0.0142
-0.0377 ∗∗
-0.0343 ∗∗∗
-0.0220 ∗∗∗
(4.04)
(-2.28)
(-1.49)
(-1.52)
(3.96)
(-2.29)
(-1.49)
(-1.57)
(1.40)
(-1.97)
(-2.85)
(-4.41)
δ
c
0.00546 ∗∗∗
0.00508 ∗∗∗
0.00779 ∗∗∗
0.00640 ∗∗∗
0.00546 ∗∗∗
0.00508 ∗∗∗
0.00779 ∗∗∗
0.00640 ∗∗∗
0.00554 ∗∗∗
0.00444 ∗∗
0.00493 ∗∗
0.00641 ∗∗∗
(22.35)
(3.12)
(3.97)
(28.03)
(22.35)
(3.13)
(3.97)
(28.03)
(22.28)
(2.21)
(2.38)
(28.28)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
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D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
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L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
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m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
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m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
-0.0198 ∗∗∗
-0.00599
0.00918
-0.0143 ∗∗∗
-0.0202 ∗∗∗
-0.00400
0.00956
-0.0146 ∗∗∗
-0.00917 ∗∗∗
0.00558
0.00178
-0.00395
(-6.64)
(-0.62)
(0.95)
(-5.15)
(-6.72)
(-0.41)
(0.97)
(-5.20)
(-3.01)
(0.52)
(0.16)
(-1.39)
δ
c
0.00590 ∗∗∗
0.00823 ∗∗∗
0.00902 ∗∗∗
0.00660 ∗∗∗
0.00591 ∗∗∗
0.00821 ∗∗∗
0.00901 ∗∗∗
0.00660 ∗∗∗
0.00575 ∗∗∗
0.00796 ∗∗∗
0.00950 ∗∗∗
0.00645 ∗∗∗
(24.34)
(6.57)
(6.32)
(28.30)
(24.36)
(6.55)
(6.37)
(28.31)
(24.00)
(6.00)
(6.05)
(27.96)
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on
pe
rf
or
m
in
g
Lo
an
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P
L
)
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d
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y
D
ur
in
g
th
e
F
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an
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al
C
ri
si
s,
s
=
p
.
T
hi
s
ta
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e
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s
re
su
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s
fr
om
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
no
np
er
fo
rm
in
g
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an
s
ov
er
to
ta
ll
oa
ns
(N
P
L
)
on
m
an
ag
er
ia
la
bi
lit
y
as
of
D
ec
em
be
r
20
06
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
it
h
a
du
m
m
y
fo
r
w
he
th
er
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
in
th
e
fin
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
(M
A
0
6
×
δ c
),
a
cr
is
is
du
m
m
y
(δ
c
)
an
d
co
nt
ro
ls
w
it
h
ba
nk
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
C
on
tr
ol
s
ar
e
th
re
e
ye
ar
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
es
an
d
ar
e
su
pp
re
ss
ed
.
T
he
y
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
su
m
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
sc
al
ed
by
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
(S
D
R
O
A
)
an
d
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
(Z
I
N
D
)
ca
pt
ur
e
ri
sk
.
T
he
la
st
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
or
th
og
on
al
iz
ed
ag
ai
ns
t
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
al
so
in
cl
ud
e
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
fa
ct
or
s.
T
he
se
ar
e
B
K
H
H
I
,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
an
d
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,p
op
ul
at
io
n,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
e
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
ld
ep
os
it
s.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
in
vo
lv
ed
in
m
er
ge
rs
(a
cq
ui
si
ti
on
s)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
M
A
r m
,s
re
pr
es
en
ts
m
an
ag
er
ia
la
bi
lit
y
as
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
llo
w
in
g
th
e
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
of
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
us
in
g
m
et
ho
d
m
fo
r
effi
ci
en
cy
as
w
el
la
s
sa
m
pl
e
s
(p
oo
le
d,
p
or
ye
ar
ly
y
)
an
d
re
gr
es
so
r
se
t
r
fo
r
th
e
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
1
us
es
re
gr
es
so
rs
fo
llo
w
in
g
C
an
tr
el
l
(2
01
3)
an
d
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
2
ad
ds
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
st
at
us
va
ri
ab
le
s,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
3
av
oi
ds
po
te
nt
ia
lly
en
do
ge
no
us
va
ri
ab
le
s
al
lt
og
et
he
r
an
d
su
bs
ti
tu
te
s
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
m
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
effi
ci
en
cy
sc
or
e
us
ed
as
a
ba
si
s
fo
r
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
.
H
er
e
τ
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
re
ve
nu
e
effi
ci
en
cy
,
w
hi
le
pi
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
pr
ofi
t
effi
ci
en
cy
.
D
E
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
da
ta
en
ve
lo
pm
en
t
an
al
ys
is
,
SF
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
st
oc
ha
st
ic
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
an
d
G
FA
st
an
ds
fo
r
ge
ne
ra
liz
ed
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
P
an
el
A
:m
=
τ
−
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D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
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ge
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S
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al
l
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ed
iu
m
L
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F
u
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S
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l
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M
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,0
6
×
δ
c
-0
.0
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5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
05
81
-0
.0
02
59
-0
.0
18
7∗
∗∗
-0
.0
20
2∗
∗∗
-0
.0
05
07
-0
.0
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35
-0
.0
18
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
18
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
00
57
0
0.
00
29
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-0
.0
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∗∗
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78
)
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0.
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)
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0.
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)
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22
)
(-
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)
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0.
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)
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0.
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)
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)
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0.
00
97
5∗
∗∗
0.
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u
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00
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12
)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
r
=
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6
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)
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)
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)
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7)
(6
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1)
(2
8.
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)
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Concerning results on tier 1 capital, the main analysis finds that more able manage-
ment pre crisis ensured a smaller decline or even an increase in T1R during the crisis.
These main results are replicated in Panel D, r = 1 of Table C.26. I find that this
result is not driven by the selection of first stage regressors (r = 1, . . . , 3). Additionally,
SFA revenue efficiency confirms this finding for small banks and DEA revenue efficiency
also confirms this result for small banks and the full sample when r = 3. Only GFA
provides divergent evidence, especially for large banks and the full sample of banks.
Overall, these findings strengthen as one passes to a pooled Tobit regression in Table
C.27. This not only suggests that more able managers reacted more effectively to the
crisis but also that, as conjectured in the main analysis, large banks may have been
more difficult to de-risk. This may possibly have been the case due to their greater in-
terconnectedness with the global financial markets. Thus the majority of the evidence
again supports the main interpretation.
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The final analysis in this section checks, in Tables C.28-C.29, whether the results
related to liquid assets over total assets are robust. Overall the main findings hold.
Specifically, the choice of first stage Tobit regressors does not drive the results obtained
from DEA profit efficiency (Panel D, r = 1, . . . , 3). Specifically, for small banks and the
full sample, liquid assets increase more for more ably managed banks. Similar results are
yielded by SFA-revenue efficiency in Panel B. However in this case, the opposite result
obtains for large banks, which supports the interpretation that these may have been
too complex to handle during the crisis. Again, only GFA provides contrary evidence,
while DEA revenue efficiency-based MA is uninformative. These results are not driven
by the choice of yearly over pooled Tobit regressions to obtain MA as can be seen from
Table C.29. So, in sum, more ably managed banks are found to de-risk more effectively.
327
T
able
C
.28.:Liquid
A
ssets
(L
A
G
T
A
)
and
M
anagerialA
bility
D
uring
the
F
inancialC
risis,
s
=
y.
T
his
table
reports
results
from
fixed
effects
regressions
of
the
ratio
of
liquid
assets
over
total
assets
(L
A
G
T
A
)
on
m
anagerial
ability
as
of
D
ecem
ber
2006
interacted
w
ith
a
dum
m
y
for
w
hether
the
observation
is
in
the
financialcrisis
(M
A
0
6 ×
δ
c ),a
crisis
dum
m
y
(δ
c )
and
controls
w
ith
bank
fixed
effects
and
standard
errors
clustered
by
bank.
Stars
report
significance
at
the
0.1
(*),0.05
(**)
and
0.01
(***)
levels.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
brackets.
C
ontrols
are
three
year
m
oving
averages
and
are
suppressed.
T
hey
include
the
log
of
gross
totalassets
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
sum
of
risk
w
eighted
assets
scaled
by
gross
totalassets
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),the
standard
deviation
of
return
on
assets
(S
D
R
O
A
)
and
the
Z-Score
(Z
I
N
D
)
capture
risk.
T
he
last
tw
o
variables
are
orthogonalized
against
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
regressions
also
include
bank
dem
ographic
factors.
T
hese
are
B
K
H
H
I,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
and
B
K
M
S
M
L
and
are
calculated
by
w
eighting
the
dem
ographic
variables
H
H
I
(H
erfindahlindex),population,population
density,incom
e
grow
th
and
m
arket
share
ofm
edium
and
large
banks
by
the
share
ofdeposits
each
M
SA
or
non-M
SA
county
represents
ofa
bank’s
totaldeposits.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
ifthe
bank
belongs
to
a
m
ultibank
(onebank)
holding
com
pany.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
are
dum
m
y
variables
set
to
1
if
the
bank
w
as
involved
in
m
ergers
(acquisitions)
w
ithin
the
last
three
years.
M
A
rm
,s
represents
m
anagerialability
as
obtained
follow
ing
the
m
ethodology
ofD
em
erjian,Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012)
using
m
ethod
m
for
effi
ciency
as
w
ellas
sam
ple
s
(pooled,
p
or
yearly
y)
and
regressor
set
r
for
the
T
obit
regressions.
Specification
r
=
1
uses
regressors
follow
ing
C
antrell
(2013)
and
D
em
erjian,
Lev
and
M
cV
ay
(2012),
Specification
r
=
2
adds
the
holding
com
pany
status
variables,
Specification
r
=
3
avoids
potentially
endogenous
variables
alltogether
and
substitutes
bank
dem
ographic
variables.
m
indicates
the
effi
ciency
score
used
as
a
basis
for
m
anagerial
ability.
H
ere
τ−
eff
represents
revenue
effi
ciency,
w
hile
pi−
eff
represents
profit
effi
ciency.
D
E
A
stands
for
data
envelopm
ent
analysis,
SFA
stands
for
stochastic
frontier
analysis
and
G
FA
stands
for
generalized
frontier
analysis.
M
onetary
values
are
in
2005
U
S
D
ollars.
P
an
el
A
:m
=
τ
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
0.0129
-0.00724
-0.0175
0.0127
0.0128
-0.00883
-0.0175
0.0127
-0.00223
-0.0190
-0.0723
-0.00374
(1.44)
(-0.22)
(-0.31)
(1.48)
(1.43)
(-0.27)
(-0.31)
(1.47)
(-0.27)
(-0.68)
(-1.40)
(-0.48)
δ
c
0.00538 ∗∗∗
0.00408
0.00360
0.00579 ∗∗∗
0.00538 ∗∗∗
0.00409
0.00358
0.00579 ∗∗∗
0.00535 ∗∗∗
0.00374
0.00395
0.00579 ∗∗∗
(6.77)
(1.45)
(0.65)
(7.70)
(6.77)
(1.45)
(0.64)
(7.70)
(6.72)
(1.29)
(0.81)
(7.71)
P
an
el
B
:m
=
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
0.0191 ∗∗∗
0.0161
-0.0409 ∗
0.0116 ∗∗∗
0.0182 ∗∗∗
0.0169
-0.0410 ∗
0.0110 ∗∗∗
0.0142 ∗∗∗
0.0240
-0.0411 ∗
0.0102 ∗∗∗
(4.10)
(0.98)
(-1.90)
(3.31)
(3.90)
(1.03)
(-1.90)
(3.13)
(3.22)
(1.41)
(-1.96)
(2.83)
δ
c
0.00487 ∗∗∗
0.00832
-0.0148
0.00581 ∗∗∗
0.00490 ∗∗∗
0.00850
-0.0147
0.00581 ∗∗∗
0.00512 ∗∗∗
0.00896 ∗
-0.0108
0.00583 ∗∗∗
(5.99)
(1.52)
(-1.34)
(7.72)
(6.04)
(1.56)
(-1.34)
(7.73)
(6.36)
(1.90)
(-1.19)
(7.75)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
-0.251 ∗∗∗
-0.0963
0.0713
-0.0910 ∗∗∗
-0.259 ∗∗∗
-0.0953
0.0705
-0.0932 ∗∗∗
-0.173 ∗∗∗
-0.0910 ∗
0.0730 ∗
-0.0441 ∗∗∗
(-5.15)
(-1.41)
(1.27)
(-3.66)
(-5.30)
(-1.40)
(1.26)
(-3.75)
(-5.17)
(-1.76)
(1.68)
(-2.79)
δ
c
0.00637 ∗∗∗
-0.00128
0.00701
0.00578 ∗∗∗
0.00640 ∗∗∗
-0.00122
0.00696
0.00578 ∗∗∗
0.00698 ∗∗∗
-0.00497
0.0123 ∗
0.00582 ∗∗∗
(7.68)
(-0.27)
(1.13)
(7.69)
(7.71)
(-0.25)
(1.13)
(7.69)
(8.49)
(-0.83)
(1.69)
(7.75)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
S
m
all
M
ed
iu
m
L
arge
F
u
ll
M
A
rm
,s
,0
6 ×
δ
c
0.0334 ∗∗∗
0.0314
0.0106
0.0326 ∗∗∗
0.0307 ∗∗∗
0.0319
0.0111
0.0305 ∗∗∗
0.0139
0.00784
0.00739
0.0134
(3.15)
(1.33)
(0.30)
(3.37)
(2.90)
(1.32)
(0.31)
(3.14)
(1.27)
(0.29)
(0.19)
(1.35)
δ
c
0.00495 ∗∗∗
0.00364
0.00150
0.00534 ∗∗∗
0.00498 ∗∗∗
0.00362
0.00149
0.00537 ∗∗∗
0.00522 ∗∗∗
0.00373
0.00158
0.00562 ∗∗∗
(6.12)
(1.29)
(0.27)
(6.96)
(6.15)
(1.28)
(0.27)
(6.99)
(6.50)
(1.30)
(0.27)
(7.35)
328
T
ab
le
C
.2
9.
:L
iq
ui
d
A
ss
et
s
(L
A
G
T
A
)
an
d
M
an
ag
er
ia
lA
bi
lit
y
D
ur
in
g
th
e
F
in
an
ci
al
C
ri
si
s,
s
=
p
.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
om
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(L
A
G
T
A
)
on
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
as
of
D
ec
em
be
r
20
06
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
it
h
a
du
m
m
y
fo
r
w
he
th
er
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
in
th
e
fin
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
(M
A
0
6
×
δ c
),
a
cr
is
is
du
m
m
y
(δ
c
)
an
d
co
nt
ro
ls
w
it
h
ba
nk
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
C
on
tr
ol
s
ar
e
th
re
e
ye
ar
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
es
an
d
ar
e
su
pp
re
ss
ed
.
T
he
y
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
su
m
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
sc
al
ed
by
gr
os
s
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
(S
D
R
O
A
)
an
d
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
(Z
I
N
D
)
ca
pt
ur
e
ri
sk
.
T
he
la
st
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
or
th
og
on
al
iz
ed
ag
ai
ns
t
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
al
so
in
cl
ud
e
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
fa
ct
or
s.
T
he
se
ar
e
B
K
H
H
I
,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
an
d
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,p
op
ul
at
io
n,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
e
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
ld
ep
os
it
s.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
in
vo
lv
ed
in
m
er
ge
rs
(a
cq
ui
si
ti
on
s)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
M
A
r m
,s
re
pr
es
en
ts
m
an
ag
er
ia
la
bi
lit
y
as
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
llo
w
in
g
th
e
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
of
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
us
in
g
m
et
ho
d
m
fo
r
effi
ci
en
cy
as
w
el
la
s
sa
m
pl
e
s
(p
oo
le
d,
p
or
ye
ar
ly
y
)
an
d
re
gr
es
so
r
se
t
r
fo
r
th
e
T
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
1
us
es
re
gr
es
so
rs
fo
llo
w
in
g
C
an
tr
el
l
(2
01
3)
an
d
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
2
ad
ds
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
st
at
us
va
ri
ab
le
s,
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
r
=
3
av
oi
ds
po
te
nt
ia
lly
en
do
ge
no
us
va
ri
ab
le
s
al
lt
og
et
he
r
an
d
su
bs
ti
tu
te
s
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
m
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
effi
ci
en
cy
sc
or
e
us
ed
as
a
ba
si
s
fo
r
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
.
H
er
e
τ
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
re
ve
nu
e
effi
ci
en
cy
,
w
hi
le
pi
−
eff
re
pr
es
en
ts
pr
ofi
t
effi
ci
en
cy
.
D
E
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
da
ta
en
ve
lo
pm
en
t
an
al
ys
is
,
SF
A
st
an
ds
fo
r
st
oc
ha
st
ic
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
an
d
G
FA
st
an
ds
fo
r
ge
ne
ra
liz
ed
fr
on
ti
er
an
al
ys
is
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
P
an
el
A
:m
=
τ
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,0
6
×
δ
c
0.
00
79
9
-0
.0
01
77
-0
.0
44
0
0.
00
74
4
0.
00
89
9
-0
.0
03
78
-0
.0
44
7
0.
00
83
0
0.
00
59
0
-0
.0
08
90
-0
.0
72
5
0.
00
43
6
(0
.9
5)
(-
0.
06
)
(-
0.
87
)
(0
.9
2)
(1
.0
7)
(-
0.
13
)
(-
0.
87
)
(1
.0
2)
(0
.7
3)
(-
0.
32
)
(-
1.
44
)
(0
.5
6)
δ
c
0.
00
53
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
39
9
0.
00
39
1
0.
00
57
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
53
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
39
6
0.
00
38
9
0.
00
57
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
53
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
37
9
0.
00
30
0
0.
00
57
8∗
∗∗
(6
.7
1)
(1
.3
8)
(0
.7
8)
(7
.6
9)
(6
.7
1)
(1
.3
7)
(0
.7
8)
(7
.6
9)
(6
.7
0)
(1
.2
7)
(0
.6
1)
(7
.6
9)
P
an
el
B
:m
=
τ
−
eff
S
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,0
6
×
δ
c
0.
01
52
∗∗
∗
0.
01
59
-0
.0
42
1∗
0.
00
95
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
46
∗∗
∗
0.
01
67
-0
.0
42
3∗
0.
00
90
7∗
∗
0.
01
02
∗∗
0.
02
17
-0
.0
40
7∗
0.
00
70
1∗
(3
.3
4)
(0
.9
5)
(-
1.
94
)
(2
.6
8)
(3
.2
0)
(1
.0
0)
(-
1.
94
)
(2
.5
5)
(2
.3
3)
(1
.2
7)
(-
1.
94
)
(1
.9
4)
δ
c
0.
00
50
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
79
6
-0
.0
14
0
0.
00
58
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
50
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
81
4
-0
.0
14
0
0.
00
58
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
52
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
82
8∗
-0
.0
10
3
0.
00
58
2∗
∗∗
(6
.2
0)
(1
.5
0)
(-
1.
34
)
(7
.7
4)
(6
.2
2)
(1
.5
4)
(-
1.
33
)
(7
.7
4)
(6
.4
8)
(1
.7
9)
(-
1.
15
)
(7
.7
5)
P
an
el
C
:m
=
τ
−
eff
G
F
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,0
6
×
δ
c
-0
.3
65
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
92
2
0.
05
58
-0
.0
69
2∗
∗∗
-0
.3
82
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
91
0
0.
05
52
-0
.0
71
8∗
∗∗
-0
.1
75
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
86
2∗
0.
07
46
∗
-0
.0
40
0∗
∗
(-
5.
84
)
(-
1.
45
)
(1
.0
4)
(-
3.
09
)
(-
6.
08
)
(-
1.
44
)
(1
.0
3)
(-
3.
20
)
(-
4.
97
)
(-
1.
67
)
(1
.7
0)
(-
2.
54
)
δ
c
0.
00
74
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
02
44
0.
00
72
5
0.
00
57
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
75
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
02
34
0.
00
71
9
0.
00
57
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
70
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
04
72
0.
01
28
∗
0.
00
58
2∗
∗∗
(8
.4
5)
(-
0.
45
)
(1
.0
4)
(7
.7
0)
(8
.5
5)
(-
0.
44
)
(1
.0
3)
(7
.7
0)
(8
.5
0)
(-
0.
77
)
(1
.7
2)
(7
.7
5)
P
an
el
D
:m
=
pi
−
eff
D
E
A
r
=
1
r
=
2
r
=
3
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
r m
,s
,0
6
×
δ
c
0.
04
48
∗∗
∗
0.
03
34
0.
01
29
0.
04
30
∗∗
∗
0.
04
30
∗∗
∗
0.
03
37
0.
01
34
0.
04
16
∗∗
∗
0.
02
95
∗∗
∗
0.
01
94
0.
00
38
3
0.
02
84
∗∗
∗
(4
.3
0)
(1
.3
9)
(0
.3
6)
(4
.4
9)
(4
.1
1)
(1
.3
6)
(0
.3
6)
(4
.3
2)
(2
.7
4)
(0
.7
3)
(0
.1
0)
(2
.8
8)
δ
c
0.
00
48
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
43
8
0.
00
17
7
0.
00
53
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
49
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
43
7
0.
00
17
8
0.
00
53
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
51
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
36
9
0.
00
19
8
0.
00
55
4∗
∗∗
(6
.0
9)
(1
.5
1)
(0
.3
4)
(7
.0
6)
(6
.1
1)
(1
.5
1)
(0
.3
4)
(7
.0
7)
(6
.4
6)
(1
.3
1)
(0
.3
7)
(7
.3
0)
329
Thus, overall, this section shows that the conclusions drawn from the analysis in
Chapter 5 about the influence of managerial ability on bank risk during the crisis are
robust to the parametrization of managerial ability and, hence, A4 ought to be accepted.
C.2. Further Robustness Checks
This section provides some further analyses on the robustness of the results. In cases
where the findings unambiguously support the main conclusions I merely tabulate the
results without providing any separate discussion. This is the case for all tests except
for the placebo crisis. Here the results are also in line with the main findings but require
some additional discussion.
More specifically, Section C.2.1 investigates how results change if one defines a placebo
crisis and reruns the regressions. Concretely, I define a crisis for the years 2003-2004
with 2002 being the pre-crisis period. Section C.2.2 investigates how results change if
potentially endogenous regressors are omitted from the analysis of liquidity creation and
bank risk-taking. Specifically, the regressions omit BKSIZE, CREDRSK, SDROA
and ZIND from the analysis. The analysis of liquidity creation conducted by Berger
and Bouwman (2009) includes the equity over asset ratio as a regressor. In their case
this is the main variable of interest. However, this variable may, as they explain at
length, be endogenous to liquidity creation. Hence I have omitted it from the main
analysis. However, it is important to ensure that this choice is not driving results.
Hence Section C.2.3 reruns the regressions while including EA among the regressors.
The main analysis includes the years 1996-2010. There may be concerns that the
inclusion of the financial crisis period is somehow influencing the findings for normal
times. Hence I rerun the analysis with a reduced sample that stops in 2006. These
findings are reported in Section C.2.4. Further, it may be the case that the definition
of the crisis period is driving results. Hence I reestimate the difference-in-differences
models for a modified crisis definition 2008-2009 in Section C.2.5.1 and 2007-2008 in
Section C.2.5.2. Specifically, I either designate 2006 as the last pre-crisis year and drop
2007 from the analysis or I drop data from 2009 onwards, inclusive. These analyses show
that the initially insignificant coefficients on the interaction between MA and the crisis
dummy in the main analysis are primarily due to the late period of the crisis (2008-
2009). Here it appears that more ably managed banks in fact increase their liquidity
creation. However the opposite is true initially, 2007-2008. This conforms with one’s
intuition. Specifically, if the theory of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) is true, then it
is the general uncertainty about the evolution of the economy that drives banks to
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decrease their liquidity creation and one would naturally expect more able managers to
do so more effectively. Once the crisis is well under way and being actively addressed
by regulators as was the case in 2008-2009, much of that initial uncertainty disappears
and hence the effect should reverse. This is in fact what the results indicate with some
significantly positive coefficients on the interaction between MA and the crisis dummy
for the period 2008-2009. In addition, one might raise the concern that managerial
ability as observed in 2006 is not predetermined with respect to the financial crisis. To
address this concern, Section C.2.6 reruns the difference-in-differences analysis using the
interaction between the crisis dummy and managerial ability as of the year 2005. The
final robustness check relates to the original analysis of Berger and Bouwman (2009).
They combat endogeneity by using lagged 3-year moving averages of their regressors.
I have opted to run the main analysis merely using the 3-year moving averages. To
ensure that the choice to not lag regressors is not driving results, Section C.2.7 reruns
the analysis with lagged 3-year moving averages of the regressors.
Overall, the original findings strengthen in some cases and weaken in others; but
they are in general qualitatively robust. Most importantly, the relatively weak find-
ings regarding the impact of managerial ability during the financial crisis strengthen
remarkably throughout the majority of the robustness checks.
C.2.1. Placebo Crisis
This section reports results that are obtained for a placebo crisis in the years 2003-2004.
Specifically, it designates 2002 as the last pre-crisis year and measures the impact of
2002 managerial ability on “crisis” liquidity creation and risk in Tables C.30 and C.31.
Results are qualitatively similar if one defines the crisis for 2004-2005 and uses 2003-MA
for example (unreported).
As regards the results for liquidity creation I find that a negative impact of “pre-crisis”
managerial ability on “crisis” performance is not present, except for large banks. More-
over, the “crisis” dummy is positive. As expected this is the opposite of the main analysis
because no crisis actually took place. No mergers took place in the sample, henceMRG
is dropped. As regards the risk characteristics, Panel A shows a significantly negative
coefficient on NPL (Panel A) for large banks, while the other coefficients are insignif-
icant. All subsamples return insignificant coefficients for the tier 1 ratio (Panel B).
Finally, the results for LAGTA are similar to the main findings. Overall, the evidence
shows that, while some mechanical patterns may exist in the data, their magnitude is
not sufficient to drive the findings of the main analysis.
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The subsequent sections unambiguously support the main findings and, therefore,
include only tables without a separate discussion.
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Table C.30.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During a Placebo Crisis,
Defined as 2003-2004.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2002 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA02 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the
log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total
assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score
(ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The
regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI
(Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth and market share of medium
and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s
total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multi-
bank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial
ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA
profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MA02 × δc 0.00752 -0.00643 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.00120
(0.52) (-0.12) (-3.25) (-0.09)
δc 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗
(33.96) (3.96) (6.56) (34.60)
CREDRSK 0.783∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(32.05) (17.17) (9.21) (33.79)
ZIND 0.000273 -0.0000992 0.000756 0.000273
(0.98) (-0.09) (0.60) (1.04)
SDROA -0.000411 -0.00110 -0.00116 -0.000648
(-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.28)
BKSIZE 0.00225 -0.0194 0.0219 0.00278
(0.50) (-1.14) (0.97) (0.68)
BKHHI -0.00457 -0.139∗∗∗ 0.0512 -0.00644
(-0.68) (-2.78) (0.80) (-0.95)
BKMSML 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0596 0.0305 0.0176∗∗∗
(3.96) (1.54) (0.50) (3.56)
BKPOP 0.00762∗∗∗ 0.0167 -0.00971 0.00682∗∗∗
(2.91) (1.02) (-0.48) (2.67)
BKPDNS 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0321 -0.0312 0.0175∗∗
(2.65) (1.10) (-0.85) (2.43)
BKICHG 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.0499 0.0296∗∗∗
(2.67) (3.91) (0.36) (3.14)
MBHC 0.0128∗∗ -0.0105 0.0241 0.0127∗∗
(2.14) (-0.62) (1.57) (2.21)
OBHC 0.00717 0.00148 0.00112 0.00696
(1.49) (0.12) (0.10) (1.47)
MRG 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
ACQ -0.000785 0.0108 -0.0211 0.000155
(-0.31) (1.17) (-1.40) (0.06)
Constant -0.455∗∗∗ -0.386 -0.354 -0.447∗∗∗
(-7.14) (-1.54) (-0.84) (-7.44)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.567 0.700 0.628 0.571
N 17414 700 392 18506
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C.2.2. Excluding Potentially Endogenous Regressors
Table C.32.:
Bank Liquidity Creation and Managerial Ability, Reduced Set of Regressors.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on lagged managerial ability
(MAt−1) and controls with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank.
Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported
in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include bank demographic factors.
These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by
weighting the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density,
income growth and market share of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each
MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy
variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ)
are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last
three years. MA represents managerial ability as obtained following the methodology of De-
merjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors
on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MAt−1 0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0863∗∗∗ -0.00171 0.0622∗∗∗
(8.41) (3.14) (-0.04) (7.60)
BKHHI 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0284 -0.0589 0.0238∗∗
(2.69) (0.39) (-0.29) (2.31)
BKMSML 0.0241∗∗∗ -0.00675 -0.175∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗
(4.27) (-0.21) (-2.46) (3.78)
BKPOP 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0309 0.0153∗∗∗
(6.98) (4.00) (1.60) (7.44)
BKPDNS 0.00652 -0.0200 0.0130 0.00305
(1.39) (-1.13) (0.28) (0.69)
BKICHG 0.158∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.625 0.183∗∗∗
(6.84) (3.95) (1.20) (7.95)
MBHC 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0116 0.00233 0.0285∗∗∗
(6.29) (0.55) (0.07) (6.54)
OBHC 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0177 0.0149 0.0251∗∗∗
(6.94) (0.87) (0.46) (7.15)
MRG 0.0402 0.0487∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗
(1.11) (2.90) (2.61) (2.22)
ACQ -0.00234 0.00153 -0.00265 -0.00247
(-1.24) (0.18) (-0.14) (-1.33)
Constant 0.0578∗ -0.0800 -0.0212 0.0694∗∗
(1.95) (-0.58) (-0.10) (2.46)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.301 0.289 0.140 0.297
N 79152 3341 1863 84356
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1
-0.00177
-0.0161 ∗∗∗
-0.00932
-0.00202 ∗
-0.0257 ∗∗∗
0.0111
0.00684
-0.0190 ∗∗∗
-0.123 ∗∗∗
-0.0684 ∗∗
0.00987
-0.106 ∗∗∗
(-1.51)
(-3.78)
(-1.35)
(-1.81)
(-8.34)
(1.02)
(0.93)
(-6.52)
(-14.75)
(-2.55)
(0.26)
(-13.11)
B
K
H
H
I
-0.00250 ∗∗
0.00412
0.0221 ∗
-0.00216 ∗
-0.00435
-0.00123
0.0356
-0.00273
-0.000108
-0.0473
0.0219
0.00222
(-2.15)
(0.55)
(1.90)
(-1.88)
(-1.58)
(-0.06)
(1.45)
(-0.98)
(-0.02)
(-1.16)
(0.29)
(0.37)
B
K
M
S
M
L
-0.00687 ∗∗∗
-0.00192
-0.0107
-0.00601 ∗∗∗
-0.000268
0.00946
0.0173
0.000374
-0.00698 ∗∗
-0.00547
0.100 ∗∗
-0.00451
(-10.05)
(-0.37)
(-1.51)
(-9.03)
(-0.17)
(1.02)
(1.64)
(0.24)
(-1.97)
(-0.21)
(2.27)
(-1.31)
B
K
P
O
P
0.00136 ∗∗∗
0.000833
0.000202
0.00135 ∗∗∗
-0.00412 ∗∗∗
-0.00457
-0.000700
-0.00398 ∗∗∗
-0.0140 ∗∗∗
-0.0123 ∗
-0.00781
-0.0134 ∗∗∗
(5.39)
(0.56)
(0.14)
(5.54)
(-5.70)
(-1.41)
(-0.27)
(-5.88)
(-7.91)
(-1.67)
(-0.63)
(-7.98)
B
K
P
D
N
S
0.00307 ∗∗∗
0.00370
-0.00517
0.00299 ∗∗∗
-0.00294
0.0163 ∗∗
0.00176
-0.00111
-0.00547
0.00284
0.0111
-0.00290
(5.71)
(1.04)
(-1.38)
(5.72)
(-1.55)
(2.31)
(0.26)
(-0.63)
(-1.37)
(0.24)
(0.30)
(-0.78)
B
K
I
C
H
G
-0.0232 ∗∗∗
-0.0590 ∗∗∗
-0.0180
-0.0250 ∗∗∗
-0.00630 ∗∗
-0.0339
-0.0545
-0.00864 ∗∗∗
0.0547 ∗∗∗
0.000888
-0.119
0.0513 ∗∗∗
(-16.45)
(-4.75)
(-0.68)
(-17.79)
(-2.04)
(-1.45)
(-1.46)
(-2.82)
(7.47)
(0.01)
(-0.82)
(7.06)
M
B
H
C
0.00111 ∗
-0.000198
-0.00108
0.000840
-0.0213 ∗∗∗
-0.00569
-0.0334 ∗
-0.0211 ∗∗∗
-0.0199 ∗∗∗
-0.00335
-0.0182
-0.0212 ∗∗∗
(1.95)
(-0.06)
(-0.36)
(1.54)
(-9.83)
(-0.81)
(-1.84)
(-10.34)
(-4.48)
(-0.13)
(-0.61)
(-4.98)
O
B
H
C
0.000911 ∗
0.000683
-0.000992
0.000827 ∗
-0.0165 ∗∗∗
-0.00678
-0.0340 ∗
-0.0169 ∗∗∗
-0.0242 ∗∗∗
-0.00885
-0.0231
-0.0252 ∗∗∗
(1.88)
(0.22)
(-0.40)
(1.77)
(-9.21)
(-0.99)
(-1.83)
(-9.73)
(-6.93)
(-0.35)
(-0.84)
(-7.27)
M
R
G
0.00103
-0.0141 ∗∗∗
0.00127
0.00309 ∗∗∗
0.0184 ∗∗
-0.00129
-0.00573 ∗∗
0.0152
0.00932
-0.00412
-0.0316 ∗∗∗
-0.00824
(0.50)
(-3.04)
(0.94)
(3.75)
(2.24)
(-0.16)
(-2.43)
(1.27)
(0.17)
(-0.22)
(-2.79)
(-0.25)
A
C
Q
-0.000575 ∗∗
0.000369
0.000948
-0.000533 ∗∗
0.00140 ∗
-0.00155
-0.00188
0.00118
0.00309 ∗
-0.0137 ∗
0.000741
0.00298 ∗
(-2.28)
(0.36)
(0.50)
(-2.21)
(1.74)
(-0.65)
(-0.60)
(1.56)
(1.73)
(-1.83)
(0.06)
(1.71)
C
on
stan
t
0.00248
0.00956
0.0256
0.00293
0.226 ∗∗∗
0.140 ∗∗∗
0.131 ∗∗∗
0.217 ∗∗∗
0.567 ∗∗∗
0.534 ∗∗∗
0.366 ∗∗∗
0.554 ∗∗∗
(0.74)
(0.42)
(1.26)
(0.88)
(21.50)
(3.20)
(3.86)
(22.31)
(23.12)
(4.55)
(2.80)
(23.77)
B
an
k
F
E
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
T
im
e
F
E
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
A
d
j.
R
2
0.266
0.405
0.408
0.274
0.0706
0.0866
0.122
0.0674
0.116
0.141
0.0770
0.112
N
79152
3341
1863
84356
79152
3341
1863
84356
79152
3341
1863
84356
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Table C.34.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis,
Reduced Set of Regressors.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2006 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA06 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include bank
demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML
and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), popula-
tion, population density, income growth and market share of medium and large banks by the
share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. MBHC
(OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank (onebank) holding
company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was involved in mergers
(acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial ability as obtained fol-
lowing the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA profit efficiency and
standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MA06 × δc -0.0290∗∗ -0.0675 -0.0817 -0.0323∗∗∗
(-2.40) (-1.45) (-1.30) (-2.76)
δc 0.00103 -0.00372 0.00454 0.000154
(1.19) (-1.07) (0.81) (0.18)
BKHHI -0.0147 -0.102 -0.518∗∗∗ -0.0314∗∗
(-0.98) (-1.58) (-4.27) (-2.10)
BKMSML 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.0833∗ 0.0483 0.0500∗∗∗
(6.65) (1.91) (0.41) (6.44)
BKPOP 0.00116 0.00561 -0.0627∗∗ -0.00000145
(0.32) (0.46) (-2.06) (-0.00)
BKPDNS -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0378 0.0548 -0.0306∗∗∗
(-3.71) (-1.48) (0.97) (-4.21)
BKICHG 0.223∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(9.31) (6.38) (2.02) (11.47)
MBHC 0.00680 0.0307 0.0855∗ 0.0113
(0.84) (1.08) (1.88) (1.46)
OBHC 0.00964 0.0378 0.0686∗ 0.0120∗
(1.49) (1.40) (1.76) (1.88)
MRG 0 0.0559∗∗∗ 0 0.0472∗∗∗
(.) (3.38) (.) (9.39)
ACQ 0.00355 -0.0224 -0.0437 0.00137
(0.91) (-0.86) (-0.95) (0.34)
Constant 0.335∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗ 1.131∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
(7.73) (2.21) (3.51) (8.81)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.0290 0.167 0.145 0.0346
N 19890 1059 530 21479
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0
6 ×
δ
c
-0.0173 ∗∗∗
-0.00802
0.00683
-0.0147 ∗∗∗
0.000692
0.0253 ∗∗∗
0.000390
0.00309
0.0743 ∗∗∗
0.0510 ∗
0.00770
0.0663 ∗∗∗
(-5.35)
(-0.72)
(0.72)
(-4.92)
(0.16)
(2.70)
(0.04)
(0.81)
(6.26)
(1.74)
(0.22)
(6.15)
δ
c
0.00670 ∗∗∗
0.00919 ∗∗∗
0.00724 ∗∗∗
0.00714 ∗∗∗
-0.00489 ∗∗∗
-0.00366 ∗∗∗
-0.00664 ∗∗∗
-0.00469 ∗∗∗
-0.00649 ∗∗∗
-0.0137 ∗∗∗
-0.0217 ∗∗∗
-0.00654 ∗∗∗
(32.79)
(8.66)
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(-3.74)
(-3.64)
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(-4.92)
(-4.17)
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0.00674 ∗∗∗
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0.00790 ∗∗∗
-0.00538 ∗∗
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-0.00446 ∗
0.0132 ∗∗
0.0222
0.0829
0.0161 ∗∗∗
(3.39)
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(0.32)
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(0.94)
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-0.0195 ∗∗∗
-0.0408 ∗∗∗
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-0.0191 ∗∗∗
0.00611 ∗∗∗
0.00173
-0.00418
0.00607 ∗∗∗
-0.0194 ∗∗∗
-0.0165
-0.0556
-0.0193 ∗∗∗
(-17.76)
(-4.67)
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(4.75)
(0.26)
(-0.27)
(4.86)
(-5.66)
(-0.81)
(-1.08)
(-5.77)
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P
0.00303 ∗∗∗
0.00225
0.0000461
0.00316 ∗∗∗
-0.00350 ∗∗∗
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0.00471
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-0.00830
0.0421 ∗∗
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(6.33)
(0.57)
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(-3.30)
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(-3.15)
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(2.12)
(-0.91)
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0.00396 ∗∗∗
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(0.93)
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-0.0905 ∗∗∗
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-0.0135 ∗
(2.96)
(-1.67)
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-0.00456
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0.00472 ∗∗∗
-0.0112 ∗∗∗
-0.00251
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-0.0130 ∗∗∗
-0.0206 ∗∗∗
-0.0404 ∗∗
-0.0557 ∗
-0.0221 ∗∗∗
(3.46)
(-0.91)
(-1.06)
(2.94)
(-3.37)
(-0.41)
(-3.09)
(-3.93)
(-2.92)
(-2.12)
(-1.81)
(-3.25)
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G
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0
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0
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0
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(.)
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(.)
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(.)
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(.)
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0.00685
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(-3.41)
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0.207 ∗∗∗
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0.202 ∗∗∗
0.375 ∗∗∗
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C.2.3. Including the Equity over Asset Ratio as a Regressor
Table C.36.: Bank Liquidity Creation and Managerial Ability, Regressors Include EA.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on lagged managerial ability
(MAt−1) and controls with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank.
Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are re-
ported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the equity over asset
ratio (EA) and log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled
by gross total assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA)
and the Z-Score (ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against
CREDRSK. The regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI,
BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the de-
mographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth
and market share of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA
county represents of a bank’s total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to
1 if the bank belongs to a multibank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy
variables set to 1 if the bank was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years.
MA represents managerial ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev
and McVay (2012), using DEA profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly
subsamples. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MAt−1 0.0137∗∗ 0.0518∗∗ -0.0220 0.0138∗∗
(2.03) (2.34) (-0.63) (2.05)
EA -0.550∗∗∗ -0.203 -0.0249 -0.511∗∗∗
(-14.69) (-1.23) (-0.09) (-14.17)
CREDRSK 0.620∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(56.12) (14.33) (11.00) (58.37)
ZIND -0.000821∗∗ -0.00207 0.00147 -0.000687∗∗
(-2.42) (-1.54) (0.59) (-2.11)
SDROA -0.00803∗∗∗ -0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0324∗∗ -0.00967∗∗∗
(-3.57) (-4.21) (-2.06) (-4.52)
BKSIZE -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0157 0.00300 -0.0151∗∗∗
(-6.38) (-1.43) (0.22) (-6.57)
BKHHI 0.0156∗∗ -0.0253 0.0165 0.0128
(1.98) (-0.45) (0.10) (1.59)
BKMSML 0.0207∗∗∗ -0.00385 -0.0934 0.0195∗∗∗
(4.68) (-0.14) (-1.62) (4.54)
BKPOP 0.00775∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0255 0.00834∗∗∗
(4.71) (2.71) (1.43) (5.26)
BKPDNS 0.00113 -0.0166 -0.0108 -0.000680
(0.32) (-1.20) (-0.28) (-0.20)
BKICHG 0.187∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(10.05) (4.49) (2.06) (11.17)
MBHC 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0129 0.0285 0.0175∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table C.36 – Continued from previous page
Small Medium Large Full
(4.84) (0.78) (0.66) (5.06)
OBHC 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0192 0.0364 0.0135∗∗∗
(4.51) (1.22) (0.86) (4.82)
MRG 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0796∗∗∗ 0.0292∗ 0.0618∗∗∗
(6.61) (4.82) (1.88) (7.28)
ACQ 0.000674 0.00422 -0.00768 0.000484
(0.44) (0.57) (-0.61) (0.32)
Constant -0.000205 -0.144 -0.392 -0.0208
(-0.01) (-0.73) (-1.40) (-0.66)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.480 0.461 0.375 0.477
N 79152 3341 1863 84356
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Table C.38.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis,
Regressors Include EA.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2006 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA06 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the
equity over asset ratio (EA) and the log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk
weighted assets scaled by gross total assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on
assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score (ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonal-
ized against CREDRSK. The regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are
BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weight-
ing the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), population, population density, income
growth and market share of medium and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-
MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set
to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy
variables set to 1 if the bank was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years.
MA represents managerial ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev
and McVay (2012), using DEA profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly
subsamples. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MA06 × δc 0.00684 -0.0558 -0.0715∗ -0.00700
(0.59) (-1.36) (-1.66) (-0.63)
δc -0.00464∗∗∗ -0.00714∗ -0.0108 -0.00590∗∗∗
(-5.23) (-1.77) (-1.54) (-6.90)
EA -0.299∗∗∗ -0.314 0.0961 -0.278∗∗∗
(-3.20) (-0.89) (0.14) (-3.13)
CREDRSK 0.774∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗
(29.87) (7.01) (4.28) (31.10)
ZIND 0.00169∗∗∗ 0.00212 0.00549 0.00161∗∗∗
(2.80) (0.77) (1.06) (2.76)
SDROA -0.0254∗∗∗ -0.0362∗∗∗ -0.0317∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗
(-6.65) (-4.13) (-1.98) (-7.63)
BKSIZE -0.0682∗∗∗ -0.0252 -0.0198 -0.0567∗∗∗
(-9.36) (-1.03) (-1.15) (-9.04)
BKHHI -0.00211 -0.134∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.0179
(-0.17) (-2.42) (-3.78) (-1.46)
BKMSML 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0697 0.0370∗∗∗
(5.26) (2.65) (0.60) (5.71)
BKPOP 0.00352 0.00635 -0.0235 0.00263
(1.19) (0.57) (-0.66) (0.93)
BKPDNS -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0429∗ -0.00377 -0.0245∗∗∗
(-3.30) (-1.71) (-0.06) (-3.97)
BKICHG 0.208∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.400 0.245∗∗∗
(9.87) (4.32) (1.46) (11.83)
Continued on next page
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Table C.38 – Continued from previous page
Parameter Small Medium Large Full
MBHC 0.000298 0.0215 0.0599 0.00130
(0.04) (0.92) (1.45) (0.19)
OBHC 0.00200 0.0320 0.0403 0.00269
(0.34) (1.43) (1.22) (0.47)
MRG 0 0.0817∗∗∗ 0 0.0919∗∗∗
(.) (4.58) (.) (15.66)
ACQ 0.00649∗ -0.0227 -0.0318 0.00511
(1.92) (-1.08) (-0.90) (1.51)
Constant 0.592∗∗∗ 0.211 0.488 0.491∗∗∗
(6.49) (0.67) (1.07) (6.13)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.226 0.311 0.316 0.232
N 19793 1059 529 21381
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C.2.4. Reduced Sample Period
Table C.40.: Bank Liquidity Creation and Managerial Ability, Sample Ends 2006.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on lagged managerial ability
(MAt−1) and controls with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank.
Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are reported
in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the log of gross total assets
(BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total assets (CREDRSK), the
standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score (ZIND) capture risk. The
last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The regressions also include bank
demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG and BKMSML
and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl index), popula-
tion, population density, income growth and market share of medium and large banks by the
share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total deposits. MBHC
(OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank (onebank) holding
company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was involved in mergers
(acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial ability as obtained fol-
lowing the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA profit efficiency and
standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MAt−1 0.0124∗ 0.0477 0.0543 0.0114∗
(1.83) (1.42) (1.34) (1.68)
CREDRSK 0.644∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(52.82) (21.01) (17.54) (55.56)
ZIND -0.000406∗∗ -0.000328 0.00140 -0.000342∗∗
(-2.28) (-0.48) (1.17) (-1.96)
SDROA 0.000514 -0.0229∗∗ -0.0113 -0.000582
(0.29) (-2.35) (-0.75) (-0.34)
BKSIZE 0.00764∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗ 0.00786 0.00408∗
(3.02) (-2.04) (0.52) (1.77)
BKHHI 0.00804 -0.00192 0.0752 0.00799
(1.41) (-0.05) (0.96) (1.35)
BKMSML 0.00271 0.0109 -0.0464 0.00204
(0.76) (0.43) (-1.00) (0.58)
BKPOP 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(6.69) (2.30) (3.02) (7.56)
BKPDNS 0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0177 -0.0374 0.00722∗∗
(2.78) (-1.60) (-1.13) (2.06)
BKICHG 0.00377 0.0679 -0.0282 0.00511
(0.56) (1.06) (-0.24) (0.77)
MBHC 0.0183∗∗∗ -0.00228 0.0306 0.0172∗∗∗
(5.09) (-0.17) (1.31) (5.01)
OBHC 0.0114∗∗∗ -0.000717 0.0427∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(3.98) (-0.06) (1.85) (4.18)
Continued on next page
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Table C.40 – Continued from previous page
Small Medium Large Full
MRG 0.0644∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗
(3.01) (-2.13) (2.88)
ACQ -0.0000832 0.00695 -0.00821 0.0000337
(-0.06) (1.15) (-0.74) (0.02)
Constant -0.400∗∗∗ 0.00996 -0.753∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗
(-11.92) (0.05) (-2.78) (-11.63)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.587 0.658 0.533 0.588
N 59463 2281 1418 63162
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C.2.5. Alternative Crisis Period
C.2.5.1. Crisis 2008-2009
Table C.42.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis,
Crisis Defined as 2008-2009.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2006 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA06 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the
log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total
assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score
(ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The
regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI
(Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth and market share of medium
and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s
total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multi-
bank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial
ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA
profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MA06 × δc 0.0244∗∗ -0.00338 -0.00777 0.0193∗
(1.98) (-0.07) (-0.14) (1.65)
δc -0.0000278 -0.00655 -0.0158∗ -0.000814
(-0.03) (-1.21) (-1.71) (-0.85)
CREDRSK 0.750∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗
(36.21) (9.55) (8.80) (38.68)
ZIND 0.000557 -0.000539 0.00312 0.000369
(1.36) (-0.32) (0.89) (0.94)
SDROA -0.00829∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.00916 -0.00840∗∗∗
(-4.95) (-3.32) (-1.40) (-5.41)
BKSIZE -0.0126∗ -0.0680∗∗∗ -0.0106 -0.0114∗∗
(-1.94) (-2.78) (-0.57) (-2.01)
BKHHI -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0444 -0.0847 -0.0170∗∗∗
(-2.65) (-1.46) (-1.28) (-3.19)
BKMSML 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0150 0.00671 0.00939∗∗∗
(2.99) (0.61) (0.11) (2.87)
BKPOP 0.00433∗∗ 0.0142∗∗ -0.0261 0.00442∗∗∗
(2.47) (2.00) (-1.06) (2.61)
BKPDNS -0.0130∗∗∗ 0.00951 0.00751 -0.0134∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table C.42 – Continued from previous page
Small Medium Large Full
(-3.41) (0.67) (0.22) (-3.65)
BKICHG 0.00965∗ -0.00199 -0.155 0.00897
(1.67) (-0.05) (-1.52) (1.58)
MBHC 0.00166 0.0412 0.0329 0.00295
(0.23) (1.65) (1.08) (0.43)
OBHC -0.00198 0.0494∗∗ 0.0154 -0.000135
(-0.34) (2.06) (0.63) (-0.02)
MRG 0 0.0487∗∗ 0 0.0438∗∗∗
(.) (1.99) (.) (7.16)
ACQ 0.00494 -0.0210 -0.0139 0.00318
(1.45) (-0.94) (-0.47) (0.94)
Constant -0.0840 0.617∗ 0.322 -0.0913
(-1.05) (1.72) (0.70) (-1.27)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.467 0.508 0.586 0.473
N 14785 795 379 15959
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C.2.5.2. Crisis 2007-2008
Table C.44.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis,
Crisis Defined as 2007-2008.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2006 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA06 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the
log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total
assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score
(ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The
regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI
(Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth and market share of medium
and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s
total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multi-
bank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial
ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA
profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MA06 × δc -0.00257 -0.0620∗∗ -0.0298 -0.00714
(-0.28) (-2.01) (-0.88) (-0.84)
δc -0.00415∗∗∗ 0.00397 -0.00162 -0.00406∗∗∗
(-5.95) (1.39) (-0.36) (-6.13)
CREDRSK 0.771∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗
(29.54) (11.50) (7.64) (31.34)
ZIND 0.000324 -0.00185∗ 0.00109 0.000132
(1.22) (-1.78) (0.58) (0.51)
SDROA -0.00685∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0140∗ -0.00844∗∗∗
(-3.61) (-2.76) (-1.94) (-4.84)
BKSIZE -0.0224∗∗∗ -0.0569∗∗ -0.0184 -0.0244∗∗∗
(-3.19) (-2.47) (-0.83) (-4.11)
BKHHI -0.0115∗ -0.0941∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗
(-1.90) (-4.24) (-2.77) (-2.72)
BKMSML 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.0169∗∗∗
(4.87) (4.64) (1.83) (5.28)
BKPOP 0.00161 0.00118 -0.0268 0.00164
(0.96) (0.20) (-1.32) (1.01)
BKPDNS -0.0102∗∗∗ 0.00695 0.00843 -0.0108∗∗∗
(-3.06) (0.52) (0.30) (-3.33)
BKICHG 0.0907∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.0356 0.0933∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table C.44 – Continued from previous page
Small Medium Large Full
(9.81) (2.05) (0.32) (10.30)
MBHC 0.00667 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0500∗∗ 0.00786
(1.00) (2.61) (2.32) (1.25)
OBHC 0.000894 0.0337∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.00320
(0.16) (2.27) (2.77) (0.58)
MRG 0 0.0612∗∗∗ 0 0.0551∗∗∗
(.) (3.53) (.) (8.76)
ACQ 0.00294 -0.0201 -0.00961 0.00146
(0.95) (-1.43) (-0.41) (0.48)
Constant 0.0322 0.420 0.348 0.0604
(0.38) (1.33) (0.74) (0.81)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.453 0.535 0.579 0.460
N 15310 798 436 16544
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C.2.6. Impact of Pre-2006 Managerial Ability
Table C.46.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis,
Managerial Ability Measured in 2005.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2005 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA05 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the
log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total
assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score
(ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The
regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI
(Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth and market share of medium
and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s
total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multi-
bank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial
ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA
profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MA05 × δc -0.0208∗ 0.0317 -0.139 -0.0223∗∗
(-1.91) (0.68) (-1.56) (-2.07)
δc -0.0156∗∗∗ -0.00770 -0.0184∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗
(-14.07) (-1.05) (-2.13) (-14.94)
CREDRSK 0.741∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(33.01) (7.05) (6.42) (34.64)
ZIND 0.000173 0.00109 0.00805 0.000313
(0.31) (0.48) (1.62) (0.58)
SDROA -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0347∗∗∗ -0.0388∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗
(-5.44) (-3.61) (-2.72) (-6.64)
BKSIZE -0.0473∗∗∗ -0.0622∗∗ 0.00184 -0.0422∗∗∗
(-8.89) (-2.20) (0.11) (-8.97)
BKHHI -0.00274 -0.114 -0.494∗∗∗ -0.0165
(-0.22) (-1.63) (-3.96) (-1.30)
BKMSML 0.0390∗∗∗ 0.0377 0.0945 0.0395∗∗∗
(5.73) (0.95) (1.04) (6.00)
BKPOP 0.00228 0.0153 -0.0361 0.00210
(0.74) (1.39) (-1.22) (0.71)
BKPDNS -0.0147∗∗ -0.0106 0.0803 -0.0151∗∗
(-2.38) (-0.48) (1.07) (-2.53)
Continued on next page
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Table C.46 – Continued from previous page
Small Medium Large Full
BKICHG 0.225∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.230 0.260∗∗∗
(9.83) (5.02) (0.84) (11.60)
MBHC 0.0138∗ 0.0426∗∗ -0.00184 0.0130∗
(1.76) (2.14) (-0.04) (1.74)
OBHC 0.0126∗ 0.0587∗∗∗ -0.00326 0.0133∗∗
(1.90) (3.80) (-0.09) (2.07)
MRG 0 0.0830∗∗∗ 0 0.0710∗∗∗
(.) (4.39) (.) (14.55)
ACQ 0.00326 -0.0213 -0.0144 0.00191
(0.86) (-1.64) (-0.44) (0.52)
Constant 0.335∗∗∗ 0.570 0.0387 0.291∗∗∗
(4.80) (1.63) (0.10) (4.53)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.228 0.277 0.365 0.232
N 19819 1049 516 21384
360
T
ab
le
C
.4
7.
:I
m
pa
ct
of
M
an
ag
er
ia
lA
bi
lit
y
on
B
an
k
R
is
k-
T
ak
in
g
D
ur
in
g
th
e
F
in
an
ci
al
C
ri
si
s,
M
an
ag
er
ia
lA
bi
lit
y
M
ea
su
re
d
in
20
05
.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
om
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
th
re
e
m
ea
su
re
s
of
ba
nk
ri
sk
,n
on
pe
rf
or
m
in
g
lo
an
s
ov
er
to
ta
ll
oa
ns
(N
P
L
),
ti
er
1
ra
ti
o
(T
1R
)
an
d
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(L
A
G
T
A
)
on
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
as
of
D
ec
em
be
r
20
05
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
it
h
a
du
m
m
y
fo
r
w
he
th
er
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
in
th
e
fin
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
(M
A
0
5
×
δ c
),
a
cr
is
is
du
m
m
y
(δ
c
)a
nd
co
nt
ro
ls
w
it
h
ba
nk
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ba
nk
.
St
ar
s
re
po
rt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
0.
1
(*
),
0.
05
(*
*)
an
d
0.
01
(*
**
)
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
C
on
tr
ol
s
ar
e
th
re
e
ye
ar
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
es
an
d
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
lo
g
of
gr
os
s
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(B
K
S
I
Z
E
).
T
he
su
m
of
ri
sk
w
ei
gh
te
d
as
se
ts
sc
al
ed
by
gr
os
s
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
R
E
D
R
S
K
),
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
(S
D
R
O
A
)
an
d
th
e
Z-
Sc
or
e
(Z
I
N
D
)
ca
pt
ur
e
ri
sk
.
T
he
la
st
tw
o
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
or
th
og
on
al
iz
ed
ag
ai
ns
t
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
al
so
in
cl
ud
e
ba
nk
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
fa
ct
or
s.
T
he
se
ar
e
B
K
H
H
I
,
B
K
P
O
P
,
B
K
P
D
N
S
,
B
K
I
C
H
G
an
d
B
K
M
S
M
L
an
d
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
th
e
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
H
I
(H
er
fin
da
hl
in
de
x)
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
de
ns
it
y,
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
e
of
m
ed
iu
m
an
d
la
rg
e
ba
nk
s
by
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
de
po
si
ts
ea
ch
M
SA
or
no
n-
M
SA
co
un
ty
re
pr
es
en
ts
of
a
ba
nk
’s
to
ta
l
de
po
si
ts
.
M
B
H
C
(O
B
H
C
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
m
ul
ti
ba
nk
(o
ne
ba
nk
)
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ny
.
M
R
G
(A
C
Q
)
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
ba
nk
w
as
in
vo
lv
ed
in
m
er
ge
rs
(a
cq
ui
si
ti
on
s)
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
ye
ar
s.
M
A
re
pr
es
en
ts
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
ili
ty
as
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
llo
w
in
g
th
e
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
of
D
em
er
jia
n,
Le
v
an
d
M
cV
ay
(2
01
2)
,
us
in
g
D
E
A
pr
ofi
t
effi
ci
en
cy
an
d
st
an
da
rd
fir
st
st
ag
e
re
gr
es
so
rs
on
ye
ar
ly
su
bs
am
pl
es
.
M
on
et
ar
y
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
20
05
U
S
D
ol
la
rs
.
P
a
n
el
A
:
N
P
L
P
a
n
el
B
:
T
1
R
P
a
n
el
C
:
L
A
G
T
A
P
ar
am
et
er
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
M
A
0
5
×
δ
c
-0
.0
21
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
00
72
3
-0
.0
12
3
-0
.0
18
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
02
84
0.
00
67
2
0.
01
72
0.
00
10
3
0.
05
13
∗∗
∗
0.
05
48
∗∗
0.
02
65
0.
05
09
∗∗
∗
(-
8.
12
)
(-
0.
07
)
(-
1.
00
)
(-
7.
41
)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.8
4)
(1
.2
6)
(0
.3
2)
(5
.1
8)
(2
.3
0)
(0
.5
9)
(5
.5
3)
δ
c
0.
00
56
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
86
8∗
∗∗
0.
01
32
∗∗
∗
0.
00
60
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
13
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
00
40
9
-0
.0
02
19
0.
00
12
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
14
6
-0
.0
08
22
-0
.0
05
75
0.
00
08
80
(1
8.
77
)
(4
.7
2)
(4
.4
0)
(2
0.
49
)
(3
.1
1)
(-
0.
24
)
(-
0.
59
)
(2
.9
6)
(1
.3
0)
(-
1.
43
)
(-
0.
54
)
(0
.8
0)
C
R
E
D
R
S
K
0.
04
85
∗∗
∗
0.
04
52
∗
-0
.0
16
8
0.
04
86
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
98
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
51
0
-0
.0
59
7
-0
.1
89
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
06
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
90
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
17
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
94
∗∗
∗
(8
.9
3)
(1
.7
7)
(-
0.
46
)
(9
.2
6)
(-
20
.8
9)
(-
1.
27
)
(-
1.
44
)
(-
21
.2
0)
(-
31
.7
8)
(-
8.
60
)
(-
3.
14
)
(-
33
.1
9)
Z
I
N
D
-0
.0
00
44
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
03
44
-0
.0
01
06
-0
.0
00
49
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
00
55
7
0.
00
13
7
-0
.0
02
13
∗∗
0.
00
00
40
3
0.
00
02
35
0.
00
05
95
-0
.0
00
90
3
0.
00
02
69
(-
2.
68
)
(0
.5
6)
(-
0.
90
)
(-
3.
12
)
(0
.2
2)
(1
.5
6)
(-
2.
03
)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.3
8)
(0
.3
0)
(-
0.
33
)
(0
.4
6)
S
D
R
O
A
0.
02
14
∗∗
∗
0.
02
74
∗∗
∗
0.
04
73
∗∗
∗
0.
02
32
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
13
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
14
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
00
77
4
-0
.0
12
4∗
∗∗
0.
01
99
∗∗
∗
0.
00
48
0
-0
.0
07
45
0.
01
82
∗∗
∗
(1
2.
72
)
(3
.9
2)
(6
.9
7)
(1
4.
44
)
(-
7.
03
)
(-
3.
04
)
(-
0.
08
)
(-
7.
06
)
(4
.6
3)
(0
.3
6)
(-
0.
37
)
(4
.5
1)
B
K
S
I
Z
E
0.
02
06
∗∗
∗
0.
02
36
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
11
5∗
∗
0.
01
94
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
17
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
35
9
-0
.0
10
8∗
-0
.0
14
6∗
∗∗
0.
01
56
∗∗
∗
0.
01
35
0.
02
18
0.
01
35
∗∗
∗
(1
1.
87
)
(2
.8
6)
(-
2.
28
)
(1
2.
97
)
(-
7.
22
)
(0
.6
9)
(-
1.
68
)
(-
7.
39
)
(2
.7
0)
(1
.0
8)
(1
.0
7)
(2
.7
8)
B
K
H
H
I
0.
02
03
∗∗
∗
0.
01
27
0.
13
3∗
∗∗
0.
02
33
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
58
0
-0
.0
15
1
0.
06
34
0.
00
23
3
0.
02
29
0.
00
71
4
-0
.0
88
6
0.
02
21
(4
.0
2)
(0
.2
7)
(4
.0
9)
(4
.5
8)
(-
0.
09
)
(-
0.
62
)
(1
.1
4)
(0
.3
6)
(1
.3
6)
(0
.0
9)
(-
0.
64
)
(1
.3
6)
B
K
M
S
M
L
-0
.0
25
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
47
9∗
∗∗
-0
.0
88
4∗
∗
-0
.0
25
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
52
0
0.
00
32
4
-0
.0
20
5
0.
00
72
3∗
∗
-0
.0
14
1
-0
.0
06
14
-0
.1
34
∗
-0
.0
18
3∗
∗
(-
9.
16
)
(-
3.
82
)
(-
2.
28
)
(-
9.
43
)
(1
.4
4)
(0
.2
7)
(-
0.
87
)
(2
.1
3)
(-
1.
58
)
(-
0.
14
)
(-
1.
75
)
(-
2.
16
)
B
K
P
O
P
0.
00
35
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
62
8
0.
00
75
1
0.
00
36
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
02
38
0.
00
01
60
0.
01
56
∗∗
-0
.0
02
28
-0
.0
00
45
4
0.
01
46
0.
07
30
∗∗
∗
0.
00
04
21
(3
.6
0)
(1
.2
4)
(1
.1
2)
(3
.8
3)
(-
1.
58
)
(0
.0
4)
(2
.0
5)
(-
1.
61
)
(-
0.
14
)
(1
.1
3)
(3
.2
4)
(0
.1
4)
B
K
P
D
N
S
0.
00
71
6∗
∗∗
0.
02
09
∗∗
0.
02
11
0.
00
85
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
10
2
-0
.0
02
63
-0
.0
05
35
0.
00
17
5
-0
.0
00
38
0
-0
.0
23
0
-0
.1
35
∗∗
-0
.0
00
29
3
(3
.2
9)
(2
.1
6)
(1
.1
0)
(4
.0
8)
(0
.3
6)
(-
0.
42
)
(-
0.
34
)
(0
.6
9)
(-
0.
04
)
(-
1.
09
)
(-
2.
43
)
(-
0.
04
)
B
K
I
C
H
G
-0
.0
39
4∗
∗∗
-0
.1
73
∗∗
0.
07
70
-0
.0
42
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
51
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
18
5
-0
.2
55
-0
.0
55
9∗
∗∗
0.
07
77
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
25
-0
.5
07
0.
07
11
∗∗
(-
4.
62
)
(-
2.
19
)
(0
.6
1)
(-
4.
98
)
(-
4.
32
)
(-
0.
37
)
(-
1.
59
)
(-
4.
72
)
(2
.6
7)
(-
1.
11
)
(-
1.
18
)
(2
.4
8)
M
B
H
C
0.
00
31
7
-0
.0
07
55
0.
01
59
∗∗
0.
00
26
7
-0
.0
12
1∗
∗∗
-0
.0
08
80
-0
.1
35
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
13
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
19
4∗
∗
-0
.0
01
93
-0
.0
85
2∗
∗
-0
.0
18
1∗
∗
(1
.5
1)
(-
1.
50
)
(2
.0
0)
(1
.3
3)
(-
3.
37
)
(-
1.
63
)
(-
21
.0
9)
(-
3.
84
)
(-
2.
27
)
(-
0.
14
)
(-
2.
53
)
(-
2.
25
)
O
B
H
C
0.
00
21
2
-0
.0
05
39
0.
02
01
∗∗
∗
0.
00
19
8
-0
.0
06
50
∗∗
-0
.0
08
21
∗
-0
.1
33
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
08
41
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
26
0∗
∗∗
-0
.0
23
5∗
∗∗
-0
.0
93
3∗
∗∗
-0
.0
25
5∗
∗∗
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
361
T
ab
le
C
.4
7
–
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
vi
o
u
s
pa
ge
P
a
n
el
A
:
N
P
L
P
a
n
el
B
:
T
1
R
P
a
n
el
C
:
L
A
G
T
A
P
ar
am
et
er
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
S
m
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
L
ar
ge
F
u
ll
(1
.1
3)
(-
1.
34
)
(4
.3
8)
(1
.0
9)
(-
2.
05
)
(-
1.
73
)
(-
34
.5
0)
(-
2.
67
)
(-
3.
47
)
(-
2.
69
)
(-
3.
00
)
(-
3.
56
)
M
R
G
0
-0
.0
20
5∗
∗∗
0
-0
.0
04
86
∗∗
∗
0
0.
00
94
9∗
∗
0
0.
02
55
∗∗
∗
0
-0
.0
68
6∗
∗∗
0
-0
.0
55
3∗
∗∗
(.
)
(-
3.
32
)
(.
)
(-
3.
39
)
(.
)
(2
.3
6)
(.
)
(1
2.
72
)
(.
)
(-
4.
17
)
(.
)
(-
11
.4
4)
A
C
Q
-0
.0
00
76
5
0.
00
11
5
0.
00
50
8
-0
.0
00
60
3
-0
.0
01
17
-0
.0
02
12
0.
00
34
8
-0
.0
00
91
3
0.
00
14
3
0.
00
91
0
-0
.0
01
77
0.
00
19
8
(-
0.
84
)
(0
.2
5)
(1
.3
9)
(-
0.
69
)
(-
0.
77
)
(-
1.
18
)
(1
.2
6)
(-
0.
64
)
(0
.3
9)
(0
.8
6)
(-
0.
06
)
(0
.5
6)
C
on
st
an
t
-0
.3
17
∗∗
∗
-0
.4
63
∗∗
∗
0.
03
45
-0
.3
12
∗∗
∗
0.
52
5∗
∗∗
0.
11
3
0.
25
7∗
0.
48
1∗
∗∗
0.
72
3∗
∗∗
0.
43
2∗
-0
.0
05
14
0.
72
9∗
∗∗
(-
14
.0
7)
(-
4.
54
)
(0
.3
1)
(-
15
.2
6)
(1
6.
48
)
(1
.5
5)
(1
.9
2)
(1
7.
52
)
(9
.3
9)
(1
.8
8)
(-
0.
01
)
(1
0.
77
)
B
an
k
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
A
d
j.
R
2
0.
23
3
0.
42
5
0.
54
0
0.
25
0
0.
17
3
0.
06
90
0.
31
2
0.
16
5
0.
29
1
0.
33
3
0.
27
3
0.
29
1
N
15
36
8
79
1
42
4
16
58
3
15
36
8
79
1
42
4
16
58
3
15
36
8
79
1
42
4
16
58
3
362
C.2.7. Using Lagged Regressors
Table C.48.: Bank Liquidity Creation and Managerial Ability, Lagged Regressors.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on lagged managerial ability
(MAt−1) and controls with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank.
Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels. T-statistics are re-
ported in brackets. Controls are lagged three year moving averages and include the log of
gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total assets
(CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score (ZIND)
capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The regressions
also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS, BKICHG
and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI (Herfindahl
index), population, population density, income growth and market share of medium and large
banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s total de-
posits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multibank
(onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank was in-
volved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial ability
as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA profit
efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are in 2005
US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MAt−1 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0791∗∗∗ -0.00425 0.0429∗∗∗
(6.18) (2.92) (-0.10) (5.47)
CREDRSKt−1 0.314∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(34.99) (4.40) (3.33) (35.40)
ZINDt−1 -0.000871∗∗ -0.00221 0.000452 -0.000635∗
(-2.30) (-1.43) (0.13) (-1.73)
SDROAt−1 0.000200 -0.0307∗∗ -0.0335 -0.00120
(0.07) (-2.26) (-1.37) (-0.41)
BKSIZEt−1 -0.0132∗∗∗ -0.00902 0.0150 -0.0133∗∗∗
(-4.75) (-0.94) (1.12) (-5.34)
BKHHIt−1 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0578 0.0829 0.0323∗∗∗
(3.48) (0.76) (0.38) (3.15)
BKMSMLt−1 0.0135∗∗ -0.0221 -0.144∗∗ 0.0129∗∗
(2.48) (-0.83) (-2.23) (2.45)
BKPOPt−1 0.00945∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0169 0.00982∗∗∗
(4.77) (3.88) (0.89) (5.20)
BKPDNSt−1 0.00222 -0.0151 0.0131 -0.000826
(0.51) (-0.95) (0.39) (-0.20)
BKICHGt−1 0.167∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.368 0.178∗∗∗
(8.34) (2.56) (0.86) (8.93)
MBHCt−1 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.00381 0.000262 0.0234∗∗∗
(5.83) (0.26) (0.01) (6.10)
OBHCt−1 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.00584 0.00653 0.0210∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table C.48 – Continued from previous page
Small Medium Large Full
(6.60) (0.44) (0.19) (6.86)
MRGt−1 0.0358∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗
(2.07) (2.19) (3.40) (3.75)
ACQt−1 -0.00201 -0.00276 0.00680 -0.00195
(-1.11) (-0.35) (0.45) (-1.11)
Constant 0.0793∗∗ -0.0206 -0.128 0.0927∗∗∗
(2.17) (-0.12) (-0.41) (2.75)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.350 0.306 0.162 0.344
N 77267 3312 1844 82423
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Table C.50.:
Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis,
Lagged Regressors.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009)
CATFAT measure of liquidity creation scaled by total assets on managerial ability as of De-
cember 2006 interacted with a dummy for whether the observation is in the financial crisis
(MA06 × δc), a crisis dummy (δc) and controls with bank fixed effects and standard errors
clustered by bank. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels.
T-statistics are reported in brackets. Controls are three year moving averages and include the
log of gross total assets (BKSIZE). The sum of risk weighted assets scaled by gross total
assets (CREDRSK), the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the Z-Score
(ZIND) capture risk. The last two variables are orthogonalized against CREDRSK. The
regressions also include bank demographic factors. These are BKHHI, BKPOP , BKPDNS,
BKICHG and BKMSML and are calculated by weighting the demographic variables HHI
(Herfindahl index), population, population density, income growth and market share of medium
and large banks by the share of deposits each MSA or non-MSA county represents of a bank’s
total deposits. MBHC (OBHC) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank belongs to a multi-
bank (onebank) holding company. MRG (ACQ) are dummy variables set to 1 if the bank
was involved in mergers (acquisitions) within the last three years. MA represents managerial
ability as obtained following the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), using DEA
profit efficiency and standard first stage regressors on yearly subsamples. Monetary values are
in 2005 US Dollars.
Small Medium Large Full
MA06 × δc -0.0138 -0.0460 -0.0697∗ -0.0184
(-1.06) (-0.92) (-1.67) (-1.52)
δc 0.00227∗∗ 0.00168 0.000410 0.00231∗∗
(2.26) (0.28) (0.04) (2.35)
CREDRSKt−1 0.0465∗ -0.279∗∗ -0.140 0.0238
(1.89) (-2.43) (-0.85) (1.00)
ZINDt−1 0.000275 0.00477 0.00700 0.000696
(0.40) (1.47) (1.41) (1.04)
SDROAt−1 -0.0135∗∗ -0.0363∗ -0.0595 -0.0162∗∗∗
(-2.54) (-1.77) (-1.47) (-3.19)
BKSIZEt−1 -0.0605∗∗∗ -0.0650∗∗∗ -0.0789∗∗ -0.0633∗∗∗
(-8.72) (-2.81) (-2.59) (-10.02)
BKHHIt−1 0.00379 0.00469 -0.563∗∗∗ -0.0115
(0.18) (0.04) (-2.87) (-0.55)
BKMSMLt−1 0.0523∗∗∗ 0.0621 0.0411 0.0509∗∗∗
(4.69) (1.22) (0.35) (4.73)
BKPOPt−1 0.00175 0.0104 -0.0443 0.00238
(0.41) (0.63) (-1.33) (0.58)
BKPDNSt−1 -0.0357∗∗∗ -0.0707∗∗ 0.0351 -0.0389∗∗∗
(-3.16) (-2.43) (0.50) (-3.59)
BKICHGt−1 0.0431∗ 0.576∗∗ 0.528 0.0587∗∗
(1.68) (2.14) (1.15) (2.28)
MBHCt−1 -0.0113 -0.00801 -0.0129 -0.0112
(-1.35) (-0.33) (-0.26) (-1.40)
OBHCt−1 -0.00282 0.0214 0.00473 -0.000431
(-0.40) (1.04) (0.10) (-0.06)
MRGt−1 0 0.0706∗∗∗ 0 0.0603∗∗∗
(.) (4.28) (.) (9.92)
ACQt−1 0.00703∗ -0.0273∗∗ -0.00934 0.00546
(1.74) (-2.03) (-0.21) (1.39)
Constant 1.042∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗ 2.358∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗
(11.91) (5.86) (4.63) (13.82)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.0256 0.108 0.101 0.0297
N 18652 1029 497 20178
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